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Had a cute midpoint writing session (you can read our notes here if you like) and now diving back into the reading. last half of the book lets gooo

Chapter 14 - Galileo’s inquiries formed only a small part of the so called Copernican Revolution.  Adding the remaining elements makes it still more difficult to reconcile the development with familiar principles of theory evaluation.

Chapter 15 - The results obtained so far suggest abolishing the distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification, norms and facts, observational terms and theoretical terms.  None of these distinctions plays a role in scientific practice.  Attempts to enforce them would have disastrous consequences. Poppers ‘critical’ rationalism fails for the same reasons. 

~~~~~

had a fun connection moment in chapter 15 when Feyerabend was talking about how scientific progress often doesn’t start with a cleanly defined problem, “but rather from some extraneous activity, such as playing, which, as a side effect, leads to developments which later on can be interpreted as solutions to unrealized problems” (pg 157). Felt very reminiscent of Lockheart’s approach to math as play, with any application being after the fact. I imagine the two would agree on a lot.

But I think the passage that spoke to me the most in this reading was his answer to whether critical rationalism is like, a desirable way to be:

[Popperian critical rationalism] may satisfy a school philosopher, who looks at life through the spectacles of his own technical problems and recognizes hatred, love, happiness, only to the extent to which they occur in these problems. But if we consider human interests and, above all, the question of human freedom (freedom from hunger, despair, from the tyranny of constipated systems of thought and not the academic ‘freedom of the will’), then we are proceeding in the worst possible fashion.  For it is not possible that science as we know it today, or a ‘search for the truth’ in the style of traditional philosophy, will create a monster?  Is it not possible that an objective approach that frowns upon personal connections between the entities examined will harm people, turn them into miserable, unfriendly, self-righteous mechanisms without charm and humour? ‘Is it not possible,’ asks Kierkegaard, ‘that my activity as an objective [or a critico-rational] observer of nature will weaken my strength as a human being?’  I suspect the answer to many of these questions is affirmative and I believe that a reform of the sciences that makes them more anarchic and more subjective (in Kierkegaard’s sense) is urgently needed. (ch 15 pg 156)

I can’t imagine that it’s any surprise based on my videos that this resonated with me, but i guess the thing that actually is sticking about it is how he’s able to make this almost moral argument for approaching science differently, but the moral argument isn’t really the justification. Rather, his whole philosophical treatise gives the value for his ‘anarchistic’ approach, and it also just so happens to be in alignment with a more humane science. Maybe I’ve had too many arguments with people where my thoughts are dismissed as unjustifiably centering ‘peoples feeeeligns’ or whatever tf when the most important thing should always be the quality/progress of The Science, but i’ve long thought that a lot of the social things that make doing science yucky for some people ALSO MAKE THE SCIENCE WORSE.  Basically i’m just saying I feel very vindicated by Feyerabend.

Also i have no idea why Feyerabend brought ‘a satisfactory sex life’ into his discussion on the invention of theories (ch 15 pg 155) but i think its hilarious anyways

Comments

phil e the theyby

Is it just me, or does Popper’s critical rationalism feel like it has a very COLONIAL connotation after considering all of Feyerabend’s ideas? Like, the incoming theory shows its superiority and eradicates the prior, inferior theory? That may feel like a stretch, but a lot of what I was thinking in chapter 15 was about WHY science is viewed as this rational progressive process if what Feyerabend is saying is true. And it feels like a narrative that has fundamentally colonial connotations; the more superior, rational thought processes of the modern age eradicate the irrational “superstitions” of old. I find it really interesting to read chapter 15 from a consideration of my field of study, clinical psychology. It’s interesting because I feel like, especially in clinical practice, the field seems to actively embrace an approach much closer to Feyerabend’s model than Popper’s. While people are certainly trained and grounded in different theories, most people integrate several different theories or perspectives, utilizing them as feels appropriate based on the actual human sitting in front of them. A lot of the theories describe similar phenomena from different lenses; sometimes they feel more like translations of each other into different languages rather than competing theories. For me, I increasingly feel like a lot of the ideas I bring in when I do therapy don’t even map neatly onto a psychological theory; I feel like I draw as much from Marx or Freire when understanding college students’ experiences related to work and education than I draw from theories behind second-wave Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy. And I don’t do that just to be a left-wing nutjob; I do it because it seems to most effectively capture what’s underlying how they really feel, and they tend to confirm it when I share the ideas with them (ya know, without saying “According to Marx…”). And who knows? Maybe the same is true in every other field once you actually understand it well enough. I’d love to hear the thoughts of folks from other fields. I’m really interested to dive into the next section! Just please no more history on the Copernican Revolution; I don’t know what half of this stuff means 😖

