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CHANGE OF SCHEDULE: I had asked in the original scheduling post for this book whether people would want to do a collaborative live writing session at the midpoint the way we have been doing for the end of books so far, and people seemed interested so I’m going to interrupt our regularly scheduled programming to include that. This week is still our normal discussion of chapter 11-13, but next week we’ll pause the reading to have a discussion session and perhaps give people a chance to catch up on the reading, before continuing on to the second half of the book. If you’d like to participate in the live writing session, indicate your availability next week on this when2meet and I’ll announce the time/day this friday. I also edited the original reading schedule to reflect this change. Hope to see you there!

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Chapter 11 - Such ‘irrational’’ methods of support are needed because of the ‘uneven development’ (Marx, Lenin) of different parts of science. Copernicanism and other essential ingredients of modern science survived only because reason was frequently overruled in their past.

Chapter 12 - Galileo’s method works in other fields as well.  For example, it can be used to eliminate the existing arguments against materialism, and to put an end to the philosophical mind/body problem (the corresponding scientific  problems remain untouched, however). It does not follow that it should be universally applied.

Chapter 13 - The Church at the time of Galileo not only kept closer to reason as defined then and, in part, even now: it also considered the ethical and social consequences of Galileo’s views/its indictment of Galileo was rational and only opportunism and a lack of perspective can demand a revision.

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am i the only one who's been bringing this book up in every other conversation since starting to read it???

How shall we proceed in order to bring about such a fair comparison [between old and new theories]? The first step is clear: we must retain the new cosmology until it has been supplemented by the necessary auxiliary science. We must retain it in the face of plain and unambiguous refuting facts. We may, of course, try to explain our action by saying that the critical observations are either not relevant or that they are illusory, but we cannot support such an explanation by a single objective reason. Whatever explanation we give is nothing but a verbal gesture, a gentle invitation to participate in the development of the new philosophy. (ch 11 pg 112)

So at this point Feyerabend has me pretty sold on his take of the scientific method re Galileo and the Copernican revolution, and I felt like this chapter prompted me to think of other examples. His idea of progress requiring a ‘step backwards’ certainly holds for many scientific paradigm shifts—Maxwell, Bohr and Einstein, are all good examples—but it’s a lot easier to identify these things after the fact, once we’ve already done a lot of work to support the once outlandish theories. It got me trying to think of what ideas are out there today that might be examples of the irrational ideas that we should retain ‘in the face of plain and unambiguous facts’? 

The main one that keeps coming up for me is MOND, which I talked about as an alternative to dark matter in my video about gravity being a social construct. I think it has a lot in common with Copernicanism in Galileo’s time—an idea that’s been around for a while that has its small group of dedicated supporters, but generally dismissed by the mainstream as silly and not really worth indulging in. tbh I had some second thoughts after publishing the video that it was too silly and unscientific of a thing to take seriously, but maybe thats what it looks like to retain new ideas that don’t yet have the support to be compared productively to old ideas? like, I’m not saying that I Fully Subscribe to the idea of MOND, but Feyerabend’s argument makes me feel a little more justified in inviting people to participate in the development of a new philosophy, so to speak. 

I’d be curious to hear if anyone else thought of any modern ideas that might fall into this category too?

also the discussion of galileo’s trials goes hard, the comparison between the church and the orthodoxy of modern scientific institutions is… wild but also makes total sense??? I hope there’s more on that coming, and if there’s not im gonna have to go follow the references in his footnotes bc the irony is too strong to not deep dive further

