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The thirty years' war was one of the most brutal conflicts in human history that resulted in the deaths of approximately 8 million people from the military battles, famine and disease which ravaged Europe and its Atlantic colonies between 1618 and 1648. While the war was primarily fought in Europe, the rivaries between the European states spread beyond the continent and presented a unique opportunity for African states to exploit.

The kingdom of Kongo was the most significant African power best positioned to exploit a European rivary in the Atlantic world. Kongo had been the sole regional power of west-central Africa before the arrival of the Portuguese at Luanda (Angola) presented a new challenge that threatened its autonomy. Kongo's elite was well informed about local conflicts and rivaries in Europe, so when the thirty year's broke out, envoys from Kongo travelled regulary across Europe and Brazil to forge military alliances with the Dutch republic against the Portuguese. Together with the kingdom of Ndongo led by Queen Njinga, the combined forces of Kongo, Ndongo and the Dutch crushed the Portuguese in several battles and halted its colonial advance. Kongo and Ndongo used Dutch soldiers and firepower to defeat Portugal, in strategic alliances that expired as soon as the desired objectives of the African kingdoms were met.

This article explores the African dimension of Europe's thirty year's war, explaining how African states were able to exploit European rivaries for their own interests.

Dutch delegation at the court of the King of Kongo, 1641, in Olfert Dapper, Naukeurige beschrijvinge van den Afrikaensche gewesten (Amsterdam, 1668)

Portrait of Dom Miguel de Castro, Emissary of Congo, 1643, National Gallery of Denmark

Brief background of the Dutch-Portuguese rivary in the Atlantic and the thirty years war.

When the Dutch Republic (1579-1795) entered Atlantic waters during the 1590s, the Spanish and Portuguese had already established a dominant position in the Atlantic for more than a century. The two Iberian kingdoms had united in 1580, and given their monopoly over colonizing the Atlantic world and controlling its trade, the activities of other European states like France, England and the Dutch were confined to raiding Iberian shipping. Ultimately, the unified Iberian empire's failed attempts at controlling Bohemia (in south-western Germany), while fighting a Dutch revolt, pitted them against several European states in a large scale conflict that inevitably spread to the Atlantic.

The flow of Spanish silver from mines in Brazil had been crucial for the conduct of European wars since the late 16th century, and profits of sugar trading and their related slave trade were added to the Spanish silver once Spain and Portugal were united. Attempts to redirect or severe these resource flows were an integral part of the Atlantic policies of the Iberian kingdoms versus the so-called "Low countries" during the thirty years war. In the early 16th century, these "Low Countries" (Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands) were politically under the Spanish Habsburg empire. But beginning in 1568, the low countries fought an eighty-year war of independence that led to the creation of the Dutch republic, its involvement in the thirty years war and its eventual independence from Spain.

(Brothers in Arms pg 15-21, The kingdom of Kongo and the Thirty years' war pg 191)

As part of their rivary with the Spanish empire, the Dutch republic's federal assembly, known as the States-General, devised a grand plan (Groot Desseyn) to cut off Spanish participation in the war by breaking its links to the Atlantic. While the plan's immediate objectives were of a military nature, it had a more long term commercial objective that was part of the two empires' longstanding commercial rivary. The Dutch republic thus created the 'West India Company' (WIC) as a charter corporation in 1621 to conduct Dutch commercial activities in the Atlantic. The WIC immediately became a major competitor of the Iberian interests in west and central Africa, displacing the Portuguese in ivory and copper trade from the kingdom of Kongo.

