The Fallacy of Average Engagement Distances (Patreon)
Content
Especially when discussing optics or calibers, many people like to cite "Standard Infantry Engagement Distances" to justify why their favorite optic or round is the best choice. But is it actually worth evaluating these "standard" engagement distances? Or is it a fallacy to do so? The truth lies somewhere in between. Let’s find out.
Average Engagement Distances Since WWI
Historically well-documented wars have allowed researchers to draw standard engagement distances from them. However, we must first understand that these distances are a mathematical average and often do not reflect individual or anecdotal experiences on the ground.
WWI: The standard engagement distance between infantry squads in WWI was 100 to 300 meters. Static trench lines and open fields often allowed full-power rifle cartridges to reach their maximum effective range. But if you study WWI closely, you may notice a massive caveat here, which we will discuss later.
WWII: In WWII, the overarching average for infantry engagements dropped to the 100 to 200-meter range. This statistical shift laid the foundational perspective that the standard-issue, full-power rifle cartridge was becoming increasingly obsolete.
Korea: The Korean War led to the standard engagement distance dropping slightly again, with most studies placing it in the 50 to 200-meter range. We have to keep in mind that this happened despite Korea's mountainous terrain, which theoretically should have expanded engagement distances.
Vietnam: This conflict is an extreme outlier. Infantry engagement distances were 50 meters and below on average. The reasons are heavily terrain-related and obvious.
The Falklands: During the Falklands War, the absolute average crept back up to 100 meters. However, this conflict perfectly illustrates how inaccurate "infantry engagement averages" can be. British forces had access to limited night vision—which was more than Argentina had to offer most of its soldiers—and were considered far better trained in night fighting. Therefore, the average engagement distance must be divided between night and day. Nighttime assaults usually occurred below 50 meters, while daytime firefights started at 300m and reached up to 600m. The GPMG and the ATGM were the primary weapons during those daytime engagements.
Afghanistan: The average engagement in Afghanistan took place between 500 and 800 meters. This led to the assumption that a doctrinal move toward more DMRs and other heavy-caliber options would be necessary for standard rifles to remain relevant.
Iraq: At the exact same time, firefights in Iraq painted a very different picture, taking place at 50 meters and below on average. Again, we can easily identify terrain—the conflict being largely fought in urban environments—as the primary reason for this.
Ukraine: The war in Ukraine is ongoing and not yet exhaustively researched. Both sides are stretched thin and simply have more pressing priorities than conducting large-scale statistical studies. However, individual accounts and tactical evaluations show infantry combat in Ukraine largely revolves around suppression (position-to-trench), CQB (trench assaults), and medium-range engagements (tree line-to-tree line). Ukraine’s geography is very flat, enabling long lines of sight that are only interrupted by tree lines. These immense distances allow indirect fire weapons like mortars, alongside drones and ATGMs, to carry the heavy burden of a firefight. Add to that the fact that both Ukraine and Russia—due to their shared Soviet heritage—view infantry and direct-fire ground forces differently than Western nations; their primary role is often to support and protect the artillery.
The Danger of the Average
A German Shock Trooper deployed in late WWI or a French trooper deployed in the early movement-centric warfare of the same conflict would have both been incorrectly trained and equipped if we took the "average" of the conflict for granted. Rather than fighting long-range rifle duels, they would have faced point-blank trench combat or short-distance firefights in dense forests, respectively.
The average is a scientific value that frequently fails to reflect reality. Relying on an average can result in preparing for absolutely unrealistic ranges. If a conflict's firefights take place either between 800 to 1000m or 0 to 50m, averaging those numbers leaves troops equipped for a 400m fight that never actually happens.
Factors Driving the Averages
An average engagement distance is dictated by manifold factors. These variables prove that even when historical averages are statistically correct, using them as the sole source for a training curriculum will likely result in preparing for the war of yesterday. Engagement distances are driven by:
Tactics & Doctrine: How do both sides employ infantry doctrinally, and what specific tactical maneuvers do they apply?
Training: Is one side fundamentally better trained? What are the baseline training standards across the board?
Technology: What technology (e.g., night vision, thermal optics, drones) is available that forces infantry to actively increase or decrease their standoff distances?
Supporting Arms: Is the infantry deployed with integrated close air support and/or artillery?
Terrain: What lines of sight does the specific theater's geography actually allow?
What We Can Actually Learn
As the saying goes, the last war is not tomorrow's war. What we can learn, however, is just how wildly engagement distances fluctuate and how much they are altered by factors far beyond the choice of calibers and optics.
The primary lesson learned is brutal and simple: We need to be prepared for everything.
Training for long, intermediate, and close-quarter distances must be a foundational part of any curriculum. The best general-issue weapon is the one that can cover all of these distances effectively within its intended purpose. The rifle is not the infantry squad or platoon's main effort weapon; it is there to provide security, close with and kill the enemy, and provide suppression at long distances.
Make no compromises in your training, but accept the necessary compromises in your weapon system.
As always, thanks for your attention.