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[Pictured: Nyack Marina, just North upriver of Manhattan]

This is a discussion thread to post quotes and feelings and thoughts on the second part of Lila: An Inquiry Into Morals.

Phaedrus makes incredible headway on his formal Metaphysics of Quality, whilst also being confronted with Lila's dark backstory and passionate nature.

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I'm going to break form a bit here. Instead of posting quotes without commentary, I will restate the 4-tiered Metaphysics of Quality in my own words.

The reason I'm doing this is because these ideas are not introduced linearly or clearly at all, in my experience and the experience of others I have seen discuss this. He starts casually using terms like "inorganic patterns" and "socio-intellectual patterns" and then proceeds as though this has all been stated very clearly and concisely, as opposed to buried in the middle of many paragraphs.

So: This is, to my understanding, a faithful summary.

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Reality consists of 4 static layers of value, each layer giving birth to an entirely independent, new emergent kind of value. 

Dynamic Quality is the 5th layer that rules over all, always, forever and ever, amen.

The 4 static levels of quality are:

1. Inorganic value patterns (non-living things)

2. Biological value patterns (living things, defined by DNA)

3. Social value patterns (society, culture, institutions)

4. Intellectual value patterns (ideas)

and...

5. DYNAMIC QUALITY. The unknowable, endlessly definable and undefinable, intuitive, cutting edge of reality pre-intellectual sense of Quality that pulls everything forward towards it, usurping and inventing all Static patterns of Quality.

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On top of this, Pirsig radically proposes that understanding these emerging levels of static quality are also MORAL levels. As in, the higher the emergent layer of value, the more moral it is. It is immoral for lower levels to conquer higher levels.

After all, what's the difference between "more valuable", "better" and "right"?

"Just as it is more moral for a doctor to kill a germ than a patient, so it is more moral for an idea to kill a society than it is for a society to kill an idea." (p. 161)

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"As Phaedrus had gotten into them he had seen that the isolation of these static moral codes was important. They were really little moral empires all their own, as separate from one another as the static levels whose conflicts they resolved:

First, there were moral codes that established the supremacy of biological life over inanimate nature. Second, there were moral codes that established the supremacy of the social order over biological life conventional morals—proscriptions against drugs, murder, adultery, theft and the like. Third, there were moral codes that established the supremacy of the intellectual order over the social order—democracy, trial by jury, freedom of speech, freedom of the press. Finally there's a fourth Dynamic morality which isn't a code. He supposed you could call it a "Code of Art" or something like that, but art is usually thought of as such a frill that that title undercuts its importance. The morality of the brujo in Zuni—that was Dynamic morality." (p. 163)

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This is a theory that Pirsig/Phaedrus thinks explains reality and morality much better than a Subject/Object metaphysics or anything else out there. Maybe not perfectly, but better.

It was tempting to take all the moral conflicts of the world and, one by one, see how they fit this kind of analysis, but Phaedrus realized that if he started to get into that he would never finish. Wherever he looked, whatever examples came to mind, he always seemed to be able to lay them out within this framework, and the nature of the conflicts usually seemed to be clearer when he did so. (p. 161)

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Okay. That's my shot at elucidating the fundamental fabric of the web that was spun in the first half of this book. Haven't even touched the interpersonal stuff between Lila and Phaedrus, or either of their emo doomer internal monologues. 

I'm so looking forward to what others make of all of this.

I will be responding to almost all comments, in perpetuity, whenever you make your way to this checkpoint!

Now post your static intellectual thoughts and dynamic intuitive feelings below!

