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so the choice to read this essay in particular was inspired by the many comments I got on my Galileo and Falsifiability videos about Popper's takes on marxism (which honestly with all hsi caveats at the start im still not totally sure what his feelings on it are?)

having gone from doing technical science research to social science research, I had a lot of thoughts about this essay BUT since I think this one was a lot more accessible than the last one, I'm not going to give a recap/thoughts to start and instead will engage in the comments some~

Comments

Ryan Messina

This essay has not dated well and my response to it is a lot more negative. I won’t go into details on his discussion of prediction (particularly its connection to signal reconstruction in information theory) and his account of open systems, which both were based on assumptions that now appear misguided. Given those starting points, I wouldn't blame him for the conclusions he reached. What I found problematic was his insistence that social science should remain humble. I read this use of “humility” as meaning a closeness to evidence, so arguably philosophy has less grounds than social science and his writing on philosophy is even more distant. I did not find his work to embody the very humility he demanded. I felt Popper’s biggest hurdle was in how talked about experimentation. He advocates for it, but not in a way that felt genuine to me. What he seems to mean is running theories in the closed space of a lab, available only to those within institutional science. He often blurs this line, as though the goal of science is simply to remain institutional. But when dealing with open systems, the relationship between field work, laboratories and modelling or simulation are not so neatly separated; these are artificial barriers put up by science after all. This tension between them makes his account feel limited. I don’t think Popper is entirely to blame for this. To me, this is evidence towards the scientific community and culture that placed him on a pedestal. This demonstrates how much culture shapes science, sometimes more than the ideas themselves. If physics bros were as good at philosophy as they think then they would engage seriously with social science, in the nuances and its complexity, instead retreating to the ivory tower and throwing stones from a safe distance. I felt Popper used philosophy as a tool to make unfalsifiable claims, while pretending that science (especially physics) was doing all the heavy lifting. In reality, the barrier between philosophy and science is artificial and not real. Apologies for having such a negative tone, but this one really did frustrate me. I did not think he came at this with a genuine intention and his motivation to push institutional science showed a true bias shaped by his position within that system and the incentives of funding. He did not have an unbiased perspective, and I felt he demonstrated that.

Jacques Vincelette

The first paragraph criticises social sciences through loaded terms 'doctrine', 'prophecy, 'relic', 'superstition'. Reducing science to the petri dish imposes limiting and artificial boundaries. Ironic how now 2020 vision blows boundaries apart in the special effects studio: Technologically Entertaining Design and the science of hype, advertisement, manipulation.

Jacques Vincelette

Section VII reducing historicity to 'conspiracy theory of society' punched me in the gut like Margaret Thatcher's "there is no society". Phenomenology carried a certain historicity for sure, certainly. After the black liberation, women's liberation, peace movement, Quebec's quiet revolution, LGBTQ2S+ pride, hippy folk, disco, hip hop, and Montreal protocol, the 1989 Toronto goal was torpedoed in Noordwijk for endless rounds of COP conferences. Whether weather by direct design or neglect of science, the denial of historicity serves dismissal of any accountability.

AJ Biffl

But is desire for accountability a reason to invent narratives of blame? Surely accountability can be found without an absolute map of history

AJ Biffl

I thought his takes on marxism were interesting - like on the one hand, he gets at one of my main issues with marxism which is that it expects too uniform a reaction to historical pressures, as opposed to the real results of historical evolution which "differ widely," but then on the other hand he seemed to paint marxism as just a villification of capitalists. My BIGGEST gripe with this chapter was the bit about how destroying the "institutional and traditional framework of a society" also somehow destroys the values present in that society. Like, values are cultural constructs that are carried and maintained by the people, not institutions. The example 'values' he gives of increasing freedom and reducing misery and violence are extremely non-central. He also says, "a set of values can have social significance only in so far as there exists a social tradition which upholds them," which is an extremely different thing than having institutionalized entrenchment. And so sure, some constructed value systems (like 'it is good for men to wear blue and women to wear pink') in the absence of centralized enforcement and perpetuation would fade, but stuff like 'freedom is good' definitely would not. All of his ideas seem to come from a place of 'let me tell you what to do,' and the bit about how after a revolution the people will "have returned to the beasts" was just gross.

