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Why the German Army failed in the West 43-44

The German Army had serious problems with conducting counter-attacks against the Western Allied Forces in 1943-44 this was different to the Situation on Eastern Front against the Red Army. As such the question is, why was this the case and this is not about logistics. Disclaimer: I received a pre-release ebook of Prof. Neitzel’s Book “ Deutsche Krieger. Vom Kaiserreich zur Berliner Republik – eine Militärgeschichte ”. Cover: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Destroyed_german_self-propelled_gun_carriage.jpg Colorization: vonKickass Other modifications: MHV »» SUPPORT MHV «« » patreon - see videos early (adfree) - https://www.patreon.com/join/mhv » subscribe star - https://www.subscribestar.com/mhv » paypal donation - https://paypal.me/mhvis » YouTube Membership - https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCK09g6gYGMvU-0x1VCF1hgA/join »» MERCHANDISE «« » teespring - https://teespring.com/stores/military-history-visualized » SOURCES « Neitzel, Sönke: Deutsche Krieger. Vom Kaiserreich zur Berliner Republik – eine Militärgeschichte. Propyläen: Berlin, Germany, 2020. OKH: Zusammendruck der Ausbildungshinweise Nr. 10-23. Nr. 2000 / 44 geh. H.Qu. OKH, 5. Mai 1944. BArch, RW 38/183: Oberbefehlshaber West: Erfahrungen und Folgerungen aus den Landungskämpfen von Salerno. 25.12.1943 Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathan M.: Armageddon in Stalingrad. The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2: September-November 1942. University Press of Kansas: United States, 2009. Dick, C. J.: From Victory to Stalemate. The Western Front, Summer 1944. Decisive and Indecisive Military Operations, Volume 1. University Press of Kansas: Kansas, US, 2016. Dick, C. J.: From Defeat to Victory. The Eastern Front, Summer 1944. Decisive and Indecisive Military Operations, Volume 2. University Press of Kansas: Kansas, US, 2016. Citino, Robert M.: The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943. University Press Kansas, USA, 2012. Töppel, Roman: Kursk 1943. The Greatest Battle of the Second World War. Helion: Warwick, UK: 2018. Citino, Robert M.: The Wehrmacht’s Last Stand. The German Campaigns of 1944-1945. University Press of Kansas: USA, 2017. Creveld, Martin van: Fighting Power. German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945. Greenwood Press: Westport, Connecticut, USA, 1982. #WehrmachtFail,#WhyWehrmachtFail,#GermanArmyFail

Comments

Hyok Kim

Again, thanks for the video. I didn’t know that the Soviets used ‘hugging’ deliberately as a tactic. I thought only boxers, and MMA fighters used clinch. I agree with the professor to a T on this. He’s reading my mind. There was little Germany could have done in the West offensively. The best Germany could have hoped for was to fight defensively with occasional ‘jabs’ to keep the Allies from gaining momentum in their advance, stalling for time and space, and make them ‘bleed’ their resources faster than Germany, and make their public ‘tired’, and ‘bored’ ala ‘Vietnam’, maybe create trouble in their colonies, hope the Allies stumble into PR disaster in their colonies, demoralizing the public further, and eventually negotiate an ‘honorable’ peace while working on neutralizing their air supremacy with ME 163 or Bachem. Galland was right to advocate ME 262 as an interceptor not as an attack bomber, but ME262 was dependent on oil. Not 163 or BACHEM. This way, Germany could have built massive effective interceptors to stop the Allied strategic bombing, giving a breathing space for the German industry as well, to work on their E boat program to strangle British. Of course, building more hetzers instead of panthers and tigers would have helped as well.

Miguel Aldaz

I just found yesterday in an old books sale a Combat Studies Institute (CSI) report #13 titled “Tactical Responses to Concentrated Artillery” covering WWI, WWII, Korea and Yom Kippur wars. It might be interesting as companion to your thought provoking video. Congrats on it. I’m wondering if the Heer’s emphasizes on mortars towards the end if the war (120mm Granatwerfer 42 and the barely deployed 210mm mortar) was a partial answer to the enemy superiority in artillery: economic, easier to conceal and move, and with a very powerful punch.