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For centuries, Africans had been travelling across Europe and the near east; Christian Africans from Nubia and Ethiopia travelled to Constantinople and Spain, while Muslim Africans from Ghana and Mali travelled to Andalusia, and the famous pilgrimage of Mansa Musa which travelled through Mamluk Egypt dazzled European traders in Cairo. Beginning in 1444, Europeans begun arriving on the west African mainland onboard Portuguese ships. Unlike the peaceful African travelers however, many of the Europeans travelling along the west-African coast were engaged in raiding, piracy and establishing colonial enclaves, as part of the petty warfare which characterized the western Mediterranean at the time.

In 1446, a foolhardly Portuguese captain, lured by the prospect of kidnapping slaves and conquering lands for the king of Portugal, led his men to their deaths on the westernmost coastal provinces of the Mali empire between Senegal and Guinea. Over the following decade from 1446-1456, every attempt made by the Portuguese to land on Mali's coast was met with resounding defeat. It wasn't until 1913 when the Portuguese general Teixeira Pinto led a second wave of military expeditions into the interior of Guinea, that the Portuguese could establish a colony in west Africa.

This article explores the history of Mali's contacts with the Portuguese; from the initial warfare to the peaceful era of gold trade through Elmina and Wadan, to the arrival of Portuguese envoys at the court of the Mali emperor. It explains the role played by the Mali empire in preventing the establishment of Portuguese colonies on the west African mainland for nearly 470 years.

ruins of Wadan in southern Mauritania, where a short-lived Portuguese factory was established in 1487

Mali's vassal states along the Atlantic coast

The fifteenth century was a time of political division in the western Sudan, when the Empire of Mali was in decline and the new power of Songhay was only beginning to ascend.

While Mali had expanded over much of the region between the Senegal and Gambia rivers early in its establishment during the 13th century, the regions along the Senegal river had broken off by the early 15th century to form the Jolof empire/confederation under Njajane Njaye, consisting of the kingdoms of Walo, Cayor/Kayor, and Baol, that were led by a mostly Wolof-speaking elite and, all of which were provinces of Mali but were by then virtually autonomous. The regions to its south beginning with the Saloum river, the Gambia river, the Cassamance river (these are in Senegal and Gambia) as well as the Cacheu river and the Geba river (in Guinea) were still under Mali's control. The former two which were mostly under Mali's provinces such as Kaabu and Mali's lords such as the Farim/Faran of Sankolla, while the rest were led by various "mansas" who directly paid allegiance to the Mali emperor.

(African dominion pg 152-153, cross-cultural pg 196 n153, Senegambia and the Atlantic pg 8-7)

Maps showing the Mali empire at its height in the 14th century, versus during its decline in the late 15th century, where the empires of Jolof/Cayor, Songhai and Great Fulo/Futa Toro emerged

The first Portuguese expeditions into the Sene-gambia and Guinea coasts during the 1440s-60s were merely extensions of earlier raids on the southern Saharan coast, which in their turn were an extension of the religiously justified petty warfare and piracy that plagued the western Mediterranean during this period. Slaves and other booty were their main objective; Various kidnapping episodes along the coast of Jolof meant that the bad reputation which the Portuguese had acquired along the Saharan coast of southern Mauritania followed them southwards. After the initial shock of encountering the large ships, the African armies were alerted to the new threat and quickly readied a response.

(cross-cultural pg 168-169)

The African infantry which the Portuguese first encountered on reaching the coastal territories of Jolof and Mali in 1444-5 carried a tough leather-covered shield, a javelin or a lance, a sword or long knife, and frequently used bow and arrows with poisoned tips to great effect. The watercraft used by their navies, which mostly operated in rivers but were quickly repurposed for the sea, consisted of shallow draught watercraft such as large dugout canoes that could carry upto 40 men armed with the same weapons, and were directed using paddles or oars.

