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In this episode, Breht O'Shea and Alyson Escalante join forces for a deep philosophical conversation on Marxism, consciousness, and the mind-body problem. Using China Miéville’s essay on consciousness and materialism as a starting point, they explore why the nature of subjective experience remains such a profound challenge for crude or reductionist forms of materialism -- and why this question matters for Marxists.

Alyson begins by carefully summarizing Miéville’s original essay and its challenge to conventional Marxist materialism. From there, Breht lays out several major positions in the philosophy of mind, including dualism, physicalism, idealism, panpsychism, neutral monism, emergentism, eliminativism, and epiphenomenalism. Together, they then work through two responses to Miéville’s essay, clarifying the arguments, tensions, and stakes of the debate.

In the second half, Breht argues for a different approach: a dialectical monism informed by dependent origination. Rather than reducing consciousness to matter, escaping into idealism, or treating mind and matter as separate substances, this view understands reality as a single, dynamic, relational process in which consciousness, embodiment, nature, society, and practice arise interdependently.

The conversation closes by bringing Buddhist philosophy and phenomenology into dialogue with Marxism, exploring emptiness, experience, nonduality, and the limits of conceptual thought. What emerges is not a rejection of materialism, but a call to deepen it -- beyond reductionism, beyond dualism, and toward a more dialectical understanding of consciousness & reality.

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Brad Northcote

Great timing! *Just* as I was stepping out and deciding what to listen to. I will have to add Miéville's essay to my reading list. Just recently finished Ellen Wood's "A Social History Of Western Political Thought", and in it she offers a materialist analysis of Spinoza's monism as not necessarily lending itself to radically democratic politics, but still occupying a more progressive space in its time (essentially secularizing in favour of the *Dutch merchant class* vs. petty bourgeois artisans & Calvinists' strictly orthodox separation of man and God, if I recall correctly). If monism in itself isn't strictly revolutionary, though, Cartesian dualism definitely seems to imply a more regressive idealism at this stage. In any case, love these conversations!

Perro Wero

Breht any chance you could comment on article #6 of the MoU? Specifically, that the $300m private sector investment (not reparations) may ultimately be used as a soft-power mechanism for Imperialism? Elina Xenophontos recently published a substack article examining this perspective; she also appeared on Upstream explaining her perspective in depth. I would absolutely love if you could do an episode (read and analyze style) analyzing that perspective from a dialectical materialist lense. Any thoughts would be greatly appreciated. Solidarity!!

Rev Left Radio

Interesting! Yes, ill listen to that episode / article and see if I can add anything meaningful to her analysis. Or maybe have her on the show if at all possible to talk about it!

Rev Left Radio

Nice! and oh that Wood piece sounds very interesting! I break with Spinoza as well on dialectical grounds in this episode, which you might find worthwhile; but yes, ill check out that book asap!

Perro Wero

Yes, that would be great! Thanks Breht!!

Edward Blum

Not a philosophy guy, but don't Mieville's arguments ignore the dialectic aspect of dialectical materialism? If events are a process and consciousness is how I resolve the contradiction between my experience and the communal experience can't the evolution of consciousness be explained by our need to resolve the contradiction of our needs along the lines of Maslow's hierarchy of needs (which he stole from Native Americans).

Lefty In Training

Maybe this just isn't my thing, but Mieville's argument just seem like philosophical wankery to me. Not as bad, and certainly not as anti-revolutionary, as the folks Rockhill talks about in his book, but wankery nonetheless in my opinion. That said, if he is seriously trying to undermine or outright replace dialectical materialism with some sort of idealism, that does strike me as anti-revolutionary in its own way. The historical materialism of Marxism is the only ideology that's even come close to breaking the back of capitalism and freeing multiple nations from a portion of their imperial oppression. And maybe I'm just bias because I recently finished Part 1 of Luna's translation of the Vietnamese Marxism curriculum, but dialectical materialism is the entire underpinning of historical materialism; without the dialectical relationship between, for example, the objective and subjective forces of history or the base and the superstructure, what are we even doing as Marxists? I'll give Mieville the benefit of the doubt that they aren't trying to undermine the most successful revolutionary theory and practice in modern times or that I'm talking about something different than he is. But in skimming his essay, I'm either not seeing where he is considering the implications on historical materialism, or he's criticizing some phenomenon that isn't that important/relevant. Or maybe, going back to my original guess, I'm just too focused on multiple genocides and climate collapse to think this is as important to Marxism as Mieville makes it out to be.

