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hi all, here's the last post for Popper~

I've fallen behind in my comment engagement intentions--I'm going to try to catchup somewhat this week but I'll also flag that between the upcoming live show, the video I'm working on, and an above average amount of life stuff going on I'm probably gonna be a bit quiet for a few weeks. lots cooking, v excited to share the things I'm working on

thanks for your patience, and very curious to see what y'all will make of this last reading given... all the things

Comments

Jacques Vincelette

"we used the weapons which the threat of Nazism had induced us to develop". She made me hit her! "we must not allow the distinction between attack and defence to become blurred." At least America gains clarity with its new "Department of War."

AJ Biffl

*swigs budweiser* (works for both quotes)

AJ Biffl

Was anyone else confused by the footnote on pg 357 where he says, "The existentialist Jaspers writes ‘This is why love is cruel, ruthless; and why it is believed in, by the genuine lover, only if it is so’. This attitude, to my mind, reveals weakness rather than the strength it wishes to show; it is not so much plain barbarism as an hysterical attempt to play the barbarian." What point was he trying to make? Calling it 'weakness' seems at odds with what he was saying in the main paragraph. I actually really liked most of what he said in this chapter (I'm as shocked as anyone). I definitely still disagree that rationality is the *only* path to anti-violence, but on the whole I really liked what he had to say. About the part where he talked about how "there can be no tolerance between these different Utopian religions," I feel like there is at least some common ground in how all people envision utopias. Like we're all human, surely there's some things we all want even in the most general terms (no crime, no starvation, etc).

Ryan Messina

There is a lot to say about this one, but I think I will keep to a couple ideas that I pulled out 1. Connections to falsifyability: I do think this was an important read that tied his epistemological and political ideas. His critique of utopianism, that it posits ultimate ends immune to criticism aligns closely with his standard of falsifiability. A political program that cannot be tested, challenged, or revised at a given point in time isn’t worth pursuing. I think this ties really well back to my first comment (I have edited and revised sections out) “I see the issue as one of trust and culture rather than logic and strategy. Without trust, those affected by a decision must have a way to challenge it. Extending Popper to today, if you cannot trust a system or its processes and have no means to contest them, its claims are meaningless as a theory that cannot be falsified”. 2. The tension I was looking for: There was an interesting observation as this is the first time I heard someone speaking about the transition between WW1 and WW2, and his comment about post WW2 as more brutalism than after WW1. That perspective highlights a culture of aggression that Popper himself was very much part of. What’s fascinating is how, despite recognizing such aggression, he continues to place his hope in reason and rationalization as the only way to conclude conflict. I think this reveals one of the central tensions in Popper’s work: he sees reason as the safeguard against violence, yet he seems blind to the possibility that reason and rationalization can themselves feed into a culture of aggression he underestimates the emotional, cultural and even irrational forces in history. Reason does not directly create violence, but the way Karl applied it to the social sciences can reinforce systems of domination rather than protect people from them. On one hand, Popper’s insistence on reason as a counter to dogma and authoritarianism is deeply important. On the other, it risks overlooking the ways rationality can be co-opted to justify the very forms of violence he wanted to resist. I think 2025 is exactly the year to be reading this and pulling it apart because we can see how all this went, Popper was unable to rationalise his way out of this one!

Ryan Messina

I agree, he showed empathy in this section!