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Comments

BrEaNs

I took a break from reading this book to write/defend my thesis. I will probably not understand stuff correctly. I like Beck's statement that reading this book is like "BAM ZING POW holy SHIT" and then you turn around and try to explain it (or remember it) and it's so convoluted and weird. --- I love Dynamic v. Static Quality --- DQ/SQ slaps. It's the kind of thing you see everywhere once you hear about. I like that neither DQ or SQ can exist alone. A good song will turn into an annoyance after several back-to-back listens. A tribe can't survive without a (initially heretical) member energizing it. I like that even is DQ is above SQ, SQ isn't "evil." Phaedrus acknowledges that structure is important, but typically kind of stifling. It ties in pretty exactly to a description of science by Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn says that science works by having a common language and belief system that all scientists within a field use. These beliefs and language enable scientists to explore puzzles using the tools they have. However, eventually the problems with a given belief system grow too numerous (think Newtonian physics -> Einsteinian physics), so we move from "Normal Science" to "Revolutionary Science." Revolutionary science allows us to radically change everything about a field, but it's not sustainable. If people are to figure out small puzzles and agree on answers, we need some consensus. So we move from Revolutionary Science to Normal Science. The staticness of Normal Science cannot survive a dynamic reality, and the dynamicness of Revolutionary Science threatens to dissolve science into nothingness. (I mention this connection partially because Phaedrus said that "science values static patterns," which I considered half true). Descriptivism and prescriptivism also seem to somewhat parallel DQ and SQ, but I'll wait to (maybe) talk about that in the Authority and American Usage Bookclub. Also, I've been nerding out a lot for the past 1.5 years about AI and evolution, and Pirsiq has entirely rewiring how I think about these problems. I've been using DQ and SQ a lot to make my ideas more interpretable to myself. So thank you Pirsig, I guess. --- I have mixed feeling about Static Quality Levels--- At one level, the static levels of quality are good. At least, inorganic and biological are solid. The computer metaphor works quite well for inorganic and biological value. Life is on a whole 'nother plane than inorganic stuff, even if inorganic stuff comprises life. Once we get into social and intellectual, in becomes substantially less interpretable. This situation is not helped by Pirsig's failure to properly introduce these ideas and Phaedrus's blinding confidence in them ("[the levels] are exhaustive. that's all there are"). I want to understand this evolutionarily (because that's a strong predilection of mine), so it bothers me that social value is below intellectual value, even though ideas seemingly must emerge before social value patterns can exist. It makes since that humans can morally kill germs because they are at a higher level of evolution and that human style consciousness (and cat style consciousness for that matter) is at another level compared to mere biological value, so why not draw the line at consciousness (roughly equivalent to intellectual)? Why do we jump from biological quality to very human-centric ideas of social and intellectual quality? To explore this gap somewhat, I'm going to introduce a (in my opinion also flawed) level system for consciousness. Daniel Dennett explored this somewhat in Darwin's Dangerous idea. He delineates between Darwinian creatures (which exhibit no ability to make choices and merely propagate via the luck of the draw), Skinnerian creatures (which learn to choose what to do in a situation through past survival), Popperian creatures (which have an ability to imagine different outcomes and don't have to endure several near-deaths before learning), and Gregorian creatures (which can think about what they should think about to solve a problem and that can copy their peers without hands-on experience with something). Again, I think is not a perfect (or particularly clear) system, but it highlights the massive jump being biological quality and social/intellectual quality. We could say that wolves and stuff have social quality (they form packs) but not intellectual quality (they know jack shit about deontology); however, it's also fair to mention that many things alive today don't really have social quality in the same way we do, but have complex inner worlds. Octopi, for instance, are typically solitary animals, but they know how to use tools and are widely considered very intelligent species. It really seems like Inorganic, Biological, Conscious, Social, and then Intellectual is a more reasonable way of ordering static quality. IDK