(Brothers in Arms pg 25-32, The Kingdom of Kongo and the Thirty years' war pg 192-193)

Brief background of the relationship between the Kingdoms of Kongo and Ndongo, and the Portuguese

For most of its early history, the kingdom of Kongo was the regional power of west central Africa. However, the kingdom's rapid expansion in the 16th century and its increasing centralization of power, had some negative side-effects; most notable among which was the invasion of the 'Jaga' in the 1560s which had led to an alliance of convenience between Kongo and Portugual that ultimately ended with the creation of the colonial enclave of Angola whose capital was Luanda in 1576. Internally, Kongo's period of rapid expansion and centralization had undermined the kingdom's royal sucession system from one where Kings were elected by the state council, to one where Kings seized power using the support of some of the kingdom's provinces controlled by allies of the king's royal house.

These sucession disputes were brief periods of weakness in which the kingdom's status as a regional power was challenged both internally --by provinces such Soyo that couldn't produce Kings-- or externally by the Portuguese colony of Angola, whose governors were always intent on reducing Kongo to vassalage and instigating conflicts to acquire more slaves. Neverthless, Kongo's centralizing institutions always prevailed for much of the 16th and 17th century, and the kingdom's status as a regional power in the Atlantic world was retained. Kongo's significance in the Atlantic political system was such that it was one of the few African kingdoms which routinely repatriated its own citizens from the Americas when they were illegally enslaved. Additionally, Kongo regulary sent its envoys, students and merchants across Europe where they resided in Lisbon, Madrid and Rome, as official guests representing Kongo in Europe. From its extensive contacts with European states, Kongo could sucessfully navigate Europe's political landscape as it forged religious, political and commercial alliances as long as they conformed to Kongo's own interests.

(see this article for more on Kongo and the Portuguese)

The kingdom of Kongo's intimate knowledge of Europe's political landscape and intra-European affairs was a product of the kingdom's robust political institutions and diplomacy that was enhanced by the kingdom's early adoption of a number of Iberian cultural traits including Catholicism and Iberian titlelature. Kongo's kings institutionalized Christianity across the kingdom, adopted Iberian titles, and through their embassies to Rome, suceeded in raising the capital Mbanza Kongo, to an episcopal see of Sao Salvador. However, the relationship between Portuguese Angola and Kongo later became estranged as a result of the two state's conflicting goals in west-central Africa's regional politics, especially with regards to Kongo's southern neighbor - the kingdom of Ndongo.

(Under the sign of the cross, Early Kongo-Portuguese relations)

Don Antonio Manuele de Funta, Ambassador of the King of the Kongo to the Pope. Rome: Giovanni Antonio di Paoli, 1608.

The colony of Angola around Luanda had been acquired from Kongo by Portugal in exchange for the latter's assistance against the Jaga invasion. But Luanda was within the hinterland of the kingdom of Ndongo, an upstart state that was challenging Kongo's regional power status and opposed the Portuguese encroachment. A combined Kongo-Portugal army intent on colonising Ndongo had been crushed by Ndongo's army in 1580, and several more invasions from Luanda directed against Ndongo met a similar fate in 1589 and 1594. These defeats forced the Portuguese to forge an alliance with the fearsome marauding bands called the imbangala who sucessfully invaded Ndongo and defeated its armies on several occasions from 1618-1621, expanding their control as far as Ambaca where they built a fort. Flush with victory, the Portuguese set their sights on Kongo, preparing for a major invasion to annex the kingdom's southern provinces.

(See this article for more on Queen Njinga and the Portuguese)

During the Portuguese invasion of Ndongo, the kingdom of Kongo was ruled by Alvaro III (1615-1621) who chose to stay out of Ndongo's internal struggles as he had his own to deal with in Kongo. His very ascension to the throne was contested as he had been installed by António da Silva, a provincial lord from the royal House of Kongo's Soyo province. Besides a handful of internal challenges to his power were the ecclesiastical challenges of Portuguese priests undermining his authority that forced him to send embassies to Rome in 1619 asking for capuchin (Italian) priests free from Iberian influence. Upon Alvaro's death in 1621, a major sucession conflict was averted when Pedro II was elected as King, and prepared to counter-attack the Portuguese in Angola whose ambitious governor Joao Correia de Sousa had defeated the Kongo province of Mbamba in December 1622 and were advancing to Kongo's capital. Kongo's army that was personally led by Pedro II, defeated the Portuguese at the battle of Mbanda Kasi in March 1623.