Jacques Vincelette

Accountability opens a crack for agency as emancipation into service: grasping the power of choosing who you serve. Beyond blame, responsibility ripples proportionally to power. (Historicity gives us a chance to ride the wave or enjoy the reflective mirror when peace planes.)

phil e the theyby

I'm interested in how other peoples' perceptions of this differ from mine, because it largely felt like he was "arguing against really flimsy arguments." For Sections I - V, it felt like Popper was doing a fairly good job of dismantling what, to modern eyes, feels like a really bad argument (that THE purpose of social sciences is to predict historical developments); I have no way of knowing how accurate his perception of the argument is (Jacques comment suggests that, at least with regards to historicity, Popper might not have had an accurate perception; that said, Popper did give this address in 1948). If Popper's perception of the 1948 discourse around the social sciences is accurate, then sure, good job, Popper; you showed that argument is bad. But given how weak the argument he's refuting seems, it's hard to imagine that was the position folks actually held, unless the identity and purpose of the social sciences was really that young at the time. So then we get to Marxism. My interpretation is that he is more commenting on his perception of "Marxism as a political movement (as Popper understood it)" as opposed to "stuff Karl Marx actually said." Is his perception of Marxism as a political movement (in terms of its values and ideology) accurate as of 1948? I have no idea! :P Section X felt incredibly weak to me, where I felt like Popper was commenting on the abstract concept of a revolution as opposed to actually being grounded in any actual historical revolution. I read the following statement: "The theory of revolution overlooks the most important aspect of social life--that what we need is not so much good men as good institutions." (463) ...as deeply clueless. Like...the whole point of revolution, especially Marxist revolution, IS to replace the institutions, not just the men. I don't think Popper's discussion here is completely devoid of valuable and important points, and I actually would agree with him in statements such as the following: "The historicist revolution, like most intellectual revolutions, seems to have had little effect on the basically theistic and authoritarian structure of European thought." (465) Disclaimer: I know very little about the specifics of historicist revolution he's referring to here. But I will say that Popper's claims that European Marxist revolutionaries may have unknowingly held onto some of the same basic (authoritarian) structures of thought, in spite of their rhetoric to the contrary, definitely hold some truth to me (my sense is that Latin American Marxists generally did a better job dismantling those structures). The only critique I have is that *deep breath* Karl Marx LITERALLY WARNED ABOUT THAT EXACT THING. So on the Marxism part, it read like Popper didn't really know what he was talking about. But then again, he gave this address in 1948, so it's theoretically possible that his perspective was relatively informed for the time period (but given that a lot of what he's arguing for are things Karl Marx directly said, and that Marx died in 1883, I'm gonna say that Popper probably just didn't know what he was talking about). I'm sure that, given the information he had and the discussions he was exposed to, Popper felt his takes were novel and meaningful responses to the world around him. But as I'm reading it, I think he probably would have benefitted from a bit more humility: from educating himself on these movements and their actual practice, and from assuming that they MIGHT have had greater insights that what Popper interpreted based on his experience. Maybe if he had, he could have developed more meaningful critiques (because there absolutely were meaningful critiques to be had; response to critique and shortcomings are a big part of why Marxism or any political ideology develops and changes over time). But in this case, Popper's relationship to Marxism feels more like a tech CEO who's convinced that he could have done physics and actually, even though he's never actually studied it, he has some really GREAT ideas that could revolutionize the field if he really put the time into them. But let's see what you have to say about PUBLIC OPINION AND LIBERAL PRINCIPLES, Karly P! :P EDIT: idk if Dr. Fatima cares about this (and hopefully she doesn’t), but I can imagine feeling self-conscious if I picked a book/chapter/whatever for discussion and people were largely critical of it. So I just wanted to explicitly say that I think it’s GOOD to read things I don’t agree with or am critical of in some way, especially when they’re by folks who are as influential as Popper. It makes us more grounded in our beliefs when we engage thoughtfully, openly, and critically with people who view(ed) or approach(ed) the world differently than we do. So even when I’m critical of him, I’m personally really glad we’re reading Popper.

AJ Biffl

But then talk about power, not laws of history

Reading Point

1+1 hydrated brain sides is antigenocidal physics where writing includes c=√(Energy/mass) and one man's "everything" is his 1+1 reading/writing handedness on the Sun's. Earth now; ✌🏽@grok words = "stop genocide" in Kinyarwanda where 1+1=O2

Ryan Messina

This is a good pick up about what actually was it like in 1948. He mentions earlier in the book that his ideas started in 1915. So taking this as his opinions at a particular point in time on a topic rather than what is true or accurate.

