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before getting into this week's chapter, I want to announce that I'm adding one essay to the readings from this book: next Monday we'll discuss Chapter 18 - Utopia and Violence. I started reading it as I was finishing the previous essay and it looks really interesting, it feels (not uniquely to this exact moment but still) pretty topical, and it's another short one (<10 pages).

Today's essay on Public Opinion and Liberal Principles also feels pretty topical---without saying anything about the text itself yet, discourse about free speech and censorship has evolved so much over the past decade, and reading this essay had me reflecting on thoughts I've not revisited in quite some time. Curious to hear what came up for y'all, I'll chime in more in the comments~

Comments

Ryan Messina

This was super chill as its intent seemed to be to insight debate rather than to argue anything. I found it much less stressful to read and have my own experiences included in this rather than I felt having to fight for them in the last parts. A couple of quotes that got me thinking: 1. “Democracy is to get rid of government without bloodshed” 2. “Many simple men are wiser than a government”. My thoughts: In the 1950s, the ideas of democracy are very different to what they are today and worth revisiting. Not simply what democracy is, but how it functions and who it serves remain pressing today. In the decades that followed, the rise of neoliberalism and technocratic governance shifted the emphasis from political debate to economic rationality. Citizens were increasingly recast as consumers in a system run by experts, with efficiency often treated as the highest measure of success rather than public deliberation or collective well-being. This shift left public discourse thinner and more vulnerable. Democracy was celebrated as “the right thing” yet rarely unpacked in its full complexity. Citizens were encouraged to trust institutions without cultivating the tools to question them, and that trust was frequently abused. In this environment, disinformation and polarization have flourished. Democracy remains the dominant language of legitimacy, but its practice is weakened when the everyday conversations that sustain it are reduced to slogans or managerial logic. Perhaps this challenge can be seen through a metaphor to help see alternatives. In traditional kung fu, farmers were expected to defend their villages using the tools of everyday life. They were not full-time warriors, but their shared discipline and vigilance gave them strength. To quote Sun Tzu from memory was something like 1 professional to 6 amateurs as ratio of what to expect. Democracy may be similar. It cannot survive if left only to professionals and experts; ordinary people must develop democratic skills as part of daily life, questioning, participating, and practicing vigilance. The real test may be whether a community of flourishing amateurs can defend what matters more effectively than a narrow elite of professionals. Extending this metaphor to the modern world, technology has changed the balance. A small team of engineers can now equip elites with tools that overwhelm dozens of amateurs. Yet this doesn’t make the kung fu lesson obsolete, it makes it more demanding. Defense today is not just about visible struggle, but about hidden contributions: the coder who builds open tools, the teacher who strengthens critical thinking, the citizen who questions easy narratives. Democracy is no longer safeguarded only in the arena, but in the unseen networks that sustain it. The question, then, is not just whether amateurs can defeat a professional, but whether a distributed community can out think and outlast concentrated power.

