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A few really general notes before getting into these chapters:

A lot of people prefaced book club comments with apologies for being “late”, so I just want to clarify–there really is no “late”. My idea with this format of making a weekly post is that people can engage with it at their leisure. You're probably more likely to get responses from others if you comment during the week a discussion post is ‘active’ (and even more likely if you post early in the week), but there is no expectation of you to share your thoughts on any particular timeline. In fact, there’s no expectation of you to share your thoughts at all, so please don’t apologize for, you know, having lives and stuff

And a follow up on my last note about the book’s density–I’m starting to realize how much Feyerabend likes to repeat/re-articulate his arguments, so recently when I’m feeling like a section i’m reading is particularly hard to absorb, I’ve taken to just pushing through it and coming back to it later if needed instead of not moving on until i get it 100%. Most of the time I’ve ended up understanding the difficult part by way of a summary a few pages later or even revisiting the chapter heading summary. Thought id share my methods in case it’s helpful to anyone, ymmv. anyways, on to the reading:

Chapter 5 - No theory ever agrees with all the facts in its domain, yet it is not always the theory that is to blame. Facts are constituted by older ideologies, and a clash between facts and theories may be proof of progress. It is also a first step in our attempt to find the principles implicit in familiar observational notions.

Chapter 6 - As an example of such an attempt I examine the tower argument which the  Aristotelians used to refute the motion of the earth. The argument involves natural interpretations – ideas so closely connected with observations that it needs a special effort to realize their existence and to determine their content. Galileo identifies the natural interpretations which are inconsistent with Copernicus and replaces them by others.

Chapter 7 - The new natural interpretations constitute a new and highly abstract observational language. They are introduced and concealed so that one fails to notice the change that has taken place (method of anamnesis). They contain the idea of the relativity of all motion and the law of circular inertia.

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I’ve really been enjoying Feyerabend’s introduction of ‘natural interpretations’ as a concept: 

“...those ‘mental operations which follow so closely upon the senses’, and which are so firmly connected with their reactions that a separation is difficult to achieve” (ch 6, pg 52). 

The example he uses (of Aristotelians saying that because a stone dropped from the top of a tower appears to fall straight down instead of in an arc, the earth must not be moving) brings to mind two lines of reasoning i find…frustrating? The first is basically flat earth logic— ‘the ground/horizon obviously looks flat, therefore it is flat’. The other one is an argument i repeatedly got in the comments of my ‘gravity is a social construct’ video that Alan Sokal (from my last vid) actually made in his Lingua Franca article: “anyone who believes that the laws of physics are mere social conventions is invited to try transgressing those conventions from the windows of my apartment (I live on the twenty-first floor).” Again, an appeal to an obviously true experience people all have and intuitively understand, and a jump from that shared sensation to what it means about the world. 

I don’t think these lines of reasoning are doing the same thing exactly, but I think Feyerabend’s discussion of natural interpretations sheds an interesting light on both of them. The part on language hit me as especially relevant to the latter; another criticism i saw a lot in the comments on the gravity vid was something like, “sure if you make all these contrived definitions of ‘gravity’ and ‘construct’, maybe you’re right, but there’s no real reason to do all that”. I think Feyerabend’s discussion of the linguistic assumptions baked into the Aristotalian paradigm/“17th century everyday thought”, and how they hampered the acceptance of Galileo’s theory makes a pretty good case for being that persnickety with the words we use to talk about science (at least sometimes). 

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Also on the topic of natural interpretations, i appreciated the presentation of Galileo’s approach as dialectical:

“In the history of thought, natural interpretations have been regarded as either a priori presuppositions  of science, or else as prejudices which must be removed before any serious examination can begin…Galileo is one of those rare thinkers who wants neither forever to retain natural interpretations nor altogether to eliminate them. Wholesale judgements of this kind are quite alien to his way of thinking. He insists upon a critical discussion to decide which natural interpretations can be kept and which must be replaced.” (ch 6, pg 53)

In my videos i’m often arguing for ppl in science to be more open to one side of whatever split (objectivity/subjectivity, logic/emotion, western/non-western) and the response to that is often that I’m ignoring the usefulness/benefit of the other side. From my perspective, that’s not the case—I don’t usually think the pendulum should swing all the way in the opposite direction, but bc it’s already being held stuck in one extreme, it feels most useful to make the case for the opposite. I’m hoping we’ll get more on Galileo’s synthesis of accepting and being critical of natural interpretations bc i don’t really see many representations of scientists (contemporary or historic) doing science in ways that occupy this gray space, synthesizing two sides of whatever philosophical split. And i would like to do it more, but it’s hard without models. 

