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"African prehistory is a puzzle on a grand scale, still only partly solved"

Jared Diamond's magnum opus is one of the most widely read books on World History. In his work of monumental ambition, Diamond seeks to explain why the modern world was shaped by lopsided outcomes, which greatly favored the populations of western Europe, and enabled them to mold societies across the world through conquest and colonialism. He identifies what he considers the most critical factors for this lopsided western dominance; that "some peoples developed guns, germs, steel, and other factors conferring political and economic power before others did". (GGS, pg 24-25)

His central argument therefore attempts to explain the distribution of these factors. He argues that trajectory of a given society's history was determined by geographic circumstances, which favored Eurasia over other world regions, and enabled it to acquire and develop the guns, germs and steel with which it colonized the rest of the world.

In his attempt to solve the "grand puzzle" of Africa; which he observes possesses the same disadvantages as pre-Colombian America, Diamond contends that early European colonialism in Africa was rather ephemeral except on the continent's southernmost tip, he therefore side-steps answering why this was the case, and instead decides to focus on what he calls the Bantu "engulfing" of sub-equatorial Africa, in which he draws several erroneous analogies with the European colonization of Australia.

In a separate section about the Eurasian advantage in the rapid spread of domesticates along what he considers an East-West continental orientation, Diamond includes Africa as an example of a North-South oriented continent, arguing that African domesticates spread at a much slower rate than across western Europe. (Although he doesn't follow this up with an explanation for why this was a disadvantage to Africans). (GGS, pg 186-187)

This article examines Jared Diamond's myths and misconceptions on African history, and shows that his book : "Germs, Guns and Steel" is simply a collection of speculative conjecture and unremarkable insights, that doesn't bring its readers any closer to solving the "puzzle" of African history.

Map of Africa's population groups according to Jared Diamond

Khoisan foragers "engulfed" and decimated by Bantu-speaking Farmers?: Forager-Framer relationships in African History.

Diamond claims that the present distribution of the "pygmy" foragers of the Congo Forest region, the Hadza and Sandawe foragers of Tanzania and the Khoisan of south-western Africa were all once a part of a large geographic distribution of related groups speaking click-based languages that was "engulfed" by the Bantu-speaking farmers through conquest, expulsion, interbreeding, leaving only linguistic legacies of their former presence (GGS pg 383-384, 385-86)

Examining the linguistic and Genetic relationship between the three clusters of sub-equatorial Africa's Foragers: Hadza-Sandawe, "Pygmies" and Khoisan.

Studies on the genetic ancestry of modern Hadza and Sandawe foragers reveal that both groups showed a high genetic distance from the KhoiSan, being as similar to the Khoi as they are to any other Bantu group or to each other. The genetic evidence therefore did not support a common ancestry for the Khoisan and East African foragers sharing the click sounds. "the divergence of all contemporary groups of analysed foragers was completed long before the arrival of Bantu farmers" (Černý Luísa Pereira, Archeogenetics of Africa pg 9-10)

A similar study comparing the KhoeSan, the western "pygmies" of central African rain forest and the Niger-Congo speakers shows that the lineage that gave rise to the Khoisan split off about 110,000 years ago, much earlier than the lineages that eventually gave rise to the western "pygmies" (32,000 BP) and the Niger-Congo speakers from whom the Bantu emerged (10,000BP). The authors find that there was "long period of independent evolution for the lineages leading to extant hunter gatherers" (ie Khoisan and Pygmy) "and a longer period of shared history between Pygmy and non-Pygmy NKs (Niger-Congo) groups than between either of these groups and KhoeSan" (Krishna et al, an early divergence, 626)

Therefore, in both cases, the different groups of Foragers ("pygmy", Hadza, Sandawe, and Khoisan) show greater genetic affinity with their immediate Bantu-speaking neighbors than with each other. The presence of click sounds in their languages is by itself not a marker of a closely related group/continuum of languages like Diamond suggests, and its wholly unlike the linguistically and genetically related Bantu-speakers; a language group far younger than the Khoisan and Hadza languages, the latter of which may even be a language isolate. (Rainer Vossen, The Khoeasan languages, pg 33-36, Frank Marlowe, the Hadza, pg 15-17)