Aldum

I feel that "the more superior, rational thought processes of the modern age eradicate the irrational “superstitions” of old" is a bit of a stretch. From what I'm understanding from the description of critical rationalism, it's not about replacing "irrational" theories, but more about finding problems with a theory through criticism, and creating a new theory that solves the problem with the old while still retaining what worked from the old theory. I don't think it implies that the old theory even with problems is irrational. I think Feyeranbend's argument against critical rationalism is that the assumptions of rationality and being required to only use falsifiable statements ignores past developments of science that didn't assume rationality as much. I realize after writing this (and rereading the chapter while doing so) that maybe this is in line with what you are saying lol. I guess my point is that I don't think its intentionally attempting to eradicate old thought processes, but rather that it accidentally does. I don't know if this distinction matters, and maybe I don't disagree with you, but I think engaging with this has helped me adsorb the chapter better than before

phil e the theyby

Re: your last sentence: I feel like that’s all we can ever hope for, right? Just a deeper engagement and reflection on what’s being said and what we can make of it. I think my (questionably-articulated, vibes-based) point was less about the INTENTION of Popper’s model than how it functions in practice. And I think Popper’s model was meant to be descriptive rather than prescriptive, so I don’t think that’s even how Popper’s saying it SHOULD be (although he might be; I haven’t read his work). It’s more that, when you look at the consequences of science as described by Popper, we’ve eradicated all of the old, “lesser” theories, then justify it by saying our new theories are more advanced, more evolved. It’s not about specifically labeling the old theories as “irrational” or “superstitions”; it’s more about the idea that it’s OK to eradicate them because they’re LESS rational. And I agree that, as Feyerabend describes it, Popper isn’t using a metric of “rationality” (he’s using “ability to address a problem”); I more think that the “moving from less rational to more rational” is the justification given after the fact. To me, it just felt kind of parallel to the eradication of indigenous cultures under the justification that they’re a less evolved, less rational form of humanity/culture. Whereas Feyerabend’s approach (at least at this stage) feels like it has a more pluralistic approach with decolonizing potential. Also, I 100% agree with your read on what Feyerabend’s argument against critical rationalism, though I think it’s also implicit that he takes issue with critical rationalism precluding FUTURE developments of science that don’t assume or rely on “rationality.”

Nathaniel Bookout

I found it confronting how readily I adopt Popperian critical rationalism, almost instinctively. Like when he says "every step that protects a view from criticism, that makes it safe or 'well-founded', is a step away from rationality. Every step that makes it more vulnerable is welcome." (153) Taken at face value, this does seem like a good thing, right? It should be the role of rational discourse to challenge ideas, in order to maintain "a kind of scientific integrity, a principle of scientific thought that corresponds to a kind of utter honesty–a kind of leaning over backwards….", as Feynman would say. So I think your point about colonialism is pretty important. It isn't just used against indigenous people; the idea you need to be "rational", and that your ideas should follow from "objective' evidence in an ordered manner, is also used against feminists, queer and trans people, neurodivergent people, and even anarchists and communists. Of course, it's also used against religious fundamentalists and conspiracy theorists. I think, though, that conspiracy theorists are in a different group than activists, epistemically. Unless you're talking about radical feminist conspiracy theories or something, I guess. Because conspiracy theories aren't rational, ever, but a lot of the philosophy behind modern activism, like James Baldwin and Judith Butler, is. Something Feyerabend is stepping over is that rationality still underpins the development of new ideas, even if it isn't absolute. Doesn't he describe how Copernicus operated primarily as a mathematician in his astronomy? And Maestlin proceeded against his own preferences due to what rationality led him, based on the evidence he (thought) he was seeing. Even Galileo made an attempt at rational and rhetorical justification for his ideas, without which his scientific revolution might not have happened. I'm getting less the impression that Feyerabend is meaning to throw rationality out, and more that he's sort of mapping out the nature of human thought. It seems like there's an "irrational side" to rational thinking, in the first place, and that any methodology of rationality would necessitate an acknowledgement of that. He's condemning rationality that pretends it is "pure" by being rid of tainted irrationality, as that purity only serves to alienate the human condition, and reinforce oppression.

