Home Creators Posts Import Register Favorites Logout
haven't archived this post yet. have a subscription? use the importer!

Content

Strategic bombing to win a war doesn’t work, we’ve figured this out after about 50years of trying to make it work (arguably longer but that's another story...). Whether the United States Air Force (USAF), the Royal Air Force (RAF) or many other Air Forces, strategic bombing was advertised as a war winning mission. However,  behind this mission there was the desire to establish independence from the Army and Navy and decision-makers often interpreted reality to suit their needs. Join me as I dive deep into a story about independence, perceptions and technical and tactical innovation in air force history.

This video is sponsored by my friends of the United States Naval Institute Press. You can get 25% OFF their entire book collection if you use the code MILAVHIS.
Link:
https://www.usni.org/press/books
My reading list:https://www.usni.org/press/books?f%5B0%5D=subject%3A1959

Files

Previews only

Bombing to Victory: The Lie We Tell Ourselves

- 25% OFF - Use code MILAVHIS to receive 25% OFF: https://www.usni.org/press/books My reading list: https://www.usni.org/press/books?f%5B0%5D=subject%3A1959 - Check out my books - Ju 87 Stuka - http://stukabook.com STG-44 Assault Platoon - http://sturmzug.com German Panzer Company 1941 - http://www.hdv470-7.com/ Achtung Panzer? Zur Panzerwaffe der Wehrmacht - http://panzerkonferenz.de/ - Support - Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/join/MilAvHistory Channel Memberships: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCmpahmxWXajV0-tuMMzSzAg/join PayPal: https://www.paypal.me/MilAvHis - Social Media - Twitter: https://twitter.com/MilAvHistory Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/milaviationhistory/ - Sources - Biddle, Tami Davis; Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing 1914-1945, Princeton University Press, Princeton: 2002. Deaile, Melvin G.; Always at War – Organizational Culture in strategic Air Command, 1946-62, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis: 2018. Faber, Peter R; Paradigm Lost: Airpower Theory and Its Historical Struggles, in Olsen, John A; Airpower Reborn – The Strategic Concepts of John Warden and John Boyd, Naval Institute Press: Annapolis. Hallion, Richard; America as a Military Aerospace Nation: From Pearl Harbor to Desert Storm, in Olsen, John A, Airpower Applied: U.S., NATO, and Israeli Combat Experience, Naval Institute Press: Annapolis 2017. O’Mara, Raymond; Rise of the War Machines: The Birth of Precision Bombing in World War II, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis: 2022. Muller, Richard; Major General Haywood S. “Possum” Hansell Jr. - Planner, Commander, and Historian, in Olsen, John A.; Airpower Pioneers – From Billy Mitchell to Dave Deptula, Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 2023. Vlaun, Brian; Selling Schweinfurt: Targeting, Assessment, and Marketing in the Air Campaign against Germany, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis: 2022. Warden III, John A., The Airpower Profession, in Olsen, John A, Airpower Applied: U.S., NATO, and Israeli Combat Experience, Naval Institute Press: Annapolis 2017. - Timecodes - 00:00 - Enough Bombs for Victory 00:25 - The Path to Strategic Bombing 01:57 - Independent Air Force 05:16 - Perceptions: Strategic Bombing 09:27 - Technical-Tactical Innovation 12:19 - Explaining Away The Problem - Audio - Music and Sfx from Epidemic Sound

Comments

Steve Kurt

Lots of good topics for discussion here! I always had the impression that Curtis Lemay was one of the drivers for tactical bombing, and was surprised to only see a flash of a photo of him. As a former Marine Corps aviation guy, I always liked how the Navy had their own infantry (the Marines) and their own air power, in addition to their naval force. Meanwhile, the Army can't play well with their own air element, which has to be split off. Being insulated within the Dept of the Navy, I was surprised at all of the drama between the Army and USAF, and the curious ideas such as those suggesting that the USAF could win a war by itself. Always good to hear from a neutral observer!

Minion

One of your best, Chris. Ta muchly As we say down here, beer's in the fridge 😉

MilAvHistory

LeMay gets a lot of rightful credit but I framed this video outside of personalities because it would open a new can of worms, from Douhet to Trenchard and Mitchel to Arnold, Hensell, LeMay, Power etc. LeMay was definitely the character that solidified the USAF and SAC, together with Power.

O D

Maybe. I think of the numerous proponents of.. Whatever theory.. the most bullets fired, the biggest infantry rifle bullets, the most light MG or Heavy MG.., Bomb loads, Spies, Artillery and tank guns... it is really hard to see how much any of these effect a war.... but one can't really believe they have no effect. Clearly Lots of money to manufacture weapons and a good national strategy to win is essential.

O D

But the history of getting national support for an Air Arm is a little different endeavor... ..I'm certain lavish claims were made with no evidence of support. But I worry if this isn't a new wiping boy....some historians seem to be of the view that Air power didn't help win WW2... I'm sure that view is wrong. And comparing WW2 to Vietnam or even Korea is missing an important difference.

Sean Tyson

Fascinating, thought-provoking video, Chris. I enjoyed the way you treated two major themes: justification of a strategic air strategy, and the misunderstanding(?) that strategic victory is not possible with air power alone. Certainly for the US, this is an extremely complex topic, even more than what you've depicted here: There's the initial drive to justify creation of an independent air force, then there's the drive to explain away its failures (multiple reasons for failure, but no acknowledgment that the base theory might be flawed). And of course, there's ultimately the political power of the military-industrial complex that comes with the growth in the military along with the associated growth and influence of the companies that build military systems. One of the things I like the most about your videos, though, is their length: Long enough to provide a relatively detailed examination of a topic, but not so long that I won't have time to watch. Thanks so much for your efforts, really glad to support your work!