Brad Northcote

Having listened through and read the essay/response/response to the response, I have a hunch that Miéville would describe even material-as-process as metaphysically idealist "materialism in name only"---and be especially critical if this dismissed or declared solved the "hard problem" (not that you do either!). My head is spinning and all of this will definitely take revisiting. But ultimately, Miéville seems to consider anything but what Bakunin in God And The State calls the "vile matter" of the idealists as smuggling in idealism under the name of materialism, as opposed to (again, Bakunin!): "the matter of which materialists speak, matter spontaneously and eternally mobile, active, productive, matter chemically or organically determined and manifested by the properties or forces, mechanical, physical, animal, and INTELLIGENT (my emphasis), which necessarily belong to it."

Saya Clarke

Incredible, instant RevLeft classic episode and right up my ally. The only issue is that I don't know if I am actually experiencing joy and appreciation while listening to it or if the neurons in my brain are just responding consequentially to external stimuli in a complex way that ultimately makes logical, mechanical sense but I'm too stupid to understand it.

David Munkvold

I love this stuff. One think that I always think are missing from these convos is scale. Scale in both time and space. What we think is matter : "a thing existing in a space" actually dissolves when we zoom in real close. Matter becomes energy and quantum dynamics become prevalent. Is it actually existing at that place or is it potentially occupying multiple places? So to me matter and energy are spectrums. When you shift the scale of space and time in either direction different dynamics become pravalent. And there could even be other axes in addition to space and time that we don't know about. Does a blade of grass have a consciousness through one season? Does a grass colony that has been alive for 100,000 years have consciousness over that time frame? Does a human have consciousness during 1 millisecond? Does a human have consciousness over 10 generations? There are scales at which we can measure and we can study them. There are scales at which we cannot measure and we must remain open to possibilities. What is cool about Marxism is that it is a study of the scale of human socities and their dynamics over generations. To apply the lessons of the Dynamics at this scale to all scales would be stupid LOL.

Squiggle

The wankery is the point. That's why Marx had a thing or two to say about philophers and their not changing the world.

Liv

On Buddhism and answering ultimate questions, the big bang, etc., I think it’s important to investigate why the Buddha refuses to answer such questions. It wasn’t because his answer would be misconstrued, it wasn’t because asking such questions isn’t conducive to following the Buddhist path, and it wasn’t even because the answers to the questions are unknowable in the sense that there are answers that are beyond our comprehension. The reason he refused to answer such questions is because they are misguided on a metaphysical level. That is, the questions themselves all rely on essentialist assumptions that render them incoherent. It’s not just that it’s impossible to produce a coherent answer, but also that the questions themselves are meaningless. To even posit a question on the origin of the universe relies on the mental construction of a universe and of a beginning/end to phenomena. By even asking such a question you are making indefensible assertions.

Wes Rich

This was great. I learned so much and am incredibly thankful for this back and forth. Granted I had to google like 1000 terms but not only did this fill in a ton of gaps for me but also has me now wrestling with ideas and concepts well above my pay grade and I love it. Thanks for yet another great episode.

