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CHAPTER 102: Three Games, Six Thousand Purchases, and an Email

Alex delivered the NG Store MVP on January 28, 2006, exactly three months after George gave him the list of requirements.

The MVP did exactly what George had asked and nothing more. It was a Windows desktop application with an interface Alex had designed with the same philosophy he used for everything: functional before pretty, clear before elegant. A left panel with the list of catalog games. A right panel with the page of the selected game: three screenshots, a text description, the system requirements, the price, and a blue button that said "Buy" in white letters that was the biggest element of the interface because the purpose of the interface was for the player to press that button.

There was no friends list. There was no chat. There were no communities or reviews or achievements or wishlists. Just the store, the purchase, and the download. Alex had cut everything that wasn't essential for the first launch without hesitation: the social features would come later, when the store had users who needed to socialize. First you had to have users.

The catalog had three games:

Castlevania: Symphony of the Night, $14.99. The PC version of NGS's first game, with a native resolution of 1024x768 that was better than the PS2 version. Five years after its launch, Castlevania was still selling at retail at $19.99. The digital discount was an incentive to buy on NG Store.

The Binding of Isaac, $14.99. The PC version with all the balance updates George had made over the years. Isaac had the most active player community of NGS: the experimenters who still looked for item synergies five years after the launch.

Hollow Knight, $19.99. The PC version with the full rain of City of Tears, the maximum-resolution shadows, and the 500 NPCs the console versions couldn't handle. It was the most recent and best-selling NGS game, and it was the one George expected to attract most of the initial purchases.

Three games. Three prices. A blue button. And a server in San Francisco waiting for someone to press the button for the first time.

*

George launched NG Store with no press release, no event, no trailer, nothing a marketing company would have considered acceptable for the launch of a new product.

He wrote a post on three forums: the official NGS forum, the Hollow Knight subforum on NeoGAF, and the Isaac subforum on something called Reddit that in 2006 was a small niche platform George used because he remembered it was going to be enormous.

The post was identical on all three sites:

"We've created something new: NG Store, a digital store where you can buy PC games directly from us. You download the app, look for the game, buy it, and it downloads and installs on its own. No CDs, no boxes, no going to the store. The three NGS games are available at a reduced price: Castlevania $14.99, Isaac $14.99, HK $19.99. The link to download the app is below. It's free. You only pay when you buy a game. George Hightower, NGS"

There were no hashtags or influencer campaign or a 30-second trailer showing the interface. It was a text post from a man who made games telling the people who played his games that they could now buy them in a new way. Direct. No middlemen. Like everything George did.

Claire saw the post and said:

"That's it? A post on three forums?"

"It's all we need. The people who read those forums are NGS fans. They're going to download the app out of curiosity, they're going to buy a game they maybe didn't have or want to re-buy in digital, and they're going to talk about NG Store on the same forums where they read about it. The advertising is word of mouth. Free. Organic. Authentic."

"And if no one downloads the app?"

"Someone is going to download it."

*

Fifty thousand people downloaded the NG Store app in the first week.

It wasn't an enormous number. In the context of the video game industry in 2006, fifty thousand downloads of an unknown application from a studio that hadn't advertised was insignificant. Electronic Arts sold a million copies of a game in a week. Blizzard had two million people playing World of Warcraft simultaneously on its servers.

But George was comparing with zero, not with EA or Blizzard. A week earlier, NG Store didn't exist. Now it had fifty thousand people who had installed it on their computers, who had created accounts with email and password, and who had looked at the catalog of three games with the curiosity of someone who enters a new store to see what it has.

Of the fifty thousand people who downloaded the app, six thousand five hundred bought something.

Claire looked at the number and did the math in her head, which was her sharpest tool.

"Conversion rate of thirteen percent. One visitor in eight buys."

"Is that good?"

"It's extraordinary. At retail, the conversion rate is two to three percent. Someone goes into Best Buy, looks at the games, and buys one in one of every thirty or forty visits. Here one in eight. Because the people who downloaded the app were already fans. They already wanted to buy. They just needed the place."

Six thousand five hundred purchases. Hollow Knight was the best-seller with 3,500 copies. Isaac sold 1,800. Castlevania sold 1,200. The total revenue of the first week was $100,000. Minus the PayPal and card transaction costs (4%), there was $96,000.

"Ninety-six thousand dollars," Claire said. "In a week. No manufacturing, no distribution, no retailer. A ninety-six percent margin after transaction costs."

"The retail margin is twenty-five percent," George said.

"I know. I just calculated it." Claire closed the calculator. She opened it. She calculated again. "Every digital sale generates 3.8 times more profit than a retail sale. Every sale. If the proportion of digital sales grows..." Claire left the sentence unfinished because the implications were so big that articulating them was unnecessary.

"It's going to grow," George said. "This is only the beginning."

*

The first users of NG Store were exactly who George expected: NGS fans who wanted the games in digital or who re-bought them because they wanted the PC version.

The forums filled with posts about NG Store in the second week. Not many. Dozens. But the dozens were enthusiastic:

"I bought HK on PS2 when it came out but I always wanted the PC version with the full rain. $19.99 on NG Store. Installed in 20 minutes. The rain of City of Tears on PC is something else. You can see the individual drops. The puddles have reflections. It deserves the re-buy."

"The app is basic but it works. I bought, it downloaded, it installed, I played. Zero problems. Are they going to add more games? Because if other studios could sell their games here, it would be amazing not to have to go looking for download links on random websites."

