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In this episode, Breht speaks with Dr. Richard Wolin, author of Heidegger in Ruins: Between Philosophy and Ideology, about the dark entanglement between Martin Heidegger’s philosophy and his lifelong commitment to National Socialism. Heidegger is often hailed as the most important philosopher of the 20th century, yet his work was deeply shaped by the reactionary politics of his time. Wolin explains how Heidegger’s central ideas -- Being, Dasein, authenticity, rootedness, and the “decline of the West” -- became intertwined with fascist notions of destiny, hierarchy, and belonging. They discuss the long history of attempts to sanitize Heidegger’s record, what the Black Notebooks reveal about his true convictions, the interwar period in Germany and the conservative revolution, Heidegger's spiritual racism, and how the same civilizational despair and longing for renewal echo through today’s far-right political movements. This conversation explores how the search for meaning and authenticity, when divorced from solidarity and democracy, can turn toward reactionary myth-making, hierarchical exclusion, and fascist authoritarianism.

Check out Dr. Wolin's articles in the LA Review of Books HERE

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Rakish Tilt 🎩

Oh dang, I'M HERE FOR THIS! One challenge I experience is how much I like Sartre's philosophy and politics, and how much he was influenced by Heidegger.

Brad Northcote

Added "Heidegger in Ruins" to my reading list. I'm not at all familiar with Heidegger's work except in passing, to be honest. So it will be interesting to hear any thoughts about the broader utility of his concepts beyond their original intent. I listened to the Red Menace episode on Carl Schmitt before, and again after, reading Oswaldo Zawala's "Drug Cartels Do Not Exist", which cleverly uses the Schmittean understanding of the state to critique U.S. narratives about Mexican "drug cartels" as a pretext for state repression. There are worthwhile critiques of appropriating such concepts beyond their intended context, but I wonder if there could be anything similarly fruitful from Heidegger's work in spite of him. Excited to give this a listen!

Rev Left Radio

Thats a really good and deep question and I wish I had it asked it in the interview tbh! If Dr. Wolin comes back, ill try to remember. Ive always found Heidegger's philosophy pretty opaque and havent really waded too far into it. On the other hand, his work is essential to 20th century existentialism and phenomenology, as well as various form of post-structuralism, so his influence is unavoidable. One day ill dive deeper into his work and maybe do an explainer

Rev Left Radio

Yea, absolutely. Very interesting, but also common in philosophy: that predecessors of philosophers diverge greatly from them in serious ways. Heideggers work and legacy can and should be engaged with, just with a deeply critical eye and knowledge of the meta-political project at play.

Rakish Tilt 🎩

I was under the impression that Mencius refers to the latinized name for 4th Gen Confucian Chinese sage Mengxi.