(A reinterpretation of the Kongo-Portuguese war pg 238-241)

The first Kongo-Dutch alliance against the Portuguese: 1623-1625

The aftermath of the Portuguese defeat was perhaps the lowest point in Portugal's colonial history in central Africa, and this was largely due to the actions of Pedro to forestall Luanda's ambitions. Between January and March of 1623, Pedro wrote several letters to the Vatican and to King Charles II of the unified Iberian empire, protesting the unjustified invasion and the capture of Kongo's citizens as slaves who he demanded be returned. To apply more diplomatic pressure on Charles, Kongo's king Pedro also wrote to the Dutch republic's States General for a military alliance to permanently expel the Portuguese, in which Kongo's army would attack Luanda from land in coordination with a Dutch seaborne attack. Pedro was proposing hiring the Dutch as mercenaries, outlining a plan to pay them in ivory and silver, and as a further concession to allow them to occupy Luanda in place of the Portuguese. Pedro's initiative undoubtedly influenced the Dutch to extend their 'Grand Plan' to west-central Africa, and take over Portuguese colonies rather than confining their activities to raiding Iberian shipping.

(A reinterpretation of the Kongo-Portuguese war pg 240)

Threatened by the Kongo-Dutch alliance, The Portuguese in Angola moved quickly to restore its diplomatic relations with Kongo. The Overseas Council in Lisbon ordered the return of governor Joao Correia de Sousa to Portugal ‘in chains’, and immediately begun to repatriate Kongo's citizens who had been illegally enslaved in Brazil. The latter process eventually saw the return of over 1,000 Kongolese from Brazil by 1625, which would remain the largest number of freed Africans returning to their homeland before to the 19th century. De Sousa's replacement in Luanda was the bishop of Angola, Simao de Mascarhenas, who took office in August 1623 and begun negotiations with Pedro by sending embassies to the king's court. Pedro pressed more demands on de Mascarhenas' envoy, asking that Angola withdraws from the fort of Ambaca (in Ndongo). Its likely that Pedro had also created an anti-Portuguese alliance with Ndongo as well, in a well-crafted political strategy not so dissimilar to the Dutch's 'grand plan'.

(A history of west-Central Africa pg 131-132, A reinterpretation of the Kongo-Portuguese war pg 242)

The Dutch were the most important partner in Pedro's grand plan to expel the Portuguese, and its this unlikely alliance between a Catholic African power and a protestant European power that created a west-central African wing of Europe's thirty year's war. Kongo's longstanding commercial relationship with the Dutch (and other European states) provided Pedro with up-to-date information of Political events in Europe, including the expiry of the Dutch-Spanish truce of 1621. It had been nearly two decades since the Dutch first arrived in Kongo around 1593, and had developed their commercial relationship further in 1606 when they were warmly received in Kongo's province of Soyo, whose count Miguel da Silva sent a letter to the Dutch states General in 1607 proposing a commercial alliance with the WIC.

The Portuguese attempted to cut off the Dutch by attacking the latter's ships at sea and requesting Miguel da Silva for permission to construct a fort on Soyo's coast in 1609. But this request was denied, and a similar request to Kongo's king Alvaro II, Soyo's overlord, was also denied. Soyo's navy assisted the Dutch in repelling a Portuguese seaborne attack, and Alvaro ordered Miguel da Silva to write to the Dutch, asking them to set up trading stations in Soyo. By 1619, there were four Dutch factories in Soyo, which were soon connected to the Dutch forts in the kingdom of Loango, the northern neighbor of Soyo.