Adam

Maybe I'm just missing them, but I couldn't find the links. Adding them here for folks (plus a Stanford Encyclopedia article for philosophy heads). Miéville's article: https://salvage.zone/beyond-folk-marxism-mind-metaphysics-and-spooky-materialism/ Fluss and Frim's reply: https://salvage.zone/their-materialism-and-ours-minds-matter-and-marxism/ Pineda's reply: https://spectrejournal.com/naturalized-dialectics/ SEP article on Consciousness: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/

Max

I used to bend over backwards trying to prove that Hegel is materialist, because I wanted to use more of him than just the stripped method of dialectics. Throwing away the entirety of his system because it was predicated on the wrong supreme substance seemed just terribly wasteful. And does he really belong into the camp of superstition and subjective mania? After all, while certainly being more concerned with the ideal side of things, does he really contradict that being determines consciousness? Sure, nominally he subsumes everything under the category of spirit, but he also literally develops his system out from being and starts his philosophy of history with geography, and... It just doesn't sit right to cast him (and many others) into the trash bin of idealism or to keep them as a guilty pleasure on the side. However, go down this path of relativisation, and not only will you end up with everything but the crudest delusions at least partially exculpated from the allegation of idealism, you will also lose any meaningful theoretical distinction within that conceptual pair. And there are definitely differences. Hegel and Marx do have two very contrasting stances of thought. Hegel looks backwards in time as the owl of Minerva at dusk, reflecting upon the ideas that have formed out of material history. Whereas Marx looks forward to a future revolt that uproots the current system at ground level and topples the existing superstructure of ideas. He is therefore more concerned with society's basis than Hegel is. Their difference is meaningful but it is not that one is just plain wrong or delusional (with maybe a kernel of truth) and the other one is correct. They are trying for different aims, and if you switch the two you will find that Hegelian political economy as well as Marxist metaphysics are rather poor and underdeveloped. Maybe each perspective is useful for a different area. Therefore, we should not think of materialism and idealism as two competing propositions for metaphysics (everything matter or everything mind) but as two complementing intelletctual stances. Materialism and idealism are two irreducible disciplines of thought. Their priority changes according to the field. Materialism has priority where thought must submit to the real conditions of life, history, production or practice. Idealism has priority where thought reflects on form, mediation, concept or appearance. This avoids being forced to construe Hegel to be a materialist, when we want to apply more of him than a “rational kernel”, but it also avoids to dissolve any distinction between the two modes into a limb centrist pluralism. This is possible, because – and I think Miéville is getting at something very similar –the metaphysical conception that everything is matter is not actually needed for what we cherish materialism for. Principally, Materialism is a discipline for thought before the priority of the real. It means: do not let concepts float free from life; do not explain society from ideas alone; do not confuse your category with the thing; do not mistake consciousness for its own ground; return always to practice, (re-)production, history, nature, labour. This does not require matter as the supreme category. In fact, any such category however earthily named, is constituting an idealist conception. I’d even go so far as to say there is no such thing as true materialist metaphysics, because all metaphysics reside within the realm of idealism. Metaphysics’ grasp on the real is always already mediated ideally. It may call itself material, but the matter it alludes to is just an abstract ideal concept. A trick of the mind by which thought secures the real in advance. But this "real" is no longer prior, excessive, resistant; it is classified and therefore idealised. In the classical Marxist(-Leninist) conception this would go well with the demonisation of metaphysics. Instead, I do not mean to question the legitimacy of metaphysics or ontology. Quite the contrary: The metaphysical grasp is absolutely necessary for any serious intellectual access. Metaphysics are like the roots of conceptual thinking that nourish all its branches and which are implied in any blooming conceptualisation, even if not directly visible. What I propose, is a division of labour between the two philosophical stances. Leave metaphysics to idealism. A “materialist” metaphysical conception is generally either a dreadfully poor and shallow positivism or a very meticulously veiled and creatively re-termed derivative of some existing idealist system. Idealism does not teach that mind is independent from matter. It teaches that the object is never directly given; it is mediated by thought, concept, form or subjectivity. Materialism preserves the deeper truth that these forms do not float freely, but arise from and answer to a reality that precedes, exceeds and corrects thought. We begin from the priority of the real over thought, but we understand the real itself as a moving, mediated, historically articulated whole in which thought is one of reality’s own forms. That is why we long for Hegel. This is where idealism has its place. The role of materialism is then to prevent us from lingering and to push us onwards. If metaphysics are the roots, we must not forget the ground they reside in. This ground is precisely what Heidegger’s conception of Being (capital B) tries to disclose. This seems very far apart from Marxism. However, Marxist materialism, at its best, is also an attempt to think from the ground: from labour, (re-)production, need, practice etc. A turn to the Heideggerian conception of Being does not mean abandoning materialism for mystical ontology. It endeavours to radicalise materialism beyond the metaphysics of “matter”. Heidegger helps break the spell of treating beings as mere objects present before a subject. He reminds us that before we theorise objects, we are already in a world. We do not first encounter matter as neutral stuff; we encounter tools, paths, rooms, faces, tasks. Being is not another object behind objects, but the ground of their appearing as meaningful at all. This now brings us to the hard problem of