(Warfare in Atlantic Africa pg 23, 27, 29)

In 1446, a well-armed Portuguese expedition consisting of 22 soldiers led by Nuno Tristao, sailed up the mouth of the Saloum river but was met with 12 boats carrying "as many as seventy or eighty Guineas, all Negroes, with bows in their hands" that fired at them and paddled fast to engage them in combat, the Portuguese fled but the African army remained in pursuit, raining a hail of arrows on the ship that the Portuguese were trying to board. In the end, none of the 22 Portuguese survived the battle, all having died of their wounds. "for that poison was so artfully composed that a slight wound, if it only let blood, brought men to their last end". In the same year, another Portuguese party led by Alvaro Fernandez sailed down Mali's coast, captured two women and drew the attention of the local forces, who with "four or five boats of Guineas prepared like men who would defend their land". The Portuguese having learned their earlier lesson, quickly retreated "seeing the great advantage their enemies had, and especially because they feared the great peril that lay in the poison with which they shot". The African navy pursued them and even shot Alvaro with an arrow as he was escaping. One last timid attempt was made at landing a Portuguese party, but the approach of "120 Guineas, some with shields and assegais, others with bows", quickly sent the invaders into retreat.

( The Chronicle 2, pg 252-254, 258-261)

The Portuguese came to learn that their weaponry, sailing ships armed with artillery, and later fortifications, were of little advantage in African warfare. In confined coastal waters and on rivers, the sailing ships were vulnerable to concentrated attacks by large war canoes and often fell prey to determined African parties, the soldier's metal armor was uncomfortable in the humid climate, and their firearms were often too clumsy and couldn't be loaded fired frequently. African weaponry and tactics were still highly effective against them, and poisoned arrows usually caused horrible damage.

(cross cultural pg 177)

The Portuguese continued their raiding activities despite the death of Nuno Tristao and opposition from most Portuguese against "fighting with men who so plainly carried death about with them". In 1447, an armed party led by Stevam Affonso and Diegaffonso travelled up the Geba river where they were ambushed by "Guineas" who "issued out against them from one side with their assegais and bows" and charged at them for close combat such that half the party died and the rest quickly retreated. After these losses, the Portuguese briefly confined their raiding activities in the Berber populated regions, but eventually ceased their petty skirmishes.

(The Chronicle 2 pg 264)

The cumulative loss of life and diminishing returns from raiding, persuaded the Portuguese to seek peaceful relations and trade rather than combat and military glory. The effects of these Portuguese defeats by the states in the Senegambia and Guinea, especially compared to their virtually unchallenged raiding along the Sahara coast that enslaved hundreds of Berbers, was such that Prince Henry the navigator "decreed that crusading there was to be replaced by peaceful trading". Although this decree wasn't immediately put into practice considering the more pressing demands King Afonso V (r. 1438-1477) was facing, diplomacy eventually became the default relationship of all future Portuguese missions in west Africa, especially during the reign of Afonso's successor king John II (r. 1477-1495).

(Spain, Portugal and the Atlantic pg 219)

The road to Diplomacy: from traders to envoys

Initially, mutual distrust often sabotaged well-meant attempts at normal relations. The Portuguese slave-raiding activities which seemed unexplainable to those on the African mainland along the Gambia river, led the Africans to perceive the Portuguese  as "cannibals" who should be killed and have their possession taken. This was especially true in the regions dominated by Mali which were even more hostile to any Portuguese party that approached them --whether militarily or diplomatically-- than the territories under Jolof.

(cross cultural pg 170)

By 1445 for example, peaceful trading relations had been established with all the major coastal Jolof states, which had also successfully defeated each Portuguese incursion onto their coast that lasted less than a year after first contact in 1444, but fierce fighting continued with Mali's vassals for nearly a decade as explained above. But by 1456, the combined diplomatic efforts of Cadamosto and Diogo Gomes led to the establishment of peaceful trading relations with several of Mali's vassal states in the Gambia region, including Badibu, Niani, Wuli, Sankolla, and Niumi. The majority of these early Portuguese negotiations with the vassals of Mali had to do with trading arrangements; once the Portuguese had succeeded in establishing their reputation as traders rather than raiders, they acquired the same standing and received the same treatment from the local societies as did any other visiting merchants. The success of both the trading sessions and long-term commercial relations depended on the development of customs, traditions, and practices that would guarantee Portuguese as well as African interests. The advantage in negotiations often lay with the Africans, because they could always appeal to the local political authority, but the Portuguese couldn't as the crown's capacity to intervene was extremely limited and often ineffective.