Ryan Messina

This was definitely a traumatic read for some parts, I can resonate a lot. I had to have a few very large chats with chatgpt to try and help me process them. Now chatgpt defended a lot of the initial claims made by Karl and was very uncritical but not until I introduced power and how it functions did it side straight away.

Ryan Messina

I think this is spot on. It is exactly what I was feeling when he was saying this stuff.

Nathaniel Bookout

"But I will say that Popper's claims that European Marxist revolutionaries may have unknowingly held onto some of the same basic (authoritarian) structures of thought... definitely hold some truth to me.... Karl Marx LITERALLY WARNED ABOUT THAT EXACT THING. " Did he? I'm not doubting you, just curious exactly what it was he warned about. Did he talk about gender oppression? Race? Colonialism? I always had the impression he mainly cared about capitalism. Or I could be misunderstanding you.

Nathaniel Bookout

I kinda agree with your interpretation of the section about cultural institutions. I don't think that Popper gives enough credit to the ways cultural ideas communicate--you don't always need specific institutions to build a movement around an idea or creed, if people can wrap their heads around that idea. And I think that his emphasis on needing to have physical, tangible reasons to justify anything may be biasing him towards wanting physical, tangible institutions. They are also tied down by that physicality in a way the larger movement built on ideas is not.

Nathaniel Bookout

I can already see one of the biggest glaring issues with Marxism (at least as Popper understands it) is the premise of Social Darwinism. Or what feels like it to me, at least. I know that Social Darwinism is not exactly the same thing as the historicism he’s describing (it could be a subcategory of it, but I think he’s describing a bigger idea than that). It’s just easier for me to understand what he’s saying in terms of Social Darwinism. That’s exactly what “predicting revolutions” feels like: “the view that the story of mankind has a plot, and that if we can succeed in unravelling this plot, we shall hold the key to the future.” (338) It could be what I’m calling Social Darwinism is one of the underlying ideas intrinsic to historicism Popper is criticizing in general (that applies beyond just Marx). Specifically, I’m talking about the idea that human nature, and therefore human societies, can follow an objective, observable, natural pattern akin to the pattern detected by Darwin when he conjectured about Natural Selection. Of course, on some level this idea underpins a lot of the “soft” sciences, like economics (which seems like it should be one of the other “historicisms” Popper doesn’t like but idk). But there are many other “soft” sciences that have made it a point to attack this idea in particular, and I think with good reason. Like sociology, where it’s well-established practice to not pretend as if your data is objective about anything in human nature, and to even go so far as to lay out your own biases as explicitly as possible, embracing the fact that you cannot study this field objectively. “Accordingly, the belief in the empirical existence of social wholes or collectives, which may be described as naive collectivism, has to be replaced by the demand that social phenomena, including collectives, should be analysed in terms of individuals and their actions and relations.” (340-341) I’m not a sociologist but I think that many of them would agree with this statement. And I certainly think it’s true that much of the work in sociology (which is about documenting systemic problems in society like injustice) is directly about dismantling the “myth of society” as solely governed by intentional wills. “These considerations hold not only for the evolution of man, but also for the evolution of life in general. There exists no law of evolution, only the historical fact that plants and animals change, or more precisely, that they have changed. The idea of a law which determines the direction and the character of evolution is a typical nineteenth-century mistake, arising out of the general tendency to ascribe to the ‘Natural Law' the functions traditionally ascribed to God.” (339-340) He talks about Darwinism here, kinda saying something similar to what I am. I think what he says about natural evolution is interesting too. I’m not clear where we’re at in the world of biology today, but I remember that the idea “evolution is a forward moving arrow” is problematic, in a lot of scientists’ opinions. If I’m not mistaken, though, this idea is having a bit of a comeback. “The view that it is the task of the theoretical