Bonus: Provisional Script for War Room XIX Battle of Ap Bac (Patreon)

Welcome back to the War Room, where we are going to take a look at the Battle of Ap Bac, fought on the 2nd of January 1963. This is an interesting battle on a few counts, not least because it’s a significant Vietcong victory in the early phase of active American involvement in Vietnam, but because it’s a battle in which the attacking side, with all the advantages of paper, suffers a cascade of failures because the defender has nailed down the basics for a light infantry defence.

Background

By the start of 1963, the United States is becoming increasingly embroiled in South East Asia, seeking to support South Vietnam against North Vietnam as part of a wider Cold War strategy to prevent communist expansion in the region.

A key component of this support is military assistance. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam, the ARVN, was by this time fighting its counterinsurgency campaign against the North Vietnamese controlled guerrillas of the Viet Cong with American arms and equipment and under the supervision and direction of American advisors.

Despite this, the ARVN suffered from a great many problems, not least the motivation of its conscripted soldiery and political pressure from above. Having gained power via a military coup and already managed to survive several more, President Diem saw an overriding need to limit the threat posed by his own military. As such, the South Vietnamese forces were optimised for loyalty over competence. Officer positions, particularly senior positions, were filled out by the politically reliable, parallel command structures were created to prevent individuals gaining too much power and, because Diem believed that one of the attempted coups against him had grown out of heavy losses amongst some units, officers leading forces that sustained casualties could face reprimand or demotion.

The Viet Cong, in contrast, were generally more highly motivated and could include men with considerable experience built up fighting the French in the previous decades, but were comparatively lightly armed.

While the ARVN could bring armoured vehicles, artillery and air support to bear, the Viet Cong were limited to small arms and man-portable heavy weapons. Critically, at this stage in the conflict they lacked the antitank weapons they needed to go up against South Vietnamese tanks and APCs.

So as the ARVN conducted sweep and clear operations and tried to break the link between the guerrillas and the population by instituting a ‘Strategic Hamlet’ program, the VC sought to avoid being tracked down and pinned in place where ARVN mechanised and heliborne units could destroy them.

In the lead up to the battle of Ap Bac, this is exactly what looked to be about to happen.

At the tail end of 1962, an American ELINT aircraft had located a radio transmitter in the hamlet of Ap Tan Thoi. Estimating that the transmitter would be defended by a reinforced company of Viet Cong, the ARVN’s 7th Division was ordered to attack.

Terrain

Ap Tan Thoi lies south west of Saigon in the rice farming area of the Mekong Delta, just south of the Plain of Reeds. The Plain of Reeds was essentially a large, swampy floodplain unsuitable for large scale cultivation or habitation and as such had served as a key refuge for first the Viet Minh against the French and now the Viet Cong.

The village itself sits at the northwest end of an arc of raised ground which runs off to the southeast and the village of Ap Bac, before turning south. The two villages are made up of lightly built wood, reed and bamboo houses surrounded by small orchards, gardens and groves.

The whole arc somewhat resembles a Pacific atoll, being a narrow stretch of slightly raised ground in a sea of rice paddies. These are low-lying, inundated, very muddy and the individual fields are broken up by small berms that allow the farmers to get about without getting their feet wet but don’t offer any cover.

The paddy fields are supported by several canals, but the most important here is the Cong Ba Ky Canal, which runs north to south and skirts the western edge of the raised ground.

Southern Plan

Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Bui Dinh Dam and assisted by US Advisors led by Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann, the 7th Division planned Operation Duc Thang 1, or Victory 1, to trap and destroy the Viet Cong expected at Ap Tan Thoi.

The 17th Civil Guard Battalion from the Provisional Dinh Tuong Regiment under the provincial chief Major Lam Quang Tho was to attack from the south, the 2nd Battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment was to be carried by the H-21 helicopters of the American 93rd Transportation Company to the north, supported by 5 UH-1 Huey Gunships. There were only 10 H-21s, enough to carry a single company at a time, so it would take three trips before all three were in position. Once on the ground though, the battalion was to attack Ap Tan Thoi from the north.

Also under the command of Tho as part of the Dinh Tuong Regiment was the 4th Squadron, 2nd Armoured Cavalry. Made up of a company of infantry carried in 13 M113 APCs commanded by Captain Ly Tong Ba, 4/2ACR would attack from the west.

With this pressure from three sides, Dam and Vann intended to force the Viet Cong out of the cover of Ap Tan Thoi and into the open paddy fields to the east where they could be destroyed by artillery, helicopters and close air support.

Not intended for the attack but kept in reserve were the 352nd Ranger Company and 1st Company, 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry.

The night before the attack, the Rangers would be carried up the canals by River Assault Group 21 to get into a blocking position to the north and prevent the Viet Cong escaping into the Plain of Reeds if they began to move before the attack went in. From that position, the Rangers would also be able to support the 2/11 airborne attack from the north.