phil e the theyby

This essay was super interesting! There were a lot of really good takes here, along with a number of places where I could see fundamental assumptions of Popper's thought I don't align with. I appreciated his naming several of the fundamental tenets of liberalism, many of which are still argued today (though they become increasingly less convincing over time) including "rationalist optimism," (468) "the myth of progress of public opinion" (469). I found this quote really compelling: "I am inclined to believe that, in Great Britain, it is not so much the truth of an assertion or the wisdom of a proposal that is likely to win for a policy the support of public opinion, as the feeling that injustice is being done which can and must be rectified." (470) This feels deeply accurate; correcting perceived injustice very much feels like the MO of rhetoric across the political spectrum, along with what motivates political engagement (which sometimes transfers to "engagement" in the social media sense of the term: time spent online). And this is complicated, because it's good to care about injustice and to try to address it! But we also need to recognize how seductive and dangerous this tendency can be. Is there room for moving away from "correcting injustice" (which is a fundamentally combative stance to our politics) to "caring for people" (which is fundamentally about nurturing people)? I know the latter position isn't compelling to folks in the same way (because it doesn't incite anger), but in terms of our mental health when trying to navigate all of the fucked up things in the world, I think a politics of care FEELS better, and I believe that (at least in terms of our own individual actions) it has the same or better outcomes for the people we're trying to support. I really appreciate Popper's critique of the Liberal Utopia (#6 on page 472), because I think this is a very common trap to fall into: the idea that we can just start a new society based on having the right ideals and values, and can somehow not be influenced by the course of history. As he writes: "All laws, being universal principles, have to be interpreted in order to be applied; and an interpretation needs some principles of concrete practice, which can be supplied only by a living tradition." (473) I think that, even when you're aiming for revolution (obviously, Popper is not a revolutionary), you have to know and solidify the traditions you're trying to critique, the traditions your revolution is drawing from, and how your fundamental assumptions will impact the society you're trying to develop. So this sort of reckoning with history and tradition feels SUPER valuable. I'm not super convinced by the whole "the state is a necessary evil" part. This quote in particular bothered me in ways I'm still trying to work out: "In such a world there would still be weaker and stronger men, and the weaker ones would have no legal right to be tolerated by the stronger ones, but would owe them gratitude for their being so kind as to tolerate them." (471) Even if Popper isn't referring to physical strength, this idea still relies on there being a single metric of strength, which I don't think is a fundamental truth of humanity. The best prototype I can come up with for a single metric of "strength" is "social status," which seems like a fundamental part of our biology that probably isn't going away. But I think a society can be built on principles where higher status is given to people who care for and uplift the "lower status" members of society rather than devaluing them (which is one of the core principles of Christianity, although it often isn't practiced that way), and in doing so helps to contribute to a society where different people are valued for different things, and we support people in finding out how they can best contribute and where their source of "status" lies. I don't think the state is a necessary part of that, and I think communities founded on anarchist principles generally take this approach of dismantling the idea of there being certain people who are "strong" and others who are "weak." I don't like Popper's view of truth (473-474) as something that's "found"; a pragmatist or a social constructivist view of truth feels most useful in a pluralistic society. I do think that his note on point (c) (474) is a good one, though. Where Popper, exploring "critical discussion" says: "Its value lies, rather, in the fact that participants in a discussion will, to some extent, change their minds, and part as wiser men." (474) I wrote in the text: "It's cute that he thinks this" Super interesting chapter overall! I'm looking forward to the next one :)

phil e the theyby

This context around the idea of what democracy IS and how it functions, especially with the historical changes since Popper wrote this paper, makes a TON of sense and is incredibly helpful in making sense of some of Popper's views. I think that relationship to "experts" that you're discussing is incredibly important to consider and make a broader part of how we think about our politics, and I don't see it discussed nearly enough. So I really appreciate you bringing it up! :)

AJ Biffl

I had some thoughts on the grievances/"moral sensitivity" bit too, but I wonder how much of that is just that you get a louder reaction the more viscerally you ignite emotions. So maybe it's not actually that the whole population has this type of responsiveness or that an emotional grievance has more influence, but that louder, more tangible influence comes from those grievances. So the incentive for political messaging is very slightly separate from discussion of major grievances, but is igniting or focusing already existing grievances in some minority of the population. I think that's what we see in the MAGA movement - focus on a small subset of the population that will actually respond to your messaging, but radicalize and mobilize so they respond strongly enough to actually get out and buy stupid hats and go to rallies and vote. So a small minority of the population is mobilized enough to overpower the half-assed resistance from the majority, and wrongly give the impression that the 'public as a whole' feels this way.

AJ Biffl

I actually got really frustrated with Popper during this essay (which I guess was part of his goal, to write something to spark lively debate, but my god), where he talked about applying principles of liberalism to a new society without traditions, asking "should we prevent a pianist from practising, or prevent his neighbour from enjoying a quiet afternoon" - like maybe you could decide how to establish what freedoms can or can't be limited by *talking to the people who will be affected and not by trying to impose absolute principles based on your big brain.* Like god forbid the liberal principles that lead you to trust the power of free discussion to set the 'moral framework' of a society be applied to actually establish what the application of those principles should look like. But no, it's too dangerous to actually let the discussion do the deciding, we need to incept an approved Tradition instead. It was also interesting to see how Popper talked about the 'truth is manifest' belief here compared to how he talked about it in the introduction ("On the sources of knowledge and of ignorance," which I read when the book club was announced but before we'd actually started), where he claimed that actually the theory that "truth is manifest" leads to 1) fanaticism and conspiracy, because when people disagree they think they must be lying or wicked to not agree with something so 'obvious,' and 2) that it leads to authoritarianism, because 'truth' is in constant need of "interpretation and affirmation, but also of re-interpretation and re-affirmation" - an authority is needed to keep the edges polished. Also, the bit in the "practical problems" section about publishers' monopolies made me think how now in the internet age it seems like the barriers to publishing your views to a wide audience are almost gone, but is there still censorship from the equivalent of 'publishers' now?