(cross cultural pg 174-175)

The Portuguese came to rely upon established African institutions governing relationships between "landlords" and strangers, in which the latter (in this case -the Portuguese) would have to attach themselves to a local African protector (the landlord) who, in exchange for commission, would represent the stranger in the community, look after their commercial interests and assume liability of their actions. It's in the context of this institution that the Portuguese established what were initially semi-permanent trading outposts on the mainland. These outposts -later called "factories" and "forts", weren't similar to colonial enclaves of the later centuries, nor were they primarily fortified against the African mainland, but were instead small establishments set up on land leased from African rulers, and were completely at the mercy of the same African hosts, not just for trade but for security, basic provisions and general survival.

(cross cultural pg 175-176)

The road to imperial Mali: a short-lived Portuguese factory at Wadan

Knowledge about the Mali empire was spread to the Portuguese from their contacts in Wadan, the Jolof states and the Malian vassals in the Gambia region. The Mansa of Mali was seen as the titular paramount ruler of the West African interior, and the frequent mention of "Mandi Mansa" in Portuguese texts reflected earlier knowledge acquired by the Europeans about Mansa Musa's famous pilgrimage. For example, the abovementioned Alvaro Fernandez, who led a failed expedition into Mali territory along the coast, mentions "the land of Mandimansa where resides the emperor of all these kings", and Cadamosto, who led a diplomatic mission to the same region, refers to the "Meli imperio nigri"and "lo Imperador de Meli chera si gran signor di negri".

(cross-cultural pg 195)

Diego Gomes, who also led a diplomatic mission to the coast of Mali in the 1450s, is told that the “king Bormelli,” (or; Buur, ruler of Mali), controlled the “land of the gold,” and that “all the land of the blacks on the right bank of the river [Gambia] were under his dominion and that he lived in the city of Kukia.” The last reference in particular reflected a conflation of Mali and Kukia (Gao) the capital of the rising empire of Songhay under Sunni Ali, who would capture the several of Mali's eastern territories including; Timbuktu in 1468, Djenne in 1477, and was campaigning in the Adrar region of southern Mauritania by the 1470s where he captured Walata and other towns including Wadan, which remained in Songhay's control until shortly after Moroccan invasion in 1593.

(African Dominion pg 153, 189-191, Timbuktu and Songhay pg 93-97, 166,219)

Unlike his predecessor, the young king John II of Portugal had more ambitious plans with regards to his newly-found African trading partners that went beyond expanding commercial relations. John II had committed himself to Christian proselytization in the west-African states through peaceful methods since earlier attempts at forceful domination had failed. Even though the Portuguese raiding activities in the 1440s and 50s could hardly qualify as proselytization, they were revised as such after John II revived his commitment to the papal bull of 1455 that granted the Portuguese a "monopoly" over the African Atlantic against other European states. Its therefore during John II's reign that we find the earliest record of direct political/military assistance/alliance offered by the Portuguese crown to a west-African ruler in exchange for accepting Catholicism. A wolof prince named Benmui/Bemoí who was beset by a civil war in the Jolof empire, requested John II for military aid but the latter conditioned this aid on the former becoming a catholic. Benmui thus travelled to Lisbon where he was given a lavish reception and was converted, and came back to Africa with a large Portuguese force inorder to serve as Portugal's vassal, but was killed by the same force's leader presumably after many of the soldiers had died of a fever.

(Spain, Portugal and the Atlantic pg 220-221)

It's during this period in the 1480s, that the Portuguese established three main permanent trading outposts on the African mainland the late 15th century that grew out of the semi-permanent outposts described earlier. These included; Elmina on the Gold Coast (1482), at Wadan in Mauritania (1487), and at later at Gwato in Benin (late 1490s).