phil e the theyby

I'm posting this before reading/responding to the comments so I can share my initial processing/reactions. Stuff I liked in this essay: 1) Popper's highlighting the need for non-rational processes in determining WHAT we prioritize through our "rational discourse," and grounding his arguments in "these are the non-rational, personal preference things that I value" (e.g., non-violence) was a strength. Too much philosophy pretends that it isn't involving the non-rational, personal value judgments, so it was nice that Popper wasn't trying to bullshit us in that way. 2) This quote was really good: "The true rationalist, by contrast, will always know how little he knows, and he will be aware of the simple fact that whatever critical faculty or reason he may possess he owes to intellectual intercourse with others" (488). 3) I largely agree with his view that any view of Utopia that aims to end at a point of "we've got it all figured out now and don't need to change or adjust anything because we live in this perfect world" is flawed. I also liked his focus on the present effects of political movements ("On the contrary, if among our aims and ends there is anything conceived in terms of human happiness and misery, then we are bound to judge our actions in terms not only of possible contributions to the happiness of man in a distant future, but also of their more immediate effects" (486). Climate change activists who only focused on the catastrophic effects that will happen down the line gave a lot of people reason to not care at all; there are an overwhelming amount of current negative effects of climate change that (IMO) should be the primary focus of that activism. Stuff I was more confused about (not even that I necessarily disagreed; in many cases I wasn't sure if my views differed from Popper's or not): 1) There were a bunch of things he said would happen with a Utopian vision of the future that I didn't really see as inherent to what I think of as "utopian" thinking, but I can't tell if this is just because we're defining our terms differently, and I can't tell if he thinks that these processes would apply outside of settings that he defines as "Utopian." For example, on page 483, he talks about how Utopian thinkers have to win over or eradicate all memory of any opposing ideology or view for the future. And to me, I don't think that a society that aims to embody specific values and create unity around those values HAS to eliminate all ideological opposition, and I especially don't think that it has to lead people to forget the history of it. I think that, if we can understand the systems of power that creates past ideologies, and that those ideologies were the most effective way of meeting basic human needs for those in power at the time, we can honor why those ideologies existed without having anyone believe that we should recreate them. 2) I thought Popper bringing up the hypothetical person who just so happens to really like violence was really interesting (I'm not seeing the exact page at the moment). On the one hand, it's helpful to say, "I'm working from these assumptions; someone else working from different assumptions will come to different conclusions." But on the other hand, I don't think we should treat someone liking violence (or disliking violence!) as a simple, a priori element of their being. They have those feelings for reasons; there are underlying needs that are directed into the desire for violence. William James's essay, "The Moral Equivalent of War," argues that a society that aims to abolish war needs to create outlets to channel the spirits and personalities of folks who, in our current society, are drawn to serve as soldiers. He argued that those folks should be channeled into "fighting against" our social evils (such as poverty or illness). For me, I think that playing Dungeons and Dragons or other tabletop RPGs can be a really good, prosocial outlet for people who value the "narrative conflict" element of war, while "extreme" or physically intense activities like skydiving or martial arts can be a good outlet for people who are attracted to the "physical danger" element of war. 3) I didn't particularly like Popper's framing of us "fighting against" social ills. I think I broadly agree with his larger point (that we should be trying to alleviate "bad" things instead of creating "good" things, because different people have different opinions about what is "good"). But I do think that, even framing "the fight against illiteracy" instead in terms of building literacy and empowering people gives people a more hopeful image of the future, even if that hopeful future looks different for different people. I think that hope is the greatest benefit of "Utopian" visions, and I think that, while public policy should target the elimination of "social evils," framing it in terms of a different, better future being possible is often more helpful. I think it's that view of a brighter future that keeps us going when, despite our best offers, poverty, war, and disease all continue to exist.

phil e the theyby

What's particularly interesting about this essay is that it seems to have some of the foundations of understanding the critiques of reason you're talking about, in that Popper highlights that reason itself can't choose aims, it can just give us directions TOWARDS those aims. I think that Popper's emphasis on the necessary humility of the "rationalist" also pointed towards understanding it on some level. But it definitely doesn't seem like he understands the ways that emotional and social factors can influence not only the selection of goals, but also the PROCESS of "reason" itself. I'd imagine that Popper sees humility and openness to others as the safeguard against that, so I don't see him as operating in bad faith. I just don't think the whole "humility" part really caught on with people who followed him the way he hoped it would :P

