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On 22 January 1945, Allied pilots in air bases across western Europe awoke to a cloudless sky revealing a brilliant sun which shone across the freshly fallen snow. Officers roused the men from their bunks and shepherded them to briefing rooms while air controllers reported two words every pilot longed to hear: ”visibility unlimited.” Within the hour, four groups of P-47s from the USAAF 19th Tactical Air Command were airborne and headed towards the Ardennes sector of the front. When they arrived at the crossings of the Our River, the American pilots could not believe their luck. The roads were bursting with German soldiers and vehicles, some retreating east back to Germany while other units were headed west. The Allied flyers had stumbled upon a perfect target.

This massive traffic jam was quickly set upon by the Thunderbolts who dropped bombs and fired rockets into the mass below. B-26 Marauder medium bombers from the 9th Bombardment Division also arrived to attack the bridges, trapping the German columns in place. The aerial assault lasted all day as American squadrons flew over 600 sorties against the Our River crossings. By the end of 22 January, the German ground forces had lost dozens of vehicles and hundreds of men. It was the last official air to ground engagement of the Battle of the Bulge.

The situation in the Ardennes was quite different 37 days earlier on 16 December 1944 when Germany launched the Bulge offensive. The Fuhrer specifically timed this blow to coincide with poor winter weather in order to neuter overwhelming Allied air superiority over the European continent. However, this gamble ultimately failed. Despite poor weather conditions, a resurgent Luftwaffe, and the difficult operating theater of the Ardennes, the combined air forces of the Allies still exercised a decisive role in the campaign.

The Allies enjoyed near undisturbed air superiority over Europe since the Normandy landings in June of 1944. British and American tactical air forces provided devastating close air support to the ground troops while their heavy bombers continued to pound Germany night and day. Outnumbered and outgunned by their adversaries, German air power suffered heavy losses as the Allied ground forces advanced to the Reich’s border. At this time, the Fuhrer and the German General Staff had finalized plans for Operation Watch on the Rhine: a massive offensive designed to drive through the Ardennes region and push on to the Belgian port of Antwerp. German leadership hoped this attack would be enough to turn the tide of the war back in their favor before the Allies invaded Germany itself.

The Fuhrer’s plan for the offensive revolved around neutralizing the enemy’s air power which far outnumbered his own at that point in the war. The Allies had amassed over 8,600 aircraft in the immediate vicinity on the western front, 3,000 of which were tactical aircraft, and the rest heavy bombers. To oppose them, the Luftwaffe only had 2,300 aircraft left with the majority being fighters and interceptors. The attritional grind of the Combined Bomber Offensive had degraded German transport and industry while also crippling the Luftwaffe’s pilot corps. Although German factories were building aircraft at a higher rate than ever before, Luftwaffe pilots were entering combat with only 170 hours of flying experience compared to 300 hours for American pilots. Furthermore, the chronic lack of fuel and spare parts severely curtailed flight operations, reducing the Luftwaffe to a shell of its former self.

To compensate for these deficiencies, Operation Watch on the Rhine would be launched in mid-December when low cloud cover, dense fog, and frequent snowstorms would ground American and British aircraft. The Ardennes region was specifically chosen because it was where the U.S. front line was the weakest but also where the thick woods could shield German vehicles and men from air attack. The Fuhrer envisioned a rebuilt Luftwaffe which would support the ground offensive with overwhelming close air support. This decision was opposed by General of Fighters Adolf Galland who argued the remaining fighters should be held in reserve to attack the Allied bomber streams over Germany. Ultimately, the Luftwaffe would play a small but important role in the campaign launching nuisance raids to harass Allied aircraft.

The offensive began on 16 December 1944 under a shroud of heavy fog and low clouds, the ideal conditions German high command was looking for. Nonetheless, Allied air power tried to attack the enemy spearheads in the early days of the operation. Aircraft from the U.S. 9th Air Force flew interdiction missions against German supply lines the day after the offensive began, but the low cloud base led to inaccurate bombing. The following day over 600 aircraft took to the skies to attack the enemy ground troops, but the only notable success was a squadron of P-47s which located the spearhead of the 1st SS Panzer Division. The Thunderbolts bombed the German tanks as they crossed the Lienne River, destroying 12 vehicles. The Luftwaffe also flew harassing sorties during this time, locating Allied concentrations of aircraft and forcing them to jettison their munitions before turning for home.