I know I said this last time but it continues to be true: it’s fun to learn philosophy that fills in some gaps of things I’ve already been thinking about. really enjoying this book so far.


Comments

Robert Herold

I am glad that we are finally getting to some of my favorite parts of the book because it was here where I had some big revelations about different things. I really love Feyerabend's discussion of natural interpretations because it calls to mind not only the natural interpretations of the past, but it made me think about my own natural interpretations and I realized that I was approaching the world from a very skewed perspective. I would often find people like flat Earthers completely bewildering, and for the longest time I could never even begin to imagine how someone got to the position. But when I first read about natural interpretations and how strong they can be, it suddenly clicked for me and I suddenly got it. I am not saying that the Earth is flat, but from a certain point of view I can understand now how hard it could be to fight a specific natural interpretation like that. I have even tried to personally interrogate my own natural interpretations and it is an extremely daunting process, it makes me feel extremely weird, sometimes stupid, but it is always a fruitful enterprise. Thus, if it is hard for me to do then it is certainly understandable how someone could fall into a pattern of thought and never challenge it. I highly recommend people try to investigate their own natural interpretations because you never know what you will find out about yourself and the world around you.

Contraryon

People like Sokal are the reason I’m a solipsist. Sometimes, when things start to annoy me too much, it’s nice to be able to say, ‘but they might not exist.’ Call it a leap of faith. This idea that Feyerabend keeps coming back to, that we put ourselves into the observation, is something that is very intuitive to me, though I think the situation is worse. We exist at the center of the observation; out of necessity we define the cosmos relative to ourselves. No doubt we are all prone, from time to time, to defining ourselves in relation to the world (i.e. the part of the cosmos that we can meaningfully identify with), but this seems to me to be a pathology—a sort of solipsism in denial. It is no less delusional, having found oneself at the center of experience, to consider one’s sensations definitive; perhaps ‘there is no false sensation’ (Cioran), but sensations are still deceptive and transient. Copernicus’s innovation wasn’t simply a matter of astute mathematics, nor was it the banality that is ‘don’t trust your senses’. His innovation was to say, ‘don’t read too much into it.’ A naysayer who only went so far as to assume that there should be some observable consequence of a rotating Earth would eventually be vindicated—we know today that the rotation of the Earth is implicated in many meteorological phenomena. This attitude, flexible as it might be, is far too blasé for the theologian and dogmatist. It offends their well-crafted sensibility—that is, the facts that keep them in proper orientation with the cosmos. It is no easy thing to have truths that have been absolute since you first learned them undermined: 'It is...difficult, if not plainly impossible, to admit deception.' No matter how trivial a fact—perhaps even because the fact is trivial—we cannot avoid the sensation of rejection when the universe changes without our consent.

Contraryon

Regarding flat earthers, I'm still trying to untangle that knot myself. I have come to the conclusion that, while there are other factors to be sure, there is also the undeniable scent of misanthropy. As far as I can tell, belief in a flat earth is substantially an American thing. This makes sense to me—Americans, first and foremost, are born misanthropes.

Nathaniel Bookout

"Sex is biology" is a natural interpretation. That's the whole key to understanding trans or nonbinary identity--reinterpreting sex and gender, and how your identity relates to them. Philosophy Tube had a recent video about death I've been thinking a lot about. In it, Abigail talks about how knowledge is not the pursuit of truth we think of it as, but rather a construct defined by, and for use by, those in power. Like our liberal democracy, our knowledge is built on a foundation of death: of people who don't get to be "our people". It seems like reinforcing forcing power structures is a key component to natural interpretations, and the reason why we favor some over others. That's why "sex is biology", and terfism, tends towards misogyny. The secret function of "keeping men as men" and "women as women" is to keep the category of "woman" below "man". "We describe work suggesting that thinking of gender differences in this biological-essentialist way perpetuates a non-egalitarian gender ideology." (https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rstb.2020.0141) I think that's a strong reason to be critical of our natural interpretations, and for an anarchistic perspective in science. Politics is one angle to discovering the natural interpretations that are going unacknowledged.