Nathaniel Bookout

Boy this chapter was super relevant to my rants about Machiavelli from the last one. I don’t think this is necessarily the same thing as the “liberalism” espoused by Hobbes, though I also don’t think that Popper paid any consideration to the fact that liberalism itself is a colonialist institution (not that that would have been a common idea contemporary for his time). It does seem to me like there might be something to the myth of the progress of public opinion from Section 1 (in a different way than Popper envisions for it). “The progress of public opinion” is not always progressive. I think there could be an argument that much of progressivism, especially post-1960s, worked this way, sure (looking at how ideas from people like Judith Butler, MLK Jr., Che Guevara, and Huey Newton have all been incredibly influential–not “aristocrats”, sure, but certainly figures with ideas that held weight). But I think you could also argue that basically the entire institution of corporate-led neoliberalism happened precisely through the mechanism Popper describes here, where: “Public opinion is here conceived as a kind of public response to the thoughts and efforts of those aristocrats of the mind who produce new thoughts, new ideas, new arguments.” (34) Maybe there could be something to be said for the role of cults in incubating and ultimately pushing certain kinds of ideas, as well. I have an idea of another component that could be added to Popper’s “recipe” for the search for truth under Section 4. It’s called “recreation”. “All that is needed is a readiness to learn from one's partner in the discussion, which includes a genuine wish to understand what he intends to say.” (352) Recreation is kind of the ultimate form of this. On its most basic level, it’s literally restating what someone said, word for word, with an emphasis on perfect accuracy–which can be useful if you want someone to feel heard. But on another level, recreating someone is also about sensing what’s beneath the words as well, their meaning, their origin, their feelings, everything that you could possibly know about someone simply from their words. That is where “understanding” can really come in, through empathy. And then, I think, a “liberal” as Popper is describing here can ideally use that newfound understanding to communicate on a deeper level, meeting someone where they’re at. It’s not necessarily just about convincing them of your perspective, though that may be possible. It’s about deliberately framing your perspective in context with theirs, and then letting them do with that shared understanding whatever they will. Hopefully they do understand. That’s how I understand his ideal of “discussion”. I don’t think this is at all the same thing as propaganda for its own sake, like most “debate” content usually is. When I see people debating, it’s usually about trying to pull out all the rhetorical stops to prove your side right, and there’s often little actual exchange of value (but then again, I don’t watch a lot of debates). There’re a few exceptions to this, debaters who do actively make an effort to understand their counterparts (Mehdi Hasan is one example I’ve seen), but mostly this feels rare, and is why I tend to value straight-forward “discussions” over debates. Now, Section 3 is where it gets fishy. I don’t see a significant difference between Popper’s statement about his non-Hobbesian world–that “In such a world there would still be weaker and stronger men, and the weaker ones would have no legal right to be tolerated by the stronger ones, but would owe them gratitude for their being so kind as to tolerate them”–and the world Hobbes described where the strong prey on the weak. (350) Maybe someone can explain the nuance here. But all I see is the question: who is strong, and who is weak? Do we mean physically strong, and able-bodied? Do we mean intelligent, and well-educated? Do we mean wealthy? Or do we simply mean men? Obviously strength has many variables, in many different contexts, which was Machiavelli’s entire original thesis. To me, the idea there’s a fundamental division between “the strong”, however we categorize them, and “the weak” boils down to a fundamental view that human nature exists (or must exist) on a hierarchy. And that’s what I am calling a white supremacist, colonialist view.

Nathaniel Bookout

I agree with you that I found Popper's ideas on tradition a bit difficult to parse, and/or objectionable. To me, I think that it makes sense with what you're saying (i.e. involve "talking to the people who will be affected and not by trying to impose absolute principles based on your big brain") if it incorporated the idea that traditions themselves are malleable constructs that should be regularly adjusted as needed, to accommodate more disparate views (ala Feyerabend). But Popper never says this, and I think it's perfectly fair to interpret his meaning of tradition as more traditional, basically meaning something we accept as true because it's "always been that way". I think what you pointed out about the introduction is really valuable, and I'll definitely want to take a look. I think it makes sense if you understand what Popper is saying here about the "true liberal" as someone whose critically invested in the idea of the truth? I'm not sure, but maybe it's something like "the authoritarian wants to know that what they they know is the truth", while "the true liberal wants to know the truth that they do not know." The difference is where you position your own perspective on the hierarchy of truth, as I interpret Popper. That's how you can regularly use other perspectives to "reinterpret" the truth.