(Brothers in Arms pg 84-86)

Therefore when King Pedro and count Antonio Manuel of Soyo sent a letter to the Dutch State's general in 1623, they were both building on an established diplomatic custom. King Pedro's letter was carried by Joris Pietersen, a WIC merchant who was active on the coasts of Kongo and Loango. Coincidentally, the Dutch had been hoping to cut off the link between Spain-Portugal's colonies of Brazil and Angola, so they sent a reconnaissance mission led by Philips van Zuylen to attack the latter on August 1623. It arrived a few months later, blockaded Luanda in June 1624, sunk Portuguese ships and sailed to Soyo where it was well received. Kongo mistakenly thought van Zuylen's fleet was the one they had requested, but king Pedro's letter had infact only arrived in the Netherlands a month after van Zulyen had sailed off and van Zulyen's fleet of 3 ships with 142 men wasn't enough for the sort of military campaign Pedro hoped for. Nevertheless, the Dutch would respond positively to Kongo's request, mustering a massive fleet of 26 ships and 3,300 men under the command of Jacob Willekens to capture Brazil, of which 3 ships and 500 men command of Piet Heyn sailed to Luanda with the letter from king Pedro.

(The kingdom of kongo and the thirty years' war pg 200-201, A reinterpretation of the Kongo-Portuguese war pg 243-244)

By the time the Piet Heyn arrived at Luanda in October 1624, Kongo's internal politics had obfuscated any need for the proposed alliance. King Pedro had died in April 1624 and was replaced by his teenage son Garcia I (r. 1624-1626) who faced major opposition from the established royal house of Kwilu that was in power before Pedro's reign. Additionally, the Portuguese in Angola had concluded their peace treaty in Kongo and there was now a new governor in Luanda named Fernao de Sousa who fortified the town in addition to bringing 1,800 Portuguese soldiers and thousands of Imbangala allies. It was therefore not an ideal time for Kongo to launch a major invasion of Angola so the Dutch alliance had to be put on hold. Therefore when Piet Heyn arrived at Soyo in December 1624, count Manuel rejected the Kongo-Dutch alliance, saying there was a new king on the throne who was a friend of the Portuguese. Angered at what he saw as Kongo duplicity, Piet Heyn's fleet sailed off, joining his peers in Brazil, which would also be lost a few months later as the Dutch briefly withdrew from the southern Atlantic.

(The kingdom of Kongo and the thirty years' war pg 203, Brothers in Arms pg 196-200)

The second Kongo-Dutch alliance from 1640-1648, and the Ndongo-Dutch alliance of Queen Njinga

As the thirty years' war and the conflict between the Dutch and Spain-Portugal continued both in Europe and in the Indian ocean, the fortunes of the WIC appeared to be in decline as it reduced to raiding Iberian shipping, an activity that Piet Heyn excelled in. And in Kongo, king Garcia was deposed by a rebellion led by the House of Kwilu, which put Ambrosio (r. 1626-1631) on the throne. Around the same time, Soyo's count Manuel was suceeded by Paulo, an ally of Garcia, who despite sympathizing with the Dutch, was forced to expel them on Ambrosio's orders. The WIC's fortunes changed in 1628 dramatically when Piet Heyn's fleet captured the entire Spanish treasure fleet loaded with silver near Cuba. The Dutch then captured the Portuguese colony of Pernambuco in Brazil in 1630, and established themselves at its capital Recife. But they decided against attacking Luanda since they didn't have Kongo's support, but instead continued raiding Iberian shipping.

(A history of west-central Africa pg 148-150, The kingdom of Kongo and the thirty years' war pg 204-205)

In 1635, one such Dutch raid was defeated by a Portuguese fleet off Angola, forcing the survivors to flee to Soyo where they were received by count Paulo. But despite his openness to Dutch interests, Paulo was eventually forced to expel the Dutch in 1640 after repeated demands from the reigning king of kongo Alvaro VI (1636-1641). Despite their firm control of Recife, the Dutch stayed out of west-central Africa until they could obtain Kongo's support. And such support came when in 1640, the ambitious duke Afonso from the kongo province of Mbamba sent a letter to the expelled Dutch proposing an alliance once he the duke seized Kongo's throne. In February 1641, Alvaro died of poisoning, and duke Afonso marched on the capital, where he was enthroned as king Garcia II. By May 1641, king Garcia had sent his own envoys to Recife who then proceeded to the Netherlands to ask the Dutch States-General to send an armada for a joint attack Angola. This effectively renewed the Kongo-Dutch alliance, and yet again, on Kongo's initiative.