Robert Herold

While I do certainly understand what you mean, as I work right now in hospitality and it is certainly something that I feel quite often in how guests will simply treat me and others. Yet I think that its wrong to assume that flat Earthers are more likely to be misanthropic because I kind of feel like it might be the opposite. While they certainly have a very negative view of people in power, that doesn't mean that they view all of humanity in that same light. They tend to think that people are simply being misled and need to 'do their own research' to understand the truth. Arguably they have a much more optimistic view of people than other scientists who I know personally. Flat Earthers think that enough evidence and education can simply set humanity free from the lies of the secret powers that be, but I have met plenty of people who firmly believe that no amount of education can help people like flat Earthers. So I don't think that misanthropy is a sufficient explanation for flat Earthers.

Bella Hierro

Thank you for reminding me to watch that video! I keep seeing it come up on my feed and putting it off until I had a free hour. I think another one of Abigail’s points from that video also comes into play here, which is the point that we as humans have a difficult time separating ourselves from our delusions of human exceptionalism. Therefore everything must be as we have previously perceived, based on established knowledge. It is difficult to comprehend Galileo’s view of falling stones because we cannot comprehend a natural process that we are too small to witness. In a way humans think of ourselves as too “majestic,” to use Abigail’s terminology, to comprehend that we are so insignificant in the universe. In the same sense, we discount plenty of new hypotheses that aren’t human-centric.

Zachery Sanders

In chapter 5, the bit about Being and Not Being is stuff that drove me crazy in Western Philosophy. That along with the idea of the unchanging nature of a thing or “the thing in itself”. The boundaries around things have often seemed abstracted and nebulous to me. These relationships reminded me of a one man play by David Novak about Buckminster Fuller where he moves a knot down a rope with three sections of color. The knot he says is your life (or I guess whatever other knowledge/concept), and when it moves to the end it disappears, the “pattern integrity” is lost. This image has stuck in my mind because to me it neatly shows the transitional, and that the conceptual idea we apply to certain patterns are for the mind practical, but perhaps not quite real. Much of these chapters were so dense and well outside my knowledge bank. It was a very difficult read. It often felt like swimming against ocean waves— I’d get a sense of something, like: “hardly any theory is consistent with the facts”, but then I get a bit lost in the meanings and implication of other things, like: the assertion that because of this disconnect we now must admit, “counterinduction in addition to admitting unsupported hypotheses.” I feel like I’m missing a lot in the idea of counterinduction and unsupported hypothesis. I wish I had more time to go into this. In the story of Galileo, I followed the physics of it on a very superficial level. My brain has a hard time imagining those things. But I loved the bit about his “psychological tricks” almost like propaganda. One year in my literature class I taught On the Origin of Species. Darwin spends a good deal of time on pigeons and cattle, breeding, and variation. It’s not just the facts, but his choice and presentation. He is making appeals to wealthy educated men who have first hand experience with those two things. It seems to me he is using “psychological tricks” in the same way that Galileo does. Other Jot ideas I love the idea of “ad hoc approximations”! I might have to start using that in my daily life. “The language they speak is of course influenced by the beliefs of earlier generations” — I feel this all the time everywhere. “Philosophers who want to introduce new views this find themselves faced not with arguments, which they could most likely answer, but with an impenetrable stone wall of well-entrenched reactions” —- ouch - and how can I be sure, or how can anyone be sure they aren’t guilty of this? Chapter 7 pages 71-73 have a massive footnote leaving a blank page (save for the end of the footnote beginning on 71). My brain really wanted to make something of all that.

Zachery Sanders

Thanks for your ideas. I read leap of faith solipsism as intentionally assuming, but also potentially serious? Either way, I like that and find the possibility interesting. It's interesting to hear your ideas since they are something so outside my belief system. It does seem that I exist and often center myself (although because of certain race, class, and gender issue, sometimes it hasn't felt that way). But it also seems that I am not just in relationship to everything I am not, but also comprised and dependent on a great deal that is not me. I'm not that aware of solipsism so I'm probably missing a bunch in what you've said. I really like your last line, which I read as a kind of response to your first.