consciousness: consciousness is also not merely one object among others, not merely a brain-process that can be placed inside the already-given world. It is the very opening through which anything is given as world at all. Where a Dasein is thrown into the world, is where two senses of givenness meet: For materialism, “givenness” means the priority of the real: the world is not produced by thought; it confronts, limits, nourishes, wounds and corrects us. For idealism, “givenness” is mediation: whatever is “given” to us appears through forms of thought, language, practice, perception, history, category. The hard problem is precisely the point where neither sense can be ignored. The real is prior to consciousness, yet consciousness is the opening in which the real appears as world. Consciousness is not a ghost added to matter. It is not a second substance hiding behind the brain. It is also not solved by calling it an emergent property, if emergence only names the point where explanation becomes embarrassed. Consciousness is the world appearing to itself in a determinate living being. It is the world returning to itself through living, social, historical practice. Strictly speaking this is not identical with Heidegger’s notion of Dasein. Consciousness names the problem at the level of experience; Dasein names the deeper ontological structure in which such experience becomes possible. Miéville’s hard problem begins with consciousness, but its pressure pushes toward this deeper question of disclosedness. A Marxist can take that insight and *materialise* it: world is not merely existential atmosphere. World is historically produced and reproduced. Labour, class, infrastructure, production, ecology, state etc. shape how Being is opened for us. Capitalism is not only an economic system; it is a world-disclosure. It makes beings appear as commodities, time as abstract labour-time, land as real estate, skill as human capital, attention as monetisable, people as competitors, nature as resource. Materialism and idealism, in their dichotomy, are good starting points, but they do not function well as team badges for the long run. And freed from having to prove anything you like as somehow secretly materialist, you can not only expand your repertoire but also more clearly articulate the idealist limitations of what was sorted exclusively into the materialist camp before. Take the scientific method, for instance. The scientific method is indispensable because in a materialist sense it disciplines thought before the object. It prevents fantasy from declaring itself truth. But its object is always disclosed under a specific mode: measurable, isolatable, repeatable, formalisable. That mode reveals real beings, but not Being as such. It shows the object under conditions of extraction and is constituted ideally. The point is not to oppose science with murky spirituality, but to keep science aware of its own cut. Every method opens the world by wounding it. Analysis makes things knowable by separating them from the living totality in which they stand. Dialectics is the attempt to remember the wound through relation, movement, contradiction, development. Dialectical Materialism is tasked not to replace idealism in it's field but to link the idea back to its material ground. To conclude with some determination, I want to illustrate one way where this outlook has opened up practical consequences for me by helping me to articulate a blind spot. It also shows how the problem of consciousness translates into the problem of class consciousness. Marxism-Leninism teaches us a lot about party, line, discipline or political strategy but this presupposes a class that is already “dense” enough to be wielded. This leaves it somewhat impotent in our contemporary Western societies. It is not that today the working class has disappeared, rather that it has become far less compact. At Leninism's conception you could rely on a dense social fabric. The factory, the neighbourhood, the pub, the union hall, the party newspaper, the worker’s choir, the sports club, the cooperative, the family etc. You had a fully developed “nervous system” through which class experience became transmissible and even when it was politically confused, the class was at least socially gathered. Today, however, that body has become severely damaged and partially disassembled. Nowadays, the party-form is often invoked over a scattered social field that does not yet provide the human density a party requires. Then “build the party” becomes like commanding a seed to become a tree while refusing to ask what happened to the soil. This leads to the aggressive voluntarism that some contemporary ML practice falls into. The answer to every weakness becomes more ideological firmness: read more, study harder, draw sharper lines, build cadre discipline. But if there are no stable social forms in which people learn reliability, conflict, sacrifice or leadership, then ideology remains suspended above life. It produces confessors rather than organisers. The weakness of contemporary Marxism-Leninism is not that it overstates organisation, ideology or party. It understates the material preconditions under which organisation, ideology and party become socially real. It knows how to lead a gathered class better than it knows how a scattered class becomes gatherable. However, this does not mean culture is the hidden master key. Heimat, religion, family, neighbourhood are not magic roots that solve class politics, but they are areas in which Leftists tend to be exceptionally stupid. They are themselves contradictory forms: They can gather people for socialism or for fascism; they can protect dignity or suffocate individuality; they can preserve memory or petrify hierarchy. But precisely because they are contradictory, they are material. They are not decoration. They are battlefields of subject formation. This is where the Western Left severely lacks, in my opinion. It is used to treat most inherited forms mainly as ideological contamination. Family? Patriarchy. Heimat? (Settler-colonialist) Nationalism. Religion? False consciousness. Local pride? Petit-bourgeois parochialism. There is truth in each suspicion, but taken as a total posture, this becomes (left-)liberal acid: it dissolves the very forms in which ordinary people could become more than consumers, clients or voters. The whole problem is that Marxism often knows the skeleton very well (property, labour, state, imperialism) but has a weaker concept of the flesh (habit, rhythm, trust, shame, pride, faith), which is an odd thing to say about a movement that so fervently declares itself devoted to matter.