Nathaniel Bookout

“Rather than being an interpreter, the scientist who embraces a new paradigm is like the man wearing inverted glasses.... Paradigms are not corrigible by normal science at all... And these [’anomalies and crises’ that show up within the current paradigm] are terminated, not by deliberation and interpretation, but by a relatively sudden and unstructured event like the gestalt switch. Scientists then often speak of the... ‘lightning flash’ that ‘inundates’ a previously obscure puzzle, enabling its components to be seen in a new way... No ordinary sense of the term ‘interpretation’ fits these flashes of intuition through which a new paradigm is born.” (Kuhn, "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions") I have a challenge for Feyerabend. Maybe the idea won't hold up, but I think it's worth mentioning. At the very end of Ch. 14, he mentions Kuhn's "theory of crisis". He argues "empirically there was no crisis, and no crisis was resolved." I think it's fair to say Kuhn is talking specifically about an empirical crisis here, but my question is, can we save Kuhn if we modify it? If Feyerabend's thesis is that no method of rationality could adequately capture the nuances of human thought, rational and irrational both, then couldn't we just take a step back and create a method of "methodology" or something, instead? A theory of theorizing. I know that sounds kinda abstract and silly. But when I think about what Kuhn means when he says "anomalies and crises", my mind doesn't immediately jump to just empirical situations. Perhaps because so much of what's considered "empirical" is muddied these days (like how financial firms are considered their own controls in economics data), I don't know. But the kinds of "crises" I imagine are much broader and more impactful than simply a blurb in the data: the impacts of colonialism, capitalism, and patriarchy, for example. I kinda agree with Dr. Fatima that these things aren't just morally icky, they're bad for science. And, if that is true, couldn't the existence of things like oppression signify a need for a new, revolutionary science? Could we have a philosophy of science, and a theory of knowledge, that's tied into a philosophy of liberation, and a theory of change?

Zachery Sanders

I think I mention this before, but in my house growing up, the branch of psychology that deals with therapy was vehemently dismissive by both of my parents. In particular my dad. I think, in large part because in his mind it went "against method". As a self described "biological psychologist", he experimented on rats, stuck electrodes in their brains and made slides out of their extracted brains. "Operational definitions", and "repeatability", and independent review were like mantras in my house. Undoubtedly he was a huge factor in my inability to seek therapy because it was "too touchy feely" and not rigorous enough. Obviously there are methods and the phrase I copied below I assume is an example. I'm interested and would like to learn more about this phrase "second-wave Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy" - do you have any resources related to this?

AlexTheTutor

"For it is not possible that science as we know it today, or a ‘search for the truth’ in the style of traditional philosophy, will create a monster?" Feyerabend When reading this, I let my thoughts wonder, as if I am writing part of a novel... ...The scientist describes love as a result of electrical signals and chemical reactions. The poet (armed with humanities) attempts to express love and its feeling with a certain permutation of words on a page for us to speak with a human voice. The scientist tries to replicate the poet’s findings but concludes no such feelings were found. Over time, the scientific method (found to be more practical in generating money) crushes the spirit of the humanities and its ability to nurture curiosity and empathy, and so AI is free to (for example) to replicate you and your mannerisms for others to converse with well enough to pass the Turing test. The poet in defeat still proclaims that if we are not to consider why we create, how to create, or what should be created, then we will be drowned by desire and suffocated by loneliness. Unfortunately for the poet, negative results rarely receive publication, and such concerns were lost to an era fixated on screens...