Comments

Robert Herold

I have been so excited for this week because this is by far my favorite section of the book! Not only does it show Feyerabend's style better than any other, it is also a truly fascinating part of history that I had never heard before. Also, have no fear Dr. Fatima, you are not alone in constantly bringing this book up, I read it over 2 years ago and I still can't shut up about it and his other books lol. What I wanted to touch on though today was the fact that the most popular and most taught story of Galileo is nothing more than a myth that is used to help propel a specific view of what science is and to create a divide between church and science. I was always told that Galileo was fighting a noble cause against the irrational and vengeful Church who would simply go after anyone who tried to speak the truth. Yet as Feyerabend demonstrates that is not the truth, the truth is much more complex. However, our educational system is not constructed to teach complicated truths, it is designed to instill certain ideas and concepts into students who are supposed to sit down and just learn. The more I have looked around the more myths I have been able to find and I wanted to quickly talk about. So in political science, if you crack open any textbook you will come across, usually in the first or second chapter, a section about the scientific study of politics. In this chapter you will always come across not only the scientific method, which as we are currently reading about has its own problems, but another thing you will come across is the method operationalization. This is the method of defining abstract concepts in way that allows you to empirically measure them. Now the myth comes about in the fact that most textbooks conflate the scientific method and operationalization, in fact it is often posited that in doing the first you have to do the second. Yet this seems to imply that not only does every scientific field use the method of operationalization, but it also means that to do science is to do operationalization and to not use it makes your ideas slightly less scientific. The truth is that the method of operationalization comes from a physicist named Percy W. Bridgman, and the history of the method is a lot more complex then the idea of it just being used in every science. Yet this more complex history is never talked about in any textbook or graduate level book, and it is never taught. Instead, the field has chosen a comfortable myth over the inconvenient truth. I highly recommend people look to whatever fields they are in or are interested in and look for the myths that have been created, and then ask yourself why they were created. I would love to hear about some of the myths people find.

AlexTheTutor

Feyerabend: “It is clear that allegiance to the new ideas will have to be brought about by… irrational means such as propaganda, emotion, ad hoc hypotheses, and appeal to prejudices of all kinds.” (Chapter 11) 1) Out of context, this is a crazy view. But, I don’t think he actually means this, I think he is just being provocative on purpose, much like when he says that when doing science ‘anything goes’ (chapter 2), akin to when Nietzsche wrote that ‘God is dead’, Feyerabend just enjoys being a pre-internet troll. After getting off his initial steam, Feyerabend later provides restraint, “But propaganda of this kind… should perhaps be avoided by the professionally honest scientist”. My hypothesis: if Feyerabend was influenced by the ideas of Wittgenstein, then Feyerabend was just as influenced by the spirit of John Stuart Mill. Consider Mill’s essay On Liberty when Mill writes, “In this age, the mere example of non-conformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is itself a service”. Basically, I get the sense that Feyerabend feels a moral duty to be provocative in ‘his age’ or any age., 2) In 2012, Emily Whitehead was 6 years old. She had a kind of leukemia with a prognosis that had a survival