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Early Access: The End of the Tank... again? (Patreon)

Published:
2022-04-09 23:08:41
Imported:
2026-06
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The Many Ends of the Tank... 1918-2022

Since the Russian Invasion of Ukraine (2022) a lot of statements about the "end of the tank" came up. Most of these statements are old, very old and they show up every few decades, particularly if a new technology is invented and/or some factions suffers - for whatever reason - a certain amount of tank losses. This video discusses the various factors about the Russian Invasion of Ukraine and a lot of the previous arguments that often have not changed for decades and generally still invalid, since people forget combined arms warfare. Cover Images: Destroyed Tank - armyinform.com.ua - https://www.facebook.com/iamo.armyinform/photos/705053087604689/ Soldier - armyinform.com.ua - https://www.facebook.com/iamo.armyinform/photos/707568354019829/ Modified by vonKickass. 01:03 The current War in Ukraine 05:22 Tanks were never invulnerable 09:01 Tanks in the First World War 10:20 Interwar Period 14:04 Post-WW2: HEAT & becoming obsolete? 15:09 Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) 16:25 Drones - the latest "Tank Killer"? 19:42 Only looking at Cost 22:57 Cheap & Expensive are relative 23:42 What is the Alternative to the Tank? 26:36 The End of the Tank in the Future? 27:39 Conclusion: Combined Arms Warfare is hard »» GET OUR BOOKS «« » The Assault Platoon of the Grenadier-Company November 1944 (StG 44) - http://sturmzug.com » Army Regulation Medium Panzer Company 1941 - http://www.hdv470-7.com »» SUPPORT MHV «« » patreon - see videos early (adfree) - https://www.patreon.com/join/mhv » subscribe star - https://www.subscribestar.com/mhv » paypal donation - https://paypal.me/mhvis » YouTube Membership - https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCK09g6gYGMvU-0x1VCF1hgA/join »» MERCHANDISE «« » teespring - https://teespring.com/stores/military-history-visualized » SOURCES « Ogorkiewicz, Richard M.: Tanks: 100 Years of Evolution. Osprey Publishing: Oxford, UK, 2015. Pöhlmann, Markus: Der Panzer und die Mechanisierung des Krieges: Eine deutsche Geschichte 1890 bis 1945. Ferdinand Schöningh: Paderborn, Germany, 2016. Searle, Alaric: Armoured Warfare: A Military, Political and Global History. Bloomsbury Academic, An Imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc: London, UK, 2017. Kast, Bernhard; Bergs, Christoph: German Army Regulation on the Medium Tank Company H. Dv. 470/7 Mittlere Panzerkompanie from May 1941 Deutsch/English Panzer Company Manual 1941. 2020. Get it at: http://www.hdv470-7.com Habeck, Mary R.: Storm of Steel. The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919-1939. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, New York, USA, 2003. Zaloga, Steven: Armored Thunderbolt: The U.S. Army Sherman in World War II. Stackpole Books: Mechanicsburg, PA, USA, 2008. Zezschwitz, G.P. v.: Heigl’s Taschenbuch der Tanks. Teil III. Der Panzerkampf. Neuauflage der Ausgabe von 1938, J. F. Lehmanns Verlag: München, Germany, 1971. Reichskriegsministerium: Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau. Komplett (6 Hefte). 1. Jahrgang. Verlag von E.S. Mittler & Sohn: Berlin, Germany, 1936. Handbuch für Panzerbesatzungen I: Mittlere Panzer. 4., überarbeitete Auflage, Militärverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik: Berlin, German Democratic Republic, 1976. FM 6-30: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire. Headquarters, Department of the Army: Washington DC, USA. Shaikh, Shaan; Rumbaugh, Wes: The Air and Missile War in Nagorno-Karabakh: Lessons for the Future of Strike and Defense. Center for Strategic & International Studies, December 8, 2020: https://www.csis.org/analysis/air-and-missile-war-nagorno-karabakh-lessons-future-strike-and-defense, last accessed: 6th April 2022. https://tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww1/germany/3-7cm-tankabwehrkanone-rheinmetall https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/budget/fy1999/dot-e/army/99m1a2.html https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/M1_Abrams https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_Martin_F-35_Lightning_II https://www.quora.com/How-much-does-a-single-military-tank-and-aircraft-cost-Just-a-single-one https://www.quora.com/How-much-does-a-surface-to-air-missile-cost #EndOfTheTank,#CombinedArms,#TheUndeadTank