The Americans would learn a harsh lesson during the early stage of the battle. On the second day of the offensive, German units trapped approximately 9,000 U.S. soldiers of the 106th Infantry Division in a pocket. The commander of the 106th Division, General Alan Jones, requested an airlift to sustain the trapped men and the mission was approved. Troop carriers at air bases in Britain were loaded with supplies and a window in the weather opened on 18 December, but the order was never given to go ahead with the resupply mission. Poor liaison and communications within Allied air command led to the mission being repeatedly canceled and uncancelled until it was too late. By the 21st of December, the pocket had been destroyed while fully-loaded C-47s still sat on their runways. Yet it turned out to be a valuable learning experience for the Allies who would soon be called on for an even larger resupply mission later in the campaign.

The weather turned for the worse on 19th December as freezing rain and snowstorms swept through the Ardennes. With visibility near zero, the US Ninth Air Force only flew two sorties from the 19th to the 21st. Commander of the 12th Army Group, General Omar Bradley, was informed that no air missions were possible at a briefing on the 19th. His aide, Colonel Chester Hansen wrote in his diary, “Bradley shook his head sadly…  Weather is once again our undoing. Our air effort today has been negligible. Fighter bombers were either closed on their fields or compelled to attack enemy ground installations almost without a ceiling.” On the 21st, the 101st Airborne’s division supply officer sent an urgent request of aerial resupply for the over 20,000 men trapped in a pocket around the town of Bastogne. This time, the request was properly passed up the chain of command and a massive air bridge operation was planned for the 22nd December. Yet the weather forced another cancellation as the airborne troops in the pocket began to wonder who would arrive first: resupply, Patton, or German forces.

Finally, on the 23nd December, an eastern high pressure system known as the “Russian High” moved into the area and provided clear skies over the Ardennes. Both the Allies and the Luftwaffe scrambled as many aircraft as possible, but the superior British and American air forces had a distinct advantage. German pilots managed to fly over 900 sorties on the 23rd, but the Allies flew 3,500. The most important mission was the resupply operation for the trapped Americans in Bastogne. 241 C-47 transports escorted by 82 fighter bombers successfully parachute dropped over 300 tons of supplies to the men on the ground, more than enough to keep them in the fight. These missions would continue day after day until the pocket was relieved. By the 27nd December, 961 C-47s of the USAAF had dropped over 850 tons of supplies and ammunition to the defenders while gliders brought in medics, surgeons, and fuel.

With the benefit of clear weather, fighter bombers wreaked havoc on German supply and logistics. The Luftwaffe tried in vain to defend the troops on the ground but were overwhelmed by Allied air power. Traffic jams developed along the routes heading west which attracted heavy attacks from American P-47s and British Hawker Typhoons. The Wehrmacht quickly restricted unit movement to the hours of darkness only, which severely hampered the fighting effectiveness of their forward units. The Fifth Panzer Army’s Chief of Staff summed up the impact of Allied Air power on German artillery: “they negated the use of German rail artillery; seriously impeded the forward movement of ammunition and fuel to support the artillery battle; prevented the artillery from determining the depth of American defenses beyond the immediate line of contact; provided the American artillery a significant advantage in target location, and in overall terms reduced the effectiveness of German artillery to 50 or 60 percent of its potential.”

British and American tactical air forces also directly attacked German units at the front, working with Allied ground forces. On Christmas Day of 1944, American and British tanks were engaged by four Panther tanks of the 2nd Panzer Division which were concealed in a treeline. P-47s arrived and rocketed the treeline, forcing the Panthers out into the open where they were knocked out by Shermans and tank destroyers. Although they did not destroy the panzers with their rockets, the fighter bombers directly contributed to their eventual destruction. The following day, Typhoons repeated this tactic against German tanks of the Panzer Lehr Division which were also flushed out of their defensive positions and destroyed.

