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Ok so this essay was super long and dense—I’d hazard a guess that it’s the most difficult text of the three we’re reading by a good margin—so I wanted to give some context and summarized points to help structure our discussion around.

For a bit of context, this particular essay was published in 1955 in conversation with the ideas of Rudolf Carnap and other logical positivists that were dominant in the 20s/30s. Carnap argued that science should be differentiated from metaphysics on the basis of its meaningfulness: scientific statements must be empirically verifiable or definitionally true, otherwise they’re meaningless metaphysical nonsense.

Popper argues that this demarcation criteria is both too narrow (it doesn’t account for abstract concepts like fields or forces, which are clearly scientific) and too wide (it doesn’t exclude some metaphysics, like ‘rational theology’). He also pushes back on the general attempt to demarcate science on the basis of language, and insists instead on a basis of methodology. 

Then we get Popper’s main idea as an alternative: testability (read: falsifiability) is a better demarcation criteria than meaningfulness. This lets him contend that metaphysical statements can still be meaningful, they’re just not scientific. To tie back to our reading of Against Method, he also emphasizes that metaphysical ideas can be useful to science (e.g., atomism was a metaphysical theory before it was a scientific one), but unlike Feyerabend, Popper contends that this doesn’t bring them into the category of scientific statements.

~~~~~

To be honest, the first couple of sections had me wondering if it was worthwhile to read this essay, but the last few parts actually fleshed out my understanding of Popper’s case for falsifiability and gave me some thoughts about what I said in my last video on falsifiability. Here are a few of them: 

In subsection 2, the paragraph beginning with “Another argument is the following” directly addresses the point of whether SETI is science or not via the (non)-falsifiability of existence statements. I got a ton of comments saying something like “the statement ‘aliens DON'T exist’ is falsifiable and that’s why SETI is science”, but he argues here that universal existential statements (e.g., ‘aliens exist’, as opposed to ‘theres an alien in my house’) are categorically unfalsifiable. So I feel a little vindicated here.

Another comment I got a lot of was basically saying, falsifiability demarcates statements and not all scientific activities, and I think I kind of knew that, but I was trying to engage with the idea in the way I’ve seen it used and not adhering strictly to the original philosophical discussion. He pretty directly makes a point that refutes my first two examples in the video (systematic explorations of space/parameter space as scientific activities) with his description of “basic statements” in section 4a, but honestly I still kinda think that this is a shortcoming of his demarcation criteria, especially given that he’s interested in describing science in terms of its methods rather than its language. Like, yeah, testable ideas can come from anywhere, but that doesn’t preclude a scientific method to the generation of ideas. However, given the context of trying to argue against Carnap’s meaningfulness criteria, I guess I can see where he’s coming from.

I mentioned briefly in the video’s introduction that Popper used psychoanalysis and marxism as examples of theories that fall outside of science because of their un-falsifiabilty, but it was really interesting to see how he actually talked about psychology in relation to the demarcation problem in this essay. It almost seems like philosophers at the time were starting from the premise that physics was definitely science, and other things are science insofar as they are similar to physics, so for psychology to be scientific it should be able to predict people’s position r(x, y, t). I’m curious what Popper thought about sciences like biology given his emphasis on physicalistic universal laws.

A final thought, not related to any specific point I made—I was really struck by the line “If I may speak personally, the book (which came out a few months before my Logic of Scientific Discovery, and which I read while my book was in the press) marks the beginning of a revolution in my own philosophical thinking”. It feels trivial to say that of course people’s thoughts evolve, but also, this makes me question any characterization of Popper (or any thinker, really)’s stances. So much of what people reference of his came from Logic of Scientific Discovery, and the fact that he had a revolution of thought before it even came out makes me doubt all of it and want to read everything he wrote in order to see where he actually ended up. I’m not going to do that of course, but I do think it makes me want to be more mindful of representing people based on a particular moment of their thought–especially as someone who’s experiencing my own evolution of thought while publishing my ideas.

okayyyy that was more than I expected to write, but hopefully this helps start the discussion for what I anticipate is the least accessible of the essays we're planning to read. Excited to hear your thoughts!