Comments

Stugbit Fz

Thanks for the video, Bernhard. I have seen the one from Ralph of the Panzer Museum, but it was in German, I couldn't understand a thing he said there. So, I was hoping someone would make a video talking about this. I have some questions about the issue here, I'm not an expert on modern combat in any means, by the way, but I hope my questions are not that much stupid. First, I see you guys saying that for a tank to work properly and fulfill its duty, it needs to work inside a Combined Arms strategy. As time passes, and technology and experience develops, this combined arms force may change over the years, get upgrades, things like that. And as technology develops, not only things get more expensive, but also the world economies change, with many countries not having a strong economy to make every piece of a combined arms force work at its prime, specially considering that also training cost money too and so forth. So, giving the Russian performance in Ukraine and all, and the fact that Russia isn't exactly a super rich country compared to other world powers like the US and China, my first questions is: how economically viable is a proper modern combined arms force today for the average country economy? And considering also it's a combined force, that means all elements within that force must work appropriately so to achieve its military goal in the battlefield. So, in the case of a balanced conflit, when both foes are well prepared, the probability of some part of the combined arm forces going wrong in a clausewitian way is a reality. And with one element of the combined force failing, this could compromise the entire force itself. And since it may be a too expensive force, I wonder how modern conflits may scalate after the War in Ukraine. It seems just like what happened in the naval warfare of ww1, where both the German and British navy were too important and costly to be risked in combat. So, in the modern case, not the tank itself alone, but the entire force that gives support to it. Regards!

Military History Visualized
>>81639891

First, Combined Arms is not a strategy, it is an approach to conduct combat. One definition is combined arms means using several arms simultaneously when engaging an enemy, in contrast supporting arms would mean engaging an enemy with several arms as well, but one after the other, so sequentially. Combined Arms is from my understanding the most effective way, it is hard to do, but Russia has all the equipment it needs for combined arms. Training although definitely costs something, is key to it, but generally it should be far less expensive than the equipment of some if not all arms. Combined Arms Formation means that all arms are integrated within a formation. Manstein specifically called for the StuGs to be an organic part of the infantry divisions, so that they train together with the infantry division.

Volker Hartmann

Thank you so much for this video! And you could have even said more. What I also always point at is that the Javaline was put in service in 1996, i.e. 23 years after the T-72 was put in service. Of course it has devastating effects on it! It is a weapon specifically designed to destroy the T-72. This then gets multiplied by the fact that the T-72s often don't get used following the doctrine they were designed for (as was pointed out in the video of the DPM). Plus all what you listed up. That an anti-tank weapon that is 23 years more modern than a tank has devastating effects upon that tank is then used as basis for the conclusion that tanks in general are obsolete. That really gets me irritated. - Another great line of argument is when people pick out one string of technology and project into the future what might get developed in the next 10 to 30 years, while the tank is set as stationary. Here I heared the argument that armour cannot be improved that much. While at the same time there could be autonomous drones produced that seek a tank actively and kamikaze on it. Well...leaving totally aside the question whether such a technnology can be reasonably be developed within the next 10 years or not. If we reach the point, where such a technology really can be developed, we might get a step into the direction of sensor based protection instead of armour based protection. If one can really built such a drone with such capabilities, one can sooner or later built autonomous defense systems that detect incoming drones and shot them down. A tank is the perfect system to carry such systems. - This rationale ultimately leads to the claim that the tank, as it is built today is bound to be outdated in the future. That is true for every single piece of military equipment! (ok...maybe apart from the Mosing Nagant...and food cans...and socks...) - Another thing people do not get is that tactics do not happen in isolation. Battles happen within wars, i.e. within the realm of strategy. Where aspects as mobility and endurance become very relevant. A individual fight is not like a sports match. Sometimes the mere fact of reaching the combat area with less exhaustion is a highly important factor.