Zachery Sanders

Thanks for the resources. I'd never seen some of the stats before from the royal society publishing. It doesn't surprise me that men are more likely to think biology explains things. A study of 2100 brains' architecture! Masculine posters (example used was Star Trek posters) lead to women losing interest in computer science? Thanks for the read. The whole gender labeling and sorting is something I'm suppose to do at my job for data collection - and it always feels weird.

Scott Weber

Interesting note about The Origin of Species! I wonder if you the theory of evolution will be touched on later in the book. It's kind of an easy mode contradiction to naive notions about how science works, not something you can go out and do a controlled experiment about but somehow definitely science!

Nathaniel Bookout

Zachery, I should probably give that article another read more closely. I skimmed it admittedly the first time, but it sounds like there's a lot of really good stuff there. Bella, yeah it's a pretty dark video, one of the less understandable maybe just by virtue of its subject. Kinda like "This is Not a Video Essay", by The Leftist Cooks, which is also about knowledge and death. (TLDR below: you could say "authorized knowledge" makes the acquisition of knowledge realistic. But if knowledge is inherently unrealistic, shouldn't that make us skeptical of "authorized knowledge"?) Another thing from that video Abigail mentions that I've been thinking a lot about is "authorized knowledge". I've been getting these emails from XCel about cutting back energy on certain days for their metrics. I'm pretty bad at paying attention to my email, so I only recently noticed these. I have no idea how long they've been doing this. Anyways, this week they're doing another "measurement". And I just thought it was funny, because my AC has been broken for a week (it's finally fixed now). If they'd done this measurement earlier, they could detect that. But currently, my profile says I've saved nothing, because I've never paid attention to their specific dates and times. This is such a blatant example of "authorized knowledge", or what we've decided we can know, because obviously it's unrealistic to know everything. They have to assign power reduction to specific dates and times, maybe because asking for more would be untenable for most people? Or because they couldn't reasonably sample my power usage at every moment? Could they? My question is: can you look at XCel's data and judge whether or not power is being saved? From what Feyerabend is saying, I would guess not. Maybe you can say "power was saved at that date and time". But I'm not sure whether you can say, for sure, whether more power was saved than other times. You can say "it's probably more power saved", by virtue of Occam's Razor maybe. But that isn't actually data. Why I think this is interesting is because, while not currently the case, imagine applying something like China's "social credit" to this situation. Obviously, we want people to use less power, to help the environment. So measuring their social credit based on whether they follow these guidelines would help encourage that, no? Except that "authorized knowledge" is not true knowledge. That's Feyerabend's whole point. True knowledge is unrealistic. Which is why he argues against tacit acceptance of what we currently know, and for counter-inductive reasoning against it. "Authorized knowledge" is simply the knowledge we have within the natural interpretations we've made. In this case, I guess XCel's assumption its emails are reaching me is a natural interpretation. So how can we jump from taking the step of assuming our measurements are valid--that they accurately represent what they're supposed to, like a net reduction of energy usage--and assign that validity a new form of orthodoxy, in the form of public enforcement (via a social credit system)? This is why I would never support any such system. Because I don't see how you can enforce any qualitative changes in people's lives, without defaulting to violence. Whether we're talking about saving energy, or stopping racism, colonialism, homophobia, transphobia, misogyny, ableism, etc., social enforcement is just a thin guise over the traditional means of enforcement. That's how "fascism" roots itself in scientific methodology, in my opinion.

Nathaniel Bookout

I agree, I feel like I maybe understood about 20% of what he was saying. I know that teleology is one of the deepest subjects in Aristotelian philosophy, with a lot of discussion about what exactly the implications of "being" really is: does existence have a purpose? Aristotle said yes, telos, or purpose, was the heart of being. Or something like that, if I remember correctly, built off of the ideas of Parmenides. But I wonder if this question of telos is related to what Feyerabend is saying. If we make natural interpretations, are we making them for some goal? And if we're making them for a reason, does that mean that science has an end goal? It's interesting you mention evolution, as the idea that evolution has an end goal is historically important, and threatening to return again today.