(The kingdom of Kongo and the thirty years' war pg 207-208)

Dutch ships on the roadstead of Recife, Brazil, 1640, Het Scheepvaartmuseum

In the same month that Garcia II recreated the Kongo-Dutch alliance, the WIC sent a large fleet under the command of Cornelius Jol that arrived in Luanda in August 1641, took the city with no resistance as the Portuguese had fled inland to Bengo about 20 miles from Luanda. Portugal was now independent of Spain and its king Joao IV, sent envoys to Kongo to prevent a Kongo-Dutch alliance. Shortly after capturing Luanda, the Dutch sent their envoy, Cornelis Ouwman, to Garcia's court in Sao Salvador who after several weeks of negotiations managed to formalize their alliance in May 1642 despite Portugal's protests. Soon after Ouwman’s meeting the king ordered the Portuguese royal flag in the palace to be lowered and replaced with the flag brought by Ouwman, a banner displaying the crest of arms of the city of Amsterdam. The king also forced the Portuguese merchants out of his kingdom. By September 1641, a joint Kongo-Dutch army defeated the Portuguese and forced the Portuguese further inland to the fort of Masangano where they were also surrounded by the armies of Queen Njinga of Ndongo.

(Brothers in Arms pg 204-210)

Like Garcia in Kongo, Queen Njinga's kingdom of Ndongo had an established tradition of diplomacy which it employed to advance its own interests. Unlike Kongo however, Ndongo had been nearly conquered by the Portuguese and it wouldn't be until the 1630s that Njinga would reconquer her kingdom, using the forces of the neighboring kingdom of Matamba which she had seized. Alerted to the Dutch presence in Luanda, Njinga sent her envoys in November 1641, and by the middle of 1642, the Queen was in contact with Garcia in a joint Dutch-Kongo-Ndongo alliance against Portugal. But the alliance was soon complicated by the European wing of the war, as Portugal's independence from Spain in 1640 was followed by a peace treaty with the Dutch republic that both sides should cease attacking each other, atleast in Europe. However, the treaty left the two countries' Atlantic possessions unclear, and it wasn't until January 1643 that a brief truce was worked out allowing the Portuguese to return to Bengo.

(Dutch and Portuguese pg 33-34, The kingdom of kongo and the thirty years' war pg 211)

Kongo's king Garcia refused to comply to the terms of the Dutch-Portugual treaty of allowing the Portuguese to resettle at Bengo. Garcia was aware of the truce as early as 1642 even as he formalized an alliance with the WIC against the Portuguese, but had been assured by the WIC that it wouldn't undermine their alliance. They had afterall sent 200 Dutch soldiers to fight alongside Kongo in its August 1642 victory against the Portuguese. But by September 1642, a WIC vessel arrived at Luanda instructing the Dutch governors of the town to extend the truce to the region of west-central Africa, hence the above-mentioned treaty that allowed the Portuguese to re-occupy Bengo.