The theory that there was a prehistoric Khoisan population in east Africa that was part of broader geographic continuum of click-based speakers tying the present south-African and east African foragers has been discredited by several scholars as summarized by John Kemp, “There are no major archaeological discontinuities in the region to make us think that resident populations were somehow displaced by an incoming group” (John Kemp, Malawi and eastern Zambia pg 2-3)

The fact that most Bantu-speakers are relatively genetically homogenous, and highest admixture between the Foragers and the Bantu-speaking groups occurs only among those Bantu groups who are closest to the Foragers, rather than being widespread is evidence that the geographic distribution of the pre-Bantu populations at the time of the Bantu migration was most likely within their present locations in the late 19th/early 20th century.

(Margarida Coelho; On the edge of Bantu expansions, pg 8,13, Černý Luísa Pereira, Archeogenetics of Africa pg 10)

Not a "Bantu Empire" but a slow population drift, the nature of the expansion of the Bantu-speaking Farmers across sub-equatorial Africa.

According to Diamond "the Bantu put together a military-industrial package that was unstoppable in the subequatorial Africa of the time, within a few centuries, in one of the swiftest colonizing advances of recent prehistory, Bantu farmers had swept all the way to Natal, on the east coast of what is now South Africa".

He adds that the Bantu spread through the Congo Forest, clearing gardens, increasing their numbers and engulfing pygmy foragers whom they pushed into the forest, using their iron weapons.

The Khoisan foragers, he says, were rapidly eliminated like the aboriginal Australians were eliminated by white colonists, in an "engulfing" process involving conquest, expulsion, interbreeding, killing, or epidemics. And that the surviving foragers are remnants of Khoisan whom the bantu didn’t succeed in overrunning (GGS pg 394-397)

Myths of the "Bantu package" and technological superiority

Archeologists and linguists have for long known that the Bantu expansion which begun around 3,000BC preceded their use of iron tools and metallurgy that they obtained from the Cameroon-Nigeria region in the last centuries before the common era, Long after the Bantu had already populated much of central Africa. There is thus little evidence for the existence of a "Bantu package", as some in the past postulated, or as Diamond calls it: "military-industrial package", that would have given them a military advantage over the Foragers. (Jan Vansina, Lingusitic evidence)

Summarizing the work of various scholars about the Bantu expansion, Seidensticker writes that the old theory in which the bantu Farmer's slash and burn agriculture and the subsequent large-scale human-led deforestation, has been largely discredited by most scholars who show that Bantu farming in the Forest was at a scale so small that its unlikely to have caused simultaneous changes in falling lake levels, drained swamps and thinning vegetation. They instead suggest that the latter process of the drying forest is more likely what enabled the Bantu agriculture, rather than the reverse. (Dirk Seidensticker, population collapse pg 8)

While Diamond suggests a more-or-less continuous migration of Bantu-speakers from their ancestral homeland across the northern edge of the forest to east Africa, and along the western edge to central and southern africa as shown on his map, the dispersal of Bantu-speaking communities in the Congo rainforest was checked by a widespread population collapse of their early Farming communities in the 4th century and the early Bantu languages became nearly extinct despite practicing agriculture and possessing iron tools, only recovering with later migrations. ( Dirk Seidensticker, Population collapse, pg 8)

In summary, the biggest fault with Diamond's understanding of the Bantu expansion is characterizing it as a rapid migration of colonists armed with iron tools to fight off natives and superior agricultural methods to clear forests, when it was simply a very slow population drift of multiple "waves", whose movement was largely enabled and halted by climate change rather than technology. The population drift of the Bantu which begun around 5,000 years ago and took 3,000 years to reach the southern tip of the continent, covering a distance of nearly 3,500km, was moving at an unremarkable 1km/year.

Farmer-Forager relations: "tidy archeological assumptions harassed by inconvenient ethnographic facts"

While we know little about what exactly happened when the small bands of Bantu-speakers encountered autochthonous Foragers, we know it was unlike the analogy that Diamond portrays of white Australian colonists decimating aboriginal groups, because the contemporary relationship between the two groups shows that the Bantu-speakers were only fairly recently able to impose a level of social-political dominance over the Foragers, especially during the post-colonial and colonial eras.