phil e the theyby

Like Zachery and Nathaniel said, I did find it hard to understand everything Feyerabend was saying. I’m also personally not a fan of frequent footnotes that you should really be reading immediately when they come up, resulting in your eyes having to jump between the top and the bottom of the page. But none of that diminishes the quality of what he’s saying, and personally, I’m taking it as an opportunity to try to practice trying to really listen to another person’s perspective. I try to think of it as akin to someone having an accent or a dialect that’s harder for me to understand; it doesn’t diminish the value of what they’re saying, and it’s worth the effort to engage and hear their perspective, because it’s almost assuredly different from mine. I left these chapters really excited to see where Feyerabend will go next (I mean, I know it was in the Analytical Index, but I wasn’t reading all that). The chapters were very compelling in highlighting how this shift in scientific paradigm wasn’t at all some detached, rational, empirical process, but a competition of storytelling, closer to political theater than “the scientific method” we learned in grade school. My (current) interpretation of Feyerabend’s vision is a scientific approach where we give voice to any theory/perspective proposed, especially the ones that contradict our prevailing theories, and see what we can learn from them about the world around us and/or our natural interpretations. This feels extremely contrary to the traditional view of science as a competition between theories aiming to “getting closer to the truth” or “understanding the universe as God designed it.” I feel like this change in perspective requires a very different…emotional attitude? towards the process, where different perspectives are valued and celebrated rather than attacked and ridiculed. But I’m not sure if Feyerabend actually wants this elimination of the “competitive” attitude towards science, or still views it as a fundamentally competitive process, just one that should be navigated in a different/less dogmatic (for lack of a better term) way. The discussion of natural interpretations led me to really reflect on some of my own: —I assume that our emotions and other messages from our body have worth and value, and that it is better for ourselves and others if we listen to them and come to understand what they tell us about our needs (even if the thoughts that accompany them aren’t always correct). —I assume that it is better for everyone for different groups of people to be working towards the common good instead of different groups (and individuals) each prioritizing their own good at the expense of others. —I believe that doing harm to others is bad for your soul (even though I don’t necessarily believe in the soul as a concept), and that people will be live healthier and more fulfilling lives when we remove incentives for people to harm others. It’s been a little unsettling to recognize that a lot of what I do is basically propaganda for those interpretations. That doesn’t mean I think those ideas are “bad” or harmful, but I’m grappling with the fact that I DO take them as natural assumptions. I want to be more cognizant of the fact that other people may not share them, and there may be conditions in which my assumptions are wrong (and not just because the way I define a word is different than how someone else would). And while my role as propagandist felt a little uncomfortable, I did find it SUPER interesting to start to get a glimpse of some of my own natural interpretations, and to try to expand my perspective to better understand those who may not align with them. Ok, that was super long and barely about the chapters, but they did make me think a lot! So for all the difficulty in reading it, I’m getting a lot out of it 😊

Jörg Lütkemeier

Hi Phil, I liked reading your post here and follow along your thoughts. I vibe with them, because the doubts you voice on your assumptions is similar to my own thoughts. However: I'd like to propose that the three assumptions that you talk about are at least in aspects of them testable and I would think that you actually have at least some empirical evidence to back them. Same is true for possible exceptions to models derived from your assumptions. - To what degree do we need to see these in context of "natural interpretations"?

Zachery Sanders

I agree Robert, the misanthropy I encounter often seems a product of hopeless powerlessness. Discussions can be warm, genuine, and varied, but suddenly feel very different when certain issues (hot button, conspiracy or otherwise) arise. Testing for provocation, got you moments, and superiority of whatever logic train they're on- I don't really get a sense that they even care if my mind is changed or not.

Zachery Sanders

I wonder if there's a "middle" way forward. XCel and in my case PG&E control the dissemination and often interpretation of data. I've driven myself mad trying to figure out some of their metrics. Perhaps instead of a top down enforcement system, a generative horizontal accountability system that exists in some ways hey we got stop at some point with the anything goes to get some place.... What that would be I'm not sure.

Zachery Sanders

My index doesn't seem to list either evolution or Darwin. Feyerabend at the end of Chapter 7 write, "Galileo invents an experience that has metaphysical h ingredients". It's been a while, but Darwin's thoughts on the vastness of geological time and its relationship to variations and speciation might fit this. I wonder why Feyerabend choose Galileo and if it was influenced at all by Bertolt Brecht Life of Galileo. Science seems goal oriented to me and teleology often seems to come down to tautologies for me. What Feyerabend is doing with apriori and post hoc here is a little confusing. I really need to sit down and write a personal glossary for myself on some of his terms and usages of them - like counter inductive, natural interpretations, post hoc hypothesis etc.