The Allied air forces contributed away from the battlefield as well. C-47s evacuated over 5,000 wounded men to Britain, which provided a much needed morale boost to those fighting in the Ardennes. However, one of the most under-discussed aspects of the air war was the Allies’ use of aerial radio jamming. On 28 December, four B-24 Liberators of the U.S. 8th Air Force’s 36th Jamming Squadron arrived over the Ardennes at 15,000 feet. Three Liberators then activated their ART-3 Jackal VHF barrage jammers while the fourth switched on an S-27 radio receiver to search for German tank radios. The 36th Squadron orbited the area and jammed the radios of the Sixth Panzer Army before returning to base. These were known as “Jackal” missions and were among the first aerial jamming operations in military history. The Jackal missions would continue throughout the Battle of the Bulge when weather permitted.

Opposed by overwhelming air power, the campaign had decisively turned against the German forces by the end of 1944. Desperate to regain the initiative, the Fuhrer and Luftwaffe chief Hermann Goering decided to use all remaining German air power on the western front in one final effort. On New Year’s Day 1945, the Luftwaffe launched Operation Bodenplatte, an attempt to destroy the Allied air forces on the ground in a surprise attack. Over 1,000 German fighters took to the skies and headed west but soon encountered anti-aircraft fire from their own flak batteries. The top secret designation of the operation meant that German ground units believed it was actually Allied aircraft overflying their positions. Sixteen Luftwaffe fighters were shot down by friendly flak fire and dozens damaged before the attackers even reached enemy lines.

Despite the ominous start, the German aircraft did achieve surprise in most cases. Seventeen airfields were attacked as the Luftwaffe Bf-109s and FW-190s strafed Allied aircraft on the ground. By the end of the day, 305 Allied aircraft were destroyed and another 190 damaged. However, American, British, and Polish pilots quickly counterattacked the mostly inexperienced German pilots while anti-aircraft fire inflicted devastating losses on the attackers. Within hours, Operation Bodenplatte had failed with 271 Luftwaffe fighters destroyed and over 220 pilots killed, wounded or captured. General of Fighters Galland bemoaned the doomed effort, saying “We have sacrificed our last substance.” Never will the Luftwaffe come out in large numbers to challenge the Allies in the skies above Europe again. Where the Luftwaffe would never replace its lost aircraft, the might of British and American aircraft production could swiftly replace allied losses.

After New Years Day, snowy weather once again closed the airspace above the battlefield. Because of the poor conditions, Allied air forces could not support the counteroffensive which was slowly pushing the German line back across the Reich’s border. From the 6th to the 9th of January 1945, the 9th Tactical Air Force could not fly a single sortie. This was especially frustrating for the ground commanders as close air support could not attack the withdrawing German forces. Although the tactical air forces could do little to influence the battle on the ground, strategic bombers continued to interdict German supply routes. Flying high above the snowstorms, British and American heavies reduced the towns of Houffalize and St. Vith to rubble, which hampered the enemy’s ability to resupply its frontline troops. 22nd January saw the last clear day of the campaign, allowing the 19th Tactical Air Command to inflict a harsh blow on German columns retreating across the Our River.

Although the air war above the Ardennes in the winter of 1944-45 saw less direct engagements than in other campaigns during the Second World War, it was still one of the major influences on the campaign. Allied air superiority set the terms of the Battle of the Bulge before the German offensive even began in forcing the Fuhrer to choose the sub-optimal terrain of the Ardennes as the location for his assault, so as to cover the panzer divisions from air attack. The relentless attacks on the German transport network before the battle, set the German offensive back three to four weeks as units and supplies were delayed in making it to the front. When Operation Watch on the Rhine finally did begin, the looming threat of Allied air power ensured that any clear weather would doom the German offensive. This proved to be the case as the Luftwaffe was powerless to challenge British and American dominance in the skies over Europe.

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