rate of exactly 0%. When her healthcare team exhausted all options, they decided to try an experimental treatment (take her T cells, insert genes into cells, grow cells, insert cells back in patient). It was never tried in the history of medicine, but 22 days after treatment, Emily no longer had any trace of cancer. In fact, she is alive today with no trace of cancer… clearly, had anyone interfered and tried the treatment without approval or waged a propaganda campaign, it could have easily set back cancer treatment and research back by 10 years or more, costing scientific progress and the lives of other patients. Irrational means are not always needed to progress science. Propaganda and emotion don’t need to come before progress, it can also come afterwards. 3) Hubble tension: so how fast is the universe is expanding? There are two ways to calculate this: either measure it with observations or use theory. But in 2024, we still get conflicting answers. So, there are two options: either there is something wrong with 1) OBSERVATIONS or 2) THEORY. (the exact tension Feyerabend would love, it’s like Galileo and heliocentrism and the telescope, except… it’s nothing like that at all). It’s 2024, no single person can use a basic telescope to see for themselves. Answering this requires working with a professional team that has access to giant telescopes and supercomputers. There are already 2 science teams (Freedman and Riess). Using the same data from JWST, the 2 teams have reached exactly opposite conclusions. Team Freedman says there are problems with measuring what we observe, while team Riess is confident in saying, ‘nah bro, we double checked, the measurements are good’, so… what irrational means should employ? Feyerabend may accept the idea that the team itself already creates the irrational means (which could HINDER science, NOT progress it). Think about it: in order to measure how fast the universe is expanding, you need to know the EXACT distance from the sun to THAT star, and then the exact distance from that star to THAT galaxy, and then the exact distance from that galaxy to THAT supernova on the other side of the universe. Oh and if there’s a lot of metals in that supernova or anywhere in the process, then that could throw off the measurement, (there’s no way to know how much metal there is in a speck of light billions of light years away). Knowing all of this, one of the teams is still like, “oh yeah, the measurements are fine” Oh really…? And EVERYONE on the team believes this? There is not a single person who has ANY other alternative thought…? Let Feyerabend on your team, then you’ll see some real tension 4) Planet 9: This is about a paper published literally last week (title: Trajectory of the stellar flyby that shaped the outer Solar System). For a while, there's been this romantic idea of there being a large rogue planet beyond Neptune, anything is possible after all, and a planet 9 would explain some weird observations. But, this new paper provides a new hypothesis: our early solar system (4 billion years ago or so) actually had another star pass nearby us (about 100 AU), and that explains the weird orbits of 1000s of objects beyond Neptune and etc, (in my mind, just point a telescope 2 billion light years away until you find a giant galaxy sized mirror that can bounce light back to our solar system, so we can see if anything passed by 4 billion years ago), I know I know, the idea seems like fantasy, but that’s the point, until and unless the new hypothesis is tested (or a planet 9 is found), just be creative and have fun with ideas Myth and operationalization: yes, education, transforming the abstract concept of ‘well-educated’ to ‘percentage correct on standardized math exam’, it destroys creativity and the humanities, while suffocating the human spirit. The myth (don’t worry about learning, just get a degree, get a job, and make money), why has this or similar myths been created? (insert book-long answer)