 1/1/11, on the other hand, was kept back at Tan Tiep Airfield to be deployed by helicopter as necessary.

The whole operation was to be controlled by Lieutenant Colonel Dam from the 7th Division command post, while Lieutenant Colonel Vann observed from a light reconnaissance aircraft.

Northern Plan

Unfortunately for the ARVN and their supporting Americans, the Viet Cong were both forewarned by their own radio intercepts and spies and present in greater strength than anticipated.

The plan of attack was based on their being only a single reinforced company men present, about 120 men, if they were still there at all. It wouldn’t be the first time that the VC had already shut down the radio transmitter that gave their position away and bugged out before ARVN forces had arrived.

Instead, there were two Viet Cong companies in the area: a company each from the local 261st battalion and the main force 514th, which was passing through the area. All in all, the VC were able to field 320 men and although they were mostly restricted to small arms, they did have two .30 calibre medium machineguns and a 60mm mortar.

In addition, in contrast to standard practice through the preceding year, they had received orders to stand and fight. The Viet Cong dug in, the 261st around Ap Tan Thoi and the 514th around Ap Bac. Although they were limited to the obvious area of dry ground amidst the paddy fields, both companies were able to effectively fortify and conceal their positions to take advantage of the totally open, exposed ground surrounding them.

The Battle Begins

With the 352nd Rangers blocking any Viet Cong escape to the north, Operation Duc Thang 1 commenced early on the morning of January the 2nd, 1963.

Despite low cloud and fog, the first heliborne company of 2/11 landed north of Ap Tan Thoi at 0700 and reported no resistance.

Opening Moves

In the south, meanwhile, the 17th Civil Guard Battalion had been split into two Task Forces: Task Force A advancing on Ap Bac on the right, and Task Force B advancing on its left.

These were being watched by the alert VC of the 514th, who had a screen entrenched in a projecting treeline south of Ap Bac. The paramilitary Civil Guard, sticking to the paddy dykes of the surrounding rice fields and expecting the Viet Cong to decline an engagement against such a superior ARVN force, had no idea they were there.

At about 0740, the lead Civil Guard elements of Task Force A got to within 30m of the VC and the guerrillas opened fire. Rapidly suffering heavy casualties, especially amongst their leaders, Task Force A went to ground. After attempts to call in artillery fire were stymied by the reluctance of forward observers to expose themselves to incoming fire and call shot, Task Force A was effectively pinned.

Here, there appears to be the first signs of a breakdown in communication. With the Civil Guard a component of the local Dinh Tuoung Provisional Regiment rather than organic to the 11th ARVN Division, news of the contact and subsequent firefight took two hours to reach Lieutenant Colonel Dam.

In the meantime, fog over Tan Hiep forced the H-21s to postpone the second lift of 2/11, leaving the single company already inserted north of Ap Tan Thoi on its own. This began to move south, but was too weak to attack alone and potentially vulnerable out on the paddies, leading Dam to order the 352nd down to back them up.

Disaster

By the time the fog had cleared enough for helicopter operations and the H-21s had returned from ferrying the final 2/11 company north, it was 0945 and news that the southern attack was in trouble was reaching the Divisional Command Post.

With Task Force A fixed under fire and Tho apparently reluctant to commit either Task Force B or 4/2ACR and suffer more casualties that would bring down the ire of President Diem, the major was asking for help.

In response, Dam decided to commit his reserve and quickly insert 1/1/11 by helicopter to take the pressure off Task Force A. Physically removed from the battlefield himself in his CP, Dam asked Vann, flying overhead, to choose between two potential LZs for 1/1/11.

Unable to spot any Viet Cong positions around the village despite his suspicions, Vann ultimately decided to direct the helicopters to an LZ west of Ap Bac.

The ten H-21s came in, escorted by the Huey gunships, and angled in to drop 1/1/11 much closer to Ap Bac than Vann had anticipated- about 200m away.

Concealed in their bunkers and foxholes on the edge of the village, watching as the helicopters came in to land inside small arms range out on the open paddies, the Viet Cong waited until the lead H-21 flared out to set down and then opened fire.

Unarmoured and engaged at close range, the helicopters were quickly riddled and the ARVN infantry inside took casualties as they deployed. Taking off again as soon as the infantry were clear, the H-21s left one of their number behind in fields- too damaged to get airborne again- and another was unable to stay up and had to set down a few kilometres away.

One H-21 went back to try and evacuate the crew of the disabled helicopter on the LZ, landing between it and the village, only to be crippled and stranded under fire in turn. After this, one of the Huey gunships made an attempt. Supported by the other gunships strafing the treeline with rockets and machineguns, the Huey was still focused down by the Viet Cong as it came in to land. Losing its tail rotor, it flipped over and crashed.