A cursory observation contemporary social-political relationship between the Bantu-speaking farmers and their foraging neighbors in the 20th century may mirror the kind of image that Diamond portrays ; they are marginalized by the state that seeks to exploit their hunting grounds, and in association with the state, some Foragers are thus exploited by their farmer neighbors (for forest resources such as minerals and timber) in a relationship that some European scholars were quick to compare to serfdom .

But this uncritical observation about the status hunter-gatherers has for long colored scholars' understanding about the nature of farmer-forager interaction. Scholars relied on the concept of a "frontier" in which sedentary farmers supposedly displace mobile hunter gatherer's in successive waves that push the frontier inward; based on the assumption that the farmers had superior technologies and thus greater coercive force. But the fault with this assumption became immediately apparent once researchers begun to critically examine the relationship between Farmers and foragers; as James Moore puts it;

"It is unfortunate then that our tidy archaeological assumptions are harassed by inconvenient ethnographic facts" (J. Robinson, The archeology of frontiers and boundaries pg 94)

In Hewlett and Fancher's summary of the research on the modern relationship between central African farmers and Foragers, scholars found that modern Farmer-Forager relationships occupy a broad exchange spectrum which united both communities with varying levels of interdependence; from mutually beneficial symbiotic relationships to unequal relationships with farmer dominance. All presently-known foragers in central Africa exchange food with farmers to varying degrees on this spectrum, with the exception of the Twa in Burundi and Rwanda among whom the farmer dominance is evident. (Hewlett and Fancher pg 947)

Old theories of Farmer-Forager relationships such as the "wild yam hypothesis" in which the carbohydrate insufficient food sources in the forest that were limited by the availability of wild yams forced foragers to depend on farmers to supplement their food sources (more than the reverse), has since been rendered untenable by the wealth of archeological research which shows that the forest had been occupied by foragers long before the farmers, from whom the former were presumed to depend on to supplement their carbohydrates. (Hewlett and Fancher pg 946)

Farmer-Forager relationships in the early modern Era (15th- mid 20th century)

There's reason to believe that even among the less symbiotic pairs of Famers and Foragers, that the former only established a level of dominance over the former relatively recently.

In the case of the Hadza foragers in northern Tanzania, most of their prime lands had long been occupied solely by themselves, with farmers only recently moving into some of their territories in the 1950s close to the end of the colonial era. It wasn't until the forced resettlements in the post-colonial era during the 60s and 70s that Hadza social life was greatly affected. Prior to this, the Hadza's earliest violent encounters were in the late 19th century with the Maasai pastoralists, and an arguably exploitative relationship may have occurred between the Isanzu farmers and the Hadza in the late 19th century due to the brief boom in Ivory demand but this subsided quickly. In general, Hadza appear to have been occupying the exact same lands most likely since the appearance of the Bantu in the region, and only recently did their relationship with Farmers (and Herders) become substantial (and unequal) (Frank Marlowe pg 17-33)

In the case of the Aka foragers of southwestern central African republic, the establishment of European settler farms in 1910 and the colonial economy's exploitation of forest products such as ivory, rubber, copper, pushed the farmers into the forager regions (to escape colonial taxes and labor) and the Aka adopted farming from their new neighbors. By the postcolonial period, the Aka foragers were now moving into farmer settlements to exchange their labor and forest products for money, this represented a significant interaction tied to the modern economy, that in all likelihood didn't predate the 20th century (Guille-Escuret 1998)

In the mid-late 19th century, the growth of the lucrative ivory trade and the increasing penetration of the European colonists in south-western Africa reduced forager communities of the Basarwa and the !kung from equal partners in a symbiotic relationship with the bantu-speaking Tswana to a marginalized class. While the Basarwa had long adopted cattle herding and could raid the cattle of the Tswana and other groups, this equal dynamic of power changed dramatically in the 19th century ( Catherine Panter-Brick, hunter-gathers, pg 301-302)

In summary, even by relying on contemporary Farmer-Forager relationships, one can surmise that the incoming Bantu-speakers in the centuries prior to the modern era (and especially in the early stages of migration) are unlikely to have had any significant social-political advantage over the Foragers simply due to their possession of Iron weapons, instead , the "success" of the Bantu migration, was like in the Congo Forest, tied to natural rather than anthropogenic factors.

