After the excellent Olympiacos run, I wanted to understand whether this José Luis Mendilibar recreation could produce the same level of performance in a completely different environment.

Athletic Bilbao looked like a strong squad on paper, but this season was a useful reminder that having good players does not automatically mean having the right players for a specific tactical structure.

Season Results

🥈 2nd place in La Liga📊 85 points⚽ 88 goals scored🥅 40 goals conceded📈 +48 goal difference

🏆 Spanish Super Cup runner-up🏅 Champions League quarter-final🏅 Spanish Cup quarter-final

Overall Manager Record

🎮 55 matches✅ 36 wins🤝 10 draws❌ 9 defeats⚽ 124 goals scored🥅 64 goals conceded📈 +60 goal difference📊 65% win percentage

Objectively, this was a strong season. We finished one point above Barcelona and secured second place with 85 points.

However, the experience did not feel anywhere near as dominant as the Olympiacos run.

The Results Were Better Than the Underlying Performance

The league data helps explain that feeling:

82.99 xG compared to 88 goals scored

34.19 xGA compared to 40 goals conceded

78.27 expected points compared to 85 actual points

We scored around five goals more than expected and collected almost seven points more than our performances suggested.

At the same time, we conceded almost six goals more than our xGA.

The final position was excellent, but the underlying numbers describe a team that was competitive rather than completely dominant. We were efficient enough to finish second, but there were structural problems that never completely disappeared.

A Strong Squad Is Not Automatically the Right Squad

One of the most common assumptions in Football Manager is:

“My team is strong, so the tactic should perform.”

The Bilbao run showed why it is not always that simple.

The original structure requires very specific profiles, particularly from the wing-backs. On the left, I had to force Álex Berenguer into the role. He is right-footed and was not a natural solution for what the system required.

He still produced:

7 goals

11 assists

6.97 average rating

Those numbers are not disastrous, but his performances never gave me the balance or consistency I wanted from that position.

The central defenders also looked stronger on paper than they performed inside this particular system. Reputation, value and attributes matter, but they do not guarantee that a player will interpret the tactical demands correctly.

The Midfield Was My Biggest Problem

The central midfield pairing was the area I struggled with the most.

I rotated the players, changed combinations and tried to understand which partnership offered the best balance. Some of those experiments probably cost us points.

Beñat Prados eventually produced a solid season:

4 goals

12 assists

7.12 average rating

Mikel Jauregizar finished with:

6 goals

6 assists

6.99 average rating

The numbers are acceptable, but I never felt completely satisfied with how the midfield controlled matches. There was always something missing, especially when the team lost confidence or the opposition disrupted our initial structure.

My Biggest Mistake: Robert Navarro

The clearest selection mistake was not trusting Robert Navarro early enough.

He finished the season with:

20 starts

25 substitute appearances

11 goals

9 assists

7.29 average rating

That was the best average rating in the squad.

I could have used Navarro consistently on the right and moved Iñaki Williams into the central role. Instead, I continued trying to make Gorka Guruzeta work as the striker.

Guruzeta still scored 24 goals, but his 6.91 average rating reflected my doubts about his overall contribution. He delivered goals, but the complete performance inside the system was not as convincing as I expected.

Navarro is also a reminder not to judge players only through reputation, transfer value or attributes. Their actual behaviour inside the tactic matters just as much.

The Attack Produced, But It Did Not Always Convince

The attacking numbers were strong:

Nico Williams: 24 goals and 9 assists

Iñaki Williams: 22 goals and 10 assists

Oihan Sancet: 20 goals and 17 assists

Robert Navarro: 11 goals and 9 assists

Gorka Guruzeta: 24 goals and 5 assists

This was not a dysfunctional attack.

The issue was that the structure moved between two extremes. In some matches, it looked extremely dangerous. In others, it struggled to create the same connections and became dependent on individual quality.

That inconsistency is why the run felt less impressive than the final totals suggest.

Why It Worked Better With Olympiacos

Olympiacos and Athletic Bilbao cannot be compared only through overall squad strength.

Olympiacos entered the Greek season as the strongest domestic team and as clear title favourites. That creates a completely different environment:

More matches played with high morale

Greater individual superiority over most opponents

More control over the rhythm of domestic games

Better conditions for sustaining confidence throughout the season

With Athletic Bilbao, morale dropped several times. Once confidence disappeared, some of the tactical weaknesses became much more visible.

This does not mean that Olympiacos had the better squad in absolute terms. It means that the tactical and competitive context suited the system more consistently.

I Also Made Mistakes

It would be easy to blame everything on the squad, but that would not be honest.

I experimented too much during certain periods. I rotated the midfield, changed player usage and tested different mentalities because I was trying to understand whether the problem came from the tactic, the mentality or the available profiles.

Eventually, I stopped changing the structure and limited the adjustments, but some points had already been lost during that process.

That is part of testing a tactic properly. The important question is not simply whether we won.

The important question is:

Why did the tactic perform differently?

Sometimes the problem is the tactical concept. Sometimes it is the squad. Sometimes it is morale, role suitability or player selection. In this case, it was probably a combination of all those elements, including some of my own decisions.

Final Verdict

This remains a very entertaining tactic, but it is not a universal plug-and-play system.

It can move from looking like a super tactic to looking completely ordinary depending on:

Wing-back suitability

Midfield balance

Striker selection

Squad morale

The competitive position of the club

How quickly the manager identifies the correct players

Finishing second with 85 points is still an excellent result. However, I expected more after the Olympiacos run, and I never felt that Athletic Bilbao fully mastered the system.

The biggest lesson was Robert Navarro. I should have trusted what I was seeing on the pitch much earlier.

This is exactly why one successful season is never enough to fully judge a tactic. Same system, different squad, completely different experience.

Only thing i changed i put on balanced shots from Distance