Robert Herold

Thank you for your thoughts, I really enjoyed reading your take on Feyerabend's work. I wanted to quickly offer a bit of support to your first point when you talk about Feyerabend being provocative with his writing in places. So part of the reason for the provocative nature of this work specifically is actually a funny/sad story, and it all goes back to the reason the book was made in the first place. So Feyerabend used to work with another famous philosopher of science Imre Lakatos, and they became really good friends, then he asked Feyerabend one day if he would want to write a book together. The idea would be that Feyerabend would write his hottest takes he could come up with and then Lakatos would write a rebuttal to his remarks. But by the time Feyerabend got his part done Lakatos had passed away, so he decided to still publish his half. So this book was definitely written to be provocative because he was looking forward to the rebuttal work of Lakatos. Additionally, in interviews Feyerabend has also just straight admitted to enjoying writing very provocatively to mess with people, a section of his other book "Science in a Free Society" which is a response to some reviews of Against Method is called Conversations with Illiterates. I honestly love his style.

David Roanleigh

I definitely have not been able to engage with the text in detail because, life, but I’m appreciating the broad strokes I hope. And I’m really loving reading everyone else’s reactions, it’s been awhile since I’ve been in community with people engaging in these discussions. I vividly remember in one of my history of science courses learning how the story for Galileo as “science vs religion” was oversimplified to the point of being cartoonish. And it struck me personally as someone who left religious fundamentalism but had yet to grapple with how religion (in the broader sociocultural sense) can inform a person’s curiosities and convictions. The myths, stories, truths, fables, and facts we learn as children can be stifling, genuinely harmful even. But they’re also what ground us into a shared understanding of the reality around us. We all reach the point where we start questioning what we’ve been told, but the idea that we completely buy in to that reality or reject it completely doesn’t reflect the fluid, wishy washy way we engage with our internal sensations and external interactions. There’s a million different “myths” in medicine that we all learn or are told at some point. Plenty reflect the white supremacist, patriarchal, imperialist context in which “western” medicine has developed. (Maybe we can read The Birth of the Clinic if we’re gonna keep ramping up the intellectual opacity, lol!). But one of my favorites is about Edward Jenner developing the smallpox vaccine. Most people have heard of the way he observed milkmaids’ apparent ability to avoid serious smallpox infection and connected it to exposure to a similar but less virulent cowpox infection. This appears to be more of an apple-on-the-head storification that leaves out that Jenner was building on the work of other physicians. It also tends to leave out the fact that he was able to test his hypothesis by using his gardener’s 8 yr old son, to which I’m sure consent wasn’t exactly voluntary. Ok, sleep calls once again. Thanks to Dr. Fatima and everyone else for this space/community! ~David

AlexTheTutor

Also, it sounds like Feyerabend wrote "Against Method", so his friend could write "For Method", maybe someone else in the future will write this book, thanks for the historical perspective, really appreciate it !