Chandler Sterling

Alright, so I guess I'm speedrunning the Lila Book Club posts, huh. Didn't mean to read 7 chapters this soon, but what can I say? It seems to have hooked me. Hooray for a new split for Quality! Not sure how well I hammered it in during my ZMM posts, but the classical/romantic split didn't sit right with me. It was definitely useful, but it felt like the overlaps he allowed for were damaging to the idea that it was a "clean" split. Static and Dynamic Quality feels muuuuccchhh better in my brain. I'm honestly surprised he didn't sum it up as culture and counterculture, respectively (for Chapter 9 at least, I know it goes beyond just the cultural level later). That's where my mind was at with the whole brujo section. Maybe I've still got too much How To Do Nothing on the brain, I see the hippie communes everywhere. I would also like to take the briefest of moments to appreciate the religious moment Phaedrus has when selecting his division. "It was more as if *it* chose *him*" (pg. 125) I know that in his mind, this was almost certainly a moment of Dynamic Quality, but call it what you like, this was a spiritual moment of epiphany, and I'm glad it was included. I like the Comedy of Errors that our perspective shift to Lila starts with. Lila plans on going to Florida, so she pays someone to take her there, then when he betrays her, she jumps ship (literally) to someone who'll take her to New York. It's not ideal, but whatever, she likes New York, but oh? This guy is heading to Florida? Too bad he sucks though. It's pretty funny in a way that hides how contrived it might have felt otherwise. Another big win in my book is the way the writing style shifts when we change perspectives. Phaedrus is that distant, barely present "sad sack" we've come to know and... love? Depends on who you ask I suppose. Lila is so much more present, and it's very refreshing after all the philosophy talk. She has an uncanny ability to repeat key words or phrases she's thinking about upwards of 10 times in the course of a few sentences. That's how she stays anchored in places where Phaedrus just seems to float away. "'I can COOK. I just *love* to COOK. COOKing is one of my favorite things to do.'" (pg. 146) In her words, "there are so many worlds, and I just touch them and I'm in them for a moment and then I'm out of them again." (pg. 148) Phaedrus could NEVER be out of them again. They spend a lot of this section talking AT each other, and I am assuming that is trying to highlight some horseshoe theory of loneliness. Phaedrus is scared of being around people, and Lila is scared of being apart from people. Both of those fears stem from the same core need to be WITH someone. There is the dramatic irony of us realizing that they both think the other is stupid for acting how they do, but the main thing I think Pirsig is pointing out is that despite the surface level differences, these are two people who desperately want the same thing. They are spending too much time talking over each other instead of being the solution to the other's need for a companion. If I didn't know when this was written, I would say this is a great reflection on our currently hyper-polarized climate. Maybe that polarization is more Static than we like to think. (Bad Quality is a thing too, right?) As someone who has some experience as a programmer, I can attest to the fact that we still don't think much about the hardware. Even the people I know who dabbled in both fields aren't coding on some other level because of it. The hardware makes the software possible, but the details aren't necessary to make them do their thing. The novel in a word processor analogy was very apt, so I guess I'm just here to say, "What he said," but in the present. I think it was important that Phaedrus outlines early in Chapter 13 that, "What is today conventionally called 'morality' covers only one of these sets of moral codes, the social-biological code." (pg. 183) If anything I would've preferred a bit more emphasis on this point because the word "moral" carries a lot of weight and baggage. If this is going to be our operative word in so many places, it probably deserved more than a sentence to remind the reader that we are expanding that definition, not rewriting it. I think that's where I got held up the most when he starts talking about the morality of atoms. I like the personified atom for its romantic effect, but it doesn't feel like it holds water if we consider it to be "socially ethical". But that's not what he's saying, and honestly it took me writing this paragraph to fully conceptualize it. I like a lot about chapter 14. The process of getting the groceries sort of piling onto itself. It's never just the thing on the list, you've got to get this, and oh yeah, I should probably grab some of these. This looks nice too. Ooh, I haven't seen this in a while, might as well! Very real moment, but then again, I have been told I am not good at shopping for groceries. The intentional act of telling Phaedrus how hungry she is at every possible moment is great too. We finally have a Chris that he can't just tell to run off and play in the woods. The way she has to think of how many times she wore a funeral dress in order to come at it from a safer angle is also very real and true. Thinking about how many times you had to wear that outfit is a lot easier than thinking about why. That's all from me for now, I really gotta cut down on the length of some of these posts or something. Anyway, here's more quotes to add to the length of this post: "'What do you write about?'/'Traveling, mostly, I guess,'" (pg. 145) Aww, Phaedrus is shy about his Metaphysics of Quality. "Fittest for what? Fittest for survival? That reduces to 'survival of the survivors,' which doesn't say anything." (pg. 166) This is funny purely because of how frustrated I feel like this probably made some stuffy scientist somewhere. "First there were moral codes that established the supremacy of biological life over inanimate nature." (pg. 187) At first I wrote in the margins that, "Braiding Sweetgrass would disagree," but now I'm thinking about the story about Kimmerer cleaning out her pond even though she knew that every step potentially harmed all kinds of creatures. In the story, she does find a somewhat similar moral reasoning for this, so I will have to continue to think on this one. Might not be as cut-and-dry as my gut reaction said. "'You're trying to... you're trying to destroy me.'" (pg. 219) I like the moments where she takes a beat to rephrase a lot. Almost always leads to a devastating blow. See you in Lila Part III!

Just Connor

SHIT this is so good. the dividing of the dynamic and static and then the further divide into the 4 layers kinda just made me so happy. i’m definitely enjoying this more than zmm and not cause it’s necessarily better, but i feel i can understand more and part of that is my reading comprehension going way up recently. i love all the object-subject slander and every time i read another chapter i get very excited.

Suzanna Buck

Also not terribly germane but why the old Nyack photo? Got a jolt opening the email as I'm sitting in Upper Nyack (my hometown) right now!

