"Conjecture and Refutations", Essay 11: The Demarcation Between Science and Metaphysics (Patreon)
Content
Ok so this essay was super long and dense—I’d hazard a guess that it’s the most difficult text of the three we’re reading by a good margin—so I wanted to give some context and summarized points to help structure our discussion around.
For a bit of context, this particular essay was published in 1955 in conversation with the ideas of Rudolf Carnap and other logical positivists that were dominant in the 20s/30s. Carnap argued that science should be differentiated from metaphysics on the basis of its meaningfulness: scientific statements must be empirically verifiable or definitionally true, otherwise they’re meaningless metaphysical nonsense.
Popper argues that this demarcation criteria is both too narrow (it doesn’t account for abstract concepts like fields or forces, which are clearly scientific) and too wide (it doesn’t exclude some metaphysics, like ‘rational theology’). He also pushes back on the general attempt to demarcate science on the basis of language, and insists instead on a basis of methodology.
Then we get Popper’s main idea as an alternative: testability (read: falsifiability) is a better demarcation criteria than meaningfulness. This lets him contend that metaphysical statements can still be meaningful, they’re just not scientific. To tie back to our reading of Against Method, he also emphasizes that metaphysical ideas can be useful to science (e.g., atomism was a metaphysical theory before it was a scientific one), but unlike Feyerabend, Popper contends that this doesn’t bring them into the category of scientific statements.
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To be honest, the first couple of sections had me wondering if it was worthwhile to read this essay, but the last few parts actually fleshed out my understanding of Popper’s case for falsifiability and gave me some thoughts about what I said in my last video on falsifiability. Here are a few of them:
In subsection 2, the paragraph beginning with “Another argument is the following” directly addresses the point of whether SETI is science or not via the (non)-falsifiability of existence statements. I got a ton of comments saying something like “the statement ‘aliens DON'T exist’ is falsifiable and that’s why SETI is science”, but he argues here that universal existential statements (e.g., ‘aliens exist’, as opposed to ‘theres an alien in my house’) are categorically unfalsifiable. So I feel a little vindicated here.
Another comment I got a lot of was basically saying, falsifiability demarcates statements and not all scientific activities, and I think I kind of knew that, but I was trying to engage with the idea in the way I’ve seen it used and not adhering strictly to the original philosophical discussion. He pretty directly makes a point that refutes my first two examples in the video (systematic explorations of space/parameter space as scientific activities) with his description of “basic statements” in section 4a, but honestly I still kinda think that this is a shortcoming of his demarcation criteria, especially given that he’s interested in describing science in terms of its methods rather than its language. Like, yeah, testable ideas can come from anywhere, but that doesn’t preclude a scientific method to the generation of ideas. However, given the context of trying to argue against Carnap’s meaningfulness criteria, I guess I can see where he’s coming from.
I mentioned briefly in the video’s introduction that Popper used psychoanalysis and marxism as examples of theories that fall outside of science because of their un-falsifiabilty, but it was really interesting to see how he actually talked about psychology in relation to the demarcation problem in this essay. It almost seems like philosophers at the time were starting from the premise that physics was definitely science, and other things are science insofar as they are similar to physics, so for psychology to be scientific it should be able to predict people’s position r(x, y, t). I’m curious what Popper thought about sciences like biology given his emphasis on physicalistic universal laws.
A final thought, not related to any specific point I made—I was really struck by the line “If I may speak personally, the book (which came out a few months before my Logic of Scientific Discovery, and which I read while my book was in the press) marks the beginning of a revolution in my own philosophical thinking”. It feels trivial to say that of course people’s thoughts evolve, but also, this makes me question any characterization of Popper (or any thinker, really)’s stances. So much of what people reference of his came from Logic of Scientific Discovery, and the fact that he had a revolution of thought before it even came out makes me doubt all of it and want to read everything he wrote in order to see where he actually ended up. I’m not going to do that of course, but I do think it makes me want to be more mindful of representing people based on a particular moment of their thought–especially as someone who’s experiencing my own evolution of thought while publishing my ideas.
okayyyy that was more than I expected to write, but hopefully this helps start the discussion for what I anticipate is the least accessible of the essays we're planning to read. Excited to hear your thoughts!