Nathaniel Bookout

"am i the only one who's been bringing this book up in every other conversation since starting to read it???" I am too. I successfully convinced at least one friend to start reading it, I think. If I were to try and summarize Feyerabend thus far: a plurality of ideas is essential both scientifically, because it's more empirical, and ethically, because it counters the restriction of the sciences. It's more empirical, because counterinduction can show us flaws in theories and data that we cannot currently see. And it counters the power of specialists and academics, undermining the supremacy of their fields by introducing new ones. Pluralism was essential to scientific progress, as in the case of Galileo, who advocated for a new philosophy against the best rational considerations of the time. Taken in this way, rationality is more a defender of the status quo than it is of the truth. I see Feyerabend as an ongoing dialectic between rationalism and relativism (or positivism and post-positivism which is what I think a lot about). I wonder if he's almost a sort of postmodern Rorschach test, in that I can definitely tell I'm more postmodern now than I was 10 years ago, but I feel like reading him is actually making me less so. I don't know why, but he makes me want empirical evidence more, somehow. Just in a different way--different kinds of evidence. I can sort of tell he isn't really an anarchist because he doesn't focus as much on power dynamics as would be obvious at this point. I think the Church's interest in preserving its authority to dictate the "truth" makes even more sense when you take them into consideration. But what's crucial to me is the link to rationality: is rationality inherently predisposed to just reinforcing the authority of people in power? That implication is kinda concerning. But it makes sense with the ethical need for pluralism. I keep saying "power dynamics" because I like it as a generalized catch-all for oppression. Racism, misogyny, homophobia, transphobia, ableism, colonialism, and capitalism all have power dynamics. In distilling all oppression down to their basic hierarchies, you can see how oppression is linked. Queer-anarcho-feminism. Two things stood out to me in particular. One is the footnote reference to Vladimir Lenin's "Left-wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder". I've had this little booklet around for ages because I thought the title was hilarious. But now I'm trying to figure out what Feyerabend means when he says "see also Lenin... concerning the fact that multiple causes of an event may be out of phase and have an effect only when they occur together." Since I have a different version, I'm just reading it to figure out where Lenin's talking about all that (I haven't found it yet, hopefully I will by next week). The other thing is regarding Dr. Fatima's question: "It got me trying to think of what ideas are out there today that might be examples of the irrational ideas that we should retain ‘in the face of plain and unambiguous facts’?" It might be a bit controversial. I wonder if the Duesberg Hypothesis could be like this. AIDS Denialism, the idea that HIV doesn't exist, or that it's a harmless virus that doesn't cause AIDS, was popular in the 80s and 90s, died off, and is now seeing a resurgence in the wake of anti-vax conspiracies in the 2020s. The conspiracy theory has many forms, but it's fundamentally rooted in Peter Duesberg, who himself is responsible in part for the rise of AIDS Denialism. But, like Sokal, although his actions in the end are both wrong, and harmful, his line of reasoning might still be useful. There's a grain of "truth" to the Duesberg hypothesis, from the perspective of Feyerabend, in that the original hypothesis is simply the null hypothesis for HIV's accepted function: that HIV does not cause AIDS. I think this hypothesis is still useful in two ways. One, obviously, because it can be used like a null hypothesis should, to show that HIV does, in fact, cause AIDS. The evidence at this point is fairly strong. Second, it can be broken down into two other hypotheses that I think are equally important. Does HIV only cause AIDS? And, is AIDS only caused by HIV? Duesberg's chief concern originally was with the philosophical battle between two paradigms: environmentalism and virology. The purpose of his hypothesis was to assert the effects of AIDS were entirely environmental, the result of a confluence of diseases and other conditions (like the overuse of antibiotics in sexually active gay men), not the result of a virus. While I think his own behavior is in part to blame, the dismissal of Deusberg as unscientific is incredibly interesting when you consider what Feyerabend is saying about rationality, and the status quo. The reason environmentalism vs. virology is an important debate is because one of the sides of this issue has the upper hand. Virology at its philosophical roots is about finding single causes (e.g. the "gay virus" the Nazis desperately sought). It's this context in the 80s that saw the rise of Duesberg. Most medical practitioners today like to glaze over the course of HIV research in the 80s, and its terrible outcomes, like AZT. But from the perspective of many from the era, in particular, Duesberg is a freedom fighter for those voiceless victims. Of course, many others think they should just take their goddamn pills. I think, where we're at today, we have sufficient tools and evidence to evaluate Duesberg's questions seriously, without the need to dehumanize victims, and with impunity. He also asserts, for instance, that HIV doesn't occur in Africa, and AIDS in Africa is an entirely different phenomenon, the result of different diseases and other conditions. I think we can test this, and determine whether HIV in Africa is different, and how, and how much. I actually think we already are doing much of this, from the little digging I've done in the current literature so far. HIV is fairly well-characterized in its variants, and its correlation to AIDS and its symptoms well-documented. Researchers have looked at the question of whether untreated, otherwise healthy adults infected with HIV will develop AIDS--the trend is, they do. Researchers have looked at what other illnesses occur in confluence with AIDS, or could be mistaken for AIDs. And so forth. But my point is that fundamental paradigm conflict: environmentalism vs. virology. I feel like, from Feyerabend's point of view, environmentalism exists perfectly to demonstrate the flaws in virology, and vice versa. I wonder if you could kill two birds with one stone, both eradicating AIDS Denialism at its roots, and making better HIV science, if we embraced the Duesberg Hypothesis and transformed it to accommodate a growing philosophy of environmentalism.

