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Quality vs. Quantity (Patreon)

Published:
2020-12-04 22:05:23
Imported:
2026-06
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Germany Army: Quality or Quantity? feat. Prof. Neitzel

In this video Professor Neitzel discusses the degradation of German Kampfkraft ("fighting power") during the Second World War. For this we also compare the different challenges the Wehrmacht and particularly the German Army faced on the Eastern and Western front. Disclaimer: I received a pre-release ebook of Prof. Neitzel’s Book “ Deutsche Krieger. Vom Kaiserreich zur Berliner Republik – eine Militärgeschichte ”. »» SUPPORT MHV «« » patreon, see videos early (adfree) - https://www.patreon.com/join/mhv » subscribe star - https://www.subscribestar.com/mhv » paypal donation - https://paypal.me/mhvis »» MERCHANDISE «« » teespring - https://teespring.com/stores/military-history-visualized » SOURCES « Neitzel, Sönke: Deutsche Krieger. Vom Kaiserreich zur Berliner Republik – eine Militärgeschichte. Propyläen: Berlin, Germany, 2020. #MeatGrinder,#TechGrinder,#DeutscheKrieger

Comments

Chris McIsaac

Good stuff. If you thing the Heer had it rough, the US had to build up the US Army from <200k and started far later than Germany and the other European powers. They went up to over 1 million in a year. I always that often uneven performance of the US Army in the early parts of the campaign in NWE had to do with the late start and the fact that so much of the US Army had seen no combat. I'd love to know how the German perception of the US Army changed over time.

Hyok Kim
>>48956943

My Dear Mr. Chris McIsaac, The German Army didn’t think very well of U.S. Army overall. They thought very highly of U.S. Military Logistics, though. Here’s a quote from Patton himself. ‘’ In every campaign Patton took part in, the Germans were outnumbered, outgunned, and in the process of retreating. The war against Germany in general was a contest between the superior resources of the Allies vs. the superior fighting of German soldiers. During the Battle of the Bulge, Patton observed that “The Germans are colder and hungrier than we are, but they fight better.” Derpetology: Is General Patton Overrated? (platedlizard.blogspot.com)

Hyok Kim

Thanks for the video. I really enjoyed the professor’s take, and I agree completely about the first half. I do disagree a bit with qualification on the latter half. But first of all, have you ever read, ‘Hitler’s Panzers East’/ Great book, even though some reviewers totally misunderstand the message. It explains in great detail, the mistakes Hitler made regarding the operational strategy. Btw. It mirrors the same operational strategic mistake IJN had made just before the Midway. Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted: Stolfi, R.H.S.: 9780806125817: Amazon.com: Books First, I am not very impressed generally by anything published by Oxford and Cambridge University Press. Long on pompous, self-indulgent, self-congratulating sophomoric sophistry, short on substance, big on cherry picking to validate their petty agendas, with eyes on selling books at the expense of serious scholarship. Where I disagree with the professor is Wehrmacht could not have defeated the Soviet Union in a campaign. That Wehrmacht should have prepared for a marathon, not a sprint. NOT. Not only Wehrmacht could have defeated the Soviet Union in a campaign, not only that it was the optimal strategy, but it WAS the only strategy Wehrmacht could have defeated the Soviet Union, and won WW2. There were 2 ways Wehrmacht could have defeated the Soviet Union. One is already discussed by ‘Hitler’s Panzers East’. The other, and the most under-rated reason for Germany’s defeat in WW2, is the failure of Wehrmacht to base the foundation of their panzers on Hetzers. Here’s how Wehrmacht could have, would have defeated the Soviet Union in a campaign. The first is already discussed. The second is, by basing the foundation of the panzers on hetzers as early as possible, in the 30s, in fact, even before the Polish campaign, Germany would have streamlined the production of Hetzers on mass, almost American scale. She would have had tens of thousands, maybe even 100,000 Hetzers ready before Barbarossa. True, on tactical level, Hetzer was not an optimal foundation for the panzers, but at strategic leveL, both for defense, and offense, Hetzer WAS IT. This way, even if Germany had repeated all the strategic mistakes she had made up to that time, she still would have had enough panzers to reach and attack Moscow in sufficient strength, before the winter set in, before Moscow could stiffen her defense, before she could bring in reinforcement from Soviet Far East, before she could move the some of the production of T-34s to Urals. With the collapse of Moscow, not only the symbol of Soviet political center, but central hub for railway system, especially the western part of Soviet Union, the biggest population center of ethnic Russians, Ukraine, the breadbasket of the Soviet Union, virtually all the remaining Soviet army in the area would have been cut off from supplies, reinforcement, retreat, marooned/doomed to wither away, losing the will to fight, just waiting to surrender.