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Radio War Nerd EP #152 — Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1 (Patreon)

Published:
2018-10-14 03:20:37
Imported:
2026-06
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Recorded October 8, 2018

SYRACUSE, SICILY—The War Nerd picked up a copy of one of the great defeat-in-war novels — Zola's La Debacle — and was inspired to do a whole episode on the Franco-Prussian War that Zola wrote about. After the break, Ames and the War Nerd discuss the much-romanticized, highly infuriating Paris Commune that briefly appeared in the political vacuum of defeated France. Turns out there's not much to romanticize—just a gruesome turkey shoot by an extremely vengeful French ruling class and defeated officer corps.

Maps:

* Initial campaign, July-August 1870

* Franco-Prussian War map

Total time: 2:18:57

Direct link to this week's episode here 

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Avery

You guys made an interesting point regarding rural voters, who apparently had garnered quite a reputation for conservative tendencies by 1871. Some of the communards were aware of the irony of violently resisting democracy: <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/mots/19617" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">https://journals.openedition.org/mots/19617</a> Marx didn't call this "false consciousness" -- that phrase was coined after him and used by Lukács especially. Marx claimed that that class interests of peasants are inherently conservative, which, like many of Marx's statements about class, is a pretty dubious generalization in its own right. <a href="https://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2015/09/marx-on-peasant-consciousness.html" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">https://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2015/09/marx-on-peasant-consciousness.html</a>

Ellen Harold

There is “power” and there is chain of command, no?

Maggie+Al

I mean to be fair to old Karl, in the next passage after he lays out his theisis on the Peasants in the 18th Brumaire he starts complicating the picture.

Crazy B0nkers

The rural conservative votes during the second empire were due to 1) Low turnouts, 2) Massive electoral fraud, 3) Lack of of opposition candidates in rural areas. In other words, the rural populations were given no other choice than a conservative vote. Yet most socialists of the time preferred to ascribe inherent conservative tendencies to the peasantry rather than see their conservative vote as a consequence of their own neglect. The same could be said today about the working class vote in most western democracies.

Crazy B0nkers

My ears were bleeding. The Commune was NOT a nationalist movement but a patriotic one. Patriotism ran very deep among the French, especially within the mid to lower classes, while the second empire aristocracy owned France but only belonged to their class. French nationalism as such only appeared a couple of decades later with revenge politics and around the Dreyfus affair. I've never heard of the Front National claiming the Commune as it would have caused an uproar. The Commune is still the holiest of the holy from the jacobin left to the anarchists. Today, the treason of the elites rhetoric is mutual to left and right movements with an anti-EU/anti-NATO bent that consider national sovereignty as an essential condition for change. In France, the FN did try to appropriate it from an nationalist angle, and so did Melenchon from a populist marxist perspective. There's a very good example of that sentiment in Italy right now.

Lewis Bowden

The Bonapartism aspect of peasant support for Louis Napoleon doesn't seem to differ much from modern day strongmen and their support among the provincial poor. The Right to Strike is a strange one though. Not exactly the priority among rural peasantry.

Gabriel Uriarte

Not sure if Robert Tombs''s "The War Against Paris" on the Versailles army will appeal to people not as obsessed with questions of repression and personnel policy as I am, but I thought I'd anyway copy some passages on the origins and motivations of the officers and men. On the officers: ' The National Defence officers [i.e., those who gained rank after most of the pre-war regulars lost at Sedan and Metz]--with so many ex-rankers, semi-civilians and republicans among them, all of whom stood to lose from the reaction in the army that would accompany reaction in the state--were reluctant to become involved in civil war. The military authorities, generally of the old army, held them all in suspicion.... [They] therefore tried to solve the problem of unreliability among the officers by replacing where possible those of wartime creation by regulars returning from captivity in Germany. Nevertheless, large numbers of the former remainedin most of the Versailles regiments, and in the end remained loyal to the government. The changed situation provides much of the explanation for their more or less grudging fidelity [as it] became clear that the Parisian movement was more than a purely patriotic upsurge, and that it was not led by the kind of men to whom a moderate republican officer might be expected to rally. ... There were also personal considerations. In one way, to remain neutral would have been easy [but] to heed such advice would probably mean the end of a career, and there was therefore a scramble for employment by officers of all ranks trying to prove that they would merit special consideration when the reduced peacetime army was re-established. ... As many National Defence officers serving in the Army of Versailles shared the background, and to some extent the opinions, of the few who rebelled more openly, it was inevitable and not unreasonable that the senior commanders should be mistrustful. Their solution to the problem was to give command of the troops to regular officers returning from captivity in Germany.... During April, regular officers returning from Germany took control of the higher echelons of the army, though still a minority at company level. It may be assumed that their loyalty to versailles, in spite of occasional grumbles, was unquestionable: unlike many of the National Defence officers, they had little knowledge or understanding of the wounded patriotism of Parisians that had helped produce the insurrection, and were largely ignorant of their other grievances. In addition, personal interest attached them to a conservative regime that would return to the pre-war military system. This change in the composition of the Versailles officer corps was among the most important factors that made the army an instrument usable against Paris. Encouraged by the rivalry with the National Defence officers, their determination had a noticeable effect on the performance of the army: " One felt that they were defending their salaries. . . their personal future"; each was fighting "for his own life. . . for self preservation." ' <a href="https://www.amazon.com/War-Against-Paris-1871/dp/0521287847" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">https://www.amazon.com/War-Against-Paris-1871/dp/0521287847</a>