Comments

phil e the theyby

Woof, this was a TOUGH read. The last section felt like a rap battle were Popper was trying to take apart Carnap's career (while ending with "for real we're BFFs though"). That said, I'm incredibly glad I read it, for the following reasons: 1) It really places Popper's ideas in historical context. While I haven't read the logical positivists he cites and critiques here (maybe they sound a lot better when you actually read them), it feels like he completely takes apart their arguments and shows how ineffective their ideas about science are, while providing helpful alternative views that also place more value in "non-scientific" thought. From reading this, you can see why Popper is so impactful, because he goes a LONG way in developing a more useful view of scientific thought than the predecessors he's in conversation with. In alignment with Dr. Fatima's point, I think it's valuable to see his ideas as developing in a specific time and place, and that he changes or develops those ideas further over the course of his life. I don't think he'd object to us critiquing him or developing new and different perspectives. I know I want people 50 years younger than me to have built on and further developed the views I have now, so that my current beliefs seem quaint, outdated, or problematic. I imagine Popper would feel similarly. 2) Popper personalizes his ideas a lot, making it clear when he's stating something is HIS belief/perspective, versus when he thinks something is plainly apparent and widely recognized. While we might disagree on some of the things he places in the latter category, it's honestly a refreshing writing style (especially for the time in writing about science) to see that he acknowledges he is speaking from a human perspective. One thing that stood out to me is how much of the essay dealt with ideas of different types of truth, and the use/value of different ideas or belief systems. This all made me very curious about if Popper was aware of or had engaged with American pragmatist philosophy at all. It significantly predates him (William James, one of the most influential figures in the movement, died in 1910), and it posits us looking at truth less from an objective angle or from pure subjectivity ("everyone has their own personal truth"), but in terms of the actual empirical consequences of something being true or not. It had me thinking a lot about what the actual real-world consequences of our demarcation. I'm not sure if Popper was unaware of pragmatism, or if he was aware of it but just disagreed with it (which is certainly his right), but it stood out to me because it's a school of philosophy that feels directly relevant to what he's doing, but that he doesn't appear to be influenced by at all. These were all big-picture, more thematic reactions than specific ones (I only sometimes followed what he was saying, especially when he was refuting specific arguments), but sometimes that's just how it goes with reactions. On to the next one!

Reading Point

I took philo of science, and ethjcs at Deion's 🦶🏼🏈 CU. The solipsist-supremacist vs journalist mystery of writing historical science equations is easily solved by translating pairs of 1+1 words between 1+1 sister-body-sides from Kinyarwanda (using antigenocidal intelligence (AGI): "stop genocide" = "will now" where pointing the futire in general, thermodynamic (vague) context, specifying Cantor's 1+1 first-person, diagoal=sister (antigenocidal infinities) photonic arguments: triplet = Pi expand inaginaitons; π extend care: Π resist the Sun's Earth's gravity: 0Pi =√-1 ≠ -1 ≠ 1Pi1π1Π "proton field" where triplet N = (spiral N x 24) - (25=5x5) where pointing out "ten protons" = H2O≠CH4 = 👋🏼+👋🏼≠👋🏼👋🏼👋🏼👋🏼👋🏼 94239 42394 23942 39423 94239≠-1≠🚦left Navier-Stokes equation (in writing between 🧠🥈🧠) ✌🏽

AJ Biffl

Woof, yeah this one was dense. I'm sure it makes a lot more sense if you're familiar with Carnap and the rest of the science-philosophy pantheon of the time, but even still I think it was cool to see how Popper's thinking relates to (his presentation of) his contemporaries (also appreciate the recap). I don't have a lot to say about (what I think is) his point as a whole, beyond Feyerabend's criticisms (and points from the demarcation and pseudoscience videos), but there were a few granules I had thoughts about. ``| . . | ``| . . | ``| . . | ``| . . | ``| . . | ``| . . | `` I'm interested what other people think about the question of meaning-making in terms of different "languages" that Popper talked about. I tend to lean toward the physicalist side, that statements only have meaning when they express ideas about real, material things (though information about those things are filtered and maybe even wholly experienced through the mind's perception, so I'm not throwing out 'mental' things). But is it also possible to make "meaningful" statements about wholly constructed objects that have no basis in reality (i.e., most of math is constructed to reflect our world, but are the parts that are just completely out there)? What do other people think needs to be true for statements to be meaningful? ``| . . | ``| . . | ``| . . | ``| . . | ``| . . | ``| . . | `` It seemed to me like one of the major distinctions Popper drew with Carnap was the question of "proving" vs "disproving," and while I feel like I do agree