Max

Heidegger’s thinking will be central to the next qualitative step of Marxism-Leninism. His philosophy helps to articulate the hole present in our theory as well as our practice, of which we are already aware but lack an understanding. I see your interest in Mysticism as well as the importance Buddhist meditative practice has for you, Breht, as indicative of precisely the missing part Heidegger can help us discover. The difficulty to reconcile these practices within a Marxist framework points to the absence of a theory of world-disclosure within Marxism itself. Mystical practice already presupposes that understanding arises from immersion rather than pure reflection, from a mode of being-in-the-world prior to concepts. This experiential layer – pre-conceptual, atmospheric, world forming – is something Marx names in passing (“sensuous human activity”, “species-being”) but never systematically theorises. Wesern Marxism lacks thus the vocabulary for the lived ground out of which consciousness, motivation and political orientation emerge – a gap that mysticism intuits but cannot articulate philosophically. Heidegger distinguishes beings (entities, objects, institutions) from Being—the open horizon that makes any entity intelligible in the first place. This clarifies that every class relation, every tool, every institution already presupposes a way in which the world is disclosed to its participants. Without this distinction, analysis collapses into object-talk: it treats society as a set of things rather than a structure of meaningful existence. Being is the lived field within which beings show up as usable, threatening, valuable, or oppressive. Seinsvergessenheit names the modern tendency to see only objects, never the world that grants them meaning; everything becomes item, resource, variable. This forgetfulness underlies both liberal individualism and technocratic materialism: each treats the human as a subject facing neutral objects, rather than as a being immersed in a meaningful world. Dasein is not an isolated consciousness but a being whose existence is constituted by its involvement in the world; it is already amidst significance, labor, tools, others. The bourgeois subject presupposes a self-sufficient ego facing externals; Dasein dissolves this fiction by showing that our primary relation is practical, not contemplative. Dasein grounds praxis because it is praxis: a mode of being defined by cares, projects, capabilities, and constraints. What Marx calls “species-being” gains existential depth: human activity is not an attribute of a subject but an expression of being-in-the-world itself. Western Marxism inherited an epistemic architecture in which consciousness confronts an object from the outside; society cannot be known in this schema because the knower is part of what is to be known. The subject–object distinction forces Marxists into two dead ends: fatalism (history as automatic process) or voluntarism (party as demiurge); both stem from the same metaphysical mistake. As long as society appears either as pure object or pure subject, the materialist unity of practice and knowledge collapses into either passivity or idealistic self-assertion. The impasse of Western Marxism is not political but ontological: it lacks a mode of thinking in which knowing and being are internally bound and not external opposites. When culture is treated as mere “ideological superstructure,” the concrete ways human beings inhabit the world vanish from materialist analysis. The worker appears either as a bearer of false consciousness or as a node in a structure, but never as an embodied, situated being for whom the world has thickness, mood, temporality. A Marxism that brackets world-experience ends up reproducing the very liberal anthropology it seeks to escape: the isolated consciousness facing external systems. The lived, sensuous, pre-conceptual world becomes illegible, and with it the very soil from which political motivation, loyalty, courage, and collective meaning grow. Western left theory often substitutes procedural abstractions (“equality,” “progress,” “liberation”) for the historically sedimented forms in which people actually dwell. Universalist abstractions flatten the experiential landscapes—place, ritual, language, memory—within which political subjectivity takes shape. When Marxism speaks only in categories that are nowhere lived, it loses the ability to bind, to resonate, to articulate a world rather than merely critique it. Politics becomes an operation upon concepts, not an intervention into the world as it is concretely experienced by classes and communities. By equating the irrational with reaction, Western Marxism amputates the entire pre-rational sphere in which affect, atmosphere, and belonging are formed. What cannot be formalized becomes suspect, so the very domain in which commitment and collective identification arise is ceded to the right. The irrational is not merely the regressive; it is also the non-conceptual ground of meaning, the surplus of world that no theory can dissolve without dissolving experience itself. A materialism that fears the irrational forgets that consciousness emerges from life, not the other way around. Modern left theory often treats the world as a set of objects, institutions, and discourses, but not as a unified horizon that gives beings their sense and bearing. Without a robust notion of world, political analysis slides into either structuralism or moralism: systems without subjectivity, or subjects without ground. World is not an ideological veil but the very medium in which human beings stand, act, and understand; ignoring it yields a desiccated materialism without material texture. The absence of worldliness produces political positions that float above life rather than articulate it. A theory that cannot articulate the being of its own object inevitably substitutes conceptual schemes for reality—idealism under a materialist name. The moment materiality is not thought ontologically, it collapses into something thought-dependent, a correlate of consciousness rather than its ground. Heidegger is needed to live up to what materialism, in its dialectical form, aspires to. A primarily critical approach is blind towards what makes his philosophy so resounding and loses it in the dark shadows of his biography. His commitment to Nazism is not an accident, of course. There is a deeper meaning to it and also a kind of twisted irony in how the rejection of modernity turned into the worst modernist excess to date (with shallow headmeasuring biological positivism, the uprooting of millions and the industrial annihilation of human life). We Marxists know we can overcome modernity only by going right through it, but any Aufhebung also includes the negation to which the critics of modernity can contribute towards. Heidegger’s philosophy has many individualistic and petty-bougeois limitations, that have been dealt with extensively (there is a plethora of striking Marxist critique in this regard). Heidegger has some good dialectical intuitions, but he was not a consistent dialectical thinker, and his class position did not allow him to see the dialectical pointe that the very embodiment of modernity, the working class, is the force to overcome it. Instead, Nazism tied him to the monopolist ghouls who ushered in the way of living he despised so much. I doubt he ever came to understand that, but we can expropriate his thoughts nevertheless.

Rev Left Radio

I think this is an incredibly deep, rich insight, my friend. Im fascinated by it, and it simultaneously helps me grasp the importance of Heidegger's move to Being as his philosophical focus... In fact, it clarifies some things about Heidegger than remained opaque to me up until now. Do you have formal education in philosophy or just a laymen with an interest? Either way, its impressive.

Max

I don't really have a formal education. I'm currently finishing my bachelor's degree at age 30. I have been studying philosophy longer than I have been enrolled though. However, I have heavily employed ChatGPT in drafting this response. I recently read "Sein und Zeit" myself and used the AI to help me understand it and discuss it's implications. There is much to discuss and maybe to dispute by more reputable scholars, but I think there is something to it, even if it has not fully matured within me yet. Ever since I found back to faith (and through reading a lot of Hegel) I have been bothered by our conception of materialism. Heidegger, I think, finally uncovers a missing piece: An approach towards a dialectical conception of the irrational. That being said, the common notion of irrationality makes immediately clear the double-edged nature of this kind of thinking. And Heidegger dramatically personifies this in his biography as well. Then there is another admission I have to make, in order that I'm not scolded again for hiding my despicable nature. The only reason I started to read Heidegger is because of Haz al-Din's essay "Marxism is not woke". I know you guys don't want to hear it, but I'm convinced he hit something salient there. He can still be wrong about a lot of other things, but his point about the unresolved subject-object distinction within (Western) Marxism, that may require Heidegger to overcome is something that deserves attention. That is a hill I'm prepared to die on.

Eli 🇵🇸

Your show has been helping me get through demeaning jobs that I hate for over a year now. 😂 Genuinely a breath of fresh air during a very difficult time for my family.

B Grimez

Salute fellow Rev Lefters!!! you can never be clean, everyday you shower you can never be full, everyday you eat you can never quench thirst, everyday you drink you can never be perfect, everyday you shed imperfection -B Grimez

Rev Left Radio

I am glad its helpful - I send my sincere love and solidarity to you and your family, Elias. I hope things take a turn for the better.