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Matthew Furlong returns for another installment of our Dialectics Deep Dive Series.

Together, they discuss Althusser, Hegel, Dialectical Materialism, Marxism, Palestine, process philosophy, and much more!

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Interview referenced in the episode: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NZDGvT04sNA&ab_channel=BreakThroughNews

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Jack Hughes

🙏🏻🙏🏻🙏🏻

Ian Stockdale

Great episode, albeit with a bit more Latin grammar than I'd prefer (I'm trying to cut down on how often I think about the Roman Empire, lol). Call me a western bourgeois metaphysics sympathizer if you must, but I can't say I agree with tossing out the 'principle' of non-contradiction. My response to Graham Priest's first example is that he seems to conflate his 'conscious self' with his 'self'. As Walt Whitman said, "Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself, (I am large, I contain multitudes)". Priest's pen example reminded me of the times back in university when I was minoring in philosophy and my buddy who was majoring in business, whenever he'd had a few beers, would 'explain' Zeno's paradoxes he'd learned in his philosophy 101 class. I recognize it's probably because I'm not fully understanding his argument. Virtually this entire process, from the time you guys recorded the episode to reading this text on your screen has been a reduction to 'bits' of data: 'On' OR 'Off', 'P' OR '-P', at any given time (perhaps measured in nanoseconds). 'P' AND '-P', at the same time, doesn't compute. I've always assumed that the 'contradictions' referred to by Marxists were of the Whitman sort versus 'true' contradictions (i.e. actual violations of the law of non-contradiction). Am I mistaken?

Mohammed Mumit

This just appeared on my notifications and will listen. Although 8 is viii right?

Mexican Stalin

Not only are the recruitment numbers down if you believe in the poverty draft (I don't ) then the military is made up of mostly the most exploited members of the proletariat

Philip M

🔥🔥🔥 stoked for part 2, I wonder if Matthew has read Ross Speer's work on Althusser?

Philip M

I think it's worth critiquing Priest but you have a weak counter in the bit example because that's a result of how the logical architecture and sampling algorithms and software were designed, which has no necessary basis for proving the validity of the law of contradiction (or not 😉). Ben Burgis actually had a quite good response to this on his blog: "I am inclined to view this as a reductio proof against the idea that there are or could be such things as "moments of change." Change doesn't occur *at moments,* it occurs among moments...Priest expresses his theory of change with a paraconsistent tense logic, with pastness and futurity operators, and that tense logics have historically been associated with historically been associated with A-Theorists like Prior. It's not clear that from the perspective of the B-Theory, a tense logic with pastness and futurity operators would make any more sense than, say, a "height logic" with tallness and shortness operators, and for about the same reason."

Philip M

IMO a better jumping off point for Priest is his chapter titled Classical Logic *aufgehoben* which you can find in his website.

Philip M

As for the nature of contradiction in Marxist dialectics, that is a thorny subject which does not have anything near a consensus. Look at Priest's "Was Marx a Dialethiest?" He says, "the general idea is that idealist dialectic is committed to dialetheism because of its idealism, rather than its dialectics." Quoting Marquit, "Hegel's need for logical contradictions was rooted in his dialectical idealism, in which the world unfolds from the Idea as movements in thought in a process of dialectical negation from one opposite to another, rather than in the historical process of evolutionary development of matter, in which the process of dialectical negation unfolds in time. Hegel's dialectical unfolding, in essence, being ahistorical, required the acceptance of logical contradictions as a consequence of the need to regard the identity of opposites as an absolute identity in every respect. Materialist dialectics has no such need." Back to Priest, "Now the difference between materialist and idealist dialectics is a crucially important one. Hegel held it to be the Idea that was in a state of development. Marx believed that it was social institutions. And the nature of a substance is clearly relevant to some of its properties. For example, the Idea is not material; society is. But this difference as such bears no relevance to whether the substance involved has (can have, must have) logically contradictory properties. It is no more (or less) difficult to see how states of affairs involving a material object could be literally contradictory than it is to see how states of affairs involving, say, the Absolute could be."

Ian Stockdale

Thank you for this. I will search out Burgis' blog post, although I'm already worried it will go over my head. My point with the bit example is that P=P with certainty, resulting in a 'true' contradiction if 'P AND -P". I'm a 'walking contradiction' - I have contradictory beliefs at the same time, as do we all. That's not a 'true' contradiction, I'm not a logic machine, I'm a complex animal with feelings, interests, subconcious desires, etc. Don't reductio proofs rely on the law of non-contradiction? Is that not the very absurdity to which the argument reduces?

Philip M

That's what Priest gets at in Dialectic and Dialethic among other writings.

Ian Stockdale

I really appreciate your detailed responses to my questions, Philip. I have my homework cut out for me, at this point. Btw, Burgis' blog posts appear to be behind a paywall.

Sophia

The most irrelevant comment but here it is because you wondered. The pronunciation is Al-tou-sé(r). In other words, just keep the H silent and the s clear and you should be fine.

Philip M

I would start with Dialectic and Dialetheism.

