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Evolution of US Navy Night Fighting in WW2

Trent Hone and Justin Pyke discuss the role of the different radars and their effect the War in the Pacific in this short outtake of the upcoming long podcast on US Navy Night Fighting in World War 2. Disclaimer: I received a complimentary copy of Learning War from Naval Institute Press for content production. Check out Trent’s Blog here: https://trenthone.com Trent's Twitter: https://twitter.com/Honer_CUT Justin's Twitter: https://twitter.com/CBI_PTO_History Cover design by vonKickass. 0:00 - Intro 1:42 - Brief discussion of the conventional view of U.S. Navy night-fighting capability. 3:57 - How far back was the U.S. Navy seriously grappling with night-fighting? 6:39 - How much did the U.S. Navy’s thinking about night-fighting change in the interwar years? How did they conceptualize what night battles would look like? Did their thinking pass through any distinct phases during the interwar years, or was there a great deal of continuity? 14:16 - What kind of blind spots were present in the U.S. Navy’s assumptions about night-combat in the interwar period? 18:30 - Your chapter on the night battles around Guadalcanal is entitled “Heuristics at Guadalcanal.” What do you mean by that? 23:45 - The night battles off Guadalcanal kicked off with a humiliating defeat, the Battle of Savo Island. Was this defeat a result of poor USN preparation for night battles or other factors? 31:13 - What was the role of radar in the night battles off Guadalcanal? How was the USN attempting to integrate its use into their tactics, and how successful were they in iron bottom sound? 39:21 - Was the USN effective at analyzing the results of battles and internalizing lessons learned? Why the final defeat at the Battle of Tassafaronga? 46:41 - To sum up this phase of the war, what weaknesses of the U.S. Navy did the actions off Guadalcanal expose and how did the USN ultimately win? 53:08 - The Japanese would continue to put up stiff resistance through 1943. How was the U.S. Navy dealing with night battles post-Guadalcanal? Was there a departure from their understanding of night actions in the immediate aftermath of Guadalcanal? 58:31 - How did the development of the CIC play into U.S. Navy night-fighting in this critical 1943 period and beyond? 1:07:01 - “Battle of the Pips” and the Battle of Surigao Strait. 1:14:10 - What does the USN experience with night-fighting, from its earliest origins in thinking, to the desperate actions off Guadalcanal, to the final crushing victory over the Japanese at the Surigao Strait say about the USN as a learning organization? 1:18:02 – Conclusion and tangent about book structure. »» SUPPORT MHV «« » patreon, see videos early (adfree) - https://www.patreon.com/join/mhv » subscribe star - https://www.subscribestar.com/mhv » paypal donation - https://paypal.me/mhvis »» MERCHANDISE «« » teespring - https://teespring.com/stores/military-history-visualized » SOURCES « Hone, Trent: Learning War – The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945. Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, USA, 2018. Disclaimer: I received a complimentary copy of Learning War from Naval Institute Press for content production. Mawdsely, Evan: The War for the Seas. A Maritime History of World War II. Yale University Press: New Haven, USA, 2019. Symonds, Craig L.: World War II at Sea. A Global History. Oxford University Press: New York, 2018. #USNavy,#NightFighting,#USNavyNightFightingDoctrine

Comments

Hyok Kim

Thanks for the education. The major fatal flaw of IJN was the self-sabotage of the grand strategy for Japan, for the purpose of parochial inter-service rivalry with IJA, whatever other flaws of IJN, including their sub optimal operational strategies such as the emphasis on efficiency over effectiveness, as demonstrated at Midway, and risk avoidance at all costs as demonstrated by the failure to destroy the dry docks at Pearl, and the failure to destroy U.S. supply ships after the tactical victory at Savo all come to a moot point. Even if IJN had not made any mistakes in these tactical, and even operational matters, their flawed grand strategy doomed IJN to an eventual defeat due to inferior logistics, and the eventual trap of fighting against both U.S. and U.S.S.R. And the reason for the failure at grand strategy was built-in. The lack of the civilian control of the military. This leads to the loss of objective assessment of the performance of the senior leadership of the military, and lack of coordination between optimal military objectives vs optimal political objectives. It’s like abolishing MPs and military court, and let the generals and admirals self-police, yeah, right/ It might work in the short run, never in the long run. With this out of the way, I still think U.S.N. could have avoided the defeat at Savo, by simply placing coast watchers on the sides of the Savo, the IJN task force could have ‘hugged’ to minimize U.S. radar detection, in fact, that’s exactly what the IJN did. As for Tassofaringa, one critical mistake made by the U.S. cruisers was getting silhouetted by the already hit and burning ship. The IJN had a brightly illuminated target to shoot their torpedoes. This could have been easily avoided by the pre-engagement drill.