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Apologies for the late post—between some traveling and the extra long chapter I misjudged the time I’d need, and wow was this reading dense!
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Chapter 16 - Finally, the kind of comparison that underlies most methodologies is possible only in some rather simple cases. It breaks down when we try to compare non-scientific views with science or when we consider the most advanced, most general and therefore most mythological parts of science itself

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As interesting as the whole discussion of greek art/poetry was as an analogy to the shift between scientific cosmologies was, the part I’m interested in thinking more about was this passage from the introduction:

“One must remember those cases where science, left to itself, committed grievous blunders, and one must not forget the instances when political interference did improve the situation.  Such a balanced presentation of the evidence may even convince us that this time is overdue for adding the separation of state and science to the by now quite customary separation of state and church.  Science is only one of the many instruments people invented to cope with their surroundings.  It is not the only one, it is not infallible, and it has become too powerful, too pushy, and too dangerous to be left on its own.” (Pg 164)

First I do take a little issue with his premise here—I don’t know that I think ‘science left to itself’ exists.  When he talks about grievous blunders, I think about things like the creation of nuclear weapons. Some people will act like this was just an inevitable development in the progress of physics, but (and I have a whole video idea about this) there was no atomic bomb without a government that wanted to use it, provided the resources to make it, and incentivized scientists to work on it. Meaning this was not ‘science left to itself’. I’m wondering if there’s some better example of what he means that I’m missing, so if anyone can think of something I’d love to hear it, but I just can't even conceive of a ‘science left to itself’ to begin with.

All that aside, I am intrigued by the idea of separation of science and state. I certainly like the idea of a government not motivating its scientists with military aspirations and whatnot, but I also wonder how it would actually work. If not the government, who pays for science? Feyerabend seemed to speak very highly of patronage as a mode of funding science in an earlier chapter, but what would the modern equivalent of that look like? An idealistic answer might be something like patreon (it is a direct reference to patronage after all), but what I feel like it would actually end up being is like a venture-capitalist approach to science where it’s just billionaires instead of governments that push scientists to do whatever is useful for them. I mean I guess that's already happening to some degree with space exploration in the US being mostly privatized at this point. At this point it’s just hard to imagine developments in phyiscs/astornomy that don’t require obscene amounts of money, and bc capitalism idk how to separate that from science committing more “grievous blunders”. Curious if anyone else has thoughts on this point—what would science divested from the government look like?

Comments

bhobba

As always, insightful.

AlexTheTutor

‘Science left to itself’ .. I’ll try to answer .. what do we know so far? 1) Feyerabend has been known to write for shock value 2) So, he often would express an extreme opinion, not because he fully believed in it, but because he wanted to give attention to an argument that he felt no one was considering 3) So, he must have felt that no one was considering the consequences if science were left to itself 4) And, (my personal opinion) given him being influenced by John Stuart Mill, Feyerabend feels compelled to give us a moral warning about science being left to itself (expressing a clear objective truth is not as important as providing a moral warning) 5) Also, the entire book is about him being against doing science with one and only one method 6) He also has been influenced by Wittgenstein, so it’s worth analyzing the expression ‘left to itself’ 6.1) If scientists are closed within an echo chamber, over time it would be natural to develop unchecked biases, resulting in lapses in ethical judgment. If we consider ‘science’ as a set of scientists, then all of these scientists left to themselves who ONLY apply the scientific method would do science with a LACK OF OVERSIGHT (science left to itself), and over time science could create technologies that would allow the general public to easily do improper and immoral actions. The fact that he wrote "political interference did improve the situation" gives support to the idea he is really saying "lack of (regulatory) oversight" when he writes about science being "left to itself" also also, it's possible to do science without governmental support, but it would definitely be limited in its scope, we can all lend our unused computing power to discover a new star or find a new prime number, we can do a lot of theoretical work and even develop a theory of quantum gravity or etc, but... being able to verify that theory or land a robot on a distant planet, uh... our leftover change won't cover for that, science has advanced too much to be able to grow further without BIG monetary support, without a healthy polity and enough citizens to support science, there's no way to fund further advances in science (regardless of the weight of tech companies within the economy), at some point, things would reach a plateau

