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Early Access: Tactical Tank Driving (Patreon)

Published:
2021-01-14 18:00:46
Imported:
2026-06
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Driving: Worst Job on a Tank?

In this video we interview the former tank driver - and now historian - Jens Wehner In this video Jens from the Military History Museum Dresden of the Bundeswehr. He points out the various problems he encountered during basic training and especially combat training. Furthermore, he explains why it is so much harder to drive a tank than a regular car. Disclaimer: I was invited by Militärhistorische Museum der Bundeswehr Dresden in 2019. http://www.mhmbw.de/ Disclaimer II: Thank you to the Panzermuseum Munster for inviting me to Stahl auf der Heide 2019. Cover design by vonKickass. »» SUPPORT MHV «« » patreon, see videos early (adfree) - https://www.patreon.com/join/mhv » subscribe star - https://www.subscribestar.com/mhv » paypal donation - https://paypal.me/mhvis »» MERCHANDISE «« » teespring - https://teespring.com/stores/military-history-visualized » SOURCES « Jens' Brain #tank,#TankDriver,#TankDriving

Comments

Volker Hartmann

7:09 in that situation amfetamin or methamfetamin could actually be handy. Please don't get mad at me, I from the very beginning called the whole narrative that methamfetamin was crucial for the success of the Wehrmacht bullshit. However, I think that to say that it was totally useless just goes into the other extreme. Sure it can have downsides and eventually on the long run the downsides prevail, but on the short run it can make a difference, especially if that decides a short campaign. Which brings me to Neitzel's statement: "The Wehrmacht was a sprinter not a marathon runner."

Hyok Kim

‘’Yes they could. Albeit I wasn't thinking just of tank drivers (in their case maybe caffeine was enough), but especially of lorry drivers hauling in supplies to the front lines.’’ Wow, you’re ahead of curve. The Americans were the masters in that sense. They had brought in long haul truck drivers, many of them blacks, en masse after Normandy to haul gas to their rampaging Shermans, to keep them going day and night non stop, not giving the Germans time and space to organize, at least for a while. ‘’To your idea: Bernhard actually made a video that touches this topic. I think it is the "why half-tracks" or "why aren't there any half-tracks anymore?". Bottom line: A driver was back then a person who was very training intensive, since far less people had cars etc.’’ I read that one big advantage of half tracks is that one requires less training than tanks to drive effectively. This still could be advantageous, in fact, even more so than those days when far more people drive. One big advantage of the Mongols was their strategic mobility. One had 3 to as many as 7 horses, so that one could keep changing mounts so as not to tire one out prematurely. Mongols could afford to do so since they lived in the pasture land in the world with plenty of horses to spare, their enemies couldn’t. Similar concept, with drivers. ‘’But you could train at least another crew member at least as operational driver - that is: if you have enough time.’’ Indeed, so my puzzlement, why hadn’t Wehrmacht or Reichwehr in the 30s/ This would have allowed Wehrmacht to advance 24/7, at least theoretically, with some screening columns using search lights, and leaving the broke down tanks behind to be fixed by the following repair troops. Wehrmacht could have reached and taken Moscow before winter, before the arrival of the reinforcement from Soviet Far East, before the stiffening the defense of Moscow. Instead of trying to capture and/or lay siege to the cities on the railroad network, Wehrmacht could have just left screening force around the cities on the railroad network, and ‘allow’ the defending troops to ‘escape’ the ‘encirclement’, further demoralizing the remaining defenders and inducing them more likely to surrender without further fighting, and either built railroad extension around the cities, or build paved roads around the cities to haul supplies to the advancing panzers further east. The ‘escaping’ troops would have run of supplies very quickly, and either surrendering en masse, or leaving them vulnerable for mop up by the following infantry. A variation the Mongols uses on the once tactically powerful Hungarians.