Gabriel Uriarte

On the rank and file: ' The authorities hoped to transform the rank and file too with released regular soldiers--a hope that had been nourished since the beginning of the crisis. Thiers had not been entirely sure of the loyalty of the "old army": "Several months of captivity might have altered it, physically and morally." Only about half the 310,000 prisoners were long-service regulars, the rest being reservists and those near the beginning of their military service... The prisoner returned in a state of disorganization, and so the original plan, to send each detachment back to its depot to reform the regiments of the pre-war army, had to be abandoned. It was found necessary to form regiments provisoires from the mixed detachment as they arrived. It was hoped that companies could be formed from men of the same unit, no doubt with the intention of minimizing the danger of indiscipline arising from the lack of acquaintance of officers, NCOs and men that was blamed for the breakdown of the army in March. Even this method was slow, for the returning prisoners contained a high proportion of reservists due for demobilization -- about half, according to Thiers. There was no question of keeping them: "they would have been grumblers, not fighters." Of the 13,452 who had arrived at Cherbourg by 11 April... onnly 3,800 had been assigned to regiments.... As a result of these difficulties, the prisoners of war took part in the campaign only in its later stages, when the superiority of the Versailles forces was already established.... While on the one hand a battalion of zouaves, the elite French infantry, had to be sent to Algeria after numerous reports of its indiscipline and sympathy for Paris, other prisoners of war were "furious with the Parisians". In short, the returning prisoners were of an uncertain and changeable disposition, and like the rest of the army, they needed careful handling. ... Disaffection continued to show itself throughout May, even after the entry of the army into Paris. Soldiers from many different units were involved, from all sections of the army: the provincial National Defence regiments, the old Army of Paris, and the former prisoners of war. Clearly, being of rural origin or having served in the Imperial Army and passed through the prison camps of Germany did not guarantee hostility towards Paris, and still less enthusiasm for versailles. Yet the broad view of the conflict as being between ruraux and townsmen is not without some validity. [Evidence from] court martials for desertion or complicity in the insurrection shows that many [of the accused] shared an urban origin and a non-agricutural, often artisan, occupation. On the other hand, in the most important court-martials, those bearing witness against their comrades were of rural origin and, as important perhaps, very young. ... Certain definite, though limited, conclusions can nevertheless be reached on the "spirit" of the troops and its consequences. The army did not suddenly change from a mutinous rabble eager to fraternize with the people, into a hardened instrument of repression. In spite of the measures taken by the government, notably the purging of all those thought to favour the insurgents, there remained to the end soldiers who sympathized with Paris, and a much larger number who were strongly opposed to involvement in the civil war... The authorities had to ensure, therefore, that the troops should never again be severely tested, hence the prudence with which the campaign was conducted. Loyalty to Versailles demanded no more than acquiescence in what seemed to be the inevitable. The widespread reluctance to fight, though it reduced the army's efficiency, was prevented from disrupting its functioning. It may even have added to the ferocity of the final stages of the campaign, when resentment at being forced to fight seems to have turned against the stubbornly resisting Federes: "It is the Parisians' fault that we are still not back home." ' <a href="https://www.amazon.com/War-Against-Paris-1871/dp/0521287847" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">https://www.amazon.com/War-Against-Paris-1871/dp/0521287847</a>