African military strength rather than "Guns and Germs" determined the success or failure of European Colonization.

Following in his theory of European technological superiority arising from Eurasia's East-West geographic orientation, Diamond claims that "Europeans entering Africa enjoyed the triple advantage of guns and other technology, widespread literacy, and the political organization necessary to sustain expensive programs of exploration and conquest" but that for Africans, the spread of all three technologies was slowed by Africa's geographic orientation, with its major axis is north-south, whereas Eurasia's is east-west, thus giving Europeans a significant advantage to enable their colonization of Africa. (GGG pg 398-399)

He claims that this advantage immediately manifested itself when Vasco Dagama's fleet bombarded the (Bantu-speaking) Swahili city of Kilwa in 1498 and compelled its ruler to surrender (he perhaps presents this example in a manner analogous to what he claimed the Khoisan foragers of sub-equatorial Africa were faced with when they first encountered the Bantu Farmers)

It should be noted here that Diamond's explanation for colonization is even more gabbled than his understanding of Bantu migration, as he mentions earlier that while the Dutch had quickly decimated the San Foragers of Cape-colony south Africa, they could only advance very gradually (over 175 years and 9 wars) to subdue the neighboring steel-equipped Xhosa Bantu-Farmers, presumably because the former's land wasn't suitable to the Dutch's winter crops (?) or because of fierce resistance (?). (GGS pg 397).

He also offers a rather convenient third explanation to explain why European colonization for most of Africa occurred rather late, claiming that the prevalence of tropical diseases in Africa, "tropical Asia" and Indonesia is what prevented the colonization of (only) Africa among the above listed regions for 400 years (GGS pg 214)

All of his assertions; that technology and winter crops gave Europeans a decisive advantage where colonies were established in Africa, that colonialism failed because of a disease barrier, and that Africa is mostly oriented north-south so its domesticates diffused slowly; are false, as I will cover below.

Documenting pre-19th century European colonial defeats, victories and settlements in the central African interior that was supposedly impervious due to tropical diseases.

Contrary to Diamond's claims, the Dutch's cape colony wasn't the only colonial possession of Europeans pre-19th century Africa, nor was it the largest. From the the 15th and 17th century, the most ambitious colonial expansion in Africa prior to the Berlin conference was undertaken by the Portuguese who coincidentally chose the regions of African furthest from the diffusion of north-south technologies as purported by Diamond.

A time-travelling Jared Diamond in the 16th century would be forgiven for thinking that the entirety of sub-equatorial Africa would soon become a Portuguese colony like Brazil, but instead, the "superior technology", widespread literacy and better political organization of the Portuguese offered them few advantages, and ultimately ended with the largest loss of European life on an African battlefield prior to the Italians at Adwa.

While the gun-toting marauding Portuguese colonists sailing south along Mauritania's coast had been accustomed to raiding and kidnapping thinly populated coastal settlements, their engagements with African armies in the Sene-gambia (and in Sierra Leone) armed with just poisoned arrows and canoes quickly put an end to this during the 1450s (and in the 1535) , and compelled the Portuguese king to send diplomats to the region's African sovereigns in 1456 and 1467 and establish peaceful trade. A similar attempt by the English to raid sierra Leone's coast for slaves during 1568 was defeated (John Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa, pg 23, 43, 44)

As I have covered before in my article on the Swahili and the Portuguese, the initial bombardment of the coastal cities, the collaboration of some Swahili elites like in Malindi and the political fragmented nature of the coast, only briefly allowed the Portuguese to impose their will on the Swahili cities in the 16th century with varying levels of success, but by the 17th century, the Swahili's resistance through a combination of strategic foreign alliances (Ottomans and Omanis) and sustained local resistance.

Having failed to establish themselves in west Africa, the Portuguese colonists thus set their sights squarely on sub-equatorial Africa, simultaneously expanding into east African coast in the 1500s, west-central Africa in 1550s and South-eastern Africa in 1600s, with a grand vision of uniting their African possessions from all sides.