In a letter sent to Recife in February 1643, Garcia proposed that the Portuguese be sent to the Bengal (in India) instead, because they are "by nature an unruly people, prone to spreading discord". To test the WIC's commitment to the alliance with Kongo, Garcia II and the count of Soyo sent embassies to the Recife-based governor of Dutch brazil, Johan Maurits, in 1643 who also tried to mediate in the ongoing conflict between Soyo and Kongo. The count Daniel da Silva of Soyo had suceeded Paulo but without the king's confirmation. While initially obedient, Daniel became openly rebellious, prompting Garcia to invade Soyo twice in 1645 and 1646 but both invasions failed. While Maurits was evidently unable to mediate this conflict, he had demonstrated his commitment to the alliance with Kongo by permitting one of the envoys of the count of Soyo to travel on to the Dutch Republic. This envoy, Dom Miguel de Castro, a cousin of the count of Soyo, arrived in the United Provinces with two servants in June 1643. During his stay in the Republic Miguel de Castro met with WIC directors and had his portrait painted. In August 1643 Miguel de Castro returned to Africa aboard a WIC vessel, by this time, the Dutch-Portuguese truce had briefly expired but was later restored albeit with the Portuguese now reduced to dependents of the Dutch.

(Brothers in Arms pg 213-216, The kingdom of kongo and the thirty years' war pg 212-213)

Painting by Albert Eeckhout. Portrait of a Kongo Ambassadors to Recife, ca. 1637-1644, oil on paper, 30 x 50 cm, Jagiellonian Library, Krakow,Poland

Diogo Bemba, a Servant of Dom Miguel de Castro, 1643, National Gallery of Denmark, Copenhagen.

Meanwhile in Ndongo, Queen Njinga had suceeded in defeating the Portuguese in 1644 and 1646 with some Dutch support, but it was inadequate in 1646 when she suffered a major defeat trying to invade Angola. Altered to the growing power of the Portuguese in their hinterland and their own vulnerability at Luanda, the Dutch re-entered the war on Njinga's side. In July 1647, Njinga crushed the Portuguese at the battle of Kumbi, and defeated them again in 1648 at the battle of Ilamba, sending them into retreat. The combined Ndongo-Dutch army then besieged the Portuguese in their forts for nearly a year. But the overextended Dutch had left Luanda insufficiently guarded so when Portugual sent a massive fleet to retake the city in August 1648, the Dutch surrendered without a fight. The ever shrewd Queen Njinga sent her envoys to Luanda and concluded a peace treaty with the Portuguese who agreed to recognize the regions of Ndongo that she had recaptured.

(The kingdom of kongo and the thirty years' war pg 213, Brothers in Arms pg 218-224)

Conclusion.

The Dutch's abrupt exit from west-central Africa occurred in the wider context of the decline of Dutch Atlantic empire. The Dutch loss of Luanda in August 1648 nearly coincided with the end of the thirty years war in Europe at the treaty of westphalia in September 1648. Throughout the thirty year's war, the African kingdoms of Kongo and Ndongo had forged alliances with the WIC which largely benefited themselves but were fought at the Dutch's expense. These alliances were evidently meant to be short-lived as they were driven by the convergence of short-term strategic interests, and they effectively halted the Portuguese colonization of west-central Africa when it was at its height.

In the 1670, a repeated attempt by the Portuguese to colonize Kongo through supporting a rival candidate during the Kingdom's civil war was averted when Soyo used Dutch artillery to defeat the Portuguese at the battle of Kitombo and expel them from Kongo. By this time the bankrupt WIC had withdrawn from the region, showing that even at its twilight, African kingdoms could still exploit a European rivary for one last fight.

References

Brothers in Arms, Partners in Trade: Dutch-Indigenous Alliances in the Atlantic World, 1595-1674 by Mark Meuwese

Dutch and Portuguese in Western Africa: Empires, Merchants and the Atlantic System, 1580-1674 by Filipa Ribeiro da Silva

The Kingdom of Kongo and the Thirty Years’ War by John K. Thornton

Under the sign of the cross in the kingdom of Kongo by Cécile Fromont

A re-interpretation of the Kongo-Portuguese War of 1622 according to new documentary evidence by John Thornton and Andrea Mosterman.

Early Kongo-Portuguese Relations: A New Interpretation by John Thornton

A History of West Central Africa to 1850 by John Thornton

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