Operation Duc Thang was rapidly turning into a disaster.

With attention now firmly focused on the beleaguered 1/1/11 and the surviving American crews of the downed helicopters, Vann petitioned Dam to order 4/2 ACR and its M113s to the rescue.

Waiting for the cavalry to arrive, the American crewmen on the ground in the LZ were able to direct artillery and close air support onto Ap Bac and the surrounding raised ground. But despite being pummelled by 105mm howitzers and doused with napalm dropped by Vietnamese Air Force Skyraiders, the Viet Cong were well dug in and able to hang on without sustaining significant casualties.

In the north meanwhile, the three companies of 2/11 were closing in on Ap Tan Thoi. Attacking on three axes, the ARVN troops received the same treatment as the Civil Guard in the south. The concealed Viet Cong of the 261st Battalion opened fire on them at point blank range and forced them to ground in the paddy fields.

2/11 attempted to mount several attacks over the course of the next few hours, but made no progress and eventually settled in to direct more artillery and close air support onto the village.

The Cavalry

At 1100, Vann was informed that there were two severely wounded American helicopter crewman trapped on the LZ outside Ap Bac. With 4/2 ACR yet to arrive despite Vann’s repeated insistencies to Colonel Dam, the American advisor organised a helicopter medevac.

Two more H-21s, supported by a trio of Huey gunships, made another attempt to land at the LZ, but as before, they came under heavy fire. One of the H-21s managed to set down, but immediately took off again without picking anyone up and was too damaged to stay airborne for long, landing off to the west.

Convinced more than ever that the situation could only be saved by the M113s of 4/2ACR, Vann could no doubt see from his reconnaissance aircraft that the company still hadn’t even set off.

Cutting Lieutenant Colonel Dam out of the loop, Vann directly radioed the US Advisor attached to 4/2 to try and get things moving.

Captain Ba, commanding the M113s, replied that he did not take orders from the 7th Division CO Colonel Dam, nor did he take orders from American advisors, he took his orders from his own commanding officer and provincial governor Major Tho.

Tho himself was refusing to follow Dam’s orders to bring his units up to support 1/1/11 and clearly did not regard him and his command as subordinate to the 11th Division. Eventually, Vann prevailed on Ba to get moving- by amongst other things apparently threatening to have him shot- and the M113s finally started out.

They were, however, on the wrong side of the Cong Ba Ky Canal. While the M113s could negotiate the muddy paddy fields without too many problems, the deep, steep sided canal presented a significant obstacle. 4/2’s attached infantry had to dismount and improvise a fascine crossing from the surrounding foliage before the vehicles could get across.

As a result, it wasn’t until 1330 that the lead vehicles of 4/2 finally approached the 1/1/11 LZ. Although the M113s were able to reinforce the infantry and start loading up the wounded- including the Americans- they quickly ran into their own problems.

Although the Viet Cong at Ap Bac didn’t have any antitank weapons, the M113 commanders in the gunner position had to expose themselves to fire their pintle-mounted .50 calibre MGs and many of the drivers were opened up for better visibility.

As a result, the 4/2 ACR crews started to take casualties, principally amongst their vehicle commanders. Struggling to pinpoint VC positions and effectively suppressed, the M113s were unable to make a decisive contribution to the firefight.

Captain Ba made several attempts to move up and assault the treeline, but with his vehicles coming online at intervals after slogging through the canal, he was only able to throw two or three M113s in at a time, allowing the VC to concentrate their fire on them and drive them back.

4/2 ACR did have one vehicle armed with a long-ranged flamethrower, which could have proved decisive, but the crew had mixed the fuel incorrectly and it could only fire out to 30m: far closer than the M113s were willing to get to the Viet Cong positions.

A Final Catastrophe

At this stage, all of the 7th Division assets available for the operation were committed. The Civil Guard of Task Force A were fixed to the south of Ap Bac, while their compatriots in Task Force B were slowly and reluctantly moving up on the pinned down survivors of 1/1/11, now alone on their LZ again after the M113s of 4/2ACR withdrew behind them to get out of small arms range.

The other reserve company- the 352nd Rangers- had been too far back to contribute to 2/11’s stagnated attack on Ap Tan Thoi and was in the process of moving back north so that River Assault Group 21 could return them to My Tho.

With nothing else to throw into the fight, the ARVN troops and their US advisors could only continue directing artillery and close air support onto Ap Tan Thoi and Ap Bac.

With the Viet Cong obviously committed to a conventional battle, Vann urged Colonel Dam to request more forces to trap them where they were. With the 8th Airborne Battalion standing by in the ARVN General Staff reserve, they had a unit that could quickly be deployed to the east and create a cordon before the VC could escape overnight. With the guerrillas thus trapped, the ARVN could bring overwhelming force to bear the next day and destroy them.