Adison

ooooh some good stuff happening here in part two. i want to start with some little nuggets. “The picture looked so real you wanted to stick your finger in it and feel how warm the water was.” (chapter 10) “The water looked angry at having been forced to change its path.” (chapter 11) “Outside it had gotten dark. They walked under some street lights along the street up a hill. Some people walked by and didn’t look up.” (chapter 14) “There was so much light from the city there weren’t any stars at all. It was just all orange and black. Like Halloween.” (chapter 14) “I don’t know, the Captain said. He doesn’t seem like the sort of person who would have had a childhood… But I suppose he must have.” (chapte 14) “Suddenly she remembered the chocolate pudding never got made.She would probably never get to eat it, she thought.” (chapter 14) i think these little moments really drag you back to reality, especially when they break up the intense metaphysical discussions. they feel so tangible. i really enjoyed the second half of this section. it made all of this metaphysical stuff suddenly feel so human. i sometimes find it hard to connect theory to feeling, especially when the physical experience of philosophy is often left out of the discussion, but the way that lila drags phaedrus back down to earth? you start to feel it. “It startled him for a moment. She was real, after all. All this theoretical thought about this advanced metaphysical abstraction called Lila, and here, before him, was what it was all about. Her hair was combed and a cardigan sweater covered all but the O-V of her T-shirt. “I feel a little better now, she said.” (chapter 13) “The secret of life. I was working hard on that. You should have stuck to dancing, Lila said. That’s the secret of life.” (chapter 14) i think part of the reason phaedrus finds lila compelling is because she makes him feel things, even if it’s begrudgingly. it seems like phaedrus understands the importance of romantic quality intellectually, yet has no idea how to actually feel or cultivate it. on the other hand, lila seems to be ruled by her emotions and it allows her to tap into this dynamic quality he’s so fascinated by. instead of analyzing the world, she’s actively interacting with it. as he spends time with her, it seems that phaedrus is actually starting to feel the world around him, and i find this progress so compelling. in his initial breakdown of morals, there is no distinct place for love or emotion, almost as if the experience of morals is irrelevant in understanding them, but when lila’s cells connect with his, the emotions seem to find their way in anyways. this seems to disprove his earlier point that it is always better to serve a higher moral purpose. if he had listened to his social or intellectual values over his biological ones, he would not have had such a profound moment of human connection. and i love how he allows cells and atoms a kind of romantic agency. it feels so spiritual and beautiful and yet so logical. it’s like the emotional, primal values are being carved up with love instead of disdain. “We has invaded and the strange patterns of Quality that existed before We arrived. These cells make sweat and snot and phlegm. They belch and bleed and fuck and fart and piss and shit and vomit and squeeze out more bodies just like themselves all covered with blood and placental slime that grow and squeeze out more bodies, on and on. We, the software reality, finds these hardware facts so distressing that it covers them with euphemisms and clothes and toilets and medical secrecy. But what We is covering up is pure quality for the cells. The cells have gotten to their advanced state of evolution through all this fucking and farting and pissing and shitting. That’s quality! Particularly the sexual functions. From the cells' point of view sex is pure Dynamic Quality, the highest Good of all.” (chapter 15) “That’s the way it always is. The intelligence of the mind can’t think of any reason to live, but it goes on anyway because the intelligence of the cells can’t think of any reason to die.” (chapter 15) “That was the only good thing that had happened all day, the way their bodies paid no attention to all their social and intellectual differences and had gone on in as if these people that owned them didn’t exist at all. They had been at this business of life for so long.” (chapter 15)