sciences to discover the unintended consequences of our actions” feels insufficient to me. (342) It makes sense given Popper’s position about wanting verifiable, tangible hypotheses in science, and “the unintended consequences of our actions” is certainly tangible, in some ways, at least. But I think I’m more personally inclined towards Feyerabend’s idea that metaphysics for its own sake can also be useful as science (I don’t know where I sit on saying whether or not metaphysical statements are scientific, but I think it’s an important part of scientific method). To me, as much of the social sciences are about the intangible as well as the tangible–that is what truly makes them social sciences. The emphasis on human subjectivity in sociology is a great example. And, in my opinion, the goal of removing “the intangible” from the sciences is indistinguishable from the goal of eradicating metaphysics, which Popper was so critical of in the previous essay. “But the sequence God--Nature--History, and the sequence of the corresponding secularized religions, does not end here. The historicist discovery that all standards are after all only historical facts (in God, standards and facts are one) leads to the deification of Facts--of existing or actual Facts of human life and behaviour (including, I am afraid, merely alleged Facts)--and thus to the secularized religions of existentialism, positivism, and behaviourism. Since human behaviour includes verbal behaviour, we are led still further to the deification of the Facts of Language. Appeal to the logical and moral authority of these Facts (or alleged Facts) is, it would seem, the ultimate wisdom of philosophy in our time.” (346) This is something I’ve been feeling very strongly about what is happening in our culture today: there is a gap between truth and reality. We are obsessed with our ideas of the truth, captivated by our own illusions of the facts. Two things in particular give me the sense that there’s been a paradigm shift in modern life towards the idea that truth is unreal: 1) Donald Trump’s “philosophy”, for what it’s worth, that anything he says is true, is. And 2) AI psychosis. If I may be so bold as to speak prophetically (poor Popper’s probably turning in his grave): a great portal to hell has opened, and the demons flying forth from those fiery depths are all of Carl Sagan’s worst nightmares: anti-vax, gender critical, and climate denying “science”; in other words despotic, exploitative, and pseudoscientific “science”. “But I am convinced that these aims cannot be realized by revolutionary methods. On the contrary, I am convinced that revolutionary methods can only make things worse--that they will increase unnecessary suffering; that they will lead to more and more violence; and that they must destroy freedom…. For a revolution is liable to replace old masters by new ones, and who guarantees that the new ones will be better? ” (343-344) Popper has completely stepped out of scientific philosophy, here, and now he’s straight up just musing about human nature. This part especially reminds me of Einstein’s essay on Socialism: “It is on this that those who are striving to improve the lot of man may ground their hopes: human beings are not condemned, because of their biological constitution, to annihilate each other or to be at the mercy of a cruel, self-inflicted fate.” I’ve been especially obsessed with this idea both Popper and Einstein articulated for a very long time. I’d put it more like “Machiavelli was wrong,” just because that’s my primary context for political philosophy (you could maybe also say something like “Machiavelli was misunderstood”). I’ve already rambled a whole bunch, though, and I could go on and on about this, so I’ll just say one other thing relevant to everything else instead: the idea of human nature itself is intangible. So is any speculation about it, whether you believe that humans must always kill or be killed, or that power has many other forms besides just violence. Speaking of “Vulgar Marxism”, I was reminded of this quote: "The vulgar Marxist critic of culture, in failing to see the ultimate unity of culture and politics, refuses to see the ways in which the culture of the working class... often embodies the values of the bourgeoisie, values which may be sexist, racist, or otherwise harmful.... Thus, any discussion of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' should reasonably include a discussion of these contradictions, but due to the vulgar Marxist's narrow view of culture, such discussions are avoided.... It is only when analysis is applied dogmatically by a given power structure that censorship and cultural fascism result." (Allen Young)