Ian Stockdale

Well this has been a wild, thought-provoking experience. It's certainly woken me from my dogmatic slumber, although I've had to fight the urge to simply yell "In this house we obey the law of non-contradiction!" and go back to sleep. That would be a dereliction of duty, however. I presume that Matthew would identify as a dialetheist. Was there a deep dive episode that I may have missed where it's otherwise brought up? I can report, for what it's worth, that there wasn't the amount of formal logic that I was dreading to find in the materials, nor did I have to be versed in advanced logic to follow the arguments. However, it's not likely a good place to start (to "come in cold", in the parlance of Breht) for someone who hasn't had some exposure to a bit of elementary logic or logical paradoxes (somewhat beyond hearing a drunken explanation of Zeno's paradoxes, for example). Although at present I have many objections and remain unconvinced by many of the examples of potentially 'true' contradictions, now is not the time for all of that. Now is the time to let the non-conscious parts of my self process the material. I look forward to the next deep dive.

Ian Stockdale

Thanks again for your helpful suggestions, Philip. Just in case this is helpful to anyone else who might read this and may be encountering dialetheism for the first time (it's hard to tell if I'm the only one who is, or who cares), I found the entry at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy to be a very good basic introduction to the topic (irrespective of its application to Marxism), as well: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/

Max

The basic conception of materialism/idealism in terms of the priority of mind or matter is not able to capture the specific kernel of Hegel’s “idealism”. Because if you define materialism as the conviction that all consciousness is built upon being (as opposed to being as the product of a consciousness – divine or otherwise), you will not find anything in Hegel to dispute this. His philosophical system always starts with the immediate being. His logic literally so, his phenomenology starts with sensory certainty, his concept of state follows the economic sphere, his philosophy of history introduces the differences between peoples and their ideas as dependent on geography. He is in no way conducive to magical thinking or unchanging pre-conceived ideas that govern our lives. His spirits are metaphors for what is concrete historical and material human practice. And yet, to say he is an idealist is not wrong and neither is to claim that Marx performs a critical turn-around. However, what is meant by that does need to be conceptualized differently or otherwise you run the risk of losing too much of Hegel’s brilliance. Aside from crude esoteric mysticism or vulgar ‘scientific’ positivism, if a thinker is sufficiently thorough, he will grasp an interrelation between the material and the ideal spheres and will be miles ahead of any out of the former categories even if he started his examination from an ideal perspective. The main difference between Hegel and Marx is expressed in their different view of the role of philosophy. For Hegel, the owl of Minerva takes flight in the dusk, once the dust has settled and events have unfolded. He looks back on history which has coalesced into ideas. Its not that he denies the material roots of the human spirit, he simply does not care for them as much since he is trying to sort out the “finished product”. His approach is conservative, he wants to make sense of what has transpired and envelope their systematic relations. Marx’s approach on the other hand is revolutionary. Not content with merely interpreting the past, he looks forward on philosophy as a means to facilitate successful political practice. He wants to grow the seeds of discord within the mills of capitalism and is therefore very concerned with said formation’s material roots. Hegel suffers errors and biases because of his methods. A notorious example would be in his philosophy of history where he tries to squeeze India and China into what is thoroughly a 19th century colonial European perspective. He only has passing knowledge of these regions and what scholarly information is available to him is sullied by imperialist contempt and racism. Leaving no room for parallel development, he presumes both pinnacles of civilization as regions with no history, China as the calcified eternal order without change and India as the constant tumultuous yet colourful chaos. This paints a neat dialectical picture but is also utterly wrong. Nevertheless, I regard his philosophy of history in total very highly and as an absolute necessity for the development of historical materialism because it unveils the dialectical process. And not just as a necessary precursor but as a necessary scientific method in general. You’ll always have to go from the concrete to the abstract and from the abstract to the concrete, the former leaving space for positivist deviations and the latter for biases and mystification. Similar to the contradiction of analytic and intuitive thinking. Case in point, I would like to extend my apologia to the philosophy of right. I think it is a crime against God to put a dimwit like Fukuyama anywhere remotely close to Hegel. Nothing in what is a complete and total conception of dialectics as permeating every fiber of our lives – a philosophy of literally absolute change – would make sense to just simply end for good in anything other than the reconstruction of God prior to the next Big Bang. Hegel indeed says history ends - it ends in the present, though I fail to see the controversial content of that statement. He does, of course, regard the Prussian state as some sort of conclusion as it is the form of society in which a complete system of philosophy (and history) is realized for the first time (through him) and therefore could put an end to history as “List der Vernunft” with people being “tricked by reason” to further the development of the spirit unknowingly. Instead, it might be the start of history as a conscious undertaking of humanity, the promise of the French Revolution realized. This, I would argue, while overly optimistic is much closer to our conception of communism as the beginning of history than to Fukuyama’s drooling surrender to monopoly capitalism. Since Hegel’s philosophical perspective is backwards, he does not try guess what comes after the present because that is not his business. At least not of his philosophy. He was actually very political and entrenched in many political conflicts of his time (there is a book from Losurdo to recommend), which would further call into question his supposed assessment of Prussian perfection. In conclusion, I would see Marx’ development of historical materialism much more as a complement to Hegel’s dialectic idealism, though one absolutely necessary for any revolutionary practice. There are parts of the whole cast into shadow by the materialist approach as well. It should have priority in a 1 becomes 2 not 2 becomes 1 kind of way, but please don’t listen to the seducers that promise you won’t have to read Hegel. There is no escaping the Absolute.