CM

Came in here to said the same thing and wanted to recommend Luna Oi, perhaps Rev Left should have her as a guest. They just posted on instagram an excerpt from their episode pointing out many philosophers pointing out ‘ but how does dialectical materialism explains x, y or z???’ It actually doesn’t claim to explain everything in the universe. It’s a method to analyze the society so we can change it. Just like you wouldn’t expect theory of gravity to explain spirituality.

Lefty In Training

I want to say she's been on before, but I listen to so many socialist podcasts that I can't remember haha. Good problem to have maybe?

Michael Murray

Fascinating episode. I really think Marxists of all flavours engaging in these kinds of debates is valuable, especially for engaging with more religiously minded people who may reject any consideration of communist ideas on the grounds that historically it is closely linked with atheism or conversely atheists who consider themselves viewing the world from an completely objective 'view from nowhere' perspective, which is all too common in my field (physics). In both cases they play into the hands of the far right in my opinion.

eleanor!

thank you both for this wonderful episode! per the discussion in the last 30 minutes or so, i wonder if you are familiar with the work of Derrida? he developed an idea he called ‘différance’ as a way to articulate pretty much the exact kind of buddhist metaphysics you were talking about—a lack of permanent foundation for meaning, a process of perpetual movement, infinite deferral towards an unintelligible & empty source. i’m not sure if Derrida had any background/familiarity with Buddhist thought, & he certainly doesn’t mention it that i can recall in his writings, but it was very cool to hear these same theoretical concepts discussed from very different perspectives, & you may find his work insightful (if notoriously impenetrable)!