Nathaniel Bookout

Could you elaborate more on what you mean about the "pragmatist or social constructivist view of truth", as different from the idea truth is "found"? I've read a bit of the pragmatists, including John Dewey and William James, but it's been a really long time so I don't remember much. "Is there room for moving away from 'correcting injustice' (which is a fundamentally combative stance to our politics) to 'caring for people' (which is fundamentally about nurturing people)?" This is something I've been thinking a lot about, as well. I've been thinking about the idea of accountability, specifically. What does it look like? Can we have it without a punitive justice system? Obviously punitive justice is just systematic slavery and abuse, things which should be unrelated to justice. But how can you have accountability and restorative justice together? What would accountability look for someone like a public gunman? A rapist? A pedophile? Is there a line where accountability is unachievable? These are all questions I've had on my mind.

Nathaniel Bookout

"Citizens were encouraged to trust institutions without cultivating the tools to question them, and that trust was frequently abused. In this environment, disinformation and polarization have flourished. " I think this did a really good job at illustrating for me exactly what Popper means when he talks about eroding democratic traditions. "It cannot survive if left only to professionals and experts; ordinary people must develop democratic skills as part of daily life, questioning, participating, and practicing vigilance." Not just Sun Tzu, this is basically what Machiavelli was all about too. That's why he set out to map out how power can be used, both by and against, an autocrat in "The Prince". In an "ideal" democracy, as envisioned by Hobbes or Jefferson, every citizen is actively invested in their political futures, because if they aren't they will get tread on.

phil e the theyby

@AJ I think those are definitely solid considerations; mobilizing a small group of people who feel a sense of injustice can absolutely have an outsized influence on political outcomes. The MAGA movement is not as small as a lot of people like to think it is, but it IS significantly smaller than the entire pool of Trump voters; a lot of folks are just voting for whoever they believe will meet their immediate needs most effectively, and aren't swayed by those broader arguments of injustice. But in a country like the U.S. with extremely low voter turnout (and a two-party system, and "first past the post" voting), being able to incite and mobilize folks on the basis of perceived injustice will have a massive influence on outcomes. That said, I think the principle that people are swayed to political action by perceived injustice rather that "rational argumentation" feels incredibly accurate on a population level; it's just hard to get the entire population to agree that any specific thing is an injustice that they care about and want to act on. @Nathaniel sure! Here's how I'd (probably ineffectively) attempt to describe these, in contrast to a correspondence/objectivist theory of truth, where a statement is true because it corresponds accurately to external reality): Social constructivist: Social conventions and systems of power, rather than objective reality, dictate what is defined as "true." For example, "I am not a tree" can be taken as true in a cultural context where we exist as isolated entities who are defined by categorical labels. But in a different cultural view where being (the "am" in the statement) is defined relationally and in an interconnected context, and when we look at the fact that if all of the trees die, I will also die, the statement "I am not a tree" can be taken as false. Pragmatist: A statement's "truth value" is determined by the outcomes of assuming that the statement is true. So the statement "God exists" isn't evaluated based on whether it corresponds to the objective state of the universe, but based on the empirical outcomes it creates by people believing it's true. If the outcomes of believing "God exists" align with our human values, it is "true" (or has "truth value"); if they do not, it is "false" (or does not have "truth value"). Pragmatists really emphasize empirical outcomes rather than abstract ideas (so us saying what we THINK the outcomes of believing in God are is of much less worth than actually talking to people who believe in God and seeing how that ACTUALLY seems to impact their behavior/experience of the world).