Donald A. Fowler

I’m apprehensive to talk about this. One thing that I feel is that Popper does not really care to do much other than meet Marxism at its most vulgar and general. Which is primed to create straw men. I know that ‘science’ and ‘scientific’ in Marxist ideology has its own meaning which I feel comes out of the Hegelian methods and processes that Marx & Engels was developing upon. Having tried to go into a book about ‘scientific methods’ in marxist theory, I quickly realized that what they meant was something much more specific and philosophical than what a taxonomist, geologist, or astronomer does to figure out our shared reality. I get a sense that to some really intellectual Marxists it becomes so encompassing that having this baroque method of thinking becomes what defines the science-y-ness of any intellectual pursuit. Which, 1) I disagree with and 2) in my experience with scientists of all stripes, is not true. As a PhD in biology, I was never assigned Hegel or Marx to better comport my thinking, and though I’m not a full on hegelian/marxist philosopher, I’m pretty sure that despite Hegel/Marx’s wide impact on many studies it had a smaller one on embryology and evolution. If you read my last critique, I would put Popper’s own philosophical attempts towards a ‘science’ to be far too interested in a self-centered baroque thinking of science from ‘first principals’ to the detriment of a curiosity about how science actually is. I find the whole thing about evolutionary biology to be pretty superficial. Popper seems to think that there isn’t a lot of space between ‘life is random and unpredictable’ and a kind of anthropocentric determinism of ‘life leads to people who are perfection,’ and so takes the former over the latter. In doing so, he almost takes kind of a random walk approach to the movements of society as well. I think there is a big space between these two. Though life is not determined to create people or something like that, evolution is constrained. In fact it is through constraint and the traits it leaves behind that we are able to understand evolution at all. Otherwise a beaver can just evolve into a duck, and then into a grasshopper, then back into a beaver (as I roughly paraphrase Cuvier, an old zoologist critique of early-evolution of the 18th-19th century). Constraint can be understood by understanding how an organism is constructed and how it lives in its environment. Constraint is why vertebrates don’t have a third pair of limbs despite plenty of variation and novelty found in two, one, or none. Constraint is why we can confidently say that all vertebrates share a common ancestor, instead of all animals just hopping between different organisms. Constraint also shows up in a kind of tempo of change, which is constrained by the generation time of an organism. Similar to biology, societies have these traits. They are constrained by how they are made up, kind of ‘environmental’ factors, and the conditions that the systems produce. There is a lot to understand through sociology and history. This makeup creates really important constraints on what we expect changes, or the resistance to changes. It too also has a tempo, we don’t wait 5 minutes for everyone to have massively different politics or outlooks on society, yet we can’t look 1000 years back and find everything to be the same. Though these may seem kind of intuitively silly, in certain conceivable constraint-less ‘random-walk’ worlds these predictions wouldn’t be all that crazy. And I would take Marxism as one of those constraints, despite not being able to predict revolutions like clockwork. Marxism and its emphasis on class analysis, has inspired much of sociology and framed the thinking around class, and its common current measure income/wealth level. I’m not a historian, but for example, I find it hard to believe that studies on how so many educational outcomes depend on social/economic factors do not have their roots in a practice of sociology influenced by Marx. Even if the current practitioners never have to read him directly. And that educational outcomes DO depend so much on social/economic factors is a certain confirmation of a Marxist notion that focus on class and class/related indicators is indeed an important lens to view society. Finally, there is Popper’s requirement of prediction that really sticks to me. It is like coming upon a craps table and trying to understand the game, and, once finding that the dice rolls are random therefore impossible to accurately predict, then there is nothing else to understand in the game. In doing so, the game of craps becomes indistinguishable from blackjack for example. Yet there are ways to more fully understand both craps and blackjack despite your inability to predict every roll or draw. Now it might be something in some discussion about probability that we haven’t read, but it seems to me that whenever Popper finds an occurrence of randomness, and therefore a failure of prediction, it becomes an invitation to stop thinking and collapse all insight into that single fact. Instead, randomness can be thought about usefully. It is something that has features and shape, just as a pair of dice is different from a deck of cards, and the random outcomes they produce are similarly different. Also I’m really glad I read this and had Dr. Fatima put this into the book club. I wouldn’t have thought these thoughts and that is pretty nice.

Dr. Fatima

the question "Is his perception of Marxism as a political movement (in terms of its values and ideology) accurate as of 1948?" is an interesting one, because I actually can see the utility of engaging with the popular version of how people engage with an idea rather than the true-to-the-text version. the video i made about popper, coincidentally, did that---I wasn't engaging with the idea as popper talked about it (which I knew at the time but was even more apparent after our reading his demarcation essay the other week), but rather how I see/hear people talk about it. given that, I can see a world where popper's critique of "marxism" makes a lot of sense, i just don't know enough about popular expressions of marxism from the 40s to really say. also, given how I've discussed popper in the last few videos, i anticipated people would be critical of him, so I'm definitely not taking it personally or anything. like you noted, there's more to get from reading an influential text than agreeing with it

Dr. Fatima

interesting comparison between popper and einstein both treading into discussions of human nature---it makes sense to me that it came up for both of them when talking about how humans organize themselves. i'm curious though what you see their perspectives having in common? to me it seems like eisntein was expressing faith in the fundamental goodness of human nature, while popper was saying there's no way we can count on human nature to be good, but maybe I just don't know Machiavelli enough to see the contrast your drawing

Dr. Fatima

the straw man critique is potentially fair but idk if I'd take it as true out of hand---phil brought up some interesting questions in a comment below about the context popper was reacting to, might be worth digging into some