phil e the theyby

Yeah, there was definitely some good stuff in this chapter. I feel like a lot of my initial issues with some of what he was saying comes from Popper and I having different definitions of what "Utopian" thinking is: for him, it seems like any movement that aims at a "Utopia" aims at some fixed endpoint of static cultural that consistently and reliably meets human needs and doesn't need to change or adjust at all. And given the world around him at the time, that very well may have been what certain Utopian thinkers were arguing (I have no way of knowing that). On page 481 when he was talking about "final ends" of Utopian movements, I wrote in the margins, "Is this confusing goals (which may have no end point) with ends/end points?" And the answer is...no, it wasn't, because later in the chapter he contrasted a more goal or process oriented system with a more "final endpoint" based system. So from what I can tell, to Popper, only having static endpoints (and cultural homogeneity) is Utopian; if a movement is focused on ongoing processes that adapt and change (even if it has certain goals like the elimination of poverty, etc.), the movement isn't actually Utopian.

AJ Biffl

I wonder how much of his 'Utopian' thinking is referring to 'utopian socialism' (as opposed to 'scientific socialism,' which I think would've been common discourse at the time?), which emphasized the uber-convincing-ness in spreading socialist ideology that would inevitably lead to revolution, which would sort of explain why he put so much weight behind that link between utopia and the fixed final-endpoint mindset thing

AJ Biffl

I think he's suffering from a bias where he's only considering very hierarchical models of political movement and, like you said, that 'we've got it all figured out' stance is flawed. Though to be fair that was basically all that was going around at the time

Jacques Vincelette

Only unrequited love lasts. Love and passion recognise existence and substance as intertwined through dynamic relationship. Losing self confuses strength with weakness, barbarism with civility.

Nathaniel Bookout

As much as I’ve railed against political violence throughout these readings, as I read Popper talk about rational discussion versus violence I can’t help but think of the criticism that peaceful democratic discussion is a white colonialist value, only respected when it’s done by white colonialists. For the victims of systemic oppression, like people of color in the US or Europe, people in Gaza, or the global south in general, there’s no option for discussion because they haven’t been given room at the table–they’re not allowed. If I could turn his whole thing about utopianism around on him for a moment… Democracies don’t really exist as an ideal, utopian object we collectively agree exists, magically giving them power. The Democratic state is tied up part and parcel with all the other fundamental things that go along with a state, including its capitalist and colonialist violence. Democratic nations are castles of bones built on the corpses of the oppressed. That is why the American empire needs a genocide in Gaza. Popper sort of acknowledges this issue when he briefly talks about his “paradox of tolerance” (I’d heard of this paradox before but didn’t realize it was originally Popper’s paradox), the fact that we cannot tolerate the intolerant. Prejudice and oppression are obviously inconsistent with a working liberal society (as he understands liberalism), hence the paradox of them existing. Of course, human beings aren’t perfectly rational, and democracies aren’t perfect geometries. Both are messy and complicated, and you can see the role of greed behind the colonialism that upholds democratic injustices. So, if democracies aren’t truly rational constructions, and are truly beholden to the wanton greed of individuals (just like any state), you’re left with the implication that violence will eventually become necessary for the sake of justice, actually. And if you’re going to use violence to overthrow a state, necessarily it follows that you need an ideology that can both unify your revolution, and successfully usurp the old state. Hence, I believe, the seductiveness of utopianism. For someone like Lenin, for instance, it would’ve made perfect sense to totally eliminate any possible opposing ideology, because the consolidation of power is synonymous with the consolidation of thought. When your entire goal is not just to overthrow the "bourgeoisie" but “bourgeois ideas” then your war is not only against anyone who would resist you, but any ideas that might be different. To me this is no real solution, which is why I think I agree with Popper about “utopias”, though I think the problem has more to do with the idea of the “perfect state”, or the idea that humans should even exist in a nation state to begin with. So this leads me to what I think of as the “paradox of revolution”, which is sort of the inverse side of Popper’s “paradox of tolerance”: what happens when you're forced to use violence by the intolerant? Can you use a violent revolt to create a peaceful democratic society? I shared this quote earlier on the chapter on Marxism but it’s directly where I get this idea from so I’ll share it again: “The vulgar Marxist critic of culture, in failing to see the ultimate unity of culture and politics, refuses to see the ways in which the culture of the working class... often embodies the values of the bourgeoisie, values which may be sexist, racist, or otherwise harmful.... Thus, any discussion of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' should reasonably include a discussion of these contradictions, but due to the vulgar Marxist's narrow view of culture, such discussions are avoided.... It is only when analysis is applied dogmatically by a given power structure that censorship and cultural fascism result." (Allen Young was a gay journalist from the 70s) I think the inherent issue with the use of political violence is the fact that if you’re going to violently take control of a state, how do you implement institutions that will check your power adequately? That’s the great “American experiment”, of course. From the perspective of a Leninist, the experiment is flawed because capitalism will inevitably unbalance democracy in favor of the bourgeois, making contemporary capitalist democracies just feudalism with a funny hat. That’s why a dictatorship of the proletariat is necessary, they would argue. Democracy is just another bourgeois value. There’s something to that idea for sure, I think. But just as the Marxist asks how we check the power of greedy capitalists, I think it’s also fair to ask how to check the power of greedy Marxists. Or whatever else you can imagine. Karla Jay is another lesbian activist from the 60s and 70s that had a similar quote: “"In short, we must be wary of new sorts of fascism, coming this time from within our movement, giving us new, unacceptable choices or demands. For feminist/lesbian artistic dictatorship would be as pernicious as male domination. Let us not exchange masters for mistresses!" I don’t really have an answer to either of these paradoxes. But I have to imagine it has something to do with the fact that these categories of “violence” and “discussion” are not at all absolutes, in the way Popper seems to be categorizing them. There are a lot of ways that violence can lead to discussion, like what happened with Luigi Mangione, for instance. There are also ways to use the threat of violence without being violent: weaponizing your “strength” to defend the weak, as in the case of local police who are being gracious and forward with protesters in some cities in the US. Czar Nikolai Romanov was deposed non-violently when his own white-suited soldiers turned on him (he was only later murdered by the Reds after their coup). Something like the UN resolution on Gaza could maybe be another example, a sign that there’s more power to be had from “cooperation” than from “conflict”, and different levels of “violence” and “discussion” involved in each of those things.