Max

Hey Ian, You are correct. The law of non-contradiction is left intact for static states, in which everything can be fixated by an exact definition. However, a state can only be considered static within certain limits, such as for example in a specific mathematical axiomatic order or within a specific context of meaning such as ‘the sun is rising for me in this specific part of the world’. If you try to grasp processes like change and development, you need to learn how to think in relations instead of states. This is where dialectical contradictions come into play. The dialectic contradiction arises from dynamic states in which something is “captured” between the two poles of its movement. This does not however solely comprise 'material' movement in time but also ‘conceptual movement’ as it serves as a conception for relations in general (time being a relation between past and future). Every relation is itself contradictory because it is a relation between two things. To say something is bright also presupposes that darkness exists. Furthermore, it describes a relationship between you, your surroundings, and a light source. The same brightness setting of a phone screen can be bright during the night and dark during the day and any static statement will wither within changing surroundings or different eyes. In our daily lives (in the realm of common sense) the implicit context is usually clear and statements appear non-contradictory, but if you try to tackle abstract philosophical concepts or top-level historical practice then contradictions can become a problem. However, much like Newtonian physics being still true within certain boundaries, formal logic always applies. You can still make statements that contradict themselves and are therefore wrong. It is just important to understand that not all statements that appear as contradictions are necessary nonsensical. I am not sure about the fringe points that Priest alludes to. I don’t think they are very important as they can be dealt with pretty easily in mathematics or in political practice. I would focus much more on the problem of capturing infinite relations within the finite tools of language that will inevitably cause contradictions. Like say you have a mathematical function between set A and set B. Is the relation itself A or B or maybe both or neither? We help ourselves by saying dialectically it is A as well as B. But we never mean it is exactly A and B at the very same time, instead we might mean it is A but changing to B, it is A and a little bit B, it is A from this side, but B from the other and so on.

Steven Phillips

I’m sure most of this will be way over my head but I enjoyed Althusser’s ISA book so much… so here I am

Matthew

Hi Ian, Please forgive my late reply; I've been thinking about your question since last week and working on a reply to it, which I'd like to deliver in a recap at the beginning of Part 2 of our treatment of "Contradiction and Overdetermination". It is a question well-worth considering, and I've encountered it many times, in some form or other, over the years. I had been planning on giving you a written reply, but I've since seen that Max and Philip have supplied some helpful replies already, so I think it would be better to draw on them to help stage a more conversational approach. I basically share Max's (and I think Philip's as well) position that dialectical logic is not intended to, nor does it in fact, annul or replace the "classical" logic (which here means forms of logic invented in the 19th and early 20th centuries, not logic from, e.g. classical Greece or India) of mutually exclusionary states; rather, I think they work in complementarity. Certainly, I would recommend anyone who disbelieves the existence of mutually exclusionary states to never enter into a crosswalk, bet on blackjack, or try caramelizing onions for that matter! I'd like to explore this matter in response to your posts, with Breht, because, as I said, it is important and worth working out. I hope we can come up with some helpful images, tropes, and thought exercises to help clarify for as many listeners as possible what's going on here. Thank you for giving us an opportunity to work this through! In sol, Matthew P.S.>>Romanes eunt domus!

Ian Stockdale

Thanks, Matthew! I will reserve any questions I have at this point until I've listened to Part 2, to which now I'm REALLY looking forward. In the meantime, I'm clearly overdue for a re-watch of 'The Life of Brian'.

Ian Stockdale

Thanks for this response, Max (for some reason I didn't notice this until now). I think your point: "You can still make statements that contradict themselves and are therefore wrong. It is just important to understand that not all statements that appear as contradictions are necessary nonsensical." is a precise summation of what I'm getting from Priest et al. while perhaps 'getting in the weeds' when I look at the examples he gives. I'm expecting (or at least hoping) this will be somewhat clarified in Part 2. Cheers, Ian.

Rev Left Radio

Incredibly insightful feedback. Well said and well argued. I really want to do a full episode on Hegel. We have def touched on him in many eps in the past, but a Hegel explainer or even series could be a great idea. LMK if you would be possibly interested in something like that!

Rev Left Radio

haha maybe! Did i fuck up the roman numerals? lol Oh well

Max

Kind words, thank you! I would love to contribute. However, truth be told, I lack formal qualifications as well as full confidence to formulate in English in realtime. I would be down to try though, if I was given some time and questions to prepare. At the very least I would be happy to answer any questions in writing. Can I send you an E-Mail maybe?