with Popper that absolutely disproving a claim is more tenable than the opposite, I'm inclined to sit in the middle with the idea of provisionality, that claims are neither proven nor disproven absolutely. I think that's pretty much Popper's point about probabilities or 'confidence,' but I think I extend that to mean that any and all provisional statements are just as valid as completely "untestable" ones, being essentially just as uncertain, and there's no real need to distinguish between them. Popper himself said there will be a spectrum of testability "with degrees." He says, "There will be well-testable theories, hardly testable theories, and non-testable theories" (257). So where exactly on the "testable" spectrum does something stop being science? And I feel like the answer to that has a lot more to do with why you want to draw a line around science in the first place, what you want to exclude and why, then about anything fundamental about what types of questions are getting asked (this related to office hours question I asked after the demarcation video 👀) ``| . . | ``| . . | ``| . . | ``| . . | ``| . . | ``| . . | `` Did love the bit about how "remember that most of our scientific theories originate in myths" (257) ``| . . | ``| . . | ``| . . | ``| . . | ``| . . | ``| . . | `` I also have beef with his math formulas and notation. If anyone is able to make sense of the equation for C(x,y) on pg 288, let me know. A few pages later he contradicts himself with the definitions for p(x,y) on 289 and 290. I think the first is the conditional probability p(x|y) and the other is the joint probability p(x&y). Those may be typesetting errors with the online version, but using several different versions of p(x,y) I still can't make sense of C(x,y). He sorta acknowledges that it's a made-up form that has the behaviors he wants it to, and the exact version doesn't matter (there's another, slightly different version of the formula in this paper: https://fitelson.org/confirmation/popper_1954.pdf ).

riin

Intrusive thought all weekend: Karl Popper’s Penguins

Jacques Vincelette

As today’s hustle culture reduces science to ‘Technologically Entertaining Design’ (TED) I was inspired by the idea of research beyond tuxedos and tophats. High profitability cannot be the only aim of science. “high probability can not be one of the aims in science. For the scientist is most interested in theories with a high content.”[Chapter 11, section 6, p.286] “we both, I trust, belong to the fraternity of rationalists - the fraternity of those who are eager to argue, and to learn from one another.”[Ch 11, s6, p292] How quaint to end on Cupid’s barbed arrows, in hope that the point will stick.

Ryan Messina

I have really tried to engage with Popper’s ideas on their own terms, as he would have intended. However, coming from an engineering and systems science background, I initially struggled to situate his arguments within the context of logical positivism. Popper’s essay aims to tackle the demarcation between science and pseudo-science, motivated by a concern against dogmatism and authoritarianism. He evaluates several criteria for verification, confirmability, and testability but ultimately argues that falsifiability is the most robust. Unlike the other approaches, falsifiability allows for criticism of the meaningfulness of statements, supports the use of induction in scientific reasoning, and accommodates multiple languages and interpretations providing a flexible yet rigorous standard for scientific inquiry. So, a few things stood out to me to rant on below. 1. The importance of language: In linguistics, not only syntax and semantics but also pragmatics are important. Semantic meanings depend on context, and language is always adaptable, evolving to convey the most meaning in a given situation. Within linguistic knowledge, there is a well known trade-off between assimilation and alienation: those 'inside' a community can use shorter, more efficient semantic representations, while those 'outside' face higher communication costs. This idea connects to epistemic injustice, specifically hermeneutical injustice. For example, in a specialized knowledge system like physics, there may be no existing language to describe a new concept. Explaining the idea requires lengthy contextualization, which can make it easier for others to dismiss the work, even if it is genuinely valuable. 2. The role of power in science is not neutral: Just as language shapes who can participate in knowledge, power shapes whose voices are recognized and whose ideas are dismissed. Judith Butler’s work on gender shows that identity is performative, it’s about what gender does, not what it is. Applied to science, the question is not ‘what is science?’ but ‘how does it function?’ If science is defined by falsifiability, it is not inherently ‘good’ and should not carry moral weight—but in practice, it does. Patterns of science as used by power structures today include: -Science is used to dismiss or ignore voices that are deemed ‘non-scientific.’ -Complexity is leveraged to dismiss ideas perceived as too difficult to understand. These patterns create a narrow filter through which power operates. Only those in positions of authority can effectively challenge or interpret scientific claims, making certain ideas effectively unfalsifiable except by those in power. This illustrates how reductionism, deeply rooted in colonial histories, continues to shape which narratives get told. Reflecting on this, I find that earlier works, such as Singer Jr.’s 1959 "Experience and Reflection", edited by Churchman West, provide a more balanced perspective on the philosophy of science, I swear I am not bias ;) 3. What does this actually mean, like what is Karl afraid of?: If pseudo-science were absorbed into science, the authority of science would be weakened and its standards blurred, risking unfalsifiable claims and devaluing science. Popper’s answer falsifiability seeks to guard against this, yet his framing often feels elitist and detached from social realities. In practice no matter how rigorous the criteria for science, culture and power decide which ideas gain traction, which are dismissed, and whose voices are heard, proving as the saying goes that “culture eats strategy for breakfast”. TLDR: Popper’s argument carries a subtle tension: what seems epistemic also has moral weight. This raises the question of who decides what counts as ‘good.’ I see the issue as one of trust and culture rather than logic and strategy. Without trust, those affected by a decision must have a way to challenge it; falsifiability cannot rely on science alone. Extending Popper to today, if you cannot trust a system or its processes and have no means to contest them, its claims are meaningless. In this sense, Popper nudges us toward a systems perspective rather than focusing solely on the individual.

Jacques Vincelette

Wandering twilight between science and metaphysics, penguins highlight how karma stacks to catch up. [The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym, Poe 1838] [Mountains of Madness, Lovecraft 1936] [Poppers Penguins, Atwaters 1938]

Not a Lady Maria, She-Bear of the Global South

Guys, I could not read together this time. I have until September 8th to submit my dissertation to the qualifying comittee, and that is (ou should be) taking all of my time. Just want to share that reading comments here as I procrastinate my undone work is really nice. Hope to come back to reading together soon.

AJ Biffl

Good luck on your dissertation!

Nathaniel Bookout

Hi all, I participated in the Feyerabend book club last year (and a few others) and then sorta checked out for a bit. But I really wanted to jump back in when I saw we were reading Popper. I just finally got through the whole thing, sorry for the late response. A few of my cursory thoughts: Popper's discussion about formulating a purely scientific language just makes me think of AI chatbots and how modern tech bros are convinced that genius AGI is solving physics problems no one else can (or are having AI psychosis along those lines). I couldn't help getting "colonialism" vibes as someone else mentioned. The names Hobbes and Berkeley just make me think of that, when he talks about “asserting that words purporting to denote unobservable entities cannot have any meaning” (Note 12 on pg. 258). I really can't help but feel like that's what Popper is really referring to, when he repeatedly mentions how fixated they are on proving that metaphysics is meaningless, while the individual experiences of (white) men can be scientifically universalized as truth. Whether he knows it or not, it sounds like he's criticizing colonialist science. I found Popper's three levels of "well-testable", "hardly testable", and "non-testable", and his whole idea of confirmation, a really useful concept. I think that, combined with Feyerabend's counterinduction, "more content" and "less probable" would contribute a lot towards designing more interesting and useful hypotheses. Assuming, of course, we lived in a society that funded that kind of shit. I especially like the idea for the purposes of scientific communication--I feel like, in the world of popular science, most things people hear about are in the "hardly testable" category. Which is fine. The difficulty is in communicating the nuance to people in the difference between what those "hardly testable" scientific "truths" really mean, relative to the actual "well-tested" results. The thing about biological rules, or biological laws, is they’re usually very high in content. Which would make them just as bad for Carnup’s system as physical laws, according to Popper. Such as Allen’s Rule which “states that the body shapes and proportions of endotherms vary by climatic temperature by either minimizing exposed surface area to minimize heat loss in cold climates or maximizing exposed surface area to maximize heat loss in hot climates”, or Bergman’s Rule which ”states that within a broadly distributed taxonomic clade, populations and species of larger size are found in colder environments, and species of smaller size are found in warmer regions. It applies with exceptions to many mammals and birds." (From Wikipedia) They’re also usually really specific, just derived from particular patterns biologists observed (or think they observed) about natural evolution or the derivation of life. I think that biological laws are inherently problematic in the biological community for this reason, and are regularly being challenged. But that actually kinda resembles what Popper is advocating for as the correct use for laws, as components to more testable hypotheses (if I’m understanding him correctly).