Gabriel Uriarte

On the problems faced by the defenders: ' The events of the siege reveal much about both belligerents: the Federes by their powerlessness to disrupt the slow and cautious operations of the army, and the Versaillais by their inability to hasten the end of the campaign. The forces of the Commune were numerous on paper, but far less so in reality. Thirty or forty thousand men had mustered for the sortie of 3 April, the largest number ever gathered. Thereafter, they lost several thousand casualties and prisoners, and more through desertion, which reflected the gradual abandonment of the Commune by the population of Paris. Many thousands of men turned out for duty inside the city, such as guarding public buildings, and of course to draw their pay and rations. Service in the trenches was a different matter. For example, the 85th battailon, whose activity had been limited to guarding the Place Vendome and the Hotel de Ville, was ordered to Neuilly in April. Only 257 men left, out of a nominal 700, and half of these soon went home. Cluseret stated that he only ever had about 6,500 men in the front line. His order of 8 April making service in the compagnies de guerre compulsory for men between nineteen and forty years of age at best swelled the number of men in uniform; it could not make them into resolute defenders of the Commune, as droves of surrendering prisoners were eager to point out. The defense of Paris rested upon a few dozen dependable battalions and a handful of determined commanders. Such troops were often superior man for man to the Versaillais. They were more experienced than most of the regulars, having endured the first siege and in many cases taken part in the battles of Champigny [<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Villiers]" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Villiers]</a> and Buzenval [<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Buzenval_(1871)]." rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Buzenval_(1871)].</a> Many, especially the officers, were old soldiers, and there was a sprinkling of deserters and soldiers of fortune, some of whom proved invaluable. Some units were hardened by long spells of fighting during April and May, they knew their officers and each other, and the best of them were far more committed to their cause than were the conscripts of Versailles. Their resistance was strengthened by the formidable defences of Paris and the immense quantity of armaments at the Federes disposal, greater than was ever used, which permitted a heavy fire to be maintained.. Thought not often deadly, it kep6 the Versaillais at a distance. ... However long the [Versailles] army might hesitate, the Federes were never able to seize the initiative and seriously interrupt the attack: they lacked the manpower. When Rossel tried to mount a counter-attack after the fall of Fort Issy, only 7,000 or 8,000 men could be collected, and he abandoned the attempt. During the last few days of the siege, when the Committee of Public Safety ordered the offensive at all cost, only handfuls of men were available to be thrown into the battle. Numerical weakness left the Federes with no margin of error, making their other shortcomings fatal. There was, of course, indiscipline and drunkenness among the men and culpable ignorance among the officers, combined with frivolous self-seeking and jealousy, even at the highest levels. The same was true to an equal, and perhaps greater, extent in the Army of Versailles, but the Versaillais could afford mistakes. Cluseret, though arrogant and complacent, had a grasp of this reality. While many in Paris were talking of sorties, victories, and risings in the provinces, he realized that the only hope lay in systematic defence, taking advantage of the fortifications, "substituting machines for men," neutralizing the numerical superiority of the Versaillais and forcing them into a long and costly siege. He hoped that [their] morale would weaken--by no means a forlorn hope--and that the Prussians or public opinion would intervene. These possibilities disquieted the Versailles government. "If a mishap had ocurred outside the walls of Paris," admitted Thiers, "we could have counted on nothing." Such a result would have required thoughtful planning and disciplined execution from the federes. Widespread ignorance and indifference, aggravated by a pernicious taste for reassuring propaganda, were responsible for failure to prepare for a blow that was clearly imminent, and that had been delayed less by Federe strength than Versaillais weakness. ' <a href="https://www.amazon.com/War-Against-Paris-1871/dp/0521287847" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">https://www.amazon.com/War-Against-Paris-1871/dp/0521287847</a>

Gabriel Uriarte

[On the initial break-in operations by the Versailles army, another interesting similarity to urban fighting in Syria, in that actually only a minority of the total force actually usable in attacks.] ' [For] their army was clearly not the overwhelming force that its numbers suggested, even after the time-consuming problems of reorganization and supply had been surmounted. The inexperience of the troops imposed delays. The gunners were frequently outclassed by those of the Commune. Panics were frequent. Negligence and indiscipline were widespread. Staff work, which should have presented few problems, produced blnders tat showed that incapacity was not confined to the lower ranks. Doubts about the troops' morale were ever present. For these reasons, the generals relied disproportionately on certain units, thus reducing the effect of their numerical superiority. The gendarmes, of whom there were about 3,500 with the army, were invariably used to stiffen other troops from 18 March until early May, being kept in the line in spiute of their mature age, married status and proverbial caution. The Volunteers took over as the spearhead of 1st Corps, remaining almost permanently in the line, where it was hoped their example would encourage the others. On the southern front, the sailors were frequently used to lead attacks until 6 May, when they were unwilling to attack and had to be withdrawn. Picked companies of scouts, all volunteers, were used. Even ordinary policemen were used to lead the troops forward. ' <a href="https://www.amazon.com/War-Against-Paris-1871/dp/0521287847" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">https://www.amazon.com/War-Against-Paris-1871/dp/0521287847</a>

