Against Method: Chapters 5-7 (Patreon)
Content
A few really general notes before getting into these chapters:
A lot of people prefaced book club comments with apologies for being “late”, so I just want to clarify–there really is no “late”. My idea with this format of making a weekly post is that people can engage with it at their leisure. You're probably more likely to get responses from others if you comment during the week a discussion post is ‘active’ (and even more likely if you post early in the week), but there is no expectation of you to share your thoughts on any particular timeline. In fact, there’s no expectation of you to share your thoughts at all, so please don’t apologize for, you know, having lives and stuff
And a follow up on my last note about the book’s density–I’m starting to realize how much Feyerabend likes to repeat/re-articulate his arguments, so recently when I’m feeling like a section i’m reading is particularly hard to absorb, I’ve taken to just pushing through it and coming back to it later if needed instead of not moving on until i get it 100%. Most of the time I’ve ended up understanding the difficult part by way of a summary a few pages later or even revisiting the chapter heading summary. Thought id share my methods in case it’s helpful to anyone, ymmv. anyways, on to the reading:
Chapter 5 - No theory ever agrees with all the facts in its domain, yet it is not always the theory that is to blame. Facts are constituted by older ideologies, and a clash between facts and theories may be proof of progress. It is also a first step in our attempt to find the principles implicit in familiar observational notions.
Chapter 6 - As an example of such an attempt I examine the tower argument which the Aristotelians used to refute the motion of the earth. The argument involves natural interpretations – ideas so closely connected with observations that it needs a special effort to realize their existence and to determine their content. Galileo identifies the natural interpretations which are inconsistent with Copernicus and replaces them by others.
Chapter 7 - The new natural interpretations constitute a new and highly abstract observational language. They are introduced and concealed so that one fails to notice the change that has taken place (method of anamnesis). They contain the idea of the relativity of all motion and the law of circular inertia.
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I’ve really been enjoying Feyerabend’s introduction of ‘natural interpretations’ as a concept:
“...those ‘mental operations which follow so closely upon the senses’, and which are so firmly connected with their reactions that a separation is difficult to achieve” (ch 6, pg 52).
The example he uses (of Aristotelians saying that because a stone dropped from the top of a tower appears to fall straight down instead of in an arc, the earth must not be moving) brings to mind two lines of reasoning i find…frustrating? The first is basically flat earth logic— ‘the ground/horizon obviously looks flat, therefore it is flat’. The other one is an argument i repeatedly got in the comments of my ‘gravity is a social construct’ video that Alan Sokal (from my last vid) actually made in his Lingua Franca article: “anyone who believes that the laws of physics are mere social conventions is invited to try transgressing those conventions from the windows of my apartment (I live on the twenty-first floor).” Again, an appeal to an obviously true experience people all have and intuitively understand, and a jump from that shared sensation to what it means about the world.
I don’t think these lines of reasoning are doing the same thing exactly, but I think Feyerabend’s discussion of natural interpretations sheds an interesting light on both of them. The part on language hit me as especially relevant to the latter; another criticism i saw a lot in the comments on the gravity vid was something like, “sure if you make all these contrived definitions of ‘gravity’ and ‘construct’, maybe you’re right, but there’s no real reason to do all that”. I think Feyerabend’s discussion of the linguistic assumptions baked into the Aristotalian paradigm/“17th century everyday thought”, and how they hampered the acceptance of Galileo’s theory makes a pretty good case for being that persnickety with the words we use to talk about science (at least sometimes).
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Also on the topic of natural interpretations, i appreciated the presentation of Galileo’s approach as dialectical:
“In the history of thought, natural interpretations have been regarded as either a priori presuppositions of science, or else as prejudices which must be removed before any serious examination can begin…Galileo is one of those rare thinkers who wants neither forever to retain natural interpretations nor altogether to eliminate them. Wholesale judgements of this kind are quite alien to his way of thinking. He insists upon a critical discussion to decide which natural interpretations can be kept and which must be replaced.” (ch 6, pg 53)
In my videos i’m often arguing for ppl in science to be more open to one side of whatever split (objectivity/subjectivity, logic/emotion, western/non-western) and the response to that is often that I’m ignoring the usefulness/benefit of the other side. From my perspective, that’s not the case—I don’t usually think the pendulum should swing all the way in the opposite direction, but bc it’s already being held stuck in one extreme, it feels most useful to make the case for the opposite. I’m hoping we’ll get more on Galileo’s synthesis of accepting and being critical of natural interpretations bc i don’t really see many representations of scientists (contemporary or historic) doing science in ways that occupy this gray space, synthesizing two sides of whatever philosophical split. And i would like to do it more, but it’s hard without models.
I know I said this last time but it continues to be true: it’s fun to learn philosophy that fills in some gaps of things I’ve already been thinking about. really enjoying this book so far.