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Early Access: Versailles worked?!? (Patreon)

Published:
2021-03-05 08:48:51
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2026-06
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The Treaty of Versailles worked?

Quite many people point out that the Versailles Treaty was a complete failure and that it was utterly useless. In terms of preventing the Second World War this might be true, yet we also need to look at the various consequences the Versailles Treaty had on Germany and how that affected how it had to conduct itself in the Second World War. As such we look at how the Versailles Treaty influence German manpower, especially reserves, in the Second World War and thus had likely a not so insignificant outcome on the war. »» GET OUR BOOK «« » Army Regulation Medium Panzer Company 1941 - http://www.hdv470-7.com »» SUPPORT MHV «« » patreon - see videos early (adfree) - https://www.patreon.com/join/mhv » subscribe star - https://www.subscribestar.com/mhv » paypal donation - https://paypal.me/mhvis » YouTube Membership - https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCK09g6gYGMvU-0x1VCF1hgA/join »» MERCHANDISE «« » teespring - https://teespring.com/stores/military-history-visualized » SOURCES « Kroener, Bernhard; Müller, Rolf-Dieter; Umbreit, Hans: Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs – Teilband 1: Kriegsverwaltung, Wirtschaft und personelle Ressourcen 1939 bis 1941. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 5/1. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt: Stuttgart, 1988. Stachelbeck, Christian: Deutschlands Heer und Marine im Ersten Weltkrieg. Oldenbourg: München, Germany, 2013. Thoss, Bruno; Volkmann, Hans-Erich; Germany: Erster Weltkrieg, Zweiter Weltkrieg: ein Vergleich: Krieg, Kriegserlebnis, Kriegserfahrung in Deutschland. 2. Auflage (unveränderter Nachdruck), Ferdinand Schöningh: Paderborn, Germany, 2002. Müller, Rolf-Dieter: Hitlers Wehrmacht 1935 bis 1945. Oldenbourg: München, Germany, 2012. Meier-Welcker, Hans; Papke, Gerhard; Petter, Wolfgang: Deutsche Militärgeschichte 1648 -1939, Band 4. Abschnitt VII: Wehrmacht und Nationalsozialismus 1933-1939. Bernard & Graefe Verlag: München, 1983. Ferris, John Robert; Mawdsley, Evan: The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Volume I: Fighting the War. Bd. 1. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2015. Müller-Hillebrand, Burkhart: Das Heer 1933-1945. Entwicklung des organisatorischen Aufbaues. Band I. Das Heer bis zum Kriegsbeginn. E.S. Mittler & Sohn: Frankfurt am Main, Germany, 1954. Müller-Hillebrand, Burkhart: Das Heer 1933-1945. Entwicklung des organisatorischen Aufbaues. Band II. Die Blitzfeldzüge 1939-1941. Das Heer im Kriege bis zum Beginn des Feldzuges gegen die Sowjetunion im Juni 1941. E.S. Mittler & Sohn: Frankfurt am Main, Germany, 1956. Müller-Hillebrand, Burkhart: Das Heer 1933-1945. Entwicklung des organisatorischen Aufbaues. Band III. Der Zweifrontenkrieg. Das Heer vom Beginn des Feldzuges gegen die Sowjetunion bis zum Kriegsende. E.S. Mittler & Sohn: Frankfurt am Main, Germany, 1969. Boog, Horst u. a.: Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion. Bd. 4. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt: Stuttgart, Germany, 1983. #VersaillesWorked,#TreatyOfVersailles,#Versailles

Comments

Hyok Kim

1028 I agree with the professor on this one. Germany either was going to win the war quickly by a knock out or was going to lose the war, or best to a draw. Germany was not going to win the war of attrition, a draw at most, but not going to win. ROK has drawn the conclusion that that was the Germany’s fatal grand strategic mistake. She should have had prepared to steamroll all the way to Moscow non-stop, 24/7, regardless of breakdown, just abandoning broken down panzers along the way to be repaired later on after Moscow, driving in shifts, with search lights on the screening elements, not wasting on sieges, just leaving screening elements, not encirclement, just making sure of the control of the railroad, not even bothering to take prisoners, they could have been later picked up by patrol after Moscow. Important thing is Wehrmacht control the railroad network, and keep sending the supplies and reinforcement 24/7 to the point where the fate/destiny would have been decided. On the issue of whether more trained men would have made the difference. Any time Germany would have delayed in going to war, or delayed sending the reinforcement for the sake of better trained men, the time would not have stood still. It’s not like ‘Matrix’, where a hero makes all the fancy moves, twirling around, and the opponents stand still. Any time/resource spent on better training would have been taken advantage by the opponents as well. The questions to ask is who would have gained the relative advantage, had Germany slowed down the advance and/or delayed in going to war, delayed in sending the reinforcement. The Soviet Command Staff had been purged, and not yet recovered from the effect. The purge, obviously had temporary negative effect, but in the long, it was beneficial for the Soviet, by weeding out deadwoods, and bringing fresh, younger blood into the command. The same for the rank and file, Germany had far smaller geographic distance to mobilize, and better transportation. Germany could have mobilized her full potential faster than the Soviets. The longer Germany takes for the sake of better preparation, the Soviets would have recovered from the temporary negative effect of the purge, and more time to mobilize and train to her full potential. Not only that, given a choice between whether it would be better to have a great general, and raw recruits, or a poor general, but veteran soldiers, Machiavelli, in his ‘Discourses on Livy’ was most definitely on the side of better general, bur raw recruits. His reasoning is that a great general would have far less problem turning raw recruits into seasoned, veterans. But no matter how good the veteran soldiers are, they’re not going to turn a poor general into a great one. Great general would come up with a better grand/operational strategy than a poor general. Veteran soldiers would have tactical advantages over raw recruits. Strategy is always more important than tactics in winning wars, not battles. Germany had the better command staff than the Soviets, before ‘Barbarossa’. The whole mark of a great general is how to get the maximum effectiveness from the soldiers available no matter how untrained, and untested they may be, in real time, again, superior grand strategy and logistics is a great equalizer.

Joe Kudrna

Easy to hide your latest armament prototypes, hard to hide a few hundred thousand well trained troops, and that makes all the difference. Great job pointing out the Versailles Treaty did greatly impact Germany's military in not obvious ways.