Wadan/Ouadane is referred to in Portuguese sources as Audem/Huaden. It was a town of 300 people (certainly an underestimate) who were Muslim and were called Ezarziguy (speakers of Azer/Azay, a soninke language) but under the control of the Azenegues (zenaga/sanhaja Berbers). Wadan reportedly had "a great traffic in gold, which is brought overland from Guinea; it was even greater before the mine (Elmina)". In 1487, a Portuguese factor named Rodrigo Reinel was sent by King John II to establish a factory there, and Rodrigo was to be assisted by Diego Borges and Gonçalo d'Antas. The Portuguese factor was established upon the authorization of Sunni Ali, the emperor of Songhai, who -as the successor of the Mali empire- was the paramount authority over the southern sanhaja chieftaincies that controlled the Adrar region. But the factory was abandoned shortly after because the Sanhaja became hostile and Rodrigo and his companions were all forced to flee.

(Esmeraldo pg 75, L'Asia del s. Giouanni di Barros pg 58, Ancient Ghana and Mali pg 154, 163, On trans-saharan trails pg 81-82, 87, Salts of the Western Sahara pg 248-249, )

Arriving at the capital of Mali: Portuguese envoys at the court of Mansa Musa's grandson and the gold trade of Mali through Elmina.

Undeterred by the failure of Wadan and emboldened by the success of Elmina, John II dispatched three major diplomatic missions to the African mainland in the 1480s. An eight-member embassy led by Pêro d'Evora and Gonçaleanes was sent out to open relations with the rulers of states to the king of Timbuktu (Songhay) and to the king of Takrur (Mali). The delegation took with them "horses, azemalas (oxen), and mules with fine harnesses" to present them to these rulers. But the mission to Timbuktu ended in failure, of the eight members of the delegation sent to open relations, only one survived the voyage, the rest having succumbed to disease.

(da Asia by João de Barros, pg 257 )

During this time, a significant trade in Gold proceeded southwards into Elmina from the goldfields under Mali's control, and as mentioned above, this traffic was significantly redirecting the older northbound gold trade through Wadan. This trade, which exploded from 8,000 ounces a year in 1480s to 22,500 ounces by 1494, was being conducted by 'Mandingas' (Wangara) merchants who came from the Mali empire. Even when Elmina was only a semi-permanent outpost, a voyager named Eustache De La Fosse, had in his 1479 account of its trade referred to two dignitaries who visited Elmina that were titled 'manse' (Mansa) and the 'caramanse'; titles which he glossed correctly as "king" and "vice". "Mansa" was an aristocratic title used in the Mali empire, and the two dignitaries at Elmina indicated that Mali's rulers were aware of the Portuguese presence, and may have initiated diplomatic contact with Portugal.

(Wangara, Akan and Portuguese 1 pg 336-337)

The Portuguese envoys which set out for the Mali empire between the years 1493-1495 met Muhammad b. 'Manzugul' b. Musa, (ie; Muhammad the grandson of the Mansa Musa II who ruled over Mali from I373/4 to I387/8)

"This Moorish king" wrote De Barros, "in reply to our King's message, amazed at this novelty  [of the embassy]- said that none of the four thousand four hundred and four kings from whom he descended, had received a message or had seen a messenger of a Christian king, nor had he heard of more powerful kings than these four: the King of Alimaem [Yemen], the King of Baldac [Baghdad], the King of Cairo, and the King of Tucurol [Takrur, ie; Mali itself]"

(Wangara, Akan and Portuguese I pg 338-339, Asia by João de Barros pg 260-261

While no account of the envoys' negotiations at the capital of Mali were recorded, it seems that the Malian authorities were not particularly receptive to the overtures of the Portuguese, as no further delegations were sent by the crown, but instead, one embassy was sent by Joao Da Barros in his own capacity as captain of Elmina in 1534 to the grandson of the abovementioned Mansa.

(da Asia by João de Barros pg 257)

Despite de Barros' embassy and the report of peace between Mali and its new neighbors to the north (Great Fulo and Songhai), the gold trade to Elmina rapidly declined during to less than 6,000 ounces a year by 1550, having been gradually displaced by the growing demand for captives.