Natthew Lee

Wow! Who knew that my second comment from the Part I post would be so on the nose. I feel like a lot of my rambling about pulling Quality from entropy was my trying to grasp at Dynamic Quality without being given the vocab to describe it yet. When I was reading ZMM parts of it reminded me a lot of Jordan Peterson, in how the narrative voice is written and also in the subject matter. Did a Google and sure enough, he’s recommended the book many times. The Static vs. Dynamic Quality dichotomy I think maps well onto his Order vs. Chaos shit. Both are necessary in the correct balance to have a Quality society and life. Chaos prevents too much order from seizing up and becoming a tyrannical bureaucracy, order prevents an excess of chaos from becoming unmoored anarchy. It’s a very liberal/enlightenment way of looking at politics too, Conservatives keep the status quo intact because too much change could collapse everything we’ve built, Liberals fight for change when necessary or else unjust structures atrophy and are no longer suited to changing times: through debate they find a compromise. Peterson would say this dichotomy also maps onto “traditional marriage”, with the “Masculine Order” and “Feminine Chaos” doing this societal dance on the household scale. (“To cling to Dynamic Quality alone apart from any static patterns is to cling to chaos” (139)) I can definitely see this in the way Phædrus and Lila are written, with her being emotional, Dynamic, Feminine Chaos to an unhealthy extreme, and him being logical, Static, Masculine Order to an unhealthy extreme. BPD gf x Autistic bf: the Platonic extreme of Jordan Peterson’s perfect hetero household. “American Indians are exceptionally skilled at holding to the ever-changing center of things.” (138) What does this mean?? Does this mean their culture understands Dynamic Quality in Inorganic, Organic, Social, and Intellectual spheres and understands the world and the conflicts between them, holding them all on the same level? This being opposed to “white”/”Western” society that tries to override or erase Organic values for Social and Social values for Intellectual? That’s the best I can parse it. Both Classical and Romantic Quality have Dynamic and Static Quality inside them for how they progress, I’m sure of this, but doesn’t it feel like Classical Quality has more Static Quality inside of it? Mechanical manuals are very Static, no? But the whole groping at infinite hypotheses that Phædrus did in the first book feels like nothing but Dynamic Quality, though its surely Classical, right?. Too tired to try mapping the Classical/Romantic and Static/Dynamic onto each other. Gives me a big headache. “That’s the theme song of the twentieth century. Is society going to dominate intellect or is intellect going to dominate society? And if society winds, what’s going to be left of intellect? And if intellect wins what’s going to be left of society?” (189) Seems to me like intellect emerged the undeniable victor of this battle out of the 20th century. Churches as social hubs are disappearing, people being increasingly atomized, lonely, seems like society is being overwritten by intellect in just the way he worried. “Just as a society that weakens its people’s physical health endangers its own stability, so does an intellectual pattern that weakens and destroys the health of its social base also endanger its own stability” (190) Also makes sense to me. I’mm thinking of political polarization and people having their own sense of reality from algorithmic echo chambers. This can only be possible when societal connection is deprioritized in favor of the intellectual. Not sure about this thought but I think it feels right. “‘Lévi-Strauss postulates that a culture can only be understood by reenacting its thought processes with the debris of its interaction with other cultures. Does this make sense? I’d like to record the debris of your own memory and try to reconstruct things with it.’ She wished he had a frying thermometer.” ^^ Funniest shit I’ve ever read. This guy is galaxy brain trying to explain his batshit metaphysics to Lila and all she wants is to make french fries. She is in a complete other mode of thought from him. Her head can’t go up her own ass she’s too busy with potatos. God I love Lila so much. “You should have stuck to dancing, that’s the secret of life” I LOVE HER!! The sex scene was gross. How he kept referring to Lila’s body as “it”, a thing he was fucking. Is it supposed to be him keeping that level of detachment on purpose, so he doesn’t have to get to know her and face that he’s connecting to another person, like in a Marvel movie protagonist, “I’m too smart and snarky to get attached to a woman until she gets through my hard outer shell and softens me up”, kind of way? Trying to rationalize the plot purpose of the misogyny lol. In general Phædrus’ actions with Lila feel way more cruel and shitty to me than they did with Chris in the first book. I wonder if it feels that way because we’re getting her POV in this book, but we didn’t from Chris? Or if it’s because she argues back at him, while Chris had to take it and never really said how miserable he was until the end. Probably its both. I think the Cellular values vs. Mental values battling section is a wonderful, beautiful way to describe the id vs. the superego. Never