Nathaniel Bookout

"This was overlooked by the Greeks, who started inquiring into the reasons for such 'dignified postures'.... Such a question 'might have struck an Egyptian artist as it would strike us if someone inquired about the age or mood of the king on a chessboard'." (180) This just made me think of this song: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S4ftRXG8T9k I think Dr. Fatima raises some interesting questions. I don't think it's enough for the "separation of science and state" to focus exclusively on political interference in science, it should also account for how capital drives science away from being grounded in empiricism and scientific method (look at what's happening with the world of software development, and "generative AI"). But how do you do that without direct government interference? What form of "political interference" in science would constitute a shift towards such a separation, that could also counter both political and capital interference in science? I understand concerns about funding, but there's ways of structuring policy to ensure a balanced contribution of viewpoints from diverse perspectives including scientists, policy makers, and the public, not just investors, without losing your foundational institutions that are fronting your capital. I think one of his most interesting points is about sociology and anthropology, from the main chapter. These are deliberately unscientific methods, in a way: they're more closely associated with literature, history, and the arts, as those are the mediums through which they're often done (hence his art history lesson). And I think this broader point about how unscientific methods, like the arts, can directly inform us about science and contribute to our understanding of science, is important to consider when you're looking at who should be at the table making science policy decisions.

AJ Biffl

Separating state from science is a really interesting question, because on the one hand I am absolutely behind lowering the overinflated social authority of science, opening the way for alternative methods of investigation, alternative curricula in schools, etc., But yeah the question of then who pays for science is hugely important - in the modern era the pursuit of science, and allocating resources for people to pursue it, is like a fundamental aspect of the social contract that an entire society sort of needs to agree that expanding our knowledge is an important thing and we want it to happen (see vid "why functioning governments fund scientific research" by Angela Collier in response to the recent... unpleasantness). Maybe we could balance that by saying we as a society (the state) should fund science AND other philosophical, ideological endeavors? Open many avenues of investigation? Promote lots of different ways of being and strategies for navigating the world? But then the question becomes which endeavors does the state fund and we arrive at, like, why doesn't the state just subsidize EVERYONE'S existence, and suddenly EVERYONE has free time to expand human knowledge, creativity, etc... ~~~~~ I had a lot of thoughts about these chapters. It took me about four times reading through chapter 16 before I felt I had a good sense of what was going on becase there's a LOT. This is also why it's taken me so long to finish AM, it took me several months to get through appendix 1-chapter 17. If I'd been reading concurrently with the book club I definitely would've been left behind here. In the interest of scrollability/collapsibility I'll put the takeaways I want to share in replies, in increasing order of hot air

AJ Biffl

So first, I loved this distinction in appendix 1 between "good general education" vs indoctrination or training, that "general education should prepare citizens to choose between the standards... but it must under no condition bend their minds so that they conform to the standards of one particular group" (pg 161). The difference between empowerment and indoctrination is CHOICE. The quality or merit of a particular tradition does not matter, it is still imperative that people be allowed to choose for themselves whether they follow it - and be allowed to change their minds later.

AJ Biffl

Another thing that stuck with me, from point 8 of "some comments which connect the preceding observations with the problems of scientific method" (pg 193) this position of logicians that the "main terms of discussion be 'clarified'" rings of an inability to sit in "I don't know" (a favorite phrasing of Hank Green). Rather than being comfortable with a nebulous, unclear concept, they take the terms of discussion and "fill them with existing notions from the entirely different domain of logic and common sense, preferably observational ideas, until they sound common themselves, and to take care that the process of filling obeys the accepted laws of logic... So the course of an investigation is deflected into the narrow channels of things already understood and the possibility of fundamental conceptual discovery (or of fundamental conceptual change) is considerably reduced." To counter that requires being comfortable with things being unclear for a bit, trying to "study the *additional* and as yet unknown properties of the domain in question which one needs to make them fully understood."

AJ Biffl

Next, I really appreciated how, as PF attacks the chauvinism of science, he explicitly says (end of appendix 1) that an attack on scientific chauvinism *would be good for science*. He does not desire a wholesale attack on science, only to get rid of the rotten structures and old ideas at its core. In my notes document I wrote down a quote from Teaching to Transgress here: "Some folks think that everyone who supports cultural diversity wants to replace one dictatorship of knowing with another, changing one set way of thinking for another. This is perhaps the gravest misperception of cultural diversity." Just because there is criticism doesn't mean there is destruction. This is also related to the discussion prompt for the last chapter set (14-15), how the Popperian monster and similar behaviors, in Fatima's words, "ALSO MAKE THE SCIENCE WORSE." Also related to a recent video from Hasan Piker, title something like "AOC's biggest weakness," where Hasan mentions that the reason he criticizes AOC is because he *wants her to succeed*. We criticize and we attack and we desire change because we think it can improve the situation. There is REASON for this analysis, it's not about total destruction. We criticize because we care. So much discourse online ignores this nuance.