phil e the theyby

AJ, I actually read Popper as agreeing with your first paragraph. I thought he was saying that we need to engage with where people are coming from, and their beliefs and experiences (this is what I took "tradition" to mean, but I may have misread it), INSTEAD of Rationalizing Big Brain Liberal Principles out of thin air. But I agree with Nathaniel that some of it is a bit hard to parse, so I may be off base here. The intro sounds super interesting! Given that the lecture from the intro was given a few years after this chapter, I wonder if that reflects the development/clarification of Popper's beliefs around the "truth is manifest" idea. That's a really interesting point about the publishers' monopolies! I think I see the internet age as initially removing those barriers, but as discourse on the internet becomes consolidated into platforms owned by corporations, this censorship starts to emerge. Once a platform becomes large enough, the corporation owning it faces scrutiny from the state (see TikTok), and "community guidelines" start to emerge to align with the state's values and interests. There's also internal pressure BEFORE state intervention for corporations to engage in moderation in alignment with state interests to preemptively avoid state intervention. Of course, the guidelines are (usually) much less stringent than historical publisher censorship, but it emerges all the same. What I think is interesting is that there largely doesn't seem to be much policing by the corporations themselves (with the exception of Elon Musk trying to protect his own ego) on what is said; things that are posted on social media, regardless of how anticapitalist they are, just aren't threatening enough to the PLATFORMS for them to police them (with the major exception being that hate speech is historically seen as bad for business because it drives away everyone who doesn't agree with it).

phil e the theyby

I definitely agree that what you described is how Popper sees "discussion." I think it seems quaint to me now because so many people, even those who WANT to have well-intentioned discussions, lack the skills to really understand and empathize with another person's position when they radically disagree with it. But at its core, I do think what you describe is the liberal ideal. And honestly, I think it's beautiful; I've had some of those sorts of discussions, and they're always super rewarding. I just think that usually, when people are trying to understand another person's perspective, they don't understand their preexisting biases, and how they're filtering what the other person is telling them through those biases. I 100% agree on the concept of "strong" being problematic. In my long-ass post, I mentioned that I think the best and most useful approximation for a singular view of "strength" is being "high status" (that is, being regarded as valuable and well-regarded by the community you live in); people can be high-status for different reasons, but someone who's high-status will always receive social benefits that people who are lower-status won't get. But I think that societies can be, and have been, structured in such a way that valuing and uplifting lower-status individuals is a core to the society, so "not tolerating" lower-status people isn't a valid option for those with higher status because doing so would cause them to lose that status.

Jacques Vincelette

Working for the recently privatized Canadian nuclear industry, our joing venture parenting executives express disdain for social media. Concerns over the share transfer the civilian nuclear laboratory to American defence contractors were dismissed as social media naysay.

Jacques Vincelette

(The 'concern' was dismissed given decades of collaboration across America and industry(ies).)

AJ Biffl

That's fair phil I may have been reading something into Popper's point that wasn't there. Looking back, the passage: "Although the search for truth through free rational discussion is a public affair, it is not public opinion (whatever this may be) which results from it. Though public opinion may be influenced by science and may judge science, it is not the product of scientific discussion" made me think he was making distinction between the participants in those discussions, not their content, and his comments in the summary about how public opinion "is dangerous as an arbiter of taste, and unacceptable as an arbiter of truth... [but] may sometimes assume the role of an enlightened arbiter of justice" I read as implying he preferred a centralized, top-down sort of creation of principles (of "taste"). He also talks about "liberal tradition" as a separate entity to strengthen the abilities of critical discussion, not as a part of it. I think the distinction I was seeing, whether or not one viewed traditions as malleable, is in their source as being either the people as a whole who would be affected by those traditions or an intellectual caste whose job was to do the thinking on behalf of the people. In the 'prophecy in social sciences' essay Popper made arguments that traditions would disappear if the institutions of society were to disappear, which would not be the case if he did indeed think traditions came from individual beliefs and experiences. But he was also patently, naively optimistic about institutions (the liberal state) successfully reflecting the will of the people ("by minimizing the power of the state, the danger of the influence of public opinion, exerted through the agency of the state, will be reduced"), so maybe he did just genuinely think institutions are effective reflections of the people - though I don't understand in that case how eliminating the former would affect the beliefs and values of the latter.

Ryan Messina

This is really fascinating! I hadn't heard of Machiavelli, Hobbes or Jefferson. I think this plays into the point of if democracy is such an important concept who should some names be that should be considered house holds names? I mean if Einstein, Newton and Galileo, are house hold names those ideas surly are not as important as democracy? The fact that I quoted Sun Tzu probably shows this divide haha.