In El Salvador, Bitcoin falls on its face - for FP (Patreon)
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This is a commission for Foreign Policy, on El Salvador's first week with Bitcoin. I expect it to be edited considerably before publication - for a start, it's 300 words too long - but you lucky people get it first.
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In El Salvador, Bitcoin falls on its face
On June 5, 2021, President Nayib Bukele of El Salvador declared that bitcoin, the first cryptocurrency, would become legal tender in El Salvador. A few days later, the Bitcoin Law was passed, to take effect September 7. Businesses would be required to accept bitcoin for all payments.
Bitcoin was originally created to be a form of money outside government control. Using bitcoin as a government-endorsed currency had a number of obvious issues: cryptocurrency has a stupendous money-laundering problem, the price of bitcoin is incredibly volatile, and cryptocurrencies remain difficult and brittle to use.
Building a payment system that users trust takes time. You need to run pilot programs and fix the sort of problems that only show up in production. Deploying a system from scratch at national scale in just three months with no testing is a recipe for disaster.
But Bukele had given himself three months to put together a national-scale electronic payments system for an economy that still ran on physical cash—US dollar notes—with widespread distrust of banks. Quick deployment was always part of the plan. One government figure said: “We can do this slowly, or we can just put it on the people and people will learn. If they’re forced to do it, they’ll learn and they’ll learn quickly.” Bitcoin was seen as a rerun of El Salvador's rushed 2001 dollarization.
Facing a backlash, government figures claimed a number of times that accepting bitcoin would be entirely optional, and a number of other times that it would be mandatory. Article 7 of the Bitcoin Law, making bitcoin acceptance mandatory, stayed in place.
In a July survey, 82 percent of respondents distrusted the bitcoin project; 49 percent were unsure how it would go; 29 percent were afraid. 76 percent had some sort of Internet access, but that included low-cap data plans; other surveys showed reliable Internet was available to 45 percent of the populace, and under 10 percent in rural areas.
Bukele announced an official bitcoin wallet, Chivo—Salvadoran slang for “cool.” This would work like PayPal—you would have a balance in dollars and a balance in bitcoins, held at Chivo. New users would get a signup bonus of $30 in bitcoin. 200 Chivo ATMs were deployed, and 50 staffed Chivo kiosks were constructed around the country.
The Chivo app would be available internationally for remittances—dollars go into Chivo, the government subsidises transmission costs and keeps the actual dollars, and the recipient gets virtual “dollars” that are numbers displayed in the Chivo app.
Bukele announced the name “Chivo” in late June, but the corporation operating the network, Chivo SA de CV, was not put together until August 24, two weeks before launch. Chivo SA de CV is a private company, so is not subject to freedom of information laws as a government department would be, despite being funded with $60 million of public money. The plan was promoted by the President and his brothers Karim, Ibrajim and Yusef Bukele, who are thought to be the main bitcoin advocates in the President's circle.
The Chivo project is led by a Venezuelan team, part of a long-standing “shadow cabinet” of unofficial advisers known to work with the Venezuelan opposition. Shadow cabinet leader Sara Hanna and cryptocurrency promoter Lorenzo Rey designed the Chivo network. Bukele’s Chief of Staff, Marta Carolina Recinos de Bernal, is on the US State Department’s Engel List of corrupt officials, and is a director of Chivo SA de CV.
Rey’s payments experience was promoting an alternate cryptocurrency, Dash, as a payment and remittances channel in Venezuela—but many of the merchants listed by Dash Venezuela as accepting Dash could not even be verified as existing.
Bukele’s team got people they considered politically trustworthy—but not necessarily people who could do the job.
The Bitcoin Law remained widely unpopular. One public critic of the law, software developer Mario Gómez, was arrested without charge on September 1. Police held Gómez for five hours before public outcry secured his release; he still doesn’t know the justification for detaining him, and the police still have his seized mobile devices.
Chivo launched just after midnight on September 7. The system started failing at 3am. Server capacity was increased, and app installations were not re-enabled until 11:30am. Transactions failed through the day; customer service lines were jammed; Chivo ATMs ran out of cash.