Portuguese colonial defeats in west-central Africa:

Map of Portuguese invasions of west-central Africa (in red) and counter-attacks by Kongo (blue) and Ndongo (green), beginning with year, name of Portuguese commander (or in the African case; important figure/battle), and colonial possession (in this case only Luanda, and Benguela, see map above)

A complete chronology of Portuguese invasions and defeats in west-central Africa:

In west-central Africa, the Portuguese coastal colony of Angola was to be founded in 1571 (81 years before the Dutch established their south African colony) with the assistance of Kongo's forces to conquer their southern neighbor Ndongo, in return for Portugal assisting Kongo fend off an invasion from an interior group. But this Portuguese army of 600 musketeers didn’t land on Luanda until 1575, and was initially reduced to a mercenary unit used by both Kongo and Ndongo to fight their own internal wars (John Thornton, A History of West-Central Africa, pg 78, 84)

Below I provide a chronology of Portuguese colonial failures and successes in West-central Africa taken from Thornton's "A history of west-central Africa"

`March 1580, a combined Kongo-Portugal army (which was really serving Kongo more than Portugal) was defeated by Ndongo, despite having several hundred Portuguese musketeers (pg 85)

1581-1582, the Portuguese under Dias de Novais manages to secure local alliances of petty rulers (sobas) in the region south of Kongo, against Ndongo, he also build small forts along the kwanza (pg 86)

1585-1586, Ndongo, which feelt threatened by the new Portuguese alliances, decides to attack the Portuguese in the latter's stronghold but is defeated. Both the Ndongo and Portuguese side had musketeers by then unlike the first engament (pg 88)

December 1589, Dias' successor Luis Serrão builds an army of 15,000 with 128 Portuguese musketeers to attack Ndongo in the latter's stronghold but is crushingly defeated at Lukala river by a Ndongo-Matamba force, forcing him back to allied territory (pg 91-93)

In 1594, the Portuguese under Francisco de Almeida sent a force of 130 musketeers and cavalry to raid the Kisama region for slaves and seize its salt mines but was defeated by the dispersed forces of the region armed with spears (pg 101)

In 1596-1598, the Portuguese under Furtado de Mendonça abandoned interior conquests and focused on the vicinity of Luanda along the Bengo river where they scored some minor victories (pg 102)

In 1601-1602, the Portuguese under Rodrigues Coutinho finally manage to score a victory in Kisama after a series of minor defeats from local forces, they secure a few alliances along the way (pg 107)

In 1618, the Portuguese under Cerveira Pereira manage to establish a small colony at Benguela by defeating a local soba and thus winning the alliance of other sobas. Their colony is however much smaller than Angola and even more reliant on the local allied sobas, "The town itself was as much a trading post as a colony" (pg 115,158, 197)

In 1619-1620 while Ndongo was faced with an imbangala threat from the interior, the Portuguese under Mendes de Vasconcelos ally with the imbangala to score a major victory against Ndongo's army and allowing them to expand their Angola colony (pg 117-119)

In December 1622, the Portuguese under Correia de Sousa decides to attack Kongo, with a massive force of 30,000 including several hundred musketeers, he begun with the province of Mbamba whose duke he defeated and advanced to Mbanda Kasi where his forces were crushingly defeated by Kongo's army of 20,000. Correia was forced into exile by the Angolan settlers and died in a lisbon prison, the wrongfully enslaved baKongo were returned to Kongo from Brazil following the demand of Kongo's (pg 129-136)

1626-1629, the Portuguese under Fernão de Sousa resumed operations in Ndongo using imbangala allies and the puppet Ndongo king, he pursued Queen Njinga (who also claimed the throne) (pg 151,155)

September 1642, a combined Dutch-Kongo force scores several victories against the Portuguese incursions in the Dembos regions and along the Bengo river (pg 165)

1644-1648, Queen Njinga of Matamba and Ndongo, fighting with equally matched forces that included Dutch musketeers defeats several Portuguese incursions, managing to advance into the Angolan colony, but she also faces some losses as well. (pg 169-171)

1648, Portuguese incursions east of Kasanje are met with defeat near the source of the Keve river by Ngola Njimbo, as he had done to a similar incursion in 1629 (pg 191)

1649, while the Portuguese under Salvador Correia de Sá e Benevides send an army with 300 musketeers to attack and raid Mbwila (a semi-autonomous vassal of Kongo near the mouth of the Dande river) but fail to score a victory (pg 172)