Donald A. Fowler

I think that falsifiability seems to me to be a game of mental gymnastics rather than something that seems actually useful. It mostly seems to create a game where you state something fairly clearly but then to follow the Popper rules you just remix the words more confusingly so that it fits. As if you have a Popper in your mind arguing against writing more reasonably and more understandably in exchange for a word salad all the while he says “Ah-ah-ahh … you have to play by my special rules!” In biology, I’m a biologist, and I have been close to many taxonomists. They ascribe organisms to species and try to organize and create a common language for people who want to study these organisms further. Taxonomists create a language so that two people who have never met can work with the same organism and confidently know that they are working with the same thing. I would say that the test of whether taxonomy is a science and whether their work is good science is the degree to which other people can use these descriptions and come to the same conclusion (i.e. identification). Having talked to plenty of taxonomists, some don’t think they are testing a hypothesis or certainly have not put their work into the terms of refuting a sentence. They are simply identifying a specimen to a particular species and if it doesn’t work out that way then they probably have a new species. You can put this activity in terms of Popperian refutation, or not (and many don’t), you can put it into the terms of hypothesis testing, or not (and many don’t), and those biologists will still be going on their way doing SCIENCE in any reasonable way other than in Popper’s mind. That is because the act of positively describing things, not giving a list of refutations of which this specimen is not, is the really important contribution they are making. I think that positive descriptions are really valuable and central to what science is. Especially for biology, which relies on descriptions all the time. A similar approach is required by astronomy as well. I know that Popper isn’t really trying to describe science, as much as demarcating it from supposedly pseudo-science, and his idea even has a fairly independent axis of ‘interestingness’ on top of the gradations of demarcation. But I think this goes to show how petty and small the whole Popperian exercise becomes. The focus on physics and its mathematical ties is a popular bias for many empirical studies. What it also does is make Popper’s thinking simpler, which I find somewhat damning. Shortcuts like this are evidence to me of an entitled and lazy mind. If physics is the main focus and narrowed down through pretension, then you don’t have to think too hard, or worry too much, about the various ways that reality is approached in different fields of science. The focus on sentences as the unit of science I find is further evidence of a condescending and hypocritical attitude to much of science. To him, science can be thought through in sentences, when his own ideas need paragraphs and sections to be fleshed out. Plenty of things in science, including the evolutionary biology I study, require paragraphs and sections to explain what they wish to convey. And the philosophical/logical analysis of sentences seems to be put in such a straitjacket that the sentences that come out seem tortured for their meaning. It never seems to occur to him to consult a linguist about things such as the creation of meaning in real sentences written by scientists. On the point of his own work, what is less empirical than an idea that is so particular to one man’s thought that he can’t convey it well enough for others to understand? In the end he complains that others misunderstand him in the very text he is trying to tell us something that we are supposed to understand in turn. I know that this is somewhat the format of this style of work, but it doesn’t inspire much confidence in this reader that what I understand will actually be the same thing as what Popper would later claim he says. This is a failure of empiricism which I believe should be at the heart of any description of science, or most scholarly work anyways. Popper seems to come at this problem as if scientists are crying out of ignorance to understand a supposed morass of what is science and what is not, and just to tell us there are degrees of testability, and a range of interestingness. When scientists already have discussions within their own field of degrees of testability, what constitutes verification or refutation, and what is so untestable or unobservable as to constitute near fiction-like speculation. I think that getting a list together of how different fields have this debate and seeing how well they cohere, or not, would be a far more productive start to figuring out what is science and what is not. After reading this, I’m having a hard time avoiding the conclusion that this philosophy is what happens when someone with an arrogant and entitled mind’s shortened appetite for history, linguistics, and sociology, comes to problem and clumsily offers to exchange an existing gradients and degrees of ‘science’ within its various fields with their own gradients and degrees which are just as clumsy, if not more, and tell us its progress. I don’t have an all encompassing description of science, but I think that the best starting point to understand science, what it is, and what it isn’t, is through starting with a concept of a shared reality, with an emphasis on its social nature. I think that defining science requires a curiosity and study of what the society of science says and produces. It is a similar approach in Dr. Fatima’s video, where her criticisms start with a ‘Science is, as science does’ approach with the example of SETI.