(Wangara, Akan and Portuguese II pg 465-6, da Asia by João de Barros pg 257)

Conclusion: the Mali empire's role in the 470 year gap between the Portuguese arrival and later conquest of Guinea.

de Barros' embassy from Elmina to the capital of Mali was the last of the Portuguese overtures in the west African mainland. The closure of the factories at Wadan in the late 1480s, and Gwato in the 1510s, confined Portuguese activities to Elmina (est. 1482) and Axim (est. 1515), the former of which was later captured by the Dutch in 1637, forcing the Portuguese to move to confine their trading activities to what is now Guinea-Bissau beginning with the small forts at Cacheu (est. 1589) and Bissau (est. 1687), as well as in Benin republic at Ouidah (est. 1721), which were all established with the consent of the local kings (especially Cacheu and Bissau). Most of them were poorly manned (especially Elmina) and could be easily besieged by the African rulers, cut off from supplies, and raided at will.

(A cultural History of the Atlantic pg 252, The Portuguese in west Africa pg 15, 205, cross-cultural pg 177-178)

The forts of Cacheu and Bissau, were until 1890s the only Portuguese possessions in Guniea

Even though the beleaguered empire of Mali was in the throes of decline, Its vassals along the coast were still strong enough to repel any Portuguese attack, and force the invaders to negotiate on African terms and conduct trade according to African laws. In the following years, as Portuguese ships reached further along the coast (in the Gold coast 1470s, Benin kingdom 1480s and Kongo 1480s), showed that they have learned from the lessons in the Sene-gambia and Guniea regions. Not even attempting to raid the coasts, they went immediately to establish diplomatic contacts with the political authorities they met (the Oba and the maniKongo), inviting them to send ambassadors to Lisbon with the hope that this might spread Christianity and create alliances. Mali's vassals had earned the respect of the Portuguese in the way that the Berbers couldn't.

(Africa and Africans in the making of the Atlantic world pg 38-39)

Despite the Portuguese retreat from the west-African mainland, its colonial expansion into west-central Africa (Angola), south-east Africa (Mutapa) and East Africa (Mombasa to Mozambique) shows that their withdraw was largely determined by African resistance, the same resistance that led to their eventual withdraw from Mutapa and Mombasa after a series of defeats, and the same resistance that forced them to send diplomatic envoys to the states which had affirmed their independence.

Portuguese military expeditions of the 1440s-50s into the Senegambia and Guinea mainland which had been defeated by African forces, would not be repeated until the late 19th century when Portugal had acquired a decisive technological advantage. Only in 1915 did the Portuguese general Teixeira Pinto manage to subjugate most of mainland Guinea after a brutal 2-year war. But even then, pacification campaigns continued until 1936, and the Portuguese were ultimately expelled from Guinea in 1974 after a 9 year war of independence.

(Silences and Soundbites pg 83-84)

References

Spain, Portugal and the Atlantic Frontier of Medieval Europe by Jose-Juan Lopez-Portillo

The chronicle of the discovery and conquest of Guinea 2, by Gomes Eanes de Zurara

Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis by Duarte Pacheco Pereira

da Asia by João de Barros

The Portuguese in West Africa, 1415–1670 by M. D. D. Newitt

A cultural History of the Atlantic world by J. Thornton

Africa and Africans in the making of the Atlantic world by J. Thornton

Silences and Soundbites by Philip J. Havik

African dominion by M. Gomez

Cross-Cultural Trade and Diplomacy: Portuguese Relations with West Africa, 1441-1521 by Ivana Elbl

Senegambia and the Atlantic slave trade by Boubacar Barry

Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500-1800 by John Thornton

Timbuktu and the Songhay Empire by John Hunwick

Ancient Ghana and Mali by N Levtzion

On Trans-Saharan Trails by Ghislaine Lydon

Salts of the Western Sahara by EA McDougall

Wangara, Akan and Portuguese 1 by I. Wilks

Wangara, Akan and Portuguese 2, by I. Wilks

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