Shortly after 10am, the price of bitcoin crashed by $10,000 in three minutes. Chivo users watched their $30 in bitcoin drop below $25 in real time—a strong practical education in bitcoin’s volatility. Bukele blamed the crash on the International Monetary Fund, though it was more likely leaked news of crypto exchange Coinbase receiving a warning from the SEC. Bukele had purchased $28 million in bitcoins for the national treasury the day before.
After protests on September 6, over a thousand people marched on the Legislative Assembly on September 7 to protest the Bitcoin Law, jumping barriers placed early that morning to keep them out. One group of protestors set some tires on fire. Opposition politicians attended the day’s session in “No Bitcoin” shirts.
The protests were not against bitcoin itself. People protested the forced acceptance, the complete lack of transparency from the government, and the dysfunctional Chivo payment system—“people are against how things are being done in the name of bitcoin,” said local businessman Patrick Murray.
President Bukele was genuinely very popular, because he spent heavily on public services. Since El Salvador’s currency is the US dollar, Bukele can’t print money; so he needs to borrow. (Or skim the remittances, or increase a number in Chivo.) But the Bitcoin Law, and the disastrous launch of Chivo, has frightened the bond markets; El Salvador’s sovereign debt dropped five cents in a single day, ending September 7 trading at 87.6 cents on the dollar. The World Bank and the IMF were already reluctant to supply further funding because of the Bitcoin Law.
Chivo’s problems continued. To sign up with Chivo and get your $30 of bitcoin, you need a photo of your DUI (national ID card), a photo of yourself, your DUI number and your date of birth. But Chivo’s identity verification functionality didn’t even check the photos—you could register with only a DUI number and a matching date of birth. Some users discovered that their DUI had already been used. Others tested the system with publicly-known DUIs. Residents who hadn’t installed the app received verification codes via SMS. Salvadorans in the US who wanted to send remittances home had trouble registering.
Traders were reluctant to accept bitcoin. “I’d rather lose the sale,” one trader told La Prensa Grafica, saying how Bukele promised that bitcoin would be optional. Others didn’t trust money they couldn’t hold in their hands. Street vendors may not even have phones. Many of their customers were illiterate. Some government offices couldn’t handle bitcoin payments. Transfers from Chivo to bank accounts were not reliable. The Chivo ATMs didn’t work well—one machine had a reported three successful cash withdrawals in a day. Even transfer of bitcoins in and out of Chivo had problems. Tweets from @chivowallet gathered aggrieved responses from businesspeople.
Chivo is not mandatory—some are installing the Bitcoin Beach or Muun wallets. But interoperability is spotty, and transaction fees on Bitcoin Beach or Muun are not subsidised by the government.
September 15 was a public holiday to celebrate 200 years of independence from Spain. An estimated 15,000 people came out onto the streets for massive demonstrations, by far the largest of Bukele’s presidency—not just against bitcoin, but against Bukele’s removal of troublesome judges, securing a Supreme Court ruling allowing him to run for President again, and a swathe of changes to the constitution.
One Chivo kiosk was set on fire and spray-painted with anti-Bukele graffiti—but the vandals were wearing T-shirts that had been distributed to them from a government-owned vehicle that had previously been used to distribute pandemic relief packages.
Bukele is pressing ahead with the Chivo project—his plans need those remittance dollars, and he still hopes for an influx of foreign bitcoins. Fears of criminals bringing in dirty bitcoins and exchanging them for clean dollars, draining the $150 million trust that was set up to buffer between bitcoins and dollars, have not come to pass—because Chivo doesn’t work well enough.
It’s not clear if or when the Chivo network will be fully functional. The identity verification system simply doesn’t work, and has left behind a huge mess to clean up. Customer service staff for Chivo are being funded on a month-by-month basis.
But this disaster was widely predicted at the June announcement: deploying a huge system at national scale in three months with no transparency simply doesn’t work. Arresting computer experts who tell you this won’t make it work either.
A Chivo-like electronic payment system could be of vast benefit to El Salvador if it was designed with being trusted by the public as the goal. But if Bukele wanted Salvadorans to hate everything about bitcoin, and electronic payment systems in general, Chivo has been a worked example of how to get there.