1665, Kongo and Portuguese Angola under Vidal de Negreiros, support rival claimants of Mbwila's throne, both sent equally matched armies against each other in a lengthy engagement that ended in Kongo's defeat (pg 182)

*Kongo enters civil strife as the province of Soyo emerges as kingmaker

October 1670, Portuguese forces seeking to crush Soyo's power, advanced with an army of 500 musketeers and several thousand allied imbangala but were crushed at Kitombo and the entire force was annihilated (pg 185)

*the Portuguese generally pull back from Large scale interior deployments after this

In 1744, The Portuguese attack Matamba with a massive army of 26,000, but only manage to sack Queen Ana II's capital, the latter of whom had already retreated I anticipation, denying the overextended army a victory (pg 240)

1747, the Portuguese under João Jacques de Magalhães attack the Kisama region near the coast after failing in several campaigns during 1688, 1695, 1710, 1735 to establish Portuguese authority in the region (pg 250)

1756, A Portuguese force combining resources from Angola and Beguela, manages to capture the King of Mbailundu and attempted to install a loyal King but he was overthrown and the Kingdom only maintained nominal vassalage to Portugal, the latter's having no authority outside protecting its traders (pg 299)

Having Failed to expand their colony, the Portuguese sought to reform their small possession of Angola by instituting several reforms that were ultimately failures. The first was to displace Kongo's cloth currency with copper coins, this was abandoned after a year, the second was Lusitanizing the administration and army with qualified Portuguese rather than "mulattos" and Africans, this too failed, the last reform was establishing a steel and iron foundry in Angola, but this too failed (pg 290-291)

The Portuguese would only resume large scale colonial wars into the west-central African interior in the late 19th century. This chronology reveals that despite their intention of establishing a large colony in west-central Africa, the Portuguese armies, with their superior military technology (of guns and ships), their widespread literacy (which was infact quickly adopted by Kongo and some of its neighbors) and their "superior" political organization, they  were nevertheless routinely defeated In their wars with African armies whether the latter were armed with guns or with spears.

The Portuguese colonial invasions and defeats in south-eastern Africa:

Map showing Portuguese colonial possessions and settlements in south-east Africa, and the different invasions by various Portuguese armies (in red), and the counter-attacks by African armies (blue).

A complete chronology of Portuguese colonial invasions and defeats in South-east Africa.

A similar attempt at establishing a colony in the interior of southeast Africa by conquering the Mutapa kingdom also ended in failure. Despite the Portuguese' superiority in military technology with guns and cannons, and an army five times larger than the one Pizarro used to conquer the Inca empire.

In 1572, Francisco Barreto army of 1,000 Portuguese armed with musketeers and supported by cavalry and several African auxiliaries advanced up to Sena but it was ground to a halt as it approached the Maravi forces, while they defeated the Maravi in pitched battle the latter fortified themselves, and the most that the Portuguese captured were a few cows. Another expedition with 700 musketeers in 1573, with even more African auxiliaries and cavalry managed to score some victories in Manica region but eventually retreated, sending another expedition with 200 musketeers that was massacred by an interior force. By 1576, the last remaining Portuguese soldiers from this expedition had left (Malyn Newitt, A history of Mozambique, pg 57-58)

In 1607-1609, the Portuguese under Diogo Simoes Madeira obtained a grant from the Mutapa king Gatse Lucere over all the mines of the kingdom in exchange for the military assistance, he had offered which included 100 musketeers. This in effect, made Mutapa a Portuguese colony although internal divisions among the Portuguese allowed Gatse to restore significant autonomy (Malyn Newitt pg 83-85)

In 1628-1631, the Portuguese deposed Kapararidze, install Mavura as a puppet and an anti-Portuguese revolt sweeps Mutapa led by Kapararidze, resulting in the deaths of 300-400 Portuguese scattered over the Mutapa territory. (Malyn Newitt pg 90)

In 1632, the Portuguese under Diogo de Sousa de Meneses arrive with 200-300 musketeers and 12,000 African auxiliaries, they reestablish Portuguese control over Quelimane and Manica and succeed in defeating Kaparidze and reinstalling Mavura from whom they obtained tribute, effectively securing their colony (Malyn Newitt pg 91-92)

