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Guest: AnnibaleRecorded: February 13, 2026

In part 3 of Annibale's series recovering the real history of the infamous Munich 1938 conference, we sum up the lessons of what actually happened 1919-1939, to apply some models and lessons to conflicts of our times, from Ukraine to the South China Sea.

Further listening:RWN #578 — Deconstructing "Munich 1938" Pt. 2: 1933-39RWN EP #576 - Deconstructing "Munich 1938" Pt. 1: 1919-1933

Total time: 1:08:50Direct link to this episode's mp3 here

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Comments

Liam CZA Noble

How bout Munich 2026? The name will have much different connotations for the next century compared to the previous… love the show! Long live Annibale!

electradescending

You guys have really been putting out the episodes in these eventful days of doom and gloom. Thank you for your work and commentary.

Enoch

I spent so much of my adult life saying "this isn't Munich" to all the ambient imperialism in the US that it only occurred to me five or six years ago to start questioning if Munich were even Munich. Ever since then I've been hoping Annibale would address the topic, and am thoroughly happy with the answer.

Jonathan Penn

I have two points. First, when discussing Taiwan, it is essential to consider TSMC, the only reason the US cares about Taiwan at all. TSMC manufactures the great majority of the world's cutting edge ICs. The only US competitor, Intel, is at least two process nodes behind TSMC and will almost certainly never catch up. The recent investment by Nvidia in Intel had little to do with Intel producing ICs for Nvidia, but was rather a way to insulate TSMC from Intel's process patents. Strategically, the US needs TSMC so it can build its expensive, gold-plated weapons. Perhaps more importantly, it does not want to see TSMC's capabilities go to China. How this resolves were a war to brew up, I have no idea. Perhaps the TSMC fabs are all mined and ready to blow. But as the loss of TSMC will crater the AI boom, the US cannot simply walk away from Taiwan. Second, even if everything Annibale said about Munich is correct and I am not the scholar of history that he is so I will not even try to dispute his analysis, it does not change the fact that the West, in the persons of France and Britain, sold out the Czechs without even a "by your leave." If France and Britain had said to Germany, "We cannot bargain away Czech territory without Czech presence and participation, " at least the Czechs could have made up their own mind whether to fight at this point, rather than preemptively being forced to give up its most defensible territory, its most important industries, and any possibility of independence in the face of Nazi Germany. I do not believe the Czechs could have defeated Germany at that time, but the war would have been bloody and destroyed the very industry that Germany wanted so badly. That would have been a better outcome than what transpired. Jonathan Penn

Nicholas Levis

This is great stuff, but did I miss the climactic final episode of the Barbarossa series in which the Germans go for Moscow and get chopped at the gates? Last thing I remember was Kiev.

nick

This series rocked. Any chance of something similar — the background, the myth, the truth, the legacy — for Yalta?

CR

LOL. The British and French letting people self-determine.

Benke

Yeah, same with the Poles - they used them more or less as a speedbump for the Germans. As for China, Taiwain is also crutial for blocking China's access to the Pacific, the whole chinese coast is flanked by US allies and US bases, Japan, S.Korea, Taiwan and Philippines.

Annibale

We'll consider this option!

Annibale

It's true that TSMC plays a very special role in the global semiconductor scene, and the importance of advanced chip manufacturing has big strategic implications for both civilian tech and modern weaponry. The United States really depends on having access to top-notch fabrication capacity and certainly doesn't want that control to shift to China. That's an important point. However, it’s also worth noting that semiconductors aren't the only reason why Washington cares about Taiwan. Positioned at the heart of the first island chain, Taiwan is crucial for maintaining trust in U.S. commitments to Japan and other regional allies, and it’s a key piece in the wider power balance across East Asia. Even if TSMC weren’t there, Taiwan’s strategic value would still be significant because of its location and alliances. While semiconductors definitely raise the stakes, they don't create the issues from scratch. Regarding concerns about war potentially damaging fabrication plants, this idea has been discussed among policymakers, but such destruction would hurt not only China but also the United States and its allies. It’s more about deterring conflict rather than wanting that outcome to happen. Turning to Munich: Prague was excluded from the decisive negotiations, and this was no accident. As it was no accident that the Soviet Union was also excluded. That exclusion is a historical fact, and you’re right about it. But was this exclusion the product of cold, imperial calculation, or does it reflect leaders struggling with fear, time pressure, and perceived weakness? British and French diplomacy operated within a hierarchical structure. Paul Schroeder pointed out that British diplomacy often viewed small states as variables to be managed within the broader balance of power, rather than as entities with their own preferences shaping outcomes. Your description of smaller states becoming “objects of settlement” aligns well with scholarly research. An imperial mindset was indeed at play. Additionally, some studies show that British knowledge of Czechoslovakia was limited. P. Neville’s research on Anglo–Czech relations reveals poor understanding in London, weak diplomatic ties, and a somewhat patronising attitude towards Prague. When policymakers lack in-depth engagement and expertise, it becomes structurally easier to regard smaller states as secondary in negotiations. And neither Chamberlain nor Daladier was a diplomatic genius. So the hierarchical element is well grounded in the literature. One thing to be careful about is the stronger claim that there was little emotional conflict involved. Many serious scholars highlight the fear of another big war, the psychological shadow of 1914–18, and the idea that time was important because rearmament was still unfinished. The ongoing academic debate over whether appeasement was simply "buying time” or just wishful thinking hinges on this very issue. Jack Levy’s great study on British perceptions emphasises the importance of timing and readiness and suggests that appeasement wasn’t just about cynical sacrifice. Even archival materials from that time show that war planning and arms buildup were happening alongside diplomatic concessions, indicating a mix of worry and uncertainty rather than emotional indifference. So, there was a combination of factors: a hierarchical great-power style that normalised settling Eastern European questions without smaller states at the table; real fear of uncontrolled escalation and a belief that delay mattered for rearmament; and a thin informational and cultural connection to Prague that made exclusion politically easier to accept. Plus the fact that Western allies didn’t want to engage the Soviet Union to such an extent (for fear that Stalin could become the “peace broker”) It's understandable to criticise the decision not to include Czechoslovakia on moral grounds. However, given the strategic situation at the time, the key factor wasn't just whether the Czechs were willing to resist. It also depended on whether France and Britain were politically ready to back them up. Without their support, Czech resistance alone wouldn't have shifted the overall balance of power, even if it had initially led to a more intense and destructive conflict. If the Soviet Union had been allowed transit and been able to be part of a credible united deterrent, the strategic landscape in 1938 might have been quite different, although operational and political limitations still would have made the final outcome uncertain.

Annibale

Thank to you!

Annibale

We'll restart the Barbarossa series soon

William

Radio war nerd presents: Annibale presents: Munich 1938: everything you thought you knew is wrong: part 3

Jonathan Penn

Annibale- coincidentally (or not?) see the above the fold article today in the NYT about what losing TSMC to China in a potential conflict would do to the USA. You heard it from me first!

SB

Annibale is an international treasure. Always telling us so much of what most of us didn't understand correctly. Thank you! To people that complain, "I don't understand his accent" -- grow up. Most of the world doesn't speak Californian or New York vocal fry. The content is well worth your training your ears. A valuable life skill anyway.

Alasdair Stewart

Hell yeah. The episodes on the soviet side of ww2 is some of the best content. I am praying for some episodes on the soviet invasion of manchuria in 1945.

Nicholas Levis

Thank you. You say restart and series. Is Moscow not the final episode? Will you do Stalingrad?

Annibale

We may do Stalingrad in the future depending on what John & Mark plan to do. There are few more things to be discussed regarding Barbarossa, so expect few more episodes