seen a metaphysics articulate unbearable horniness taking over your mind so well. The passage about your cells not wanting your body to die when you self-harm I also thought was very nice. Makes me think of the quote I put in this comment a few paragraphs before: “Just as a society that weakens its people’s physical health endangers its own stability, so does an intellectual pattern that weakens and destroys the health of its social base also endanger its own stability” (190) If a society weakens its people’s physical health, then it dangers its stability. But if the people are healthy, they will do everything they can to keep the society stable. If a person weakens its cells’ inorganic composition, then it endangers the homeostasis of the person. But if the cells are healthy, they will do everything they can to keep the person alive. It’s the same shit on different scales. Maybe the guys that made Osmosis Jones were on to something………. Structurally I’m still hating the HUGE chunks of philosophy followed by HUGE chunks of prose. It sucks. Sometimes the philosophy really dragged here. I miss ZMM’s structure so much. It was so nice, in that book it felt like the story and philosophy were two tracks on a song supporting each other in tone and content. Here it feels like we learn philosophy, then apply it in the story. Feels more like we’re flipping between two books than we are reading one book. Okay that’s all of my thoughts!!! xoxo Natthew

31 Dogs

In defense of this hierarchy, he could just be describing a system of how organisms evolved to perceive and communicate quality in a way that will be accepted; a hierarchy of cultural immunity thresholds. Based. But he makes no distinction so I'm not sure if he's saying that a deterministic empirical solution doesn't exist or if it simply doesn't matter. The undefinability aspect leaves on a note of, "it's anyone's guess because everyone knows." If the work can be misinterpreted at all, then it ultimately seems like not the best format for expressing quality. It's brilliant, and the scope is so huge that attempting to define it at all risks collapsing possible answers into a wrong answer, which seems to be his point about the undefinability of quality. My point of contention is that I don't think that it's undefinable, just extremely difficult to reduce effectively. He leaves out methodology for, paraphrasing his words, a system for finding the system for finding the guy who can fix a pipe. The Buddha's methodology for finding the methodology took up about 2000 pages so that's understandable. But to not provide or direct to method at all is what I think carries potential for harm. Jordan Peterson has distinct and severe cognitive deficits that make his interpretation of quality much more divisive and crappy. With this author I can only find one possible deficit. So he's definitely much closer to the Buddha than he is to Peterson. Far more "savior than degenerate." Which I was not expecting and I'm really glad I read it because I collect profiles of this pattern of person and legit ones are really hard to find. I usually guestimate a few in a thousand chance someone will be this much "savior". The one deficit I do see likely relates to schizophrenia but also involves his being discovered at an early age, which likely afforded him enough privilege to avoid glycogen deprivation. To try to explain, there are insights from Vipassana and foulness meditation that seem to be missing here. Those insights can accidentally be found through things like severe physical disability, chronic pain and starvation (which cause glycogen deprivation), and they allow someone to incorporate physics into their mental simulation of reality (metaphysical insight.) Schizophrenia interfers with such perception because it forces heavy reliance on that mental simulation, and, not so coincidentally, causes an increase in glycogen levels. So his metaphysical cognition was on point, allowing him to understand quality. His biochemistry knowledge IS effectively incorporated into his metaphorical understanding of quality, which I think allowed him to deduce the barriers to communicating quality into the above hierarchy of cultural immunity thresholds. But lack of chronic glycogen deprivation, gravitation toward writing and philosophy moreso than physics seem to suggest too much lack of immunity, if that makes sense. That can happen when someone has too much isolation, which is why Buddhist monks beg from and work with the people every single day. Lack of cultural immunity has the opposite problem as too much, causing the characteristic vagueness and lack of methodology. The only thing I think he lacks compared to the Buddha himself is incorporation of physics, which I think he would've done if he had pursued the sciences as much as philosophy. To be fair, he may not have heard of the arrow of time, but even so I've seen a very similar man from before his time recognize these things who had a much deeper background in electrochemistry and physics. Time goes both ways for instance and it's our perception that makes it appear linear. That's why any such hierarchy is limited to human perception. Inorganic matter evolves from us as much as we do from it, and that nonlinear relationship, and the cyclic nature of that linear order he does describe, is not made clear.

