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Standard tactical doctrine dictates that breaking contact is primarily a defensive maneuver, executed to safely disengage from an enemy force. The drill is well-established: a bounding retreat designed to preserve combat power until a secure rally point or friendly lines are reached. However, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has highlighted an evolution in this doctrine, particularly among Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF): executing a break-contact drill as a deliberate offensive maneuver.

To colloquially describe this specific type of retrograde operation, tacticians have borrowed a term from the gaming community: "kiting." While traditional doctrine might classify this simply as a delaying action, delaying an enemy can serve multiple strategic intents. Kiting, by contrast, has a singular, lethal objective: the systematic destruction of a pursuing force.

The Origin of the Term

The concept of kiting originates from the online strategy and roleplaying gaming communities of the 1990s and early 2000s. In these environments, artificial intelligence (NPCs) would relentlessly chase a player who initiated an attack, often abandoning strategic foresight for blind aggression. Players would draw these enemies away from their center of gravity, utilizing superior speed and long-range attacks to slowly destroy them during a fighting retreat.

In a military context, the metaphor holds true: imagine the enemy as a kite attached to a string, following wherever you lead them. While the adversary may operate under the illusion of possessing the initiative, you are entirely dictating their actions and maneuver space.

Tactical Execution in Combat

The maneuver begins conventionally: upon making contact, the unit initiates a standard break-contact drill. If the enemy responds with high, predictable aggression, the unit transitions into a kiting maneuver. The friendly force bounds backward from fighting position to fighting position, strictly engaging the enemy at their maximum effective weapons range.

Inevitably, the pursuing enemy will be forced to bound forward under fire, steadily losing momentum. Unlike a standard defense-in-depth, the friendly unit does not launch a decisive counterattack when the enemy stalls; instead, they continue to bound back. The ultimate intent is the attrition and destruction of the enemy through highly precise small-arms fire, the setting of hasty ambushes along the path of retreat, or by deliberately luring the adversary into pre-planned kill boxes serviced by Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (S-UAS) and indirect fire. This allows a smaller element not only to dictate the circumstances of the engagement but also to decisively defeat a significantly larger force.

Prerequisites for a Successful Kite

Kiting is not universally applicable; it is a highly conditional tactic. The most critical prerequisite is an overly aggressive enemy willing to take the bait. If the adversary demonstrates tactical patience or refuses to pursue, the friendly unit is merely breaking contact and surrendering time and space.

Beyond an aggressive adversary, kiting relies on three foundational pillars:

Speed and Cognitive Agility: In dismounted tactics, speed is often a byproduct of unit size. A smaller, well-trained unit (such as a six-man SOF squad) carries a much lighter cognitive load regarding maneuverability and command-and-control. They can bound and react instinctively, whereas a larger, heavier enemy formation will struggle with the friction of coordinating a dynamic pursuit.

Precision Firepower: While long-range weapon systems are advantageous, exceptional marksmanship standards are the true differentiator. The ability to deliver precise, effective fires at the maximum effective range of standard assault rifles gives the retreating element a decisive standoff advantage, prioritizing lethal hits over mere suppressive fire.

Permissive Terrain: Kiting is heavily restricted by the environment. If the terrain is too dense, the friendly force loses its standoff range and speed advantages. If it is too open, the retreating unit risks decimation before the enemy force can lose its momentum. The ideal scheme of maneuver requires terrain that balances open areas for designated kill boxes with sufficient micro-terrain (cover and concealment) to exploit during bounding movements.

Operational Limitations

Dictating the terms of an engagement against a numerically superior force is highly advantageous, but kiting carries a significant strategic downside: the loss of operational tempo.

While the maneuver itself relies on high-speed tactical execution, it degrades momentum on a macro scale. Even if a unit successfully lures and destroys successive enemy formations, the time required to achieve this attrition multiplies due to the constant retrograde movement. Consequently, kiting is not a substitute for decisive maneuver. It is best utilized as a shaping operation to soften enemy positions, or as a fixing force to open an enemy flank for a larger, decisive conventional attack.

Conclusion

The prominent use of kiting by Ukrainian SOF against Russian formations demonstrates its viability, but tactical leaders must remember it remains a niche approach designed for highly mobile, small-footprint units. The primary offensive action of modern military formations remains the deliberate attack. Nevertheless, kiting is a highly lethal tool worth integrating into modern training regimens, particularly when synchronized with the asymmetric advantages of S-UAS, Close Air Support (CAS), and precision artillery.

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Comments

Opfor8r

I believe I read somewhere that this was employed by the Viet Cong/NVA against US forces. The would deliberately initiate a sloppy attack and break contact, pulling US forces behind them into a preplanned ambush or an area replete with traps/IEDs Its definitely useful to use against an aggressve force to attrit them down, or pull them away from their defense to enable your own follow on force to exploit that new gap created by the opfor pursuit. Imagine being the opfor, chasing after a small SOF/LI force, then eventually breaking contact after casualties back to your line, only to walk right in to another ambush or come back to a separate force infiltration past your FLOT. Real great article, I think itsgreat using a term this generation can easily visualize

Thomas Blau

Sounds similar to what insurgent forces were doing during GWOT. Insurgents constantly causing problems and harassing our forces at random areas was a huge burden to try to police every little village and it spread manpower thin. And then that’s how you would end up with things like Battle of Wanat or Kamdesh where our forces were in a tactically inferior position based upon the actions of the enemy. So in a way they were dictating our movement and force dispersion.