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Early Access: German Officer in 1937 vs Panzer Divisions (Patreon)

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2020-07-18 16:26:17
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2026-06
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1937: German argues against Panzer Divisions

Found a very interesting German article from 1937 of a Colonel that argued against Panzer Divisions, he proposed to put most of the tanks within the infantry divisions, so pretty much that way, the French had many of their divisions in 1940 organized. Cover design by vonKickass. »» SUPPORT MHV «« » patreon, see videos early (adfree) - https://www.patreon.com/join/mhv » subscribe star - https://www.subscribestar.com/mhv » paypal donation - https://paypal.me/mhvis »» MERCHANDISE «« » teespring - https://teespring.com/stores/military-history-visualized » SOURCES « Lindemann: Feuer und Bewegung im Landkrieg der Gegenwart, in: Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau 1937, 3. Heft. Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn: Berlin, Germany, 1937, S. 362-377. Franke, Hermann (Hrsg.): Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften. Zweiter Band. 2. Das Heer. Walter de Gruyter & Co. Berlin, 1937. Corum, James S.: The Roots of Blitzkrieg. Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform. University Press of Kansas: Kanas, USA, 1992. Guderian, Heinz: Die Panzerwaffe. Ihre Entwicklung, Ihre Kampftaktik und ihre operativen Möglichkeiten bis zum Beginn des großdeutschen Freiheitskampfes. 2. Auflage von: Achtung – Panzer! Die Entwicklung der Panzerwaffe, ihre Kampftaktik und ihre operativen Möglichkeiten. Union Druckerei GmbH: Stuttgart, Germany, 1943 (1937). Guderian, Heinz: Achtung – Panzer! Die Entwicklung der Panzerwaffe, ihre Kampftaktik und ihre operativen Möglichkeiten. Dritte Auflage. Union Druckerei GmbH: Stuttgart, Germany, o. J. (1937?). Kennedy, Paul: The War at Sea, in: Cambridge History of the First World War – Volume I, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2016 (2014). Dick, Charles J. From Defeat to Victory: The Eastern Front, Summer 1944. Lawrence: Kansas University Press, 2016. Zabecki, David T.: Artillery in The European Powers in the First World War. Frieser, Karl-Heinz: Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940. 4. Auflage. Oldenbourg Verlag: München, 2012. https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fritz_Lindemann https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milit%C3%A4rwissenschaftliche_Rundschau #PanzerDivision #Panzer #NoPanzerDivisions

Comments

Miguel Aldaz

Nice discussion, congrats. I’m wondering if one point against Lindemann (sorry I don’t remember now the right spelling) is that exploitation by panzer divisions were much more able of blocking the enemy decision loop than breakthroughs made by infantry divisions supported by tanks.

Volker Hartmann

According to Wikipedia it was Georg Lindemann who wrote that article, while the memeber of the 20th of July coup attempt was Fritz Lindemann (incidentally the captain of the Bismarck was also called Lindemann). You find in the German article the following statement: "In einem weiteren Aufsatz profilierte sich Lindemann als Verfechter des Bewegungskrieges. Allerdings wollte er dabei den motorisierten Truppen keine entscheidende Wirkung zugestehen. Er argumentierte, dass motorisierte Truppen in einem neuzeitlichen Krieg immer auf die motorisierten Truppen des Gegners stoßen würden und sie deshalb keine Neuerung in die operative Kriegführung bringen könnten. Auch Panzerwagen wären nach der Entwicklung von Panzerabwehrwaffen kaum mehr in der Lage, eigenständig eine gegnerische Stellung zu durchbrechen. Er plädierte deshalb dafür, die Panzer zur Unterstützung der Infanterie und nur taktisch einzusetzen, nicht aber operativ in größeren Verbänden." They quote the article you quote here as source. However, he was a Generalmajor at the time of publication. So either the rank mentioned in the article refers to the rank had when submitting or it is a mistake in Wikipedia. - One question: Is he really talking about tanks or not rather about motorization in general. Because if he is talking about motorization the answer is that what he is dealing with is the problem that Germany was unable to motorize the whole army and the winner would be the side that was able to motorize the entire or nearly the entire army. So he was then not primarily dealing with the question of the tank to infantry ration, albeit secondarily he was, but primarily with the question of using motorization in a concentrated or homogenous fassion. If that is the case the conclusion would be similar: The success of Case Yellow would not have been possible. But the question could be raised, whether with a more homogenous motorized army the Wehrmacht had succeeded in destroying larger amounts of the Red Army or not. This is of course highly speculative. But one can be said for sure: The logistical problems would not have kicked in as fast as they did. (Please note that these last sentences are just me thinking loudly, so if I overlooked something obvious: I am sorry.)

Military History Visualized
>>40806899

thx, didn't suspect there was another Lindemann with a wikipedia page. I was like that name sounds familiar. the article notes Oberst Lindemann, although it could be that by the time it was published he had been promoted. he talks about motorization and specifically tanks, he goes from Movement to Engine/Motorization to Tanks. He didn't touch anything about limits in terms of motorization due to capacity at all.

Military History Visualized
>>40779810

good point, although I am a bit on the fence. I know I personally talked about the OODA Loop and the French campaign, yet, the fast decisions (or better slow ones by the French) were independent of the tanks themselves. Similarly, in the Soviet Union, if I remember correctly, the communication system broke down, not necessarily due to breakthroughs but due to limitations of communication resources, e.g., the system was overloaded if I remember it correctly. I think it is definitely a point to consider. Although, from what I remember both the French and Soviet communication systems had severe issues that would have faced similar issues against regular infantry divisions.