Against Method: Chapter 14-15 (Patreon)
Content
Had a cute midpoint writing session (you can read our notes here if you like) and now diving back into the reading. last half of the book lets gooo
Chapter 14 - Galileo’s inquiries formed only a small part of the so called Copernican Revolution. Adding the remaining elements makes it still more difficult to reconcile the development with familiar principles of theory evaluation.
Chapter 15 - The results obtained so far suggest abolishing the distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification, norms and facts, observational terms and theoretical terms. None of these distinctions plays a role in scientific practice. Attempts to enforce them would have disastrous consequences. Poppers ‘critical’ rationalism fails for the same reasons.
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had a fun connection moment in chapter 15 when Feyerabend was talking about how scientific progress often doesn’t start with a cleanly defined problem, “but rather from some extraneous activity, such as playing, which, as a side effect, leads to developments which later on can be interpreted as solutions to unrealized problems” (pg 157). Felt very reminiscent of Lockheart’s approach to math as play, with any application being after the fact. I imagine the two would agree on a lot.
But I think the passage that spoke to me the most in this reading was his answer to whether critical rationalism is like, a desirable way to be:
[Popperian critical rationalism] may satisfy a school philosopher, who looks at life through the spectacles of his own technical problems and recognizes hatred, love, happiness, only to the extent to which they occur in these problems. But if we consider human interests and, above all, the question of human freedom (freedom from hunger, despair, from the tyranny of constipated systems of thought and not the academic ‘freedom of the will’), then we are proceeding in the worst possible fashion. For it is not possible that science as we know it today, or a ‘search for the truth’ in the style of traditional philosophy, will create a monster? Is it not possible that an objective approach that frowns upon personal connections between the entities examined will harm people, turn them into miserable, unfriendly, self-righteous mechanisms without charm and humour? ‘Is it not possible,’ asks Kierkegaard, ‘that my activity as an objective [or a critico-rational] observer of nature will weaken my strength as a human being?’ I suspect the answer to many of these questions is affirmative and I believe that a reform of the sciences that makes them more anarchic and more subjective (in Kierkegaard’s sense) is urgently needed. (ch 15 pg 156)
I can’t imagine that it’s any surprise based on my videos that this resonated with me, but i guess the thing that actually is sticking about it is how he’s able to make this almost moral argument for approaching science differently, but the moral argument isn’t really the justification. Rather, his whole philosophical treatise gives the value for his ‘anarchistic’ approach, and it also just so happens to be in alignment with a more humane science. Maybe I’ve had too many arguments with people where my thoughts are dismissed as unjustifiably centering ‘peoples feeeeligns’ or whatever tf when the most important thing should always be the quality/progress of The Science, but i’ve long thought that a lot of the social things that make doing science yucky for some people ALSO MAKE THE SCIENCE WORSE. Basically i’m just saying I feel very vindicated by Feyerabend.
Also i have no idea why Feyerabend brought ‘a satisfactory sex life’ into his discussion on the invention of theories (ch 15 pg 155) but i think its hilarious anyways