In 1684, the emerging Rozvi kingdom's ruler Changamire managed to score a major victory against the Portuguese musketeers at Maungwe, with a force armed with only bows and arrows (Richard Gray, Portuguese Musketeers, pg 533)

In 1693, Portuguese settlements in Manica and across Mutapa were attacked with a large massacre of Portuguese settlers at Dambarare done by a combined Rozvi-Mutapa force. Mutapa's ruler had since thrown off the Portuguese yoke and this attack effectively ended the colony as the rest of the settlers retreated (Malyn Newitt pg 103)

In 1695, the Rozvi forces descended on Manica and sacked the Portuguese settlements there, sending refugees scurrying back to Sena just as other regions like Kiteve were driving out the Portuguese. By the early 18th century, the Portuguese settlements were confined to Mozambique's section of the Zambezi river beginning at Tete, and other small trading towns in the interior (Malyn Newitt pg 104)

It wasn't until the late 19th century that the Portuguese reestablished control in the Zambezi valley of Mozambique , but even then, their advance was checked by African armies, such as in 1862 against the Swazi (Maylin Newitt pg 296). Like in Central Africa, the Portuguese brought their superior weaponry (including cavalry), widespread literacy and better political organization (managing to establish a large colony), but all three were ultimately rendered impotent on the African battlefield.

In all cases of the Portuguese central African colonial attempts, the disease factor was never a sufficient barrier to colonization, as evidenced by the settler colonies of Angola, Benguela, and Tete, which were firmly under Portuguese control for over four centuries and are today located deep inside the most "tropical disease ridden" regions of the world. Rather, the establishment of Large-scale colonial settlements that characterized late 19th century Africa was prevented by the strength of African armies that repeatedly defeated European incursions and retained their political autonomy.

Africa's geographic orientation: comparing the rate at which plant and animal domesticates were dispersed across the continent.

Jared Diamond argues that on the Eurasian continent, which he says is oriented West to East, food production spread "rapidly" from the fertile crescent to western Europe, as domesticates travelled at a rate of 0.7miles per year (1.1 km/year), while a similar spread of domesticates from Mexico to south-west US, occurred at a "slow" rate of 0.5 miles per year (0.8km/ year).

While acknowledging that Africa had its own independent agricultural revolution in the Sahel from which most its crops such as sorghum, millet, yams, and rice were domesticated before spreading south, He offers examples of animal domesticates (cattle, sheep, goats, and horses), which he says didn't travel across Africa as fast as they did to western Europe. (GGS pg 186-187)

We can therefore use Jared Diamond's definition of rapid vs slow rate of spread to see if Animal and Plant domesticates, both local and foreign, travelled across Africa from their respective homelands slower than they did across western Europe by measuring straight-line distances separating the earliest site of a domesticates appearance on the continent from the furthest site to which it spread.

Map of continental orientations according to Diamond, note that the straight-line distance between Dakar and Mogadishu (red line) is about 90% the distance between Brussels and Beijing (horizontal line across Eurasia), and it's about 95% the distance between Tripoli and Cape town (vertical line across Africa)

Maps of straight-line distances travelled by domesticated animals and plants in Africa between their earliest and furthest points. (taken from Roger Blench)

*Note that these arrows aren't the actual paths taken by the domesticates, nor do their dispersion points denote real archeological sites; the real directions, sites and their corresponding dates are provided in maps below

Dates, Directions and Rates of the dispersal of domesticates across Africa

Goats arrived in Sudan by 5000BC and were in Ghana's Kitampo region nearly 4,000 km west by 2,000 BC (Peter Mitchell et.al pg 494-5)

North-East-West spreading Rate= 1.3km/year (rapid)

Sheep arrived in north Africa in 5000BC and were in south Africa, nearly 6,000 km south by 500BC (Peter Mitchell et.al pg 495-496)

North-South spreading Rate = 1.2km/year (rapid)

Dispersal of Goats and Sheep across Africa. note that the dates are BP not BC

Cattle was in northern Sudan by 5000BC and by 2500BC it was in Mali about 3,000 km west (and in northern Tanzania) , reaching south Africa by 1st century BC , about 6,000 km south (Peter Mitchell et al pg 529, 609, 586, 646)

East-West rate= 1.2km/year

North-South rate= 1.2km/year (rapid)