Axiomatic

Why would, even out of context of the text, the statement that irrational means of persuasion such as propaganda, appeals to emotion, ad-hoc hypothesis, and appeals to prior prejudice are better at persuading people of a given idea/hypothesis be "crazy"?

AlexTheTutor

quick argument, although statements 1 through 4 can easily be accepted as true, someone can still argue that statemen 5 doesn't follow from the previous statements, but this is just meant as a rough sketch 1) ideally, Journalism is meant to educate/inform the public 2) but, a media group may decide to use irrational means to persuade the public to hold certain beliefs (beliefs they are convinced are the Truth) 3) so, instead of informing public, media group will decide to launch propaganda, appeal to fear and prejudice 4) over time, public becomes less informed, less rational, more emotional, less trustful of others, etc... 5) therefore, out of context, the idea of usinig irrational means to promote an idea is crazy

phil e the theyby

This is a fascinating example that you do an amazing job explaining, and I appreciate your attention to the broader context. Thanks for sharing!

phil e the theyby

I haven’t (yet) written on the previous section because, while I think I got the point, it was kind of tough for me to read. As someone with no connection to astronomy, the Galileo story felt like it got tedious. And I get why it’s there! It’s valuable and necessary for the argument. But it was a slog for me, and I didn’t have much to add to the discussion about it. But THIS! These three chapters were solid gold. I admit to being a sucker for any narrative that says “the people you think are irrational nutjobs are actually much more sensible than you think,” but Feyerabend’s argument about the role and value of the church, and what it was trying to uphold, is both really solid from an argumentative standpoint and really compelling. And the things the church was trying to do seem VALUABLE to me! Honoring social relationships and the innate human experience that can’t be reduced to scientific rationality seems like a good and valuable thing for society at large. And (of course), I still think the church sucked, and currently sucks. The reason I think it sucks fundamentally comes down to hierarchies. The people whose decisions constitute “the church” are humans, and as such I believe they are doing their best, are always trying to do the right thing, and are inherently deeply limited by their biases. Their systems of value and worth are prioritized above all others. And I believe that this can actually sometimes lead to decisions that are good for everyone; I’m not going to pretend that a single group of people are incapable of ever considering the broader good. But sometimes they’ll make decisions that are good for some people and really, really bad for others, and their limited views will either 1) prevent them from recognizing that it was bad for certain people, 2) lead them to dismiss that it was bad for the people it harmed, or 3) lead them to argue that it was actually good for those people. This isn’t because of “evil,” it’s because you are missing the perspective that comes from bringing in and recognizing the value everyone’s voice has to inform decisions about how to meet the fundamental needs humans have. All that to say, I think I’d advocate for a similar approach to moral or spiritual matters to what Feyerabend is talking about; meaningfully engage with all perspectives, dive deeper into what they’re trying to say, and read the kernel of truth underneath each of them. I’m still trying to grapple with the full potential consequences of such an approach, because there are obviously some perspectives that are really harmful when taken as guides for action (many of which inform current U.S. and global policy). But so many of these harmful perspectives are explicitly built on silencing other schools of thought that I just don’t believe in silencing as an effective solution anymore. In certain spaces, silencing is completely appropriate, and maybe even necessary. But as a broader social policy (something to apply in EVERY space), I think it does more harm than good.

phil e the theyby

Robert, reading this book as intentionally a polemic piece with some conclusions potentially taken further than they would be otherwise is a really fascinating way to engage with the text. I already try to read and think critically, but there being this added layer of “I’m not 100% sure how much the author believes this” really makes me have to justify or find a way of backing up and conclusions I take away. Thanks for sharing!

phil e the theyby

Making this a separate post because it’s about one of Fatima’s questions and my other post is directly about the text: My hot take that I want to retain in the face of it being clearly contradicted (?) by everyone’s personal experience is that “Your feelings towards the world are shaped by your life experience, and your beliefs are nothing more than rationalizations for things you already feel.” That’s not to say that “rational argumentation” can’t change one’s beliefs; rather, I’m saying that when it does, it’s because it’s changed your INTUITIVE AND EMOTIONAL attitude towards the world first, and the change in beliefs is secondary. Based on this view, I think that your rational arguments aren’t changing other people’s minds not because those other people are irrational, but because the structure of their beliefs works exactly the same as everyone else’s, including yours. This means that, if we want to change anyone’s mind, including our own, we have to change how we FEEL, and that will change how we think.