AlexTheTutor

I'm convinced that Feyerabend was a big fan of Wittgenstein 1) Wittgenstein's Tractatus 3.01 "The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world"... Feyerabend Chapter 5 "It follows that a philosopher who wants to study the adequacy of science as a picture of the world... must look at modern science with special care", Feyerabend was mentioning how some approximations in physics are necessary (AD HOC APPROXIMATIONS), a theory can make room for new data if we approximate that data to fit the model, creating a false impression of the excellence of the science 2) Wittgenstein's PI 246 "The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.", which is famously paraphrased as, "It is ok to say 'I am in pain', but wrong to say 'I know I am in pain', since it makes no sense to speak of knowledge if you cannot speak of doubt, and surely one cannot doubt their own pain"... and Feyerabend end of Chapter 6 "(I KNOW what pains are, and I also KNOW, from introspection, that they have nothing whatever to do with material processes!)" 3) Wittgenstein's initial philosophy was that there are no geninue real problems in philosophy, that all so-called problems stem from philosophers misusing language, that if we simply need to analyze how we speak to resolve any issues, and... Feyerabend's HEART of his thesis stems from the paragraph in middle of Chapter 6 that begins "This unity is the result of a process of learning that starts in one’s childhood", Feyerabend outlines the idea that we learn words as children, and these words were passed down from generations, and that over time our language blends with our observations that we no longer critically think about the words we use, but just accept these words and the experiences they convey a priori, what Feyerabend later calls the mental operations that follow so closely to our senses as NATURAL INTERPRETATIONS, and later Feyerabend argues that producing any observational statement involves 2 psychological events, 1) a sensation, and 2) a connection between that sensation and LANGUAGE. Feyerabend later argues that we need to reexamine our language to be able to clear up any errors we may have when stating our observations, very Wittgensteinian of him... Also... a very interesting thing: Feyerabend is doing BOTH analytical phiosophy AND continental philosophy at the same time. (putting aside the Wittgenstein influences), he is clearly doing analytical philosophy when he is logically and painstakingly analyzing the language we use when we make observational statements about science. But, Feyerabend is clearly doing continental philosophy, it's literally in the title of the book AGAINST METHOD, continental philosophy often goes against rigorous scientific method and includes other aspects such as culture and history, in order to understand our place in the world and the relationship we have with science. Also, middle of Chapter 5, Feyerabend writes, "It is this HISTORICO-PHYSIOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF THE EVIDENCE, the fact that it does not merely describe some objective state of affairs BUT ALSO EXPRESSES SUBJECTIVE, MYTHICAL, AND LONG-FORGOTEN VIEWS... that forces us to take a fresh look at methodology". That's the most continental thing to say in a book with the most continental book title, and yet the language analysis is abundant (analytical philosophy). Cool stuff

Nathaniel Bookout

It's interesting you bring up the competitive nature of science because that makes me think of how capitalism has influenced liberal society, philosophically, to believe competition is a fundamental aspect to life. It influenced biology, in the inception of evolution. It influenced eugenics. And it doesn't surprise me that it influences science in general, in the "competition" for absolute truth. Also, I agree with Jorg that your three "assumptions" could be rationalized, with evidence. You might currently be operating on them as assumptions, true. But you can also look at the tangible impact of, for instance, not acknowledging emotions, and see if there is one and how great it is. I think this is another reason looking to older philosophies, even from ancient times, can be useful. Because questions like why single issue politics undermine actual progress, or why violence erodes the "soul", have been extensively examined from various philosophical perspectives throughout history. And those perspectives might give us parameters we can test.

Nathaniel Bookout

I feel like, at least as a start, having a system where customers "opt-in" will be more likely to get them to participate. Because not only does that ensure your customer is willingly participating, but it also ensures they even *know* what's happening in the first place.