Jacques Vincelette

Did Lennon wear Weil's lenses? Or were they Gandhi's? Would you hit one with with retro specs?

AJ Biffl

I think you can even reframe it in terms of the intention to build a state as the only necessary condition for violence, not even greed or colonialist culture in particular (though colonialism, or at least the core assumptions of colonialism, are a package deal with establishing a state). Violence eventually becomes necessary to maintain the existence of the state because states are unstable. And yeah, begs the question of how do you transform society without a unifying, universal goal of creating a new state - either somehow a stateless goal or an un-unified transformation - or probably both. Am I interpreting the quote from Allen Young right that he's saying the cultural default of the proletariat is vulgar/violent/harmful, and that out of the box a dictatorship of the proletariat would reflect this culture? So dogmatic establishments then impose "cultural fascism" to remove or forcefully modify it?

Nathaniel Bookout

I don't know if I would say he's addressing the cultural default of the proletariat. I think he's saying that bigotry like racism and misogyny are the default values of the bourgeoisie. He's saying that any revolutionary action taken without sufficient critical evaluation just risks inheriting those same values, and therefore repeating the cycle of oppression. I guess he's kinda picturing the values of the proletariat here as a sort of blank slate, perfectly impressionable for the bourgeoisie ideals to slide right in. That may or may not be a fair way to characterize them, I don't know. I think that there's probably a good argument, though, that without a solid philosophical framework of your own, it becomes easy to fall in the trap of simply adopting the values of your oppressors.

AJ Biffl

I really like that distinction between inherent values and values cultivated by the system. What you say gels well with Paulo Freire's idea of "fear of freedom" and emphasis on "praxis" (necessarily mixing action with critical theory)

Nathaniel Bookout

i will definitely need to look into Freire thank you