Djoran Keil

Welp, that hurt my brain. I mean, I love philosophy but whenever it gets into logic it all becomes a is c when b is a then c is b and I'm like, "Please let me die now." Also, isn't a universal language of science just... math? Imma go lie down now.

AJ Biffl

I'm interested in hearing more about your ideas about reconciling Popper's standards for testability and Feyerabend's counterinduction! From what I gathered from AM, I'd thought counterinduction was one of the points where Feyerabend anticipated (or maybe already heard) disagreement from Popper, and that he (Feyerabend) specifically proposed pursuing things that would fail Popper's standards for rational pursuit (also thinking about the discussion in AM Appendix 1 about choosing papers to read or proposals to fund)

Ryan Messina

I like your description of mental gymnastics, its how I felt when reading it and also I think the conclusion you are avoiding is valid. The strong conclusions that were drawn come from such small places. I think Karls understanding of biology was very limited. I am not going to say I know much about it, but I didn’t think he genuinely showed curiosity for it. I think this is an interesting tension that is shown. On a different text in a similar time period 1969 Ludiwig von Bertalanffy was a biologist that wrote the first systems science book called “general systems theory” and it broke down a lot of the artificial barriers that science sets up and tried to replace the way science was communicated in terms of flows, it was unsuccessful in its aim but it had a lot of cool ideas for the time which sparked a lot of work and is still credited in ISO 15288 “System life cycle processes” as the initial spark that made it happen.

Christopher Garcia

I'm late to this but I will say I did have to like stop and think about what I just read a lot during this cause I'm not used to such scientific language lol. But I think I get it for the most part. I thought it was interesting reading the specifics of disproving broad statements and thought back to discussions around gender. The way people are so insistent to categorize it strictly despite how made up and contradictive it is. I just felt a similar sense of frustration reading through his examples and reasoning, one that understood where the misconceptions come from but also didn't excuse the short sighted nature of them. I probably had more thoughts on the matter a week ago but they're locked away in my brain at the moment and I can't find the key.

Nathaniel Bookout

Yeah, I'm really curious about this as well, which is why I'm interested in reading more of Popper, but I can't say I entirely have an answer for you as of yet. I get the feeling, though, that it's something along the lines of what Dr. Fatima alluded to: that Feyerabend would take certain metaphysical statements as both useful to science *and* scientific, while Popper would be careful to say that something that is useful to science may still not be necessarily scientific.

Nathaniel Bookout

I think you did a great job at articulating something I felt but couldn't exactly put words to about how Popper relates to biology. And the feeling I get thinking about Popper and biology is similar in some ways to thinking about the science of biology, today (versus the "science" of biology as it's imagined by politicians, today). There's an epistemology beneath Popper's ideas, I think, that assumes we can have some sort of relationship with the truth, through language; and more importantly, that our relationship to the truth is the same as our relationship to reality. I think maybe there's something there in his assumption that every scientific hypothesis can be generated in exactly the same way: as a high-content, verifiable sentence. When, as you pointed out, not all science is necessarily constructed around testing hypotheses like that. But some of the most important advances in biology especially (Joan Roughgarden's work, and other biologists who have investigated beyond the gender binary, for instance) have demonstrated how important it is to critically look at our use of language, and what assumptions we might be making in our language that are "coloring" the truth we think we know (which is demonstrably different from reality, as in the case of the many organisms that do not express on a gender binary). I don't think that the biases you mention are necessarily inherent to Popper himself, though, but seem more related to the overall cultural context he was writing from at the time (at least, from how I understand the analytic philosophers). But I think he was expressing something worthwhile even if from a very limited point of view: the idea that the goal of the destruction of metaphysics is inherently useless, and unscientific. I see that same goal, the goal of the analytics, everywhere I look in society today: with AI, with capitalist science, with education, everywhere. We're now living in a world that thinks it's convinced of the truth and has no need for reality, metaphysical or scientific. And I think that's what Popper and Feyerabend were both warning against.