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Ia Drang 2 - LZ Albany

As most of the exhausted battle weary men who have defended LZ Xray are choppered out, General Westmoreland orders the remaining battalions to remain in the area. Not wanting to give the impression of retreat to the NVA and the US press, he rejects the request by 3rd Brigade commander Colonel Brown that the whole force needs to be evacuated as more NVA forces are descending on the area.

A new series of Arclight B52 strikes are requested across the area for the 17th December to suppress the NVA troops spread across the Chu Pong Massif. Some strikes are to be conducted dangerously close to LZ X-Ray, and so the remaining two battalions are ordered to move out on foot, one to LZ Albany, and one to LZ Columbus. The two battalions move out together in a long and disorganised column on the morning of the 17th. The hard fighting at LZ Xray over the last few days has been costly for the Americans, but a far more horrifying situation awaits them. A near massacre at LZ Albany.

On arrival at the two Landing Zones, the plan is to use them as forward landing areas from which reinforcing US and South Vietnamese units will conduct further operations into the western Ia Drang valley. With the heavy burden placed on the helicopters of the 1st Cavalry Division in the weeks before and during the battle for LZ X-ray, the aircraft are unavailable to carry the two battalions to the new Landing Zones, likely because maintenance and repairs have fallen dangerously behind during the heavy action.

The advances to Albany and Columbus are only 2 miles, in not particularly difficult terrain, and with still overwhelming artillery and air power on call. But from the divisional down to company level, the US military vastly underestimates the strength of the remaining NVA forces in the area after the fighting for LZ Xray.

Necessarily to march to two different LZs, the force splits shortly after leaving Xray. Lt Col Tully’s 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry Regiment heads off towards Columbus, while Lt Col McDade’s 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry Regiments continues on towards Albany. The splitting of the force is the first grave error.

The second deadly mistake is that the battalion marches forward without the tactical rigidity the situation requires, dangerously stretched out and vulnerable to attacks from the flanks. The leading and tail companies in the column do maintain good wedge formations, but the two companies in the middle march in a disorganised long and thin line.

At 1240pm, 200m from the clearing at LZ Albany, the force halts to take two Vietnamese soldiers prisoner. It is likely that at least two others escape. Under interrogation, the two men claim they are deserters, but in reality they are a leading scout party for a dangerous NVA force nearby.The scouts who are not captured report the spotted US force to Commander Le Xuan Phoi, commanding officer of the NVAs 8th Battalion of the 66th Regiment and Comrade Luan, deputy commander of the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment.

The Americans number 400, the combined Vietnamese forces nearby number between 6-700. Both NVA Battalions quietly move out to hook around the left and right flanks of McDade’s Battalion. He doesn’t realise it yet, but he is soon to be completely surrounded by an enemy he doesn’t know is there.

The head of the column arrives into LZ Albany, but the whole formation is 500m long. Another halt is called. McDade calls all of his company commanders to the edge of the clearing to describe how he’d like the companies to occupy the position. In doing so, the third deadly mistake is made. The battalion and company commanders have failed to convey to their men that they are still in a combat zone, and so the height of attention and lookout should still be maintained. However with their commanders temporarily gone, exhausted men slump to the ground to catch much needed sleep. Some are veterans of the LZ XRay fight, and havent properly slept for days. To compound this, the leaders of the companies they are supposed to be commanding are, at 1:15pm, hundreds of metres away from their men.

It is at this moment, that a ferocious hail of fire rips into the column from all sides. The NVA battalions have deployed four 12.7mm heavy machine guns, and bring 82mm mortar fire down the length of the column. Captain George Forrest of Alpha Company at the rear of the column, without waiting for orders, sprints through the fire right the way down the line to reunite with his men. The leading and tailing companies, who had maintained better formation during the march, are able to scramble into effective defensive perimeters, and with Alpha’s leader back with his men, they are more coherent.

Those in the centre arent so lucky. In the first hour of the ambush, the young men can do little but hope they are fortunate enough to evade the hail of lead coming into their position. For most, they are not.

McDade has maintained close contact with his artillery support, and calls in effective close artillery strikes to hold the NVA back. After an hour, the US Air Force is once again overhead desperately delivering danger close napalm strikes on the edge of the thin perimeter of a US force about to be overwhelmed. The sky turns to dark with the swirling smoke from napalm and artillery explosions. With the disorganisation of the column, and the enemy so close, American napalm kills Americans and Vietnamese.

Upon learning of the ambush Brigade commander Colonel Brown had ordered a company from the Battalion that marched to LZ Columbus, to march to reinforce LZ Albany. This company now arrives and, together with Captain Forrests tail end Alpha company, they attempt to push inwards towards the clearing, picking up surviving isolated infantrymen on the way. If they can make it, a more complete perimeter can be formed around the clearing, allowing for helicopters to land to pick up the heavily wounded. With fire continuing from all sides this movement is very difficult but they do make progress. With nightfall, they begin to set up a perimeter where they are.

With the cover of darkness, Brown now orders B company, 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry, exhausted veterans of the days of fighting at LZ Xray, to reboard their Hueys at Camp Holloway and ride back into a hot and surrounded LZ once more.

They land at 6.30pm into heavy fire. Miraculously no aircraft are lost in the drop, and the arriving company takes command of the immediate LZ Albany clearing, absorbing any American survivors into its perimeter. This doesnt help the outlying companies, and the night offers them more danger than safety. Isolated or wounded individual GIs are found and killed in the darkness.

By morning, the Vietnamese commanders know that more aggressive US Air Power will likely arrive, and so the assault is concluded. The surviving NVA troops withdraw. Dawn reveals the horrors of the ambush. As helicopters begin to arrive to retrieve the dead, one platoon commander recalls that the scene is like a long bloody traffic jam in the jungle.

Of the 400 Americans who marched into LZ Albany, 155 have been killed and a further 124 wounded, a 70% casualty rate. One surviving US infantryman isnt accounted for, and is only located a week later by a passing helicopter. The US would claim 550 NVA casualties, but based on weapons recovered from the battlefield the real number is likely closer to half of that.

When compared to the 3 day battle at LZ X-ray, the 16 hours at LZ Albany has cost more American lives, and becomes the most deadly single day battle of the Vietnam War.

The heavy losses at the fights for LZs X-ray and Albany do little to convince the US Military of the potency of the air mobile concept, and the Brown’s 3rd brigade is withdrawn from the Pleiku campaign.  So early in the US involvement in Vietnam, the action in the Ia Drang valley has shown that, despite technological inferiority, especially against US Air Power, NVA ground forces are motivated, hard and skillful at fighting in the jungle. Although NVA losses were greater, the heavy US losses at X-Ray and Albany should have been an early indicator that the war in Vietnam would not be easy, fast, or without sacrifice

Comments

Eric

Oh, I can't wait to sit down and watch this one in real time. More Vietnam content! Maybe like Hue or another large scale battle?