Rates of travel for plant domesticates as taken from Dorian Fuller's Map (Peter Mitchelle, pg 514)

Pearl millet domesticated in southern Mauritania by 2500BC was in South Africa, nearly 10,00km south, by 100AD (I'm using Nouakchott to Bangui to Johannesburg as a straight-line distance)

West-East-South = 4.16km/yr (rapid)

Finger millet domesticated in the Sahel by 2500BC was in south Africa, nearly 5,000 km away by 700AD. (I'll use Chad's Firki region here)

North-South rate = 2km/year (rapid)

As shown above, the estimated rates of dispersion of domesticates over Africa occurred at a rate just as fast, if not faster than they did across Eurasia according to Jared Diamond's rate of 1.1km/year. While the spread of ruminants occurred slightly faster to England from the near east than through Africa (around 1.4km/year versus 1.2km/year), the same cannot be said for millet which evidently travelled much faster across Africa across a much wider geography and varied climate zones, than wheat did to England (2km/year vs 4-2km/year).

The spread of domesticates across Africa was therefore not significantly determined by the continent's geographic orientation as claimed by Diamond. The biggest fault with his calculations was that he greatly over-estimated the earliest dates for the appearance of ruminants in north Africa by 3,000 years, whether this was a simple error or it was intentionally included to buttress his argument, this alone is symbolic of the hollowness of his grand theory.

Conclusion: Myths and misconceptions of Guns, Germs and Steel.

Diamond's exerts tremendous ingenuity in trying to prove the soundness of his argument but ends up accomplishing much less than he ambitiously claims. His conception of African history as a puzzle wasn't informed by the actual state of African historiography but by the "arrogance" of the continent's historical realities which firmly rejected his 'tidy theoretical presumptions'.

References:

Černý Luísa Pereira, Archeogenetics of Africa.

Krishna et al, An Early Divergence of KhoeSan Ancestors from Those of

Other Modern Humans

Rainer Vossen, The Khoeasan languages

Frank Marlowe, The Hadza: Hunter-gatherers of Tanzania

John Kemp, Malawi and eastern Zambia Malawi and eastern Zambia before the Bantu

Margarida Coelho; On the edge of Bantu expansions: mtDNA, Y chromosome and

lactase persistence genetic variation in southwestern Angola

Jan Vansina, Linguistic Evidence for the Introduction of Ironworking into Bantu-Speaking Africa

Dirk Seidensticker, Population collapse in Congo rainforest from 400 CE

urges reassessment of the Bantu Expansion

J. Robinson, The archeology of frontiers and boundaries

Hewlett and Fancher: Central African Hunter-Gatherer research traditions

Guille-Escuret: La révolution agricole des Pygmées aka

Catherine Panter-Brick, Hunter-gatherers : an interdisciplinary perspective

John Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa

John Thornton, A History of West-Central Africa

Malyn Newitt, A history of Mozambique

Richard Gray, Portuguese Musketeers on the Zambezi

Roger Blench, Ethnographic and linguistic evidence for the prehistory of African ruminant livestock, horses and ponies

Peter Mitchell, The Oxford Handbook of African Archaeology

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Comments

Kwame Appiagyei-Opoku

I will say that the climate in Luanda, Angola assisted with the Portuguse not being defeated like they were in Senegambia, Ghana, and other places.

Kwame Appiagyei-Opoku

South of Luanda is drier and less humid compared to other parts of Atlantic Africa until you get to the Senegal region above Casamance. Their climate is similar to Angola's. Another reason why I am wondering why they didn't at least attempt to conquer them and have some type of loose influence

Dadboddeathsquad

Amazing article! I see "geographic realities" usually cited as the explanation for colonization. I was unaware how difficult it was for the Portuguese to colonize West Africa due to the military might of the states there.

Isaac Samuel

very true, and the portuguese had a history in west Africa's sene-gambia region too but it was virtually impossible for them to make landfall with any army because the navies of the small kingdoms along the coast defeated each incursion. the portuguese then sent several embassies to the mali emperor and several other kings that called for peaceful trade, and when they were finally accepted to come peacefully, thats when they managed to set up a small "factory" in wadan - a city in mauritania, but they were later outcompeted and had to abandon it. i hope to write something about that soon as well, its a fascinating era