Zachery Sanders

what a week- I meant to keep this short, but.... Feyerabend writes about the assumption that “the theories, the observations, the principles of out arguments - are timeless entities which share the same degree of perfection, are all equally related to each other in a way that is independent of the events that produced them”. I keep seeing the Dao in much of what I read in this book, and I can’t help feeling like I’m riding around on my HOBBY-HORSE and exposing the lengths to which I am made up of that. Or as Lawrence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy waxes, “A man and his HOBBY-HORSE, tho’ I cannot say that they act and re-act exactly after the same manner in which the soul and body do upon each other: Yet doubtless there is a communication between them of some kind; and my opinion rather is, that there is something in it more of the manner of electrified bodies,—and that, by means of the heated parts of the rider, which come immediately into contact with the back of the HOBBY-HORSE,—by long journies and much friction, it so happens, that the body of the rider is at length fill’d as full of HOBBY-HORSICAL matter as it can hold;—so that if you are able to give but a clear description of the nature of the one, you may form a pretty exact notion of the genius and character of the other.” Yesterday I watched a content creator’s take on Feynman’s quantum superimposition. I can’t wrap my mind around it, and if I understand a fraction of what was being said, that might be part of the point. Even conceptualizing a number like one million is hard, and some articles I’ve read indicate it’s a matter of how our brain processes information. There may be things beyond our capacity to (insert word related to understand or know) because of the limitations of our brains. We’ll have to keep on coming up with metaphors, analogies, and chimeras. For me so much of what we “see” is not just limited in the case of its physicality, but also conditioned in the historical/social/culturally conceptualization of what one has seen. These chapters really seem to dig into that. What we see is a symptom of something, with potentially no conceivable answer, and can “yet leave no trace in our experience”. Feyerabend notes that later auxiliary sciences help describe the complex processes which previous “naive realism” couldn’t. This has been true about plate tectonics and geological time, Darwin and DNA mechanisms he couldn’t know about, among many other things in science (crazy Kirkpatrick’s sponges). I can’t help feel though, that there’s a kind of teleology in this thinking, and that progressive developments keep getting us closer. I know he examines teleological thinking, but does Feyerabend address the undercurrent of teleology in his own writing? He makes the distinction between something being a “fairy-tale” and “accurate” and while he seems to indicate that “progress may be obstructed by our desire to be rational”, there’s still the idea of progress. If both are true, what is the process by which we escape the confines of a limiting system of rationality/science/method without falling into a kind of radical subjective relativity? Do these things just work themselves out in the fabric of anything goes? It’s interesting to me that Feyerband writes that the “Church” “acted no different from modern scientific institutions” and that it was a defender of science and rationality (at least in the context of it’s time). From this perspective, it is hardly unreasonable that they took the line they did. This leads credence to the idea of going against modern science institutes, but again at what point does one draw a line (how do we approach Terrance Howard?) Feyerabend writes that many scientists now “view all theories are instruments of prediction and reject truth-talk as metaphysical and being speculative”. In that word “prediction”, I can’t help but see the word interpretation, the chimeras and the HOBBY-HORSES, the symptom of our own being. Although Zizek might have meant a lot and nothing, I suppose it comes down to “Enjoy your Symptom” or as Tristram Shandy says, “and so long as a man rides his HOBBY-HORSE peaceably and quietly along the King’s highway, and neither compels you or me to get up behind him,—pray, Sir, what have either you or I to do with it?” But we do have something to do with it don’t we? The constant conversation seems like it should be- what have I seen, what have you seen, and how can we morally and ethically incorporate those views into something practical and humane?

Nathaniel Bookout

I think there's an appropriately metaphysical term for the process you're describing (since Feyerabend won't shut up about metaphysics): transformation.

Zachery Sanders

This is a radical idea, and one I hear much in the communities I interact with. Having been raised in a very analytically oriented family I often struggle to figure out what this means. I can see how feeling, emotion, and intuition shape reasoning, but I struggle to use and often see these things as barriers I need to overcome. Compassion, empathy and emotional understanding are must in conversations, but I'm not sure where to go beyond there, but I do believe it's valuable and I'm trying to work it out.

Nathaniel Bookout

Feyerabend does at one point mention he's assuming a definition of scientific progress, I think. This left me wondering: do we need scientific progress? What, exactly, is the function of "progress", and what would it look like if science didn't have it? I feel like we're currently living in a world of "anything goes", already, or almost there. AI has made it easier to make stuff up than ever before and I think that has epistemic consequences. If science is supposed to give us a world grounded in facts and reality, and not one based in personal superstitions, that's progress, right? Only, Feyerabend has shown how pluralism is better at giving us facts grounded in reality than "scientific progress" as it's traditionally understood. I guess that's why I ask the question, does science need progress at all? What if, instead, there were just different progressions? Not one theory overtaking another. Just different theories that co-exist. Superstitions don't need to be thrown out if they can be taken and remolded, honed scientifically to more accurately represent the truth.

Zachery Sanders

On a personal level the Sokal paper was beneficial for me. As a young undergraduate, I was deep into post modernism, post structuralism, and post colonialism (honestly still am), but there was also a weird kind of mania around it in my English department. When I came across it, it shattered this idea in my head that literary theory was superior because it understood the construction of narrative. I think the fact that he managed to dupe a community (as in bad faith as it was), forced me to reconcile that reality with the one I had built in my head. Never knew about Duesberg or that part of AIDS research/thought. Thanks for the info, very interesting.

Zachery Sanders

this question is great! and I agree, perhaps - if not addressed later in the book - a follow up question is what's the system for pluralism? - "Not against methods, but not for It either"?

Zachery Sanders

I was raised by a very rationalist scientist who discounted everything but reason, experimentation, and narrowly defined parameters to describe ideas (a world view that I both rejected and adopted). I wonder in what ways our backgrounds specifically influence our readings.