Nathaniel Bookout

I do think there's a pretty significant difference between their views, to be fair. Popper referenced Einstein earlier in the other chapter as "pro-metaphysics", which is pretty substantially different from most of the other thinkers he references (including Popper himself). And, just personally from how I understand the history of these ideas, it makes a lot of sense to me why someone who might be a proponent of metaphysics might also be more skeptical of the Hobbesian take on human nature. As I understand it, Machiavelli works on several layers of interpretation. 1) Machiavelli said “it’s better to be feared than loved”, which is the mundane understanding of Machiavellianism. This perspective is always incorrect, to my knowledge, from the perspective of political scientists regardless of their actual political views or view of human nature. That is not what he said. 2) “It’s best to be both feared and loved” is what he actually said. This is the obvious perspective to take with “The Prince” which positions itself as a sort of manual for how to be the perfect autocrat. For example, Moses came down from the mountain with his 10 commandments and then ordered the destruction of all the non-believers: he was feared because he brought the word of God, which was to be feared, and he was also loved for bringing the word of God (this is an actual example Machiavelli uses). 3) Machiavelli wrote a lot more extensively beyond just “The Prince”, and between “The Prince” and his other works (Discourses on Livy is one example I’ve heard of), you can extrapolate the genesis and history of contemporary liberalism. What he really did was map out power, which anyone who was literate could use whether they wore a crown or not. This is the perspective I was taught in a handful of undergrad courses on Poli Sci, so definitely take my limited education with a grain of salt. But my understanding is that positioning Machiavelli as a progenitor of liberalism–as espoused by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Thomas Jefferson centuries later–is a generally well-accepted view in the field of political science. It’s from Machiavelli that we derived the 2nd Amendment: because, under Machiavellianism, the threat of violence is both the autocrat’s greatest tool, and their greatest weakness. Personally (and I’m not involved with any institutions, so this is my view but has no real academic merit to back it up as far as I’m aware of) I’ve come to the belief that Machiavellianism is part and parcel with white supremacy and colonialism, as with the institution of liberalism itself. And this is what leads me to believe that someone who is a proponent of metaphysics might be more of a fan of this idea (“that Machiavelli was wrong”), because for better or worse, the impact of the attack on metaphysics has always been the destruction of indigenous cultures and ideas which might have very different understandings of human nature (than a white supremacist would). Why I say that “maybe Machiavelli was misunderstood”, however, is because of how you could interpret his works as “mapping the nature of power”. It’s certainly true he believed human nature was inherently violent, and that violence was equivalent to power, as would later become enshrined in American democracy. But you could also argue that you can see the power available in other forms of praxis beyond political violence through interrogating the assumptions of Machiavellianism, and perhaps even in Machiavelli’s own words themselves. My fundamental belief that political violence is always a mistake, and that there is a more powerful source for power in nonviolence through love and solidarity, is rooted in queer feminism, so there’s certainly a lot more than just Machiavelli I’m thinking about here to be clear. One of the most crucial elements to queer feminism is the abolition of hierarchy and the emphasis on intersectionality, particularly in this case uplifting the views of non-white supremacist cultures. I see that practice as not only one of political praxis, but theory of knowledge as well, practicing the idea that white people do not know all the answers simply because they can be “objective” and “rational”. And while I wouldn’t say Einstein was a “queer feminist”, I think that ultimately he held the same basic view. (Edit: just wanted to clarify I'm deriving the idea Machiavelli is colonial from the idea that liberalism itself is colonial, which is pretty well-established in many fields. I just don't know anything specifically about Machiavelli being labeled a colonialist, though I imagine there probably is a lot about that too.)

phil e the theyby

@Nathaniel, the specific point I was referring to was that those who overthrow capitalism are at risk of recreating its fundamental problems and assumptions if they aren’t thorough and dismantling those assumptions. My perception of this was, I believe, from reading Pedagogy of the Oppressed and Freire referring to the fact that Marx said that. I have a strong memory of reading that and being like “wow, how prescient!” In searching the text (using Ctrl+F) of Pedagogy of the Oppressed, as well as searching Google with whatever guesses at keywords I could come up with, I can find no evidence that Freire or Marx ever said this. So either I’m bad at searching, or I’ve completely fabricated this memory. I’ll leave my potential misinformation for historical record and feel dumb about saying something with my whole chest and apparently being TOTALLY wrong, hahahaaaa. @Dr. Fatima I do find it really interesting to engage with the popular version of an idea rather than/in addition to the text itself. I’m actually reading the New Testament right now to understand what (according to it) Jesus ACTUALLY said/did, and how that compares to different popular narratives, as well as how different interpretations of the Bible are shaped by social and political forces. Ok cool! I figured you probably anticipated the response, just wanted to be explicit in my appreciation for reading this (and all of these books) even when I disagree with them, and the hope that’s a value that’s broadly shared among folks here 🙂