Dam replied that he had secured deployment of the 8th Airborne, but that they would be dropped to the west. By now Vann had lost all patience with the ARVN officers he was there to advise and flew back to Tan Tiep to have it out with Colonel Dam.

There, he not only found Dam, but General Huynh Van Cao, the ARVN IV Corps commander, and his US Advisor, Colonel Daniel Porter, and Major General Tran Thien Kheim, the Chief of Staff of the ARVN General Staff.

The ARVN officers explained that they didn’t want to surround the Viet Cong and encourage them to fight to the death in a way that would cost the lives of more South Vietnamese troops. Instead, they wanted to leave them an avenue of escape where they could be destroyed in the open by artillery and aircraft.

The Americans opposed this, believing the VC would have a good opportunity to slip away in the night, but by now there was considerable tension between the two allies. Vann believed that the ARVN weren’t demonstrating enough aggression and were letting an opportunity to destroy the Viet Cong slip away, Cao and Dam believed the increasingly incredulous and overbearing Vann was prepared to sacrifice any number of South Vietnamese soldiers to save his fellow American advisors in trouble on the ground.

The Americans were unable to convince the ARVN commanders to change their minds and the 8th Airborne was despatched in a flight of C-123 Providers to drop to the west, behind 4/2 ACR and Task Force B.

Instead, whether due to misfortune, miscalculation or ground fire, the 300 men of the 8th Airborne jumped much closer to the enemy. Drifting down on parachutes between the VC positions in Ap Tan Thoi and Ap Bac, the Airborne were easy targets, suffering losses before they even hit the ground. Trying to organise as they landed, the paratroopers were just as exposed out in the paddy fields as all the other ARVN troops earlier in the day and were quickly pinned down as darkness fell.

The final nail in the coffin for Operation Duc Thang came in the night. Exhausted and low on ammunition, if jubilant with their unexpected success, the Viet Cong left their positions in the two hamlets and set out east to make their escape.

Although a C-47 flare ship was on station ready to illuminate the eastern paddies, it was never used. The 8th Airborne commander’s concern that the flares would light up his men in the west prevailed over Vann’s insistence on exploiting the flares to destroy the retreating VC, who were instead subjected to a smattering of ineffective, unobserved harassing rounds overnight.

Aftermath

In the morning, the Viet Cong had successfully disengaged and disappeared, leaving the ARVN to occupy Ap Tan Thoi and Ap Bac at the cost of 86 dead and 108 wounded. Their American allies had lost 3 men killed and 8 wounded between embedded advisors and helicopter crews, along with 4 H-21s and 1 Huey gunship. Of the remaining 10 American helicopters, all but one were damaged.

The VC had by no means gotten away scot free, with 18 killed and 39 wounded, but they had successfully stood their ground despite being a light infantry force outnumbered 4-1 by an opponent with armoured vehicles, helicopters, artillery and air support.

It’s easy to focus in on the failings of the ARVN force here, particularly the corrosive effects of top-down political pressure to minimise friendly casualties. Unwilling to risk upsetting President Diem, ARVN commanders repeatedly held their forces back, delayed what orders they couldn’t outright disobey and effectively allowed the enemy to escape unmolested.

On the other hand, the Americans seem to have had difficulty bridging the gap between their own professional world of conventional warfare and the more complex counter-insurgency environment of South Vietnam.

The fact that the ARVN had been recast in the image of the US Army did not mean that it would perform or behave the same way, no matter how abrasive and forceful the frustrations of professional soldiers like Lieutenant Colonel Vann.

But fundamentally, this was a demonstration of solid defensive basics by the Viet Cong. Having had time to prepare a defence, they chose their ground incredibly well and exploited it to the hilt.

Surrounded by paddy fields, they were not only set up on the only elevated ground but also the only dry ground, which allowed to fortify their positions and make use of the local village groves and orchards to remain hidden, minimising the effects of superior ARVN firepower.

They also maintained a high level of fire discipline- holding their fire in several cases until ARVN troops or American helicopters were at close range in a way that not only made their first volleys more deadly and maximised the shock effect, but also fixed their opponents in the open paddies where they were unable to disengage and forced to expose themselves if they wanted to observe, return fire or manoeuvre.

The reality of the Battle of Ap Bac from a tactical perspective is that it is perhaps less a case of ARVN-American failure and more a classic example of a light infantry defence that demonstrates how basic tactical concepts well executed allowed the defender to repeatedly take advantage of their enemy’s errors, whether they were forced or unforced.

Hope you all enjoyed this one and found it interesting. If you’d like to see these videos early and support the channel, you can do so via Patreon and Youtube Memberships. Whether you do or not, thanks for watching and I’ll see you in the next one.