Komrad Jay

In order to argue that consciousness is non-material, Mieville would need to demonstrate that the non-material exists in the first place. At this point his argument is question begging: Materialism can't explain consciousness therefore consciousness is non-material therefore the non-material exists. Admittedly, I haven't read the paper, so I am just going on the description provided here, but it really seems to be based on a series of unfounded assertions. Chiefly, that the mind can't be reduced to brain states. Perhaps I'm missing something, but I just don't see how the hard problem of consciousness is actually worth considering. It just seems to me like a way to smuggle in the supernatural (God, the soul, "mind energy" woo non-sense, etc) without having to demonstrate its existence in the first place.

Jessica

Fascinating episode! I'm still at minute 37 but I'm realizing that the fundamental premise behind the hard problem itself is flawed. Why is it assumed that "inanimate matter" like rocks have no consciousness? How would we even know? That gets into what Breht says next about the inherent limitation of science being unable to grapple with the subjective, and seeking therefore to explain everything through the objective alone. How would we even be able to objectively determine that rocks don't have consciousness? Of course they don't have neurons, but why are we presupposing that neurons are essential for the existence of consciousness just because the two seem to be linked in humans? And if the hard problem itself isn't what people think it is, then what does THAT mean with regard to all these different possible frameworks of consciousness??? Anyway, I'm sure I'll have more to comment on after the rest of the episode! This subject is rich.

Jessica

Another question sparked from this episode for me: in monism, why does there need to be some third underlying reality underneath both material reality and consciousness? Why can't reality simply be made up of both those things alone? The assumption that there just be some singular thing underneath those is itself a presumption, and it's one that honestly doesn't make any sense to me. Edit: 😂😂😂 I've since finished the episode and found that this is exactly Breht's position of dialectical monism. I've also long since come to the conclusion that the true nature of reality is relationship (an interconnected web of beings relating), and came to that from a shamanic, animistic worldview and path of practice. Interesting to arrive at the same place from two totally different traditions.

Jessica

Final thoughts: I absolutely love the *reminder* that we really are an ever-changing collection of particles within a vast soup of particles, and therefore any true objective perception of the whole of reality is simply impossible. I'm going to remember that phrase, "The Soup"! Also, this is reminding me of what I've learned from (and love about) the core Daoist cosmology, which is that duality (endless relationship) arises out of nothingness, the Void, non-existence. I guess that's emergent, but only in the biggest sense of how existence itself came to be. And this in turn reminds me of the Jewish Qabballah, and how the core of all reality is nameless (I think there's three layers of the nameless aspects of God, so the one at the very top of the tree of life is called "the nameless nameless nameless God". Or something like anyway, my memory isn't what it used to be. 😛) But the point is that at some point, if one is to truly know the truth of existence, they would have to no longer have a discrete consciousness of self that would be doing the knowing. Also many native American traditions resolve this "problem" of emergence (not really a problem, I think) in the same way the Buddhists, Daoists, and Hebrew mystics do, by referring to it as The Great Mystery. Implying that we'll never truly be able to understand it all.

T

Hey Breht! The part you where you explained your conception of dialectical monism reminded me heavily of the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics which (as a crude simplification) basically asserts that phenomena only exist in any meaningful sense in their moments of mutual interaction and in their relation to each other. In chapter 5 of his book Helgoland, Carlo Rovelli (the initial proponent of the interpretation) talks about the implications for our understanding of matter and contrasts this to his reading of Lenin's concept of matter in Materialism and Empirio-criticism and also about understanding it through the Buddhist concept of emptiness. I think you'd probably find it interesting and would be keen to hear your thoughts if you got to it at some point! Thanks for the episode :)

Pj

I used to be really troubled by the question of consciousness, but then I stooped thinking about it. (Get it?) To me the whole argument rests on the idea that consciousness is special, so it can't be explained by material means because its special. Why is it special? Because it can't be explained by material means! It posits that consciousness is a "thing," which smuggles in a lot of ideological baggage. Plants will react to sunlight and actively move to find it, why is it a stretch that consciousness is just more complex sun-seeking?