Maggie+Al

Cheers Gabriel, this is all realy good stuff. The stuff about the divisions between Pre-Sedan officers Corps and those who had risen under the Government of National Defence is interesting. Particularly because while the Royalists miss their chance (because Henri d'Artois was fucking idiot so they had to wait for him to die) and get stomped in 1876 that old reactionary officer class basically haunts France for the next 90 years, it’s kinda shocking how clearly the memory of the Commune is haunting Pétain and Weygand in 1940.

Stewart Smith

I was wondering if you'd mention Robert W. Chambers, as one of the stories in The King in Yellow is set in Paris during the Prussian siege. I wondered if he was there at that time?

eh

I'd say that the claim Marx makes in the 18th Brumaire is not so much that peasants are inherently conservative as impossible to mobilize politically for revolutionary ends under the conditions in France, and it might be worth remembering that the 18th Brumaire was written right after Napoleon III's coup and only dealt with revolution of 48 and its aftermath. If you look at The Civil War in France, the pamphlet he wrote after the fall of the commune you get passages like this "The French peasant had elected Louis Bonaparte president of the Republic; but the Party of Order created the empire. What the French peasant really wants he commenced to show in 1849 and 1850, by opposing his maire to the government’s prefect, his school-master to the government’s priest, and himself to the government’s gendarme. All the laws made by the Party of Order in January and February 1850 were avowed measures of repression against the peasant. The peasant was a Bonapartist, because the Great Revolution, with all its benefits to him, was, in his eyes, personified in Napoleon. This delusion, rapidly breaking down under the Second Empire (and in its very nature hostile to the Rurals), this prejudice of the past, how could it have withstood the appeal of the Commune to the living interests and urgent wants of the peasantry? The Rurals – this was, in fact, their chief apprehension – knew that three months’ free communication of Communal Paris with the provinces would bring about a general rising of the peasants, and hence their anxiety to establish a police blockade around Paris, so as to stop the spread of the rinderpest"

Sérgio Teixeira da Silva

Do you obssess in some place longer-lasting than Facebook that I may be able to subscribe to?

Mark Ames

I think the problem here with “nationalist” is how this word has not had a stable meaning, even in my lifetime. Up through the 70s (or later?) “nationalist” was at least as much a term for anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist leftist insurgencies and movements as it was a term for rightwing chauvinism. The Communards had a similar enemy as 20thC left-nationalist insurgencies: a rotten ruling class conspiring with foreign military occupiers. Today that word “nationalism” would pretty much only mean rightwing nativist chauvinism, or something like “white nationalism.” This too can change in another 30 years.

Crazy B0nkers

True. It's just that "nationalist" in this particular context sounded a-historical as the concept didn't quite exist. Or maybe am I just another pedant. Oh, btw, Action Francaise never "started" the French Resistance during WWII. Many AF militants did indeed join the resistance very early, whilst their leadership joined the Vichy regime, and a number of prominent AF figures became hardcore nazi collaborators. The same distribution was also quite true of most mainstream parties. Except the communists, as many card-carrying PCF militants spent the first year of German occupation risking their lives to distribute pacifist propaganda.

Sérgio Teixeira da Silva

I don't see a difference - every case is "I want *we* to rule our country, not somebody else", as far as I can see. And it's not like the Vietnamese implemented Real Communism anyway. (Not a complaint.)

Borvis

to what extent can you NOT draw a straight line from Napoleon to the Franco-Prussian War to WWI?

xnfec

Also try Alistair Horne's "The Fall of Paris. the Siege and the Commune 1870-71". He makes a point that Commune was important to Revolutionary ideology. A piece of the Communard flag was sent into space with Sputnik. He also confirms that Haussmans design of Paris was as a killing ground.

xnfec

It's been said somehere on this podcast that peasants want some land and to be left alone (Thailand, I think), which is a fairly conservative point of view. On the other hand, the other very left wing region of Italy (Hanibale) after Turin and the Northwest was Emilia Romagna (Bologna - I think) where the left was sustained by the Peasantry.

Martin Knutsen

Fun fact: The norwegian playwright Nordal Grieg, who got shot down over Berlin, wrote a play about the commune wich got plagiarized by Bertold Brecht.