Zachery Sanders

Thanks, I like this break down. When I got into philosophy for a time Wittgenstein was one thinker I couldn't get my head into. Do you get the sense with Wittgenstein that like a lot of Western philosophers there is a something behind the language (or perhaps with a better language and use), an independent truth? I'm getting the feeling that Feyerabend is, but I'm not sure yet. Other times it feels like Feyerabend is acknowledging that knowledge is situationally related and dependent.

phil e the theyby

I appreciate your thoughts, Jörg and Nathaniel! I think that elements of my thoughts are testable, but I do think some of them aren’t particularly practical to test. As an example, I think that often the hurt that comes from hurting others is buried under a number of layers of one’s own hurt, ideological justifications, and just a lifetime of dehumanizing other people as a result of living in a dehumanizing society. Actually testing it at the level I’m thinking about it feels like it takes a lifetime. But there is a difference between hypotheses you can’t test or aren’t testing for any given reason, and “natural interpretations.” Or maybe once you recognize and label them, they’re no longer natural interpretations, since you’re not taking them as a given of the world anymore. Nathaniel, I think I broadly agree with you, except that I see it as predating capitalism. I think it’s definitely a function of imperialism (and I see capitalism as sort of a natural outgrowth of imperialism; the expansion and conquest of the monarch transitions to expansion and conquest by those who own the means of production), and it might just be a byproduct of hierarchical societies in general.

AlexTheTutor

yes i do get that sense! (language is great, but sometimes it would be nice to move around language when needed, it's not the only game in town), there is a short video on YT that summarizes Wittgenstein very well if you search 'Wittgenstein Ludwig, Cambridge class'

River

I understood less than 10% of these chapters. I think I am missing out a lot because I do not know the details of the Aristotle-plato-copurnicus debate around planetary motions. Is there any concise, easy resource of these events that I can review?

32 Emilia 32

well well well i am finally reading this book again. i dont know what it was but i just never touched it again after september. I will still post my thoughts here and read all the others. u can think of me as the "the party ended 2 hours ago and hes still here" guy (girl). jumping back into against method i remembered why i stopped reading it. i have no connection to galileo/copernicus/dialogue and it made chapter 5 a slog. but a rewarding one! i think feyerabend does later explain most of what he discusses and u can kind of piece it all together. a modern video essay would for sure put a history section at the start to bring everyone up to date and i missed that here. Other than that its fun learning about galileo and relative motion. its crazy that next to being an inventor, scientist and artist this guy drew the first "incel vs chad" meme by casting his opponents viewpoint as 'simplicio' and himself as the allknowing 'salviati'. i like the little footnote discussion about "irrational" rhetorics inclusion into rationality. I cant say im looking forward to even more chapters all about galileo but i know its the biggest argument feyerabend is constructing so far and i want to see where hes going with it. until i habe read the next two chapters in march 2025!

AJ Biffl

Reading this book has had a huge influence on me (as is probably evident from the amount I quote or cite this book in other discussions), and I think these chapters were the first place I started seeing Feyerabend's philosophy applying more broadly than just to science and scientific method. The passage about "unravel[ing] the cluster of natural interpretations" in chapter 6, the circularity and self-referential nature of a set of natural interpretations, and how there "is only one way to get out of this circle, and it consists in using an *external measure of comparison*" spoke to me as also applying to social and cultural value systems. You can justify behaviors that contribute to a social organization by saying that those behaviors are rewarded by that organization, and you can justify the existence of that organization by saying it rewards its members. The set of natural interpretations underlying the system, valuative statements about behaviors and outcomes, is built to justify itself. To quote one of my favorite phrases from chapter 3, "nothing succeeds like success" - you can construct any possible metric of success that you want and then justify employing such a metric by pointing to "successful" people. So there is great danger and great power in the ability to construct natural interpretations, especially because once someone is fully entangled, they can't find their own way out.

AJ Biffl

(a few days later, after ruminating on the bus) This phenomenon of self-supporting systems also applies to worldviews. If you have a framework to analyze everything that happens in the world, like me I often reference a way of thinking about society and politics as the self-interested actions of organisms and the economic structures they rely on (other examples are religious worldviews that sort of accept that their god or gods work in mysterious ways, or conspiracy-theory worldviews where everything can be framed in terms of shady conspiracies). These worldviews gives you a grammar with which to understand every possible thing that you encounter (it's occurred to me before that as people age, they build up this kind of world view and end up with a rationalizing shield to avoid having to "learn new tricks." Everything that happens can be fit into an already-existing framework in their mind). And there's no way to actually assess the credibility of that worldview from inside it - there's no way to disprove that worldview because you can always translate new occurrences into its language.