Zachery Sanders

I find something terrifying in the idea of being against method. In my life, I’ve struggled to make some kind of meaning or order out of a seemingly constant chaotic barge of information. While reading these chapters this week, I kept telling myself I was going to dismount from my hobbyhorse(s) and focus on science. But my mind kept sparking fragments of books I’d read like: Why Althusser Killed his Wife by Geraldine Finn. Finn writes that reason is about order and law and that it is always defined by what is not (examples given are faith, emotion, personal, etc.). She writes, “Reason is always exclusive and authoritarian, polarizing and law-making. It always has its Other over which it is sovereign, which it is entitled to control or destroy as circumstances demand. This is why I believe Reason to be constitutively violent”. Or Minima Moralia by Theodore Adorno who while writing about melancholy seemed to equally be writing about any system of representation or knowledge. “All contemplation can do no more than patiently trace the ambiguity of melancholy in ever new configurations. Truth is inseparable from the illusory belief that from the figures of the unreal one day, in spite of all, real deliverance will come”. And Zen Mind Beginner’s Mind by Shunryu Suzuki who as an zen “expert” advocates the beginner’s mind starting his book with, “In the beginner’s mind there are many possibilities; in the expert’s mind there are a few.” All these things came up, and I felt a little sheepish. But then Feyerabend writes about ‘human interests and, above all, the question of human freedom” (156.) I felt vindicated in my thoughts….. As if I needed some reason and reassurance about the exploration of my own mind. It’s crazy how deep this training indoctrination can go. ——— I had a confused moment of memory about Feyerabend distinction between political “anarchy” and anarchy science. Did I know this because of the prologue, Dr. Fatima, another person’s comment, a fabrication of my mind, or a combination? There is an academic process to address this kind of confusion. It makes sense to create agreed upon orders and rules. In some ways, it doesn’t matter. The old diehard literary theory post-structuralist in me says the text includes many supportable interpretations (even it’s own negation) and many different authors). I think though for me, the problem with pushing this too far becomes the issue of infinite play, endless digression, and constant negations. That play may be good in some situations and lead to developments and break throughs. But it can also lead endlessly no where or to worse places. This “play”, “overthrowing”, “anarchy” or “constant revolution” has had a tremendous impact on some of my family living outside the U.S. I find myself then oscillating between these two poles, distrusting that my interpretations and systems may be faulty, rigid, upholding some corrupt system on the one side or on the other too fluid, too chaotic, too privileged in play to have useful impact in reality. All of this made me think of unicorns. I used unicorns a lot in my teaching, and I dug up something I wrote to my students at the end of the year. Here’s a condensed part of that: There are two forms of reading that I am opposed to; one is inherently limiting (search for the author’s / text’s intended true meaning), the other entirely too discretionary (no wrong interpretations). It is to this last idea that I have most frequently rode my unicorn, to the rescue! With ‘no wrong interpretations’ we should all be frolicking gaily about in rainbow fields on our trusted unicorn steeds (My unicorn is probably named Nosotros). But, in the first instance, the unicorn is just as useful, liberating us (we?) from the constraints of boundaries entirely too exacting. Guildenstern, in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead, as a thought experiment relates the phenomenon of a unicorn crossing a man’s path, noting that a single person’s experience can be written off for various reasons, but witnesses add a dimension that adds an aspect of truth (the common experience) until the crowd recites an interpretation of the scene that reveals their individual and social biases and instead of the truth, see “a horse with an arrow in it’s forehead, It must have been mistaken for a deer!”. We are all trapped in paradigm. I have used the unicorn for many reasons, but primary among them, is to be aware of the interpretations we all ride. What does your unicorn look like? Have you mistaken it for a deer, or a horse with an arrow in its forehead? —————- I’m still unsure where or how to draw the line. But it still seems important to trace some kind of line. I’m stopping now with another quote from Bumblebee Economics by Bernd Heinrich: “Once, while I was pulling the abdomens off bees picked from flowers, a stranger in overalls and suspenders demanded: "What in the hell are you doing?" "Killing bumblebees," I replied. "Oh," he paused, "for a minute there I thought you were one of them damn biologists; they'll do almost anything." Back in Berkeley one of my academic colleagues asked me the same question, leaving the expletive unspoken. I told him that I was studying foraging behavior. To this he said, "Oh-you mean you want to find out if they go to where there is more nectar?" Of course there is considerable truth in both assertions. But the first is possibly a slight exaggeration, while the second is definitely a flagrant oversimplification.”

Zachery Sanders

Very nice. Thanks for sharing that. My mind was struck by that line too- it went to Frankenstein.

phil e the theyby

Goddd this was so good! I love how you write. Thanks for sharing!

AJ Biffl

I'm not sure I'm interpreting you right, but it sounds to me like you've walked back around to Feyerabend's position. A "theory of change" and a "theory of theorizing" made concrete is a systematic manner of assessing and recycling and permuting particular methodologies. That's the 'anything goes' position - not a particular proscription, "always anything goes," but a flexibility - "sometimes that method, sometimes that method, never always this method."

AJ Biffl

I think stepping aside of the question of the *intention* of Popper's critical rationalism, you're absolutely right about the parallel to colonialism. The strategies used to justify the destruction of the old and the domination by the new after the fact are universal

AJ Biffl

This is a question that someone brought up in the midpoint discussion google doc, of whether or not rationality really does only reinforce existing power structures, and I think Feyerabend addresses that in Ch 15 when he points out that the "normal" course of rational science posits an existing *expectation*, which I think is indeed fundamentally tied to existing structures of knowledge, ideology, etc. Rationalism lives inside a house. Rational expectations come from the same foundations as that rationalism, and the productive output of that rationalism contributes to the structure of that house.