"Does anyone else think this could be the future of how we buy games? No going to the store. No CDs. Just click, download, play. It's like buying music on iTunes but for games."

The third post was the one George had been waiting for. The comparison with iTunes. In 2006, iTunes had proven that the digital distribution of music worked: people paid $0.99 for a song instead of pirating it or going to a store. If iTunes worked for music, NG Store could work for games. The analogy was obvious and the players were making it on their own.

*

The first email from an external developer arrived on February 17, 2006.

It was from a two-person studio in Portland, Oregon, that had made a puzzle game called Chromatic Shift. The game existed on the studio's website as a $9.99 download that sold between 5 and 10 copies a month because no one found the studio's website unless they searched exactly the name of the game on Google.

"Hi, we're Prism Games, a two-person studio in Portland. We made a puzzle game called Chromatic Shift. We sell it on our site but almost no one finds it. We saw that you launched NG Store and that you accept games from other developers (or that's what we read on a forum). Can we put our game in your store? We're willing to accept the 70/30. Anything is better than the 8 copies we sold last month. Sarah and Tom, Prism Games"

George read the email three times. It was exactly what he had predicted: a small studio with a game that deserved to be played and that had nowhere to sell it. The industry of 2006 was a machine designed for big studios with marketing budgets and deals with retailers. The small studios had no access, and their games weren't bad: simply no one saw them.

George downloaded Chromatic Shift from the Prism Games website. He played it for an hour. It was a puzzle game where the player manipulated colored prisms to direct rays of light and create combinations. It was inventive, well made, had a clean aesthetic, and ran without bugs. It wasn't revolutionary, but it was a good game no one knew about.

George answered the email that night:

"Sarah and Tom: I played Chromatic Shift. I like it. It's well made and inventive. We accept you on NG Store. I need the game files in installable format, three screenshots of 1280x720, a description of maximum 200 words, and the price you want to charge. NG Store keeps 30%. The 70% reaches you at the end of each month by bank transfer. Welcome. George Hightower, NGS"

Sarah answered in forty minutes with the files, the screenshots, the description, and a message that ended with: "I can't believe George Hightower played our game."

Chromatic Shift was added to the NG Store catalog on February 22. It sold 35 copies in the first week. Thirty-five copies that were four times more than it sold in a whole month on its own website. For Prism Games, NG Store wasn't a store but a miracle of visibility.

*

After Chromatic Shift came others.

A text RPG from a solitary developer in Japan who wrote in English with imperfect grammar but with an imagination that made up for every error. A turn-based strategy game from a three-person studio in Brazil that had no publisher and that sold copies by handing them out on USB at local conventions. A space shooter from a seventeen-year-old in Finland who had made it in his room after school.

George played each one. He reviewed each one personally. He rejected three submissions in the first month: a game that crashed on startup, another that was an incomplete demo presented as a finished product, and a third that was a blatant asset flip where the developer had bought generic assets, thrown them together with no design or coherence, and intended to charge $14.99 for something that didn't deserve to be free.

The rejections were important. George wrote to each rejected developer explaining why their game hadn't been accepted and what it needed to improve for the submission to be reconsidered. They weren't template emails. They were individual evaluations from someone who had played the game and who could point out specific problems. The developer of the incomplete game received a list of five things he needed to finish before the game was acceptable. The one with the asset flip received an honest explanation that NG Store didn't accept games that didn't demonstrate original effort.

"George, you can't review every game personally," Claire said when she saw that George spent an hour a day playing developer submissions. "You're making a 3D engine, an open-world game, AND reviewing indie puzzle games. When do you sleep?"

"I sleep enough."

"You sleep five hours."

"Five hours are enough."

"George, when you have a hundred submissions a month you won't be able to play each one."

"When I have a hundred submissions a month, I'll train someone to do the initial review. But for now I do it myself. Because every game that enters NG Store carries my name behind it, and if a bad game enters the store, the reputation that gets damaged is NGS's. And the reputation of NGS took me seven years to build."

Claire didn't argue. George's logic was irrefutable: the curation was what separated NG Store from any other download platform on the internet. NG Store was a gallery where each game had been played by a person who knew games and who had decided it deserved to be there, far from a repository where anyone uploaded whatever they wanted. That guarantee was the reason the players trusted the store and the reason the developers wanted to be on it.

*

By April 2006, NG Store had 150,000 registered users, 30 games in the catalog, and a reputation on the gaming forums as "the store where the good PC games go to be discovered."

Gamasutra, the publication of the game development industry, published an article titled "New Game Studios Launches Digital Store, Welcomes Indie Developers" that described NG Store as "the first serious digital distribution platform for PC games that isn't controlled by a publisher or a hardware manufacturer." The article quoted Sarah of Prism Games: "We sell more on NG Store in a week than we sold on our website in a month. And the thirty percent we give them is less than a publisher would ask us for to make us invisible."

George read the article in the office and thought about something he couldn't tell anyone: in five years, NG Store was going to have thousands of games and hundreds of thousands of users. In ten years, it was going to be the dominant platform for PC game distribution. And the reason was going to be the trust, not the technology or the catalog or the prices. The trust the players had in a store where each game had been reviewed by a human being who sat down to play it before approving it.

Thirty games. A hundred fifty thousand users. Three months of existence. The numbers were small. But the slope was right. And George knew that the right slopes, with enough time, became mountains.

End of Chapter 102

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