Beck

One thing that keeps coming up for me is how difficult it is to give the "elevator pitch" for these ideas. I read this book and it's like BAM ZING POW holy SHIT, then I turn around and try to explain to my friend what is blowing my mind and it's like... hmmmmm. Well you see the world is composed of VALUES.... and they're like ? ok? Maybe it's just that I myself don't have enough of a grasp on the real meat of it to sufficiently reduce it to plain language... but I want to start to get there. So I really liked your rundown of the four levels of static pattern. I think a piece I really want to fit in here is the elevator pitch--the EXACT description--of the difference between the Metaphysics of Quality and subject-object metaphysics. Because I feel like I get it, but when I try to reduce it down, I really struggle. Interestingly in Googling a little bit before writing this, I found a website that tries to do exactly that [describing the difference between s-o and MOQ], and I think it illustrates the problem here: http://www.goodmetaphysics.com/moq/ Because, even having read these books, I struggle when I read this website! Lol. I don't quite see the full picture. And if I were a newcomer, I would think, "where is all this coming from?" Without the natural progression, the introduction of this idea of "Dynamic Quality" comes out of nowhere; then to break it down into inorganic, biological, social, and intellectual; it all just seems so arbitrary. If I had to try and summarize it right now I would say it like this: Subject-object metaphysics could be better described as "substance metaphysics." Everything in the world is derived from substance--the material stuff of the universe: atoms, electrons, etc. (See, e.g., page 173: "...in a substance-dominated metaphysics where everything has to be an extension of matter.") Substance exists FIRST, and we learn about substance by interacting with it or experiencing it; we are "subjects" who interact with "objects," and while our "subjective" experience can color things in certain ways, there is also an "objective" reality we are trying to discover. Problems exist in substance metaphysics: There's a lot of discussion about how much of the world is "subject" and how much is "object"; what are the properties of objects? What is the worth of subjectivity? And there are holes in this theory and things that FEEL wrong. If everything is really just substance, how can we have free will? Are we really just atoms bashing against each other, ruled by ruthless cause-and-effect? Why does life exist at all if it has no purpose, when it has to fight against the laws of nature? Why do the basic building blocks of reality sometimes NOT follow the "laws" of nature? Why are so many things that are vital to our lives--like ideals, thoughts, and feelings--not composed of "substance?" Does this mean they don't exist--they are just mass hallucinations? These are serious problems that have haunted us for many years. The Metaphysics of Quality essentially states that Values CREATE Reality. (see, e.g., 164: "what [substance-centered evolutionists] were unintentionally showing was a superb example of how values create reality.") But this is a DIFFICULT elevator pitch. What does that MEAN? Reality just exists, right? How could "values" possibly CREATE it. I wonder if it's better to say that values SHAPE reality. Reality is not merely atoms moving around and following pre-prescribed arbitrary "laws" of substance. Instead, things have certain values that define what they do. If something is more valuable than another thing, it is more likely to occur. Life is more valuable than death... being able to walk on land is more valuable than not being able to walk on land... this maps onto evolution and explains change. On a more personal level, it defines the way we think, feel, and act. We don't act on the basis of our atoms; we aren't a matter of cause and effect. We are a conglomeration of overlapping values, all competing with each other for supremacy, but with a distinct hierarchy that has taken shape over time. We eat food because we value staying alive. But we might decline to eat certain food, even if we're hungry, because we value certain tastes or health benefits over others. And we go see a movie because we value entertainment. But we will be more entertained by a movie with social and intellectual patterns of quality than a bad movie. And we hug our moms because we value love and security and physical touch and family relationships, but also because we value HER, not just ANY mom, and the value doesn't... exactly CREATE mom except for the fact that if your mom didn't VALUE 1) biologically extending the human race and 2) having the social connection of family, you wouldn't exist, right? and if she didn't 3) value keeping you around and feeding you and staying in touch with you, you wouldn't know who she was at all, right? and if she didn't 4) value the physical sensation of a hug, you wouldn't be hugging, right? so in a sense value did CREATE the hug between you and your mom. because without value it never would have happened, for a billion reasons. and even though it feels like walking backwards to say that value creates reality, it also feels like walking backwards to say that your atoms forced you to hug your mom, and the warm fuzzy feeling you got from doing it isn't real, but rather is also just some particular atoms going crazy for... some reason. no. that hug had value to you... obviously! because if it didn't... it probably wouldn't have happened!! Hmmmmm. Is this right??? Is this Persuasive to anyone who hasn't read these books? That's what I'm trying to get at here. Because talking about all the interactions between static patterns of quality IS extremely interesting and I could definitely just wax away on that for a long time, as Pirsig does (and I'm not saying that's a bad thing). But as I get deeper and deeper into this I'm still craving the elevator pitch. Would be interested to hear how other people would attempt this