Zachery Sanders

I like this distinction between method and operationalization. I'll have to think more on this and their relationship

phil e the theyby

Zachery, it’s not easy to figure out, for sure! When interacting with others (that is, when I feel the need to change someone else’s perspectives), I try to understand the life experiences that led them to that worldview, and ask questions to clarify the emotional needs behind what they think. When it’s my own beliefs I’m trying to shift, I try to recognize what needs are causing them and how to meet them more effectively. As an example, I used to believe that I really cared about building relationships and community, and that other people don’t. So I felt like the reason a lot of the relationships I tried to build didn’t build into something more meaningful because other people just didn’t care as much. As I talk to more people and came to believe more strongly that people aren’t fundamentally different from each other in terms of their underlying needs, and as I learned more about how the structure of American society and capitalism (particularly in the post-Reagan era) have intentionally shifted societal structures away from community and towards the nuclear family, I started to shift my view of other people. I started to see them as also longing for community, but not necessarily feeling free to shift their values and priorities away from strictly focusing on work and the nuclear family. My underlying needs are the same, and I wouldn’t say they’re necessarily MET at this point. But I’m more effective in how I go about trying to meet them, and I’m less resentful of others. So I think that understanding the emotional needs that underlie my beliefs, and seeing if there are other belief systems that honor those needs and still feel “true” to me, is how I try to use this perspective to make my life better.

David Roanleigh

Have you seen any of Robert Sapolsky's conversations about how everything is biologically determined? He was all over my algorithm for awhile, and he basically makes the argument that free will is an illusion and everything is predetermined. Of course, there's a ton of negative reaction to the claim, and he even acknowledges that, despite this belief, he certainly behaves as though he has free will. However, I found his claim incredibly useful in that it renders a person's sense of intellectual or moral superiority in holding to a specific belief completely impotent. I developed my passion for philosophy from a hyper rational evangelical christian high school teacher (think Pascal's wager) and ran into plenty of derisive push back from edgy 19 year old atheists in college. Now I find this fixation on rationality rather useless in my day to day human experience, while at the same time being regularly confronted with the dismissal of human worth (whether in the context of the American healthcare system or in the genocide in Gaza). In my mind, there is no god, but life and our shared human experience are sacred (I don't think I like "sacred", but it makes for good rhetorical juxtaposition, lol). I used to justify this when thinking about my worldview as a kind of nihilism where I just choose to value life and human experience. But I rather like the idea that biological determinism (which has a decent enough rational basis) taking out the moral judgements of it being "good" that I value life and "sad" that ultimately nothing really matters. It makes me happy to think that I got here as a summation of my experiences and the experiences of everything I've interacted with and that those things had interacted with ad infinitum. Also, footnote 6 in chapter 11: "One does not start a movement by being reasonable"? Fuck Yes.

Zachery Sanders

I appreciate the response here- helpful to hear other experiences around this! Observation about Reagan era impact on family is huge in the States. Professionally, community building is central to my theory and practice. I try to be open, but being against method, at times feels really crazy and at times morally questionable. Access to private property and the myths of every man an island sa well as deserving consumption as rewarding also feels impactful on community.

32 Emilia 32

reading over ur section about environment vs virology (single causes) i'm wondering if u have seen Todd Haynes' 1995 movie 'Safe' ? it's grappling with this idea and is a pretty great movie so i definetely recommend it !

32 Emilia 32

your insight on feyerabend being provocative for the sake of it rings very true i think. esp considering this book was supposed to be a point/counterpoint release with lakatos. 'against' and 'for method'. this is supposed to be an exaggerated attack on scientific method, which in itself is harmonious with his ideas of standing by an idea even if it refuteable and counter inductive. for me personally the tone of the text completely changed once i started seeing feyerabend as a provocateur with a plan instead of a fully self-serious maniac. it just clicked.

32 Emilia 32

thank u for ur comment, it was a lot of fun to read. ill try to find a myth in musicology and come back to u!