AJ Biffl

Also, in the discussion of "cosmology A" vs "cosmology B" toward the end of chapter 16 (~pg 198), which was the transition from seeing reality as a list of properties or constituents or pieces (cosmos A) to the "conceptual totalitarianism" of an abstracted absolute Truth, a "true knowledge" accessible through logic (cosmos B), I thought it was very interesting that some aspects of cosmos B actually ring closer to what I think than cosmos A. On the whole I absolutely disagree with the "absolute truth" position in cosmos B, but the position of individual experience as subjective and as a perceptual modification to "reality" seems closer to the mark than the absolute reality supposedly experienced in cosmos A. It's interesting to me that a philosophical position that I disagree with actually describes parts of experience better than a position that I am neutral or even favorable toward (that reality is composed of its material constituents, cosmos A). I think what's happening is that cosmos B is deliberately more intricate (through the historical process that encourages philosophies to become more intricate over time, that we learn more how reductive truths are wrong and so require more and more convolutions to get an acceptably "true" answer), and so during the mental gymnastics of cosmology B to insist that "truth" still exists somewhere they acknowledge more of the nuance in the experience of base reality. I agree with that nuance, that experience is distorted by perception, but not the conclusion, that Truth has gone somewhere else.

AJ Biffl

Another thing that jumped out at me was during the analogy with anthropology (point 2 of "some comments which connect the preceding observations with the problems of scientific method," pg 188). The point was originally that there are similarities between an anthropologist seeking to understand the world-view of a new tribe and someone trying to understand a different cosmology - "[t]he procedure used for establishing the peculiarities of the archaic cosmology has much in common with the method of an anthropologist who examines the world-view of an association of tribes." But, I think you can also link this process in anthropology to scientific investigation itself, not just studying an old conception of cosmology but actively working on the "current" cosmology. They share the same tethers to conceptual (linguistic and cultural and logical) systems that the observer is familiar with. There's still this process of translating into a familir language ("linguistic interpretations" and "natural interpretations" from chapter 6). It's still an organic process of investigation and the gradual, chaotic building of a conceptual understanding. PF also makes an important point that when the anthropologist rephrases the ideas of the tribe's cosmology in English (or other Western language), it is an example of that old language being bent to (try to) encompass the new ideas - the ideas were not already contained in English or in the Western cosmology, but these languages are flexible enough to accommodate the new ideas and the new ideas become bent to their closest facsimile in the existing language. So too new ideas or observations in science get warped and pressed into some form within the existing cosmology. The fact a new idea can be expressed in terms of the old understanding is not evidence the new idea is contained or compatible with the old cosmos. Without an "external measure of comparison" (Ch 6) it is impossible to refute the translation into the new cosmology from inside that cosmology - you can always translate and bend the new ideas into the form of the old language.

AJ Biffl

The last thing I want to share was the result of a pretty extensive tirade I went on when reading chapter 15. Feyerabend actually addresses the topic in appendix 1. In chapter 15 (circa pg 151) PF describes Popper's critical rationalism and the "standards of criticism" employed by it - "rules, standards, restrictions which permit us to separate critical behaviour (thinking, singing, writing of plays) from other types of behaviour so that we can discover irrational actions and correct them with the help of concrete suggestions." This is a standard of judgement, so that a rationalist can weed out the low-quality or low-merit studies from their gaze. Now I agree with PF that such standards are false constructions, but I imagined trying to convince Popper or someone else in the scientific establishment of that. And I realized that you could never convince them to get rid of them completely - because *those standards are how they make the funding decisions*. If "anything goes," there's no metric to judge whether or not to fund or pursue any particular scientific question. In order to justify their position at all (here I pictured Popper on the board of some funding committee), they HAVE to continue believing that some studies are objectively good, and some are objectively bad, and they have the power to determine which is which. Power justifies the right to exercise itself. If there is to be a system for distributing funds to scientists seated in an institution that values objectivity and rationalism, there must be some "objective" and "rational" standard that allows that institution to exercise its influence (hand out checks). PF mentions this in the beginning of appendix 1, when he selects which papers to read - "it means that I make my selection in a highly individual and idiosyncratic way... Special problems arise with foundations that distribute money and want to do this in a just and reasonable way. Justice seems to demand that the allocation of funds be carried out on the basis of standards which do not change from one applicant to the next and which reflect the intellectual situation in the fields to be supported." This is a broad phenomenon. It's not just justification for the position of authority, but justification for the systematized manner that authority is exercised. The head justifies the hand. If there is a branch of government given guns and the jurisdiction to use force on its people, it will develop laws and protections to justify police shootings. If there is a military-industrial complex that can produce bombs, and a state apparatus that can sell those bombs to the highest bidder, and a violent global hegemony that can extract resources and political security through targeted violence, then people will distort their view of reality and dehumanize an entire population of people until they can justify building those bombs, selling them, and dropping them. There is no logic, there is only justification, and ANYTHING can be justified.