Beck

Oh one more thing that's more specific to this section. I really valued the metaphor of "software vs. hardware" when describing the independence and interaction between the static patterns of quality. A novel is not a word processor which is not the circuits in the computer. But it IS the parallel operation of all three of these things that allows me to read a novel on my computer. "Certainly the novel cannot exist on the computer without a parallel pattern of voltages to support it. But that does not mean that the novel is an expression of property of those voltages... It can reside in the brain of a programmer, but even here it is neither composed of this brain nor possessed by it." page 175. "Trying to explain social moral patterns in terms of inorganic chemistry patterns is like trying to explain the plot of a word-processor novel in terms of the computer's electronics. You can't do it. You can see how the circuits make the novel possible, but they do not provide a plot for the novel. The novel is its own set of patterns." 175. So all of these static patterns exist independently of each other; they have different operating systems. But they still interact in order to create something that cannot exist purely on the intellectual, social, or biological level, but is in some sense a coordination between all three. But a function of primarily one or the other. This is a really useful metaphor to me. And Dynamic Quality is the act of someone writing the novel!

annie liz

Aight it was a good run while it lasted, but with this Part 2 I’m back from “damn I feel kinda smart I think I get this” to “aaaaa comprehension small very small Big Concepts Small Bran.” It’s almost a relief in a way; it loosens my own expectations of myself. That being said, not fully understanding a thing never stopped me from thinking about it, nor does it stop me from talking about it to an absurd degree! “But he realized that sooner or later he was going to have to stop carping about how bad subject-object metaphysics was and say something positive for a change.” (p. 107) The consistently gentle (or not-so-gentle) ribbing of ZMM’s Phædrus by the narrator in Lila is something that makes me laugh. It feels like a nod to the reader, probably acknowledging some frequent frustrations and/or criticisms from ZMM. It also feels, in a way, like a challenge response. Like “oh, you don’t think I can argue my case in the common ground of philosophical debate because you say I need to define my terms? Well, to respond to that, I’m going to instead define *an entirely new set of metaphysics upon which our philosophical argument is based, it’s better than yours and also covers more. get bitched*” “If you're going to talk about Quality at all you have to be ready to answer someone like Rigel. You have to have a readymade Metaphysics of Quality that you can snap at him like some catechism. Phædrus didn't have a Catechism of Quality and that's why he got hit.” (p. 108) see, I disagree with this to some extent because I don’t think these debates need to be––or even should be–– won or lost with snappy comebacks or easy answers. Part of the value (sorry) of ZMM, and especially the process for ME of reading it with the book club, was the long-form process of building the argument and storytelling of Quality UP to a finishing/evolving point. I had issues or questions that I got to think hard about while I was reading it, and many of them got answered or were rendered non-useful after I stuck with it. Set questions and answers are helpful to have, but I don’t think they would have been successful in changing Rigel’s mind. The PROCESS, the longform understanding and listening, was what brought me understanding in ZMM; not a Platonic argument in which Phædrus was always on the defense. But at the same time, I understand Rigel really, really well. He saw Phædrus as a man that didn’t want to be challenged, saw him as a person that would try to USE drawn-out conversation as a strategy to avoid criticism instead of a tool to understanding. Rigel, at that point, wanted to make sure he got his frustrations and prepared arguments out AT Phædrus. His goal, and the root of his frustrations, was that he wanted to ultimately feel like HE was being heard. I think that was the fundamental issue Rigel had with Phædrus, one that a lot of people have had; he doesn’t feel heard or recognized as a person–a person representing many other people–with feelings and identities that might not align with ZMM’s thesis by Phædrus. Idk what my point really is here… their conversation has just really stuck with me. I’m literally only 2 pages into chapter 9. “Trying to create a perfect metaphysics is like trying to create a perfect chess strategy, one that will win every time. You can't do it.” (p. 108) mmm good simile. This imagery helps me. “But the fact that Quality was the best way of uniting the two was no guarantee that the reverse was true—that the classic-romantic split was the best way of dividing Quality. It wasn’t.” (p. 109) Bold move! I like it. “He was a precursor of deep cultural change. A tribe can change its values only person by person and someone has to be first. Whoever is first obviously is going to be in conflict with everybody else. He didn't have to change his ways to conform to the culture only because the culture was changing its ways to conform to him. And that is what made him seem like such a leader… He was an integral PART of Zuñi culture… He was an active catalytic agent in that tribe's social evolution, and his personal conflicts were a part of that tribe's cultural growth.” (p. 114-15) Oh phenomenal writing here. I feel like we could apply this descriptor to quite a few major folks in history. Jesus popped up first in my mind, but the list grows farrr beyond that Describing DQ as the “pre-intellectual cutting edge of reality” is excellent. Not outside of intellect, not necessarily separate from it, just BEFORE it. Very time based. Furthermore, describing SQ “always contains a component of memory” adds to that. I love this. “He does not think, "This stove is hot," and then make a rational decision to get off. A "dim perception of he knows not what" gets him off Dynamically. Later he generates static patterns of thought to explain the situation.” (p. 116) SHIT this reminds me of that Brennan Lee Mulligan conversation on ideologies and justifications, personality predating ideology, talking about how it means that “before you were a fascist, you were a bully and an asshole.” Very Kahneman’s System 1 and System 2 thinking, Greene’s automatic/manual mode etc. etc. Lots of overlapping between psychology and philosophy. I have to say, the most universal experience I think I’ve read of Persig’s yet is “listen to the same song over and over again until you’ve squeezed every single ounce of serotonin out of it, and subsequently get vivid flashbacks to the exact time you loved it that much when you listen to it in the future.” Do yall have a song like that right now? Mine is probably hold the girl by rina sawayama (an artist everyone should listen to) and the visitors by abba I remember when I first read ZMM i started trying to notice the “why” when I did things, experiencing daily life. Why did I do one thing instead of the other? Well, one was higher Quality. Why were some things higher Quality for me rather than others? Etc Etc. This chapter opens a second door from that point, allowing inquiry into static or dynamic quality experiences. In WHAT WAY do I like this thing? What makes it better or DIFFERENT than something else I like? It’s getting me deeper into my own head, in a good way. The final few pages of chapter 9, understanding why SQ and DQ are so vital to each other and to the very existence of Experience was excellent, and really fleshed out the growth from the old classical/romantic structure from ZMM. So uhhh I liked chapter 9. Like other comments above, I do miss the cohesion of philosophy and storytelling that ZMM brought versus Lila’s hard story, hard philosophy. I think it’s because the description of the story in ZMM always directly applied itself to the subject in ZMM. The narrator’s observations of the world around him would connect with his points, and it felt like a seamless combination of internal and external examination. The two made something bigger in the overarching narrative. Here, while I enjoy the story (and really enjoyed Lila’s perspective), it feels a little more abrupt. Chapter 11 is hard. Couple moments of *narrows eyes in a “that sounds weird but I don’t know enough about evolution/gravity/laws of the universe to disagree” way,* but i understand what he’s trying to say. I think. I’m very grateful for the summary of the 4 tiers of static quality from CJ; I decided to read that part of the post before I read the chapters, and it helped me navigate the winding and sometimes-confusing road of metaphysics Pirsig lays out. “There's always this feeling that this sadness is the real truth about things and it's better to live with a sad truth than with all the happy progress talk you get up here in the North.” (p. 174) This.. is abrasive to my brain. I find the idea “sad truth” and “cold harsh reality” rhetorics to be quite frustrating because they tend to portray pessimism as the “more realistic,” “smarter” way to look at life, which I wholeheartedly disagree with. seeing the world through a grimdark lens isn’t any less blinding than living in rose-colored glasses, and I wish I understood why it was so popular among academic/sophisticated types. I'm not saying Pirsig is necessarily promoting it here, but it definitely seems to be a pattern. “You're sort of another culture," he said. "A culture of one. A culture is an evolved static pattern of quality capable of Dynamic change. That's what you are. That's the best definition of you that's ever been invented.” (p. 177) Bro. Yikes. Every now and again I take a step back just to marvel at what Pirsig is truly trying to do here. My guy is creating and synthesizing a fundamentally shifted way to observe and participate in the universe, and it’s all in a book that got “do a little daaaannce” stuck in my head a week ago (it’s still there). It’s wild.