“That GWOT Thing” – How Modern CQB Was Forged in Conventional Combat (Patreon)
Content
“CQB is useless in near-peer or conventional combat.” We’ve already debunked that trope, but during my recent research, I stumbled over a few accounts from Operation Just Cause—specifically Task Force Bayonet, the Ranger and Infantry element that seized large sectors of Panama City in 1989.
Task Force Bayonet was primarily tasked with taking down “La Comandancia,” the central command structure of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF). The initial course of action was a fast, mechanized assault conducted behind a “wall of fire” laid down by helicopters and gunships, which were meant to neutralize known enemy locations. However, this plan collapsed when the PDF, anticipating the assault, dispersed their troops throughout the surrounding city blocks.
Consequently, the Rangers ran into severe ambushes while mounted in their M113 armored personnel carriers. Though they managed to reach their blocking positions, the enemy fire didn’t stop, forcing command to make a critical decision: dismount and clear the buildings block by block.
Back in the 1980s, standard Infantry and even Ranger training didn't include sophisticated Close Quarters Battle (CQB) techniques. Instead, doctrine relied heavily on blind fire, fragmentation grenades, and sheer volume of fire. The result in Panama was chaotic. I want to go over some of the critical lessons learned from this operation, which ultimately led to the Army-wide adoption of dedicated breaching tools and Battle Drill No. 6.
Techniques Matter: Infantry training in the 1980s didn’t emphasize precision CQB. Techniques largely revolved around three-man teams where the first man would throw a grenade, clear the room from outside the threshold, and whatever happened inside was left up to improvisation. In the dense urban environment of Panama, this obviously didn’t work out very well. After-action reports emphasize how Rangers had to invent systematic clearing techniques on the fly. It was directly after Operation Just Cause that Battle Drill No. 6 (Enter and Clear a Room) became a formalized part of US Infantry doctrine.
Dedicated Breaching Tools: During the assault, Rangers relied heavily on "hot" breaching using C4 charges, tank main guns, and heavy support fire. However, these tools could not always be employed. Civilians were frequently present, many structures were too fragile to withstand explosive breaches without collapsing, and explosive materials were in limited supply. The operation highlighted a clear and immediate requirement for the infantry to conduct "cold" (mechanical) and precise ballistic breaching on doors and windows.
The Need to Take Buildings: Cold War-era US Army doctrine heavily discouraged entering buildings altogether. During Panama, it became painfully evident that in modern cities, buildings act as micro-terrain and can quickly become key tactical terrain. Simply turning every building into rubble with heavy ordnance was no longer a viable tactical or political option.
Marking Techniques: Aside from colored smoke and VS-17 panels used to mark breach points, there were virtually no Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in place for marking the inside of cleared buildings to prevent fratricide. Panama is largely considered the turning point where military doctrine shifted to mandate detailed interior marking techniques (such as chemlights and chalk) to manage the chaos of urban clearing.
Civilians in the Battlespace: Previous US Army doctrine was largely based on the World War II assumption that cities would be evacuated ahead of large-scale conventional operations. However, the modern global strike doctrine of the US military meant forces would deploy with minimal build-up. Because of this high operational tempo, US forces found themselves fighting inside living, breathing cities. This reality further cemented why indiscriminately throwing grenades was no longer the best way to clear rooms.
Witnessing firsthand how Special Operations Forces (SOF)—such as Delta Force and the SEALs—cleared rooms in a vastly different and more efficient manner created a massive mindset shift among Rangers and regular infantry. Room clearing techniques, specialized breaching tools, interior marking, and advanced target discrimination were suddenly recognized not just as niche SOF skills, but as vital capabilities for every infantryman.
However, these techniques had been almost religiously gatekept by the SOF community, and it took time for them to fully filter down into conventional infantry and Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) manuals.
We’ve stated it before, and we have even more evidence now: Dedicated CQB techniques were not forged during the Global War on Terror. They were forged in the crucible of much more conventional conflicts.
As always, thanks for your attention.
Sources & Further Reading
To back up these claims, here are historical and doctrinal sources that detail the shift in urban warfare tactics following Operation Just Cause:
Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama (1988-1990)
Author: Ronald H. Cole, Joint History Office.
Relevance: Details the execution of Task Force Bayonet, the assault on La Comandancia, and the friction conventional forces faced during the urban fighting.
Field Manual (FM) 90-10-1: An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-Up Areas (1993)
Author: Department of the Army.
Relevance: This manual was heavily rewritten following the lessons learned in Panama (and later Mogadishu). It is the doctrinal document that standardized Battle Drill No. 6 (Enter and Clear a Room) and introduced precise room-clearing techniques to conventional forces.
Operation Just Cause: The Incursion into Panama
Author: R. Cody Phillips, US Army Center of Military History.
Relevance: Explores the rapid deployment of US forces into a populated urban center and the tactical constraints imposed by the presence of civilians, highlighting why massive suppressive fire was no longer viable.
Blood on the Streets: The Battle for La Comandancia
Author: Combat Studies Institute / US Army Command and General Staff College.
Relevance: Specifically details the Ranger and mechanized infantry assault through El Chorrillo, the ambushes they faced from the M113s